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A ... firm-centred perspective will ... enable  
an approach to institutional change that is  
more dynamic” (Jackson and Deeg, 2008:  
541-542). 
 
Abstract. 
In regarding corporate social responsibility (CSR), this thesis has moved beyond the 
stakeholder theory of the firm and adopted the evolutionary theory of the firm, together 
with recognising the link between corporate governance and CSR. This thesis has 
considered the historical development of the essential principles of corporate 
governance (embraced within the concept of CSR) of a Multinational Corporation 
(MNC), namely British Petroleum (BP), and assessed the transfer of these evolved 
principles for promoting development in Africa. To effectively apply evolutionary 
theory, one must also recognise that firms are part of a co-evolutionary process. Recent 
academic contributions by co-evolutionary theorists have paid attention to MNCs as 
change agents at the sector level. However, this thesis has taken this further and 
considered BP attempting to engage in institutional co-evolution where a MNC acts as a 
change agent to the wider institutional regime to promote development. Cantwell et al 
(2010) suggested that MNCs can have a significant influence upon the institutional 
regime, and presented a framework for firm-level adaptation by MNCs influencing the 
wider institutional environment in the host countries where they operate. They 
developed a co-evolutionary framework linking historical changes in the character of 
MNC activities to changes in the institutional environment, focusing upon the scope for 
firm-level creativity and institutional entrepreneurship leading to successful institutional 
co-evolution. Therefore, this thesis has followed on from this and investigated whether 
BP can be an agent for change in Africa, using the example of Angola to highlight the 
process.  
A comparison was made with the new entrants into the market, China, to judge 
whether this influences BP’s ability to engage in institutional co-evolution. In addition, 
a comparative study of mining giant Anglo American was engaged in to highlight the 
appropriateness of BP’s CSR principles to the African setting. The thesis found that BP 
cannot successfully engage in institutional co-evolution because of an ineffective 
transparency initiative, whilst Chinese involvement has further diminished the ability to 
ii 
 
transfer sound corporate governance and CSR principles, particularly because Chinese 
resource-seeking investment comes with ‘no conditions attached’ concerning 
governance in host countries. In addition, the competitive nature of securing licences to 
operate forces oil MNCs to use their CSR packages strategically, and furthermore, the 
social consequences of environmental degradation due to oil sector operations means 
that local communities cannot sustain their livelihoods, which is a lesson that has not 
been learnt from historical evolution.      
 
Keywords: institutional co-evolution, corporate governance, corporate social 
responsibility, strategic choice, path dependence.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction.  
1.1: The nature of the inquiry. 
The nature of the inquiry in this thesis is, essentially, to discover whether the emergence  
over time of the business principles of BP can provide insights into their corporate  
social responsibility (CSR) package that has evolved which is being implemented today  
in the oil sector in Angola and in African oil-producing countries in general. This is in  
order to answer the research question, which is whether the competition for Africa’s  
natural resources between Chinese firms (as the new entrants into the market) and  
Western firms (focusing upon BP) has negative implications for the governance climate  
in the region. Assuming that good governance is necessary for economic development 
(Wilkin, 2011: 61), one must consider the objective and subjective nature of this 
question. The objective function defines the problem (Fonseca and Fleming, 1996: 585). 
In this context, it is the developmental needs of Africa. Economists tend to ascribe well-
being to such objective measures (McBride, 2001: 253), and the subjective element is 
what these firms should be doing to promote good governance, and in turn, economic 
development which should enhance the well-being of the people of Africa.  
Blowfield and Frynas (2005: 504, 506-507) feel that despite the wide 
interpretations and uses of CSR,
1
 the current research agenda fails to tackle key 
questions because this agenda remains surprisingly narrow. For example, as they argue, 
in business schools much CSR research focuses upon limited issues related to the 
stakeholder theory of the firm,
2
 and as a result, vital questions are not being asked. 
Blowfield and Frynas call for more profound questions related to the role of CSR in 
international development because we know very little about the impact of CSR 
initiatives in developing countries, and what we do know raises questions about the 
efficiency of CSR approaches. Therefore, relating to the nature of this inquiry, and to 
answer the research question, this thesis has attempted to assess: 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 See section 4.8. 
 
2
 The inappropriateness of the stakeholder theory of the firm will be discussed in section 2.6. 
1. whether a major international oil corporation (BP) has learnt how to 
embrace the CSR agenda from long-term experience of engaging in operations 
in developing countries, 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This introductory chapter will outline in which chapters these aims and objectives were  
considered, but to begin with, the context for this inquiry will be discussed.  
1.2: A new ‘scramble’ for Africa. 
Africa is often perceived as the loser in the globalisation process.
3
 However, the oil 
sector in the region is currently the exception to this perceived economic insignificance 
of Africa. Today, oil is one of the world’s most vital strategic resources, and African oil 
reserves are increasingly being tapped by multi-national corporations (MNCs) because 
of growing global demand, suggesting that the continent is experiencing a ‘new 
scramble’ (Frynas and Paulo, 2007: 229-230). Indeed, Klare and Volman (2006: 297) 
highlight that this new scramble for Africa is due to the fact that the continent ‘is the 
final frontier as far as the world’s supplies of energy are concerned’, meaning that this 
new scramble is ‘becoming just as intense - if not even more so - than the former’. 
Nevertheless, terming this phenomenon as a new scramble does not accurately describe 
what is currently happening for two reasons.  
Firstly, the original scramble for Africa was a very different process, in which, 
during the 1880s and 1890s, European colonial powers including Belgium, Britain, 
                                                 
3
 For example, Strange (1998: 116) stressed that the important economic interests in Africa are not greatly 
affected by the process of globalisation. 
 
2. what CSR principles are applicable to the African setting,     
3. de jure convergence to the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance 
(China) versus actual adherence to a version of the Anglo-Saxon model of 
corporate governance (the UK), 
4. whether major international oil corporations can positively influence the 
institutional environment in the host countries where they operate,  
5. whether China’s attempts to engage in resource-seeking foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is more likely to be successful in gaining licences to operate 
than the attempts of the West to engage in resource-seeking FDI,   
6. how or if Chinese resource-seeking FDI is influencing the way that the 
West transfers CSR principles,  
7. whether CSR is used merely as a strategic tool in order to receive licences 
to operate.  
 
3 
 
France, and Germany turned African territories into colonies. This followed the formal 
partition of the continent at the Berlin Conference between 1884 and 1885, providing 
these powers with the legitimacy to govern these African colonies economically, 
militarily, and politically under their spheres of control. Therefore, access to oil was 
dictated by the colonial power that provided the capital, expertise, and technology to 
fuel the resulting oil boom.  
Secondly, the first real scramble for Africa’s oil began just prior to and after 
decolonisation. Algeria had been producing small amounts of oil from 1918, but began 
producing a significant output from their Edjeleh and Hassi Messaoud oil fields when 
they began operations in 1957. Also in 1957, the first tanker exporting oil from Gabon 
set sail, and in December, Nigeria embarked upon oil production. Between 1960 and 
1970 the continent’s oil output increased more than twenty times over, and later 
international events such as the Yom Kippur war
4 and the Iranian revolution,
5
 both of 
which threatened global oil supplies, were to set the stage for Africa’s increasing 
importance as an oil-producing region. 
Certain characteristics of these original scrambles are absent from the  
new scramble. Considering the scramble by European powers to establish colonies,  
there were clear spheres of control which do not exist today, and foreign investment was  
relatively insignificant both prior to the Berlin Conference in 1884 and during the  
immediate period afterwards. Contrastingly, the current expansion in the region’s oil  
sector is driven by foreign investment. Furthermore, Africans did not have a role to play  
in this original scramble because the process was dictated by European colonial powers.  
However, today African leaders do have a decision-making role. When considering the  
first scramble for Africa’s oil prior to and after decolonisation, the first oil-driven  
scramble was of greater significance in comparison with the current one.  
The first scramble for Africa’s oil led to major political, economic, and social 
transformations in oil-producing states, especially Nigeria. Nigeria produced 20,000 
barrels per day (b/d) in 1960. By 1973, this output had increased to over 2 million b/d. 
Currently Nigeria’s oil production is only slightly higher than the levels achieved in the 
                                                 
4
 The Yom Kippur war occurred in 1973 when Egypt and Syria made a surprise attack on Israel 
(Bronfeld, 2007: 465). 
 
5
 The Iranian revolution occurred in 1979 when religion engineered profound political change (Akhavi, 
1983: 195).   
4 
 
1970s. The contribution of the oil industry to Nigeria’s total government revenue 
increased between 1970 and 1974 from 26.3% to 82.1%, and compared with the deep 
transformations that took place in this period, the impact of the current scramble in 
countries such as Nigeria and Angola will be relatively insignificant (Frynas and Paulo, 
2007: 230, 232-235). Therefore, the fundamental question that this raises is why should 
the impact of today’s oil driven scramble in countries such as Nigeria and Angola be 
considered relatively insignificant?  
Lipumba (1994: 88) considered this question by asking whether African  
governments could establish developmental states that allocate resources and pursue  
policies that encourage investment in order to generate economic growth. This notion  
that good governance can spur economic growth is a framing assumption for a host of  
academic analyses (Kurtz and Schrank, 2007: 538), due to convincing evidence.
6
  
Therefore, good governance is essential for economically transforming Africa 
(Amoako, 2000: 155). Although real per capita income grew rapidly in the 1960s in 
much of Africa, it faltered through the 1970s to the early 1990s as the implications of 
the authoritarian rule which swept the continent in the 1960s and early 1970s took 
effect, namely political elites sacrificing the general interest to extract rents and retain 
power. However, the political landscape since 1990 has changed, with greater pluralism 
and democracy, and Africa has enjoyed a return to experiencing rapid growth after 1995 
as these changes took effect. Nevertheless, where civil conflict has persisted, this has 
not always been the case (Ndulu and O’Connell, 1999: 41), and rent-seeking behaviour 
in oil-producing states may continue the hamper development, which is part of the 
phenomenon known as the resource curse.
7
 Therefore, such previous studies have 
shaped the nature of this inquiry. If civil conflict and rent-seeking behaviour continue to 
have negative influences upon the governance climate in African oil-producing states, 
what can Western actors do to make a positive contribution to change this situation?    
                                                 
6
 For example, Hope (2005: 284) noted that ‘good governance, in all its facets, has been demonstrated to 
be positively correlated with the achievement of better growth rates, particularly through the building of 
institutions’, and the African Development Bank emphasises that ‘good governance is not only a worthy 
goal per se but also a prerequisite for sustainable development and poverty reduction in the longer term’ 
(Kabbaj, 2003: 7). 
 
7
 See sections 1.4 and 4.2-4.4. 
 
5 
 
1.3: Embed, cooperate, and act. 
The most immediate Western actors that can make a positive contribution to the  
governance climate in African oil-producing states are the oil MNCs that are engaged in  
operations there. Oil MNCs can adopt three strategies to contribute to peace, security,  
and economic development in the host countries where they operate, and these are  
embed, cooperate, and act. Adapted from Milton and Stoner (2008: 127), who suggested  
these strategies for moving towards environmental sustainability at the meso-level,  
firstly, oil MNCs should embed thinking into their corporate mentality. Whilst Milton  
and Stoner largely limited this to environmental sustainability thinking, this could be  
enlarged to embrace transparency and wider social issues into corporate decision- 
making. Secondly, there is cooperate, which in the context of this thesis means  
engaging with host country institutions. Finally, there is act, which involves going  
beyond pondering about whether such bold steps are possible, and actually engaging in  
activities that could contribute to peace and security.  
By adopting this idea, this thesis has firstly and importantly, considered whether 
oil MNCs embed thinking into their corporate mentality, using BP as the example. 
Corporate culture is a phenomenon that emerges over time, and consequently, the 
historical evolution of corporate culture highlights the ability to embed thinking. 
Embedding thinking can be assessed by a MNC’s ability to learn from past experiences, 
and an in-depth study of BP assessed this capacity to learn from experience. Secondly, 
BP’s ability to cooperate and act, two concepts that are linked, was assessed. This was 
investigated by considering BP’s ability to engage in institutional co-evolution.8 This 
follows on from the work of Cantwell et al (2010), who believed that recent academic 
contributions have paid attention to change processes, with MNCs as agents of change, 
but more particularly at the meso-level. This thesis will take this further and consider 
the MNC as a change agent to the wider institutional regime. It can then be seen what 
sort of approach BP, and the Chinese, adopt in engaging with the wider institutional 
regime.  
The first potential approach is that they could be firms that engage in 
institutional avoidance, where they take an external weak institutional environment as a 
                                                 
8
 See section 2.4. 
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given. When engaging in resource-seeking FDI, where alternative investment locations 
may be limited, firms may be willing to accept a weak institutional environment rather 
than adopting an exit strategy. The second potential approach is that they could be firms 
that engage in institutional adaptation, where they adjust their policies to better fit the 
environment. This may involve engaging in corrupt practices or implementing 
behaviour that is relevant to the host country context. The final potential approach is 
that they may be firms that engage in institutional co-evolution. Although firms may 
exhibit behaviour that is relevant to the host country context, like in the previous 
scenario, the intention is not to adapt. Rather, the intention is to be a change agent for 
the wider institutional regime. A firm could achieve this by transferring organisational 
routines and principles. In addition, institutional co-evolution may involve the firms 
influencing international standards. In CSR, firms can be proactive in this by endorsing 
global standards, such as the United Nation’s (UN) Global Compact (Cantwell et al, 
2010: 572, 574-577), and indeed, BP has joined the Global Compact (Frynas, 2009: 28).  
Therefore, this thesis makes a contribution to knowledge by assessing whether 
the attempts to transfer organisational principles by a MNC (BP) can be seen as 
institutional co-evolution. Cantwell et al proposed the framework for the firm as the 
agent for change, but following on from this idea this thesis has actually investigated the 
concept. Like other scholars who have engaged in a co-evolutionary approach, an 
analysis that is contextual, historical, and multidisciplinary was adopted. Furthermore, 
co-evolutionary insights have scarcely been previously applied to corporate governance 
and CSR,
9
 despite the fact that business strategies for CSR can be seen as a co-
evolutionary process. Of particular importance here, in terms of BP being successful in 
attempting to transfer their organisational principles to influence the wider institutional 
regime in the host countries where they operate, is the impact of the new entrants into 
the market, namely Chinese national oil companies (NOCs). New entrants into a 
marketplace always alter the ‘rules of the game’ and, according to Alden (2007: 8), 
nothing has captured the world’s imagination as much as China’s growing presence in 
Africa. However, an appropriate host country to represent the case study had to found 
that grasped the phenomenon under investigation, the choice of which will now be 
considered.   
                                                 
9
 See section 2.3.  
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1.4: Choosing Angola. 
To highlight the problem of attempting to establish a developmental state in African oil- 
producing countries, Angola was chosen as the case study. As Chapter 7 will outline,  
Angola suffers from rent-seeking behaviour
10
 and a poor institutional environment,  
together with emerging from the influence of a long civil war. Angola was also chosen  
not only because BP has operations in the country, but in order to fully consider the  
influence of the new entrants into the market, China. In this context, Angola becomes a  
significant case because the country is now China’s largest source of oil on the African  
continent. Although Western oil MNCs retain the largest stakes and the majority of the 
operational rights in Angolan oil fields (including BP, ChevronTexaco, ExxonMobil, 
and Total), Chinese NOCs have gained a significant foothold in Angola.
11
 Therefore, 
China’s presence in Angola presents a fascinating case study of new entrants into a  
market and China’s growing reach globally.  
Statistics highlight why Angola represents a fascinating case study. China was 
second behind only the USA in 2009 in terms of oil exports by destination. China 
received 29% of Angola’s oil exports in that year (with the USA only receiving 2% 
more).
12
 Angola is now ahead of Nigeria in terms of oil production
13
 making the 
country the largest producer of oil in Africa, and the seventh largest oil producer 
amongst the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) members, an 
organisation the country joined in 2007 (Energy Information Administration, 2010: 2). 
Therefore, relations with China as the new entrants into the market are of great 
importance to Angola, despite the continuing large presence of Western oil MNCs, 
including BP.  
 
                                                 
10
 Rent-seeking behaviour is when each short-run opportunity for rent, or in this context the transfer of 
wealth, displaces the long-run opportunity for the creation of social value which will be equal to or 
greater than the long-run rent payoff. It will be greater in cases where the investment alternative cannot 
capture the full social gain (Corcoran, 2001: 22). Essentially therefore, rent-seeking behaviour is when 
resources are wasted, and in many cases of rent-seeking behaviour the activity results in negative social 
value. Under such circumstances, one not only has the waste of rent-seeking, but also the social 
consequences imposed by the rent-seeking (Tullock, 2001: 5, 11). 
 
11
 See Box 1.1. 
 
12
 See Figure 1.1. 
 
13
 See Figure 1.2. 
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1.5: Structure of the thesis. 
To address the phenomenon under investigation, this thesis has been structured into four  
parts. Part 1 outlines the co-evolutionary theoretical framework (in Chapter 2) and the  
methodology adopted for this thesis (in Chapter 3), namely a case study approach which  
calls for qualitative interviews to procure an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon.  
Part 2 utilises the Western concept of CSR to firstly, link the resource curse with the 
CSR agenda (together with linking the two concepts of corporate governance and CSR); 
secondly, make the business case for an international oil firm’s business principles; and 
 
 Shallow Water Block 3/80.  
Sinopec sought to gain production rights in this area in 2004. Sinopec’s bid 
included a US$2 billion credit line from China Ex-Im Bank, and 
subsequently, Sonangol decided in favour of Sinopec and did not extend 
the license of Total, who previously operated there. 
 Deepwater Block 14.  
Also in 2004, Sonangol and Sinopec established a joint venture, Sonangol 
Sinopec International Ltd, in which they cooperate on oil production and 
refinement. The activity of this joint venture also extends to Blocks 15, 17, 
and 18. 
 Deepwater Blocks 15, 17, and 18.  
Sinopec and CNOOC gained exploration and production rights in these 
blocks, in cooperation with Sonangol and Western oil MNCs. 
 Deepwater Block 18.  
Sinopec currently owns a 50% stake in this area, with the other 50% owned 
by BP. Sinopec purchased their stake for US$2.46 billion in March 2010. 
 Ultra-Deepwater Block 32.  
CNOOC and Sinopec purchased a 20% stake in this area for US$1.3 billion 
in 2009.  
Box 1.1: The Chinese Presence and Activity in Angolan Oil Blocks, as of the 
25
th
 May, 2011 (Zhao, 2011). 
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thirdly, assess CSR in the Western extractive industry sector in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 
then explores the history of BP’s implementation of their business principles. The aim 
of this chapter is to begin assessing whether BP has learnt from experience and can 
contribute to peace and economic growth in a developing country by addressing the 
social and environmental consequences of their operations,
14
 which is embraced within 
the concept of CSR. Whether BP has evolved a governance structure to embrace CSR 
issues will be explored, together with utilising their reporting mechanisms (and those of 
other selected Western oil MNCs, where appropriate) to assess the evolution of their 
CSR agenda. This chapter then makes a study of Anglo American’s business principles. 
Although they are not an oil firm but a mining firm, this is to assess the applicability of 
BP’s CSR principles to the African setting15 since Anglo American is a firm with a long 
history of engaging in operations in the region.
16
  
 Chapter 6 considers the new entrants into the market, China, by looking at the 
wider corporate governance agenda. The general purpose of this chapter to establish 
how the Chinese will behave when they invest overseas. It will be considered whether 
China is likely to converge to or diverge from a similar corporate governance system as  
BP,
17
 and whether the Chinese NOCs are likely to enter the market as a distinct entity 
which provides a new competitive dynamic that BP has to deal with, in terms of 
impacting BP’s ability to be an agent for change. Important in this is the role of the 
Chinese state and their continuing ownership of the major oil firms. Chapter 6 also 
explores the history of Chinese corporate governance in order to discover whether these 
new entrants have learning capabilities which may impact their ability to engage in 
resource-seeking FDI. In particular, their ability in embracing Western practices will be 
assessed both historically, and today by utilising the reporting mechanisms of CNOOC 
and Sinopec (the two Chinese NOCs engaged in Angola). Both Chapter 5 and Chapter 
6, especially together with Chapter 8 later, assesses whether China’s attempts to engage 
                                                 
14
 Aim 1 in Section 1.1. 
 
15
 Aim 2 in Section 1.1. 
 
16
 Anglo American’s long history dates back to their founding in 1917, based in South Africa, to 
capitalise on a region that exploded on to the global mining scene. Anglo American believes that their 
strong South African heritage forms the roots for their global business (Anglo American, 2011a). 
 
17
 Aim 3 in Section 1.1. 
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in resource-seeking FDI is more likely to be successful in gaining licences to operate 
than the attempts of the West to engage in resource-seeking FDI.  
Having analysed the actors that are engaging in operations in Angola, namely 
BP and the new entrants (China), attention will then turn to analysing their operations in 
Part 3, to answer the research question of whether the competition between Chinese 
firms and Western firms (focusing upon BP as the example) has negative implications 
for the governance climate in the region. Chapter 7 will outline the governance climate 
in Angola to highlight what international oil firms could do to make a positive influence 
to the institutional environment in African oil-producing states; whilst Chapter 8 
assesses the practical impact of BP’s attempts to act as an agent for change,18 together 
with the influence of other oil MNCs. In addition, this chapter discovers whether BP has 
learnt from their experience,
19
 and assesses whether CSR is used as a strategic tool in 
order to receive licences to operate.
20
 The influence of the new entrants into the market, 
China, will then be assessed in Chapter 9. This is in order to discover whether China has 
a contractual advantage over Western firms,
21
 and how or if Chinese resource-seeking 
FDI is influencing the way that BP transfers CSR principles.
22
  
In Part 4, Chapter 10 will summarise the general conclusions, assess the 
applicability of the co-evolutionary theoretical framework, acknowledge the limitations 
of the study, and make recommendations for future research. Therefore, this thesis will 
look at the actors first, in terms of making an historical analysis of their adaptive and 
learning capabilities and how they have evolved over time to influence how they enact 
their business principles today, before considering the influence of these evolved 
principles in addressing resource curse issues today in Africa.       
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Aim 4 in Section 1.1. 
 
19
 Aim 1 in Section 1.1. 
 
20
 Aim 7 in Section 1.1. 
 
21
 Aim 5 in Section 1.1. 
 
22
 Aim 6 in Section 1.1. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical framework for the study. 
2.1: Introduction. 
Hitt (2005: 371, 374) suggested that the most important theoretical perspectives for 
international business in the future would include evolutionary economics, resource 
dependence, and the behavioural theory of the firm; and within these perspectives, he 
highlights corporate governance as being particularly important. This chapter will 
discuss the adoption in this thesis of the co-evolutionary theory of the firm and 
highlights the fact that co-evolutionary insights have scarcely been applied to corporate 
governance and CSR, despite the fact that business strategies for CSR can be seen as a 
co-evolutionary process.  
This chapter will outline the evolutionary theory of the firm before recognising 
that to effectively apply evolutionary theory to corporate governance and CSR, one 
must recognise that firms are part of a co-evolutionary process. Co-evolution in the 
context of whether firms can engage in institutional co-evolution will be considered. Of 
particular importance here is the work of Cantwell et al (2010). This thesis grapples 
with the issues of the firm acting as change agent to the wider institutional regime. The 
work of Cantwell et al has recently introduced an institutional element to international 
business research. Rather than relying upon quantitative research, this framework 
enables a fresh agenda to be followed-up by actively adopting their proposed 
framework, which is what this thesis has done. This chapter will then establish that the 
conventional shareholding and especially stakeholding paradigms are inappropriate for 
the purpose of this thesis.  
2.2: The eclectic paradigm and the evolutionary theory of the firm. 
For almost three decades, the eclectic or Ownership, Location and Internalisation (OLI)  
paradigm has been a dominant analytical framework for testing the determinants of the  
overseas activities of MNCs. It states that the extent, location and composition of  
overseas activities engaged in by MNCs are determined by three interdependent  
variables. Firstly, there are the competitive advantages of the MNCs seeking to engage  
in outward FDI that are specific to their ownership (O) advantages. This relates to the  
fact that the greater the competitive advantages that a MNC has then the more likely  
they are to engage in outward FDI. Secondly, there are the locational (L) attractions of  
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host countries, which assert for example, that the more endowed that a country is with 
the resources that MNCs seek, then the more likely those firms will engage in 
operations there. Thirdly, there are the internalisation (I) advantages that state that if a 
MNC can benefit from internalising the costs of operations in a certain host country, 
then they are likely to engage in operations there directly rather than franchising 
activities to a foreign firm. I advantages that internalise the costs of operating in host 
countries acquire particular importance here. When one considers the specific O 
advantages that a firm might have, there can be static O advantages which are 
capabilities possessed at a given point in time, or dynamic O advantages which are 
capabilities that have developed over time. One of the key characteristics that have 
emerged in the last few decades is the increasing requirement for firms to possess 
dynamic O advantages when they have a desire to engage in outward FDI. This is 
because firms need to have an ability to sustain and/or to improve their advantages.  
Subsequently, the evolutionary theory of the firm acquires significance here 
because it pays lip service to the process or path by which specific O advantages evolve 
over time. The evolutionary theory of the firm is a dynamic theory that focuses upon the 
long-term strategies and learning capabilities of firms. In particular, it is necessary for a 
firm to have dynamic O advantages that have evolved over time if it possesses a desire 
to engage in resource-seeking FDI. The more efficient a firm is in managing these 
advantages, then the more likely they will be granted licences to operate in host 
countries (Dunning, 2001: 83-84, 88-89, 92). Indeed, as Box 2.3 shows, one of the 
relational concepts in the behavioural theory of the firm is organisational learning, and 
firms exhibit adaptive behaviour over time. Although firms utilise individual actors as 
instruments to engage in adaptive behaviour, it is possible to deal with adaptation at the 
aggregate level of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963: 123).    
Nelson and Winter (1982: 134) wrote that ‘firms may be expected to behave in  
the future according to the routines they have employed in the past’. Fundamentally,  
routines are the basis of the characterisation of behavioural continuity in their  
evolutionary theory. Furthermore, evolutionary models allow for bounded  
rationality, where actors are not assumed to have accurate foresight. Actors have a set of  
routines that determine their actions and they generally stick to them regardless. 
However, other evolutionary models treat actors as operating within a set of routines in 
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the short-run. In the long-run, they have mechanisms that enable them to improve 
routines or to learn about better ones over time as they gain experience (Nelson and 
Winter, 2002: 30, 39-40). The ability to learn in this context concerns how actors within 
the firm make sense of complex and changing environments and how they react 
accordingly (Dosi and Winter, 2000: 27).  
Critically therefore, if a firm wishes to engage in resource-seeking FDI, then it 
will benefit from possessing dynamic O advantages that have evolved over time through 
learning capabilities. A firm is more likely to receive and sustain licences to operate if 
they have long-term experience from which they have learnt. It is true that evolutionary 
theory in its earlier form focused mainly on the technological aspects of production. 
However, only by looking at the MNCs’ evolutionary history can it be seen whether 
firm actors adhere to corporate governance and CSR routines in the short-run, or 
whether firm actors improve or replace routines in the long-run as the firm evolves and 
adapts to change. The learning processes of MNCs is what will drive their evolution of 
organisational routines (Cantwell et al, 2010: 573).  
2.3: From evolution to co-evolution. 
To effectively apply evolutionary theory to corporate governance and CSR, one must  
recognise that the firms are part of a co-evolutionary process. The essence of co- 
evolution is the idea that what happens in each autonomous domain of a system shapes 
what is going to happen in the other ones. In this context, it is the interactions between 
the MNCs and socio/political institutions that matter. In other words, it is the 
relationship between MNCs and their institutional environment. The origins of 
corporate routines are intimately a co-evolutionary process, shaped by diverse and 
conflicting selection criteria, such as problem-solving versus corporate governance 
requirements. In essence, there is the problem of higher level changes, such as in the 
institutional set-ups or in the policy environment, impacting firm behaviour (Coriat and 
Dosi, 1995: 21, 23). Co-evolutionary research incorporates a number of approaches 
simultaneously: 
 Longitudinal time series of microstate adaptation events. 
 Organisation strategic adaptation in a historical context of the firm together with  
its environment.  
 Causalities between micro and macro co-evolution. 
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 Mutual, simultaneous, lagged, and nested effects. 
 Path dependence. 
 Changes in the institutional systems where firms and industries are located. 
 Economic, social, and political macro-variables which change and can influence  
over time (Lewin and Koza, 2001: vii). 
Two of these approaches require explanation because of their utilisation in subsequent 
chapters, namely strategic adaptation and path dependence.   
Strategic adaptation can analyse the character of the co-evolutionary dynamics 
of how firms adapt in a historical context. Strategic choice may be considered as a 
process: an adaptive learning cycle. Three key issues arise from strategic choice 
analysis, the nature of choice, the nature of the environment, and the nature of the  
relationship between agents and the environment. Firstly, the nature of choice involves   
‘action determinism’. This refers to the possibility that actors select their actions  
because of built-in preferences. Action determinism therefore, draws attention to the  
predetermined mind-sets of actors, and the relevance this has for the interpretative  
process. Secondly, the nature of the environment invokes the notion of the ‘strategic  
alliance’, where a group of firms within the same sector at the meso-level make 
strategic decisions that influence upstream and downstream perceptions and objectives.  
However, as outlined in the Introduction,
23
 Cantwell et al (2010) believed that  
recent academic contributions have paid attention only to MNCs as change agents at the  
meso-level. As this thesis follows on from this and considers one MNC as a change  
agent to the wider institutional regime, the notion of the ‘strategic alliance’ is  
inapplicable because this thesis is not concerned with an analysis of the strategic 
approach of a group of firms, but the approach of one firm. Thirdly, firms also interact 
within their environment. Organisations and environments both shape each other, and a 
relationship between agents and the environment can be achieved by ‘bridging’. By 
bridging, managers can attempt to manage the environment in which they operate by 
reciprocity, through negotiation, co-operation, and information exchange. The strategic 
choice perspective therefore, encourages a learning process, which invokes action via 
debate, negotiation, influence, and exercise of choice. It is an ongoing dynamic process: 
                                                 
23
 See section 1.3.  
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information > evaluation > learning > choice > action > outcome > feedback 
 
This process comprises two dynamic cycles. These are ‘inner structuration’, extending  
to the domain of organisational design, and ‘outer structuration’, extending to the  
environment (Child, 1997: 44, 48-50, 55, 59, 69-70). 
Path dependency arguments were initially only utilised to explain why firms 
stick with outdated technologies, but more recently they were increasingly being used in 
the analysis of institutions, and they are now widely adopted in the social sciences to 
explain institutional stability and change (Kang, 2006: 2-3). Pierson (2000: 74-78) 
defines a path dependent process as one that is characterised by self-reinforcing 
sequences of events. Path dependence involves three phases. Firstly, there is the critical 
juncture where events trigger a move towards a particular path. Secondly, there is the 
period of reproduction where positive feedback mechanisms reinforce the movement 
along that path. It is not only single institutions that are subject to positive feedback 
effects.  Complementary institutions are also influenced where the performance of one 
is affected by the existence of others. Thirdly, the path comes to an end when new 
events dislodge the established way of doing things. Therefore, every path begins and 
ends with a critical juncture, also known as punctuated equilibrium. Mahoney (2000: 
507, 516-518) takes this point a stage further, by stressing that path dependence 
specifically characterises historical sequences where contingent events set into motion 
patterns or chains of events that have deterministic properties. Therefore, Mahoney 
specifies more clearly the early events in a historical sequence, and that these events 
must be contingent in that they cannot be explained by previous events. However, 
Mahoney believes that these mechanisms of reproduction have little relevance outside 
the market place and consequently, introduces other mechanisms, such as the 
application of power by actors to preserve a given institutional path.   
 The evolution of, for example, bureaucratic organisations has been receiving  
more and more attention over the last few decades. However, only a handful of studies  
have attempted to analyse the character of the co-evolutionary dynamics of how firms  
adapt over time. Nevertheless, potentially, a co-evolutionary framework by unifying  
theory and empirical research, can integrate micro and macro-level evolution, which can  
lead to ‘new insights, new theories, new empirical methods, and new understanding’  
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(Lewin and Koza, 2001: v-vi).  
Despite the potential of the co-evolutionary framework, its utilisation has been 
limited. Co-evolution has been used to understand the abilities firms have to absorb new 
knowledge. Van den Bosch et al (1999: 551) considered the role that co-evolution plays 
in understanding the absorptive capacity that a firm has for assimilating new 
knowledge, particularly the ability of a firm to combine new knowledge within its 
existing organisational form. Helfat and Raubitschek (2000: 961) used the concept of 
co-evolution to explain how organisations build and utilise knowledge and capabilities 
over long time spans, in order to gain competitive advantages in single and multiple 
product markets. In addition, co-evolution has been used to explain the formation of 
networks and alliances. Koza and Lewin (1999: 638) used co-evolution to explore the 
stimulus for the formation of a professional service network in the public accounting 
industry. Rosenkopf and Schleicher (2008: 426-427) examined how formal alliances co-
evolve within emergent, informal inter-organisational relationships in the wireless 
telecommunications industry. Indeed, co-evolution has been widely applied to 
information technology. Mitleton-Kelly and Papaefthimiou (2000: 164-165) looked at 
the co-evolution of the business process and information systems development as two 
domains, and considers how the degree of interaction between the two domains affects 
the rate of co-evolution between the two domains. Morrison et al (2007: 261) 
considered that businesses and their supporting software evolve to embrace constant 
revision, and adopted the term co-evolution to describe the concept of business and 
software evolving in tandem, but at potentially different rates. Therefore, co-
evolutionary insights have scarcely been applied to corporate governance and CSR, and 
certainly not to the ability of MNCs to transfer their business principles.  
However, Ashley (2010: 7) proposes that business strategies for CSR can be  
seen as a co-evolutionary process that is shaped by social, political, and institutional  
aspects through interactions between business, civil society, and the state; either at  
local, national, or global levels. This proposition can aid the understanding of the  
variety of perspectives for policies on CSR in an international context. Indeed, the  
MNCs of today are faced with greater institutional tensions than firms that operate  
solely within one country. This is because MNCs engage in activities across a wide  
variety of institutional environments. Consequently, MNCs have a greater stimulus to  
20 
 
engage in institutional entrepreneurship.
24
 Furthermore, most of today’s MNCs are 
structured as integrated networks containing autonomous subsidiaries. Such an 
ownership structure promotes incentives for MNCs to invest in transferring innovations, 
such as new routines, that are developed by subsidiaries together with transferring those 
innovations developed by the corporate parent. Therefore, when MNCs engage in 
institutional entrepreneurship they have an incentive to invest in developing new 
institutions within the firm.  
One specific O advantage that a MNC might have is institutional ownership 
advantages that include corporate values, together with the imprint of L advantages of 
the home country’s institutional environment. These advantages could be transferred to 
host countries to influence their institutional regime. This transfer could be either 
unintentional, through for example, unforeseen societal benefits that may be realised, or 
intentionally (Cantwell et al, 2010: 572). Intentional transfer could include, for 
example, promoting transparent accounting.
25
 In addition, assuming that co-
evolutionary logic suggests that the firm has a symbolic, co-evolving relationship with 
society as well as with the institutional environment, a co-evolutionary framework can 
surely provide business researchers with a perspective that links firm level activities to 
their effects upon society in an iterative process. However, the co-evolution between 
firm activities and changes in societal issues, and the challenges this creates for business 
in strategically addressing social issues, has scarcely been researched. As Seager (2008: 
448) argues, the ‘application of sustainability knowledge in ... management ... can be 
recognised as a necessity, but remains in mere nascent stages of development and may 
even depend upon further progress in other fields to become fully realised’. This is an 
important knowledge gap in the literature that this thesis will address. 
2.4: Institutional co-evolution. 
Co-evolutionary organisational theorists have tended to focus upon adaptation and co- 
evolution with competitors or with a community of firms at the meso-level. For  
example, Sørensen (2004: 149), in considering the labour market as a potential source  
of constraint in the entrepreneurial process, used an organisational ecology framework  
                                                 
24
 Institutional entrepreneurship is where actors use their social and political skills to engineer 
institutional change (Wijen and Ansari, 2007: 1079). 
 
25
 Unintentional and intentional transfers will be considered in the concluding chapter (Section 10.1). 
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to examine how founding rates in a sector varies with the degree of competition with  
other sectors for labour, and consequently found evidence of recruitment-based  
competition in a community ecology. Literatures on innovation systems stress the  
institutional level as the agent for change. For example, Freeman (2002: 191, 209)  
focused upon complementarity between sub-systems of society and on models of active  
learning in the UK, the USA, and catch-up economies in a historical context;  
concluding that the major contributors to forging ahead, catch-up, and falling behind in  
the 19
th
 and the 20
th
 centuries can be explained in terms of national systems, although  
operating in an international context and recognising differing levels of development at  
the sub-national level. Neither literatures consider co-evolution in terms of the firm  
itself being an agent for change. A variety of firm-level initiatives have the potential to  
effect the wider institutional environment.  
Cantwell et al (2010: 568-569) suggest that MNCs can have a significant  
influence upon the institutional environment, presenting a framework for firm-level  
adaptation by MNCs and their subsidiaries influencing the institutional environment in  
host countries. Cantwell et al adopt an approach that borrows from two respected  
scholars.  
Firstly, North (1994: 361-362), an economic historian, argued that institutions  
and organisations shape institutional evolution. Institutions set the rules of the game,  
whilst organisations are the players. Organisations can include regulatory bodies, firms,  
social bodies, and educational bodies. Such organisations that exist are dependent upon  
the opportunities provided by the institutional environment. Economic change results  
from the choices of actors within organisations. Whilst most of these choices are  
routine, some of these choices involve changing existing mindsets so that the norms of  
behaviour are gradually modified. As a result, institutions are evolving. In essence, the  
most fundamental long-run driver of change is learning by actors within organisations.  
North (2005: 2-3) also wrote that the dominant beliefs of political and economic 
actors that are the decision-makers over time result in the formation of institutions that  
determine economic and political performance. The institutional environment that  
results can impose severe constraints on the choices that firm actors can make when  
they seek to innovate or modify institutions. The subsequent path dependence makes  
change incremental, although occasional abrupt institutional change suggests that  
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something similar to the punctuated equilibrium change in evolutionary biology can  
occur in economics. Change can continually occur as organisational actors improve or  
revise routines to improve their competitive position, with a resultant change in the  
institutional environment. However, the key to understanding this process of change is  
the intentionality of the actors enacting institutional change and their perception of the  
issues. Throughout history economic growth has been episodic because either the  
actors’ intentions have not been societal well-being or their perceptions of the issues  
have been so imperfect that the result has been radically different from what was  
intended.  
Secondly, Nelson (2002: 9), an evolutionary economist, wrote that economists  
who developed evolutionary theory have been influenced by neo-classical economic  
growth theory, and have suggested that technological change has been the key driver of  
economic growth. When one recognises that technological change occurs in an  
evolutionary process, a growth theory radically different from the neo-classical one can  
be formed. However, evolutionary growth theory, just like neo-classical economic  
growth theory, has not embraced the complex institutional structures that condition  
modern economies.  
Nelson (2003: 910) also wrote that it is important to get a grip on the nature of 
modern human know-how. Some of it involves a sophisticated understanding of why 
practice works, and some of it also involves an understanding from experience that 
practice works. A cumulative advance of human know-how must be understood in the 
context of a process of learning or evolution. That cultural evolutionary process does, in 
turn, involve the co-evolution of technique and understanding. In addition, once one has 
recognised this, it becomes apparent that our learning or evolution works much better in 
certain arenas than it does in others.  
Nelson (2007: 73) further wrote that evolutionary theorising about economic 
phenomena has a long tradition, and over the past quarter century significant literatures 
have been written on the process of change in business organisation and economics. In 
both of these fields, Darwin’s broad proposition that change occurs because of a process 
involving variation, systematic selection, and renewed variation has proved significant.  
Nevertheless, the evolutionary processes involved differ in essential ways from those  
operating in the evolution of biological species.  
23 
 
Cantwell et al (2010: 567-568), by elaborating on these approaches, developed a 
co-evolutionary framework within the context of the eclectic or OLI paradigm, and  
therefore firmly within the international business context, linking historical changes in  
the character of MNC activities to changes in the institutional environment, focusing  
upon the scope for firm-level creativity and institutional entrepreneurship leading to  
changes in the wider institutional regime. Therefore, distinct from other related  
literature, their approach considers micro processes of change influencing the  
institutional regime.  
Nelson and Sampat (2001: 44-45) proposed a distinction between physical and 
social technologies. What constitutes a routine involves two different aspects, which are 
a recipe that is anonymous regarding any division of labour, and a division of labour in 
collaboration with a mode of coordination. The first aspect is what scholars are often 
considering when they are talking about technology in the conventional sense, and 
Nelson and Sampat refer to this aspect of a routine the physical technology that is 
involved. However, the second aspect involves the coordination of human action, which 
they refer to as the social technology that is involved. Organisational forms, such as a 
firm, implement particular social technologies because they are believed to be the 
appropriate ways to organise economic activity. For example, Ford’s organisation of 
mass production was followed for a long time by many firms engaged in producing 
assembled products. Today, lean production pioneered at Toyota is now considered the 
norm. Therefore, the emergence of new social technologies within the firm, or in other 
words, the emergence of a new coordination of human action can influence change. 
However, certain social technologies become the norm, whilst others do not, reflecting 
the fact that there is always a variety of institutional arrangements that are considered 
appropriate for any given institutional environment (Cantwell et al, 2010: 570).  
Nelson and Sampat (2001: 33) raise an important point here, which is what is the  
right general definition of institutions? However, they do not provide an answer to this  
question because they rightly consider that particular definitions may be appropriate for  
different kinds of analysis. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this thesis, North (1990: 5),  
in analysing institutions and economic growth, distinguishes between institutions and  
organisations. The interaction between institutions and organisations shape the  
institutional evolution. Organisations are made up of groups of individuals bound  
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together by a common purpose to achieve certain goals. Organisations include political  
bodies (for example, political parties or regulatory bodies), economic bodies (for  
example, firms or cooperatives), social bodies like Non-Governmental Organisations  
(NGOs) for example, and educational bodies (for example, schools, universities, or  
vocational training centres). Under his conception, institutions define the environment  
within which organisations operate, but the organisations themselves are not  
institutions. Nevertheless, organisations can influence the broad institutional regime in  
which organisations operate, and consequently, should be considered as part of four  
interdependent cycles within a broad institutional regime.  
Organisations operate within either the micro, meso, or macro-environments, 
and can coordinate with the institutional environment as Figure 2.1 indicates. For the 
purpose of this thesis however, this diagram has been adapted to take into account the 
aims and objects of the research, as can be seen in Figure 2.2. In both these diagrams, 
each environment is dependent upon the others. Figure 2.2 will be embedded within 
each chapter to highlight the co-evolutionary interactions taking place, and so the reader 
must refer to Figure 2.2 when reading these discussions. Nevertheless, Figure 2.2 will 
be revisited in the concluding chapter to highlight the co-evolutionary influences and 
interaction that this thesis has revealed; and consequently, Figure 2.2 must be viewed 
(as its title suggests) in the context of BP only as a potential change agent prior to 
investigating this potential. Essentially, the chapters prior to the concluding chapter will 
present the evidence, highlighting the co-evolutionary insights that informed how the 
material was viewed.  
Lewin and Volberda (2003: 2128-2129) believe that co-evolutionary research 
must capture adaptation in a historical context; micro and macro co-evolution; and 
economic, social and political macro-variables. However, they consider that satisfying 
all of the requirements of co-evolutionary research is an extremely daunting prospect. 
Therefore, they believe that research does not need to satisfy all of the requirements of 
co-evolutionary studies in every single study, just as long as the co-evolutionary 
outcome is emergent. 
Consequently, since indeed considering the interactions between all of the 
environments would be a daunting prospect, and because interactions between every  
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Figure 2.1: The Institutional Regime: Co-evolution as Interdependent Cycles  
(Adapted from Lewin and Koza, 2001: vii, and Child and Rodrigues, 2003: 2139). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: The Institutional Regime: BP as Potential Change Agent. 
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environment was not appropriate due to the fact that this thesis is only considering BP 
in the micro-level acting as change agent to the other environments, and not always the 
other way round, Figure 2.2 was conceived to embrace the nature of this inquiry. 
Therefore, whilst the arrows acknowledge that each environment is interdependent, it is 
BP’s influence upon the other institutional environments that this thesis is concerned 
with. A factor that will be considered which influences BP’s ability to transfer their 
business principles to influence the wider institutional regime comes from the macro-
level, in particular the new entrants (China). Nevertheless, their ability to transfer these 
standards, and act as a change agent in a host country is the basic subject of this thesis, 
and consequently, the next chapter will be concerned with how this ability will be 
investigated. 
2.5: The limitations of the shareholding and stakeholding paradigms. 
Conventional current views on corporate governance (of which CSR is a part) rest on  
two broad pillars, namely the shareholding and stakeholding paradigms, which offer  
competing analyses and theories. Inevitably, this debate represents a polarised  
conceptualisation on how corporate governance should be understood. The shareholding  
paradigm
26
 offers the conventional and dominant idea of individual liberty and the  
maximisation of shareholders’ value is seen as the relevant objective to satisfy. In 
contrast, the stakeholding paradigm
27
 offers the notion of social justice and thus the 
accommodation of broader stakeholders’ interests. (Letza et al, 2004: 242-243). Since 
this thesis is not concerned with shareholder value, none of the shareholding 
perspectives are appropriate.  
The notion of CSR can be seen as being derived from the stakeholder model, in 
the sense that various stakeholders send expectations to management about what they 
require firms to do under the banner of profit-making, law, ethics, and philanthropy 
(Carroll, 2004: 116). Consequently, a stakeholding perspective may have been relevant 
for this thesis. However, the trusteeship model,
28
 in that it considers the current 
corporate governance situation, highlights the essential problem with all of these 
mainstream theories, both shareholding and stakeholding, which is their static  
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The shareholding perspective includes inherent property rights theory, which 
is based on the view that private ownership is fundamental to a desirable 
social order and to the development of an efficient economy. It assumes that 
the right to incorporate is inherent in the right to own property, and 
corporations should be regarded as legal extensions of their owners. Firm 
assets are the property of the shareholders, and managers as agents of  
shareholders have no legal obligations to any other stakeholders. This then 
proposes to improve the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system by 
enhancing the firms’ accountability to its shareholders. Other shareholding 
perspectives include agency theory. Agency theory can be traced back to 
Adam Smith who identified an agency problem (managerial negligence and 
profusion) in the joint-stock company (Letza et al, 2004: 247-248).   
 Berle and Means (2009: 5) were concerned with the agency problem in 
the modern corporation as the separation of ownership from control became 
widened, which left excessive power in the hands of professional managers. 
With the emergence of the modern corporation, the power of professional 
managers was immensely enlarged whilst there was a reduction in the status of 
shareholders. The shareholders surrendered their wealth to professional 
managers and were no longer independent owners. Instead, shareholders were 
reduced to being mere recipients of the wages of capital. As they state, ‘the 
modern corporation ... placed the wealth of innumerable individuals under the 
same central control’. Central to agency theory is the principal-agent 
relationship where the principal (shareholder) delegates work to the agent 
(director and manager) who performs tasks on behalf of the principal 
(Eisenhardt, 1989: 58). Assuming that individuals maximise their own utility, 
the agency theory then asserts that managers as agents will not always act in 
the best interests of shareholders. Rather, they may pursue their own interests. 
The agency theory then focuses on solving this problem by determining 
Box 2.1: The Shareholding Perspectives. 
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conception of corporate governance and CSR. As Mueller (1995: 1220) highlights, this 
ignores ‘the continuous and ongoing interaction between choices made, and the context 
into which choices are embedded’. By analysing corporate governance and CSR using 
such conventional static approaches, dynamic processes are forced to fit into these 
theoretical frameworks, and as a result, they become increasingly isolated or even 
ignored. Therefore, the shareholding and stakeholding paradigms are not sufficient for 
the purpose of this thesis due to the fact that they neglect the historical context of 
corporate governance and CSR. Consequently, since this thesis considers these issues 
dynamically, what is required is a theoretical framework that enables an understanding 
of how a firm’s long-term strategies and learning capabilities have developed over time.  
2.6: Stakeholder theory. 
Although it has been highlighted above that the stakeholding paradigm is insufficient 
because of its static nature, stakeholder theory is usually utilised in studies that embrace  
the most efficient contract governing the relationship between the principal 
and agent. Stewardship theory criticises agency theory by claiming that 
managers are good stewards of the corporation. It argues that managers 
behave like stewards to serve the shareholders’ interests and work to achieve 
profits so that shareholders can receive a high level of returns.  
The finance model and the myopic market model both are related to 
agency theory. The finance model, like agency theory, is concerned with the 
effectiveness of market governance in ensuring that managers will act to 
maximise shareholders’ wealth. If managers cause a firm to underperform, its 
share price will be lower, providing incentives for outsiders to buy stock and 
run the firm more efficiently. The myopic market model agrees with agency 
theory that firms should serve shareholders’ interests only. However, it 
criticises the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance as it encourages 
managers to focus on short-term performance at the expense of long-term 
value and competitiveness (Letza et al, 2004: 248-249).  
Box 2.1 continued. 
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CSR. Therefore, there is a requirement to explain why stakeholder theory was deemed 
inappropriate. 
Originally published in 1984, Freeman’s pivotal work on stakeholder theory: 
Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, was republished in 2010. Freeman 
proposed an alternative approach to strategic management that embraced most of the 
concerns that had been identified in the field. Following on from, and summarising the 
work of many business thinkers,
29
 Freeman offered a stakeholder management approach 
that: 
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 Freeman (2010: iii) states that these include Ackoff, R., Emshoff, J., Rhenman, E. and Trist, E. 
Amongst the stakeholding perspectives, social entity theory is directly at odds  
with inherent property rights theory, regarding a firm not as a private 
association united by individual property rights, but as a social entity for 
pursuing general community needs. Consequently, managers are 
representatives and guardians of all corporate stakeholders’ interests. Social 
entity theory prefers to overcome market failures and transaction costs by 
legal intervention and improving checks and balances. The instrumental 
stakeholder theory supports this idea of multiple interests of stakeholders,  
but unlike social entity theory which justifies stakeholder interests on the basis 
of moral value and fundamental human rights, the instrumental stakeholder 
theory legitimises stakeholder interests subtly, which is more appropriate to 
the traditional Anglo-Saxon corporate governance mentality. It suggests that 
corporate governance should not move away from ownership rights, but 
ownership rights should be claimed by other stakeholders and not only by 
shareholders. The trusteeship model adopts a perspective that is realistic and 
descriptive when considering the current corporate governance situation. It 
argues that a public corporation is not created by a private contract and 
subsequently, is not owned by any individual (Letza et al, 2004, 250-252). 
Box 2.2: The Stakeholding Perspectives. 
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 embraced external analysis in order to aid firms in dealing with an increasingly 
turbulent environment; 
 acknowledged that the firm had duties to other members of society other than 
shareholders; 
 integrated economic and political strategies; 
 was consistent with a contributor group approach; 
 embraced adaptation and enactment; 
 was consistent with management action; 
 embraced the perspective of organisational learning; 
 and embraced resource dependency (Freeman et al, 2010: 91). 
The original stakeholder management concept was elaborated by Evan and 
Freeman (1993: 82) as containing two principles. Firstly, there is the principle of 
corporate legitimacy, where the corporation should be managed for the benefit of all its 
stakeholders, be they customers, suppliers, owners, employees, and local communities. 
Secondly, there is the stakeholder fiduciary principle, where management bears a 
fiduciary relationship to stakeholders, acting in the interests of the stakeholders as their 
agent. 
Stakeholder management focuses on the interests of groups and individuals who 
affect, or in turn are affected by, the pursuance of the firm’s objectives (Freeman, 2010: 
52). By identifying, evaluating, and assessing stakeholders and stakeholder 
relationships, firms can navigate the strategic environments in which they operate in 
such a way that they can account for the range of relationships, responsibilities, and 
interaction between themselves and their stakeholders. Stakeholder theory attempts to 
address the question of which stakeholders deserve or require management attention 
through the evaluation of relationships between organisations and stakeholders based on 
exchange transactions, power dependencies, legitimacy claims, or other claims (Doh 
and Guay, 2006: 55). For example, Mitchell et al (1997) developed a theory of 
stakeholder identification and salience based on managerial assessments of 
stakeholders’ possession of one or more of three relationship attributes: power, 
legitimacy, and urgency. According to this account, a party to a relationship has power 
‘to the extent it has or can gain access to coercive, utilitarian, or normative means, to 
impose its will in the relationship’. Legitimacy is defined as ‘a generalised perception or 
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assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’, while urgency is 
reflective of ‘the degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate attention’ 
(Mitchell et al, 1997: 865-867). 
2.6.1: Criticisms and the inappropriateness of stakeholder theory.  
There have been a number of criticisms of stakeholder theory, largely based upon the 
idea that shareholder interests are the only legitimate concern for a firm. For example, 
Sternberg (1997: 3) suggests that stakeholder theory is intrinsically incompatible with 
all business objectives and undermines both property rights and corporate 
responsiveness, and Hay (1996: 47) described stakeholder theory as ‘a rather vague and 
cryptic concept that is open to a wide variety of rather divergent ... interpretations’. 
Whilst stakeholder theory has also been criticised for weakening the fiduciary duty 
owned by managers to shareholders (particularly because shareholder investment is 
especially vulnerable and should be protected more than any other claims), weakening 
the power of certain stakeholder groups (such as employee interests that may be 
weakened by treating all stakeholders equally), weakening the corporation as a whole 
because attempts to serve the interests of all stakeholders would put it at a disadvantage 
when it comes to maximising shareholder value, and making the corporation virtually 
unmanageable because of the realities of considering all stakeholder concerns 
(Friedman and Miles, 2006: 119-122); other weaknesses make it inappropriate for this 
thesis. 
The major problem with stakeholder theory is that because the term stakeholder 
has come to encompass a wide variety of interests, the theory has become bound-up in 
attempting to define and manage the relevant importance of these multiple interests. The 
idea of stakeholding will cease to be relevant unless the term is widened to refer to the 
general interest of society (Dine, 2005: 223). Indeed, stakeholder theorists appear to be 
overly preoccupied with how the questions of stakeholder identification are answered. 
According to Greenwood and Freeman (2011: 276-277), this includes whether 
stakeholders can be identified as primary or secondary, owners and non-owners, owners 
of capital, actors or those acted upon, actors with legal principles to whom agent-
managers bear fiduciary duties, actors with voluntary or involuntary relationships with 
the firm, resource providers to the firm, risk-takers or influencers, dependents of the 
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firm, and moral claimants. The original definition of Freeman (2010: 46), stating that 
stakeholders are ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organisation’s objectives’30 is clearly an influencer definition in that  
it has instigated this pursuance of identifying stakeholders. However, in essence, the 
general interest of society is what this thesis is interested in, and stakeholder theory has 
yet to widen its scope and remains constrained by competing multiple interests. This 
thesis is not concerned with identifying which stakeholder interests are more important 
than other competing claims. Rather, it is concerned with the general interest of African 
society. 
Freeman et al (2011: 55) state that ‘stakeholder theory is fundamentally a theory 
about how business works, at its best, and how it could work. It is descriptive, 
prescriptive, and instrumental at the same time and ... it is managerial. Stakeholder 
theory is about business and how to effectively manage a business’. Freeman (2010: 
247-249) emphasises that he essentially constructed an approach for management to 
embrace the external environment in a systematic and routine way. This is because he 
viewed the business environment as complex, and consequently, it posed significant 
challenges. If the firm is to meet this challenge, it must have strategic management 
processes that routinely consider the external environment. However, this thesis is not 
interested in how management juggles the competing claims of various stakeholders. 
Rather, the issue in question is how the firm behaves to resolve the needs of multiple 
stakeholders, and stakeholder theory is not intended to provide a behavioural theory of 
the firm. In the context of this thesis, what is important are variables that affect 
organisational goals (such as external influences and/or expectations), and how 
organisations choose to respond to issues,
31
 as these will both impact firm behaviour. 
However, even Freeman (2010: iv) himself recognises that his stakeholder management 
concept focuses ‘too much on the conflicts among multiple stakeholders rather than on  
                                                 
30
 This definition originally appeared in the 1984 publication, and Freeman (2004: 58, 64) produced a 
different definition of stakeholders in later work by referring to them as ‘those groups who are vital to the 
survival and success of the corporation’, and as a result the two principles are altered and renamed. 
Firstly, there is the stakeholder-enabling principle, where corporations shall be managed in the interests of 
stakeholders. Secondly, there is the principle of director responsibility, where directors shall have a duty 
of care to use reasonable judgement to define and direct the corporation in accordance with the 
stakeholder-enabling principle. In addition, Freeman adds the principle of stakeholder recourse, where 
stakeholders may bring an action against the directors when they fail to perform the required duty of care. 
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It was Cyert and March (1963: 115-116) who proposed a behavioural theory of the 
firm, a basic framework for analysis that has two major organising devices. Firstly, 
there is a set of exhaustive variable categories, and secondly, there is a set of 
relational concepts. They proposed that one can analyse the process of decision-
making in the firm in terms of the variables that affect:  
 organisational goals,  
 organisational expectations,  
 and organisational choice. 
Each of these will be considered in turn below. 
Organisational goals. 
There are two sets of variables that affect the goals of an organisation, and these 
are what influences the dimensions of the goals (or in other words, what is viewed 
as being important), and what influences the aspirations for achieving any 
particular goal. 
Organisational expectations. 
Organisational expectations result from drawing inferences from available 
information, and therefore, what is considered are the variables that affect the 
process of drawing inferences, or the variables that affect the process where 
information becomes available to an organisation. 
Organisational choice. 
Organisational choice occurs in response to a problem, and the variables that affect 
organisational choice are those that influence the definition of a problem, the 
standard decision rules, and the order of consideration of alternatives. 
In the course of developing these above three sub-theories, Cyert and 
March developed four relational concepts that are used in their behavioural theory, 
and these are the quasi-resolution of conflict, uncertainty avoidance, problemistic 
search, and organisational learning. 
Box 2.3: The Behavioural Theory of the Firm.     
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finding ... behaviours that dissolve those conflicts’. If a government at the institutional 
environment level is a stakeholder in the firm, together with society itself at the macro-
level, then what we need is a story about how the firm behaves to resolve the conflict 
between, and addresses the needs of, these multiple stakeholders. In fact Freeman calls 
for a story about business that ‘must also be one of business in society’, and suggests 
that ‘more than ever, we need a story about responsible capitalism’.32  
Freeman believes that his stakeholder approach, together with others who have 
since developed and utilised the idea, should only be seen as ‘a good place to start’. 
Whilst one must recognise the contribution made by Freeman’s stakeholder approach,  
perhaps the time is right to move on to a narrative embracing responsible capitalism. 
This thesis argues that this can be achieved by adopting an institutional perspective. 
Campbell (2006: 928-929) states that stakeholder theory examines whether and 
why firms attend to the interests of stakeholders, and is therefore related to CSR. 
However, as Campbell argues, ‘most of the stakeholder literature focuses on defining 
important stakeholders, arguing that stakeholders have legitimate claims on 
corporations, advocating stakeholder management practices, and trying to show how 
stakeholder management affects corporate financial performance’. Therefore, it does not 
consider the conditions under which firms ‘are likely to act in socially responsible ways 
vis-à-vis their stakeholders. In sum, all of this literature points toward but does not 
systematically develop an institutional analysis of CSR’. In fact, Campbell is concerned 
‘only with institutions and the sticks and carrots they provide that constrain and enable 
behaviour in ways that facilitate CSR’. Unfortunately therefore, whilst Campbell 
considers institutional factors, there is only an interest in what institutional conditions 
affect and/or influence CSR and not in how a firms’ CSR activity can influence 
institutions. 
2.6.2: Moving beyond stakeholder issues. 
Clarkson (1995: 103) distinguishes between stakeholder and social issues. A particular 
society determines what is a social issue, and enacts legislation and regulation to ensure 
that this social issue is addressed. In the absence of relevant legislation and regulation, 
                                                 
32
 This is because in projecting his radical stakeholder management concept, Freeman (2010: iii) states 
that ‘we still need a new story about business. The recent global financial crisis has made this plain. I 
believe that the central characters in that story must be companies and their customers, employees, 
suppliers, communities, and financiers. Other groups such as NGOs, governments unions, etc. may also 
be important to particular businesses’. 
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an issue may be a stakeholder issue but not necessarily a social issue. Whether an issue 
has become a social one can be determined by the presence of legislation and regulation 
that addresses it. Therefore, the requirement for legislation and regulation is necessary 
for an issue to be a social one, and this thesis is concerned with the firm behaving 
and/or acting as a change agent to influence the institutional environment as to what are 
social issues, moving beyond stakeholder issues, as will now be outlined. 
In the preface to the 2010 reissue, Freeman (2010: iii) states that when he wrote 
the first publication, he felt that ‘managers had to deal with those groups and individuals 
that could affect or be affected by their company, i.e. stakeholders. That seemed to me, 
and still does, to be the essence of strategic thinking’. Freeman went on to stress that his 
publication did not ‘make the usual distinctions between economic and social, or 
business and non-business’, and found it ‘ironic that the scholars who have used and 
developed the idea the most were those in corporate social responsibility’. Surprisingly, 
Freeman argues, he continues ‘to believe, that social responsibility is one of those ideas 
that prop up a story about business that is no longer useful’, but Freeman goes on to 
recognise that ‘it is now old hat in many areas of business’. Nevertheless, as stated 
above, Freeman et al do stress that stakeholder theory is managerial, and this comment 
suggests that it was never really intended to be used primarily to study CSR. 
Furthermore, and to answer Freeman’s call for a new story about business, perhaps the 
time is right to move beyond stakeholder issues.  
 To the extent that thought has been given to the impact of CSR initiatives in the 
developing world, this tends to be solely at the micro-level, looking at what particular 
firms are doing with regard to their stakeholders, such as workers and local 
communities (Blowfield and Frynas, 2005: 507). Consequently, we do not know enough 
about big-picture issues such as what firms are doing to meet major development 
challenges such as infrastructure development and institutional capacity building. 
Freeman and Reed (1983: 96), state that ‘if this task of stakeholder management is done 
properly, much of the air is let out of critics who argue that the corporation must be 
democratised in terms of increased direct citizen participation’. However, even though 
these directions are prescribed, there is little discussion in stakeholder theory of the 
implications or indeed how a shift towards a new regulatory regime for the developing 
world could be achieved (Blowfield and Frynas, 2005: 509). 
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2.7: Discussion. 
To move beyond stakeholder issues to considering major development challenges, this 
thesis argues that a shift towards a new institutional regime for the developing world 
must be achieved, and the study of whether this is being achieved can be realised by 
embracing an evolutionary approach. To apply evolutionary theory to corporate 
governance and CSR effectively, it has to be recognised that firms are part of a co-
evolutionary process. The origins of this process are initiatives and/or regulation at the 
institutional environment level influencing firm behaviour. The UK government has 
developed programs to influence business activity in CSR, covering the promotion of 
voluntary initiatives, institutional capacity building, transparency, and soft regulation. 
All of these programs have been developed out of dialogue between the government, the 
private sector, and civil society (Albareda et al, 2006: 394). The motivation for the UK 
government to develop such programmes is the fact that it ‘sees CSR as the business 
contribution to [their] sustainable development goals’ (Steurer, 2010: 2). Importantly 
therefore, governments have assumed the role as drivers of CSR, and at the start of this 
century, initiatives instigated by national governments around the world have converged 
with the emergence of initiatives from different international governance organisations, 
such as the UN Global Compact (Albareda et al, 2008: 348). Consequently, adherences 
to the Global Compact, together with three other such initiatives from the global 
institutional environment level (namely the Global Reporting Initiative, the Global 
Sullivan Principles, and the OECD Guidelines for MNEs) will be embraced in 
subsequent chapters. 
As Ashley (2010) proposed, CSR at the micro-level results from a co-
evolutionary process that has been shaped by social, political, and institutional aspects 
through interactions between business, civil society, and government (the driver). Once 
firm behaviour has been influenced by this co-evolutionary process, the firm can behave 
in such a way as to attempt to positively influence a host country’s institutional regime. 
Nevertheless, as Cantwell et al (2010) stress, this positive influence could be either 
intentional or unintentional. Furthermore, Cantwell et al (2010) developed a co-
evolutionary framework that focuses upon the scope for the firm operating at the micro-
level to engage in institutional entrepreneurship that can lead to changes in the wider 
institutional regime.  
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With reference to Figure 2.2, one can now see the co-evolutionary interaction 
that embraces the essence of this thesis. Regulation in the form of CSR initiatives from 
government (this thesis will focus upon the above mentioned global initiatives) at the 
institutional environment level (although soft regulation) influences firm behaviour at 
the micro-level, resulting in management intentionality and the organisational 
principles, although both of these can also be subject to strategic adaptation and path 
dependence. All of this in turn results in the firm (focusing upon BP as the example) 
acting as an agent for change to the wider institutional regime; including governance 
(transparency), education, regulation (when firms have input on regulation), politics 
(government-to-government interaction), and economic policy (institutional capacity 
building) at the institutional environment level; addressing socio-economic needs at the 
macro-level, together with the impact of the new entrants (China) and the related issue 
of foreign competition, and technology transfer (which in this context refers to 
managerial technology and is related to education at the institutional environment 
level); and collective action amongst differing firms in the industry at the meso-level to 
address all of this issues. In addition to this co-evolutionary interaction, the influence of 
CSR initiatives from the global institutional environment upon the Chinese firms will be 
considered, in the sense of how this impacts upon the behaviour of the Chinese firms, 
which in turn has an impact upon BP’s behaviour; together with the influence of the 
Chinese firms upon education and governance in particular at the institutional 
environment level, as well as socio-economic needs within the same macro-level 
environment as China is as the new entrants. Subsequent chapters will analyse this co-
evolutionary interaction, but prior to this, the next chapter will outline the methodology 
adopted for this thesis.    
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Chapter 3: Methodology. 
3.1: Introduction. 
As Oliver (2010: 78) states, social science research is usually portrayed as being rigidly  
divided between qualitative methods or quantitative methods, appearing as almost an  
ideological divide between researchers. However, it is far more appropriate to identify 
the specific requirements of an inquiry. By establishing the aims of this research project, 
it was identified which research strategy was best to fulfil those aims. The best strategy 
could have turned out to be either qualitative or quantitative, or even a combination of 
both. However, this chapter will establish that qualitative research was appropriate for 
this inquiry, to complement a literature study. In addition, it will also establish the 
reasons for choosing a case study design when assessing the ability to engage in 
institutional co-evolution. Furthermore, the strategy to seek in-depth qualitative 
accounts will be outlined, together with the special methodology, analytical narrative, in 
which interviews provided raw data for understanding the phenomenon. By combining 
in-depth interviews and historical firm evolution via a literature study, a deep 
understanding of the phenomenon was generated.  
3.2: The literature review. 
As Barrientos (2007: 113, 115, 118-119) rightly states, any kind of research is going to 
involve conducting a literature review. A literature review may be the main focus of the 
study, or it may serve as background for another form of research. When conducting a 
literature review, it is useful to distinguish between a literature search, a literature 
survey, and a literature study. The initial phase of the literature review for this thesis, 
the literature search, was wide ranging in order to acquire a broad understanding of the 
topic which enabled a narrowing down of the focus of the research to more manageable 
areas to survey, the second phase of the literature review. At this survey phase, having 
defined the scope of the research, the pursuance of references and leads in the literature 
was embarked upon which directed the literature review in a more specific direction. 
When surveying the literature, initially this was done fairly ‘blind’ as one takes in much 
of what is presented at face value. However, at this phase it was possible to identify 
different approaches and ideas to further narrow and define the topic so that the survey 
could point the literature review towards relevant references.  
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During the progression of the literature survey, the literature study was initiated. 
The purpose of the literature study was to analyse the material, that is, approach the 
literature by analysing its relevance to the research being undertaken. There was no 
single point of transfer from survey to study because as analysis was engaged in, new 
material to survey was continually discovered. Nevertheless, the literature was 
increasingly reviewed from a more analytical standpoint. This highlights the fact that 
the literature review in this thesis was not conducted to identify a problem and then 
address it by primary data collection, or in other words, it did not serve as background 
for another form of research. Rather, although not the main focus of the study, the 
literature review was part of the analysis of the problem, including secondary data in the 
form of company reports, and it was complemented by primary data. Lewin and Koza 
(2001: x) call for qualitative insights together with event history descriptions for co-
evolutionary studies. In order to meet this requirement, primary research was initiated 
during the literature study stage of the thesis. The remainder of this chapter will be 
concerned with the choice of an appropriate research strategy for this thesis.    
3.3: Choosing a case study design. 
What distinguishes a case study design is that the researcher is concerned with  
discovering the unique features of a case (Bryman, 2008: 54). Engaging in a case study  
analysis involves conducting an in-depth contextual analysis of a particular situation  
concerning a particular problem. A case study is useful for obtaining several clues as to  
why and how certain factors might be operating. Case studies usually provide  
qualitative data for analysis and interpretation, and are highly appropriate for  
understanding certain phenomena that may promote the generation of explanations that  
can be expanded upon by further studies (Sekaran and Bougie, 2010: 30, 109). Indeed,  
proponents of case study designs usually favour qualitative methods because they are  
considered to be particularly useful for generating an in-depth analysis of a case  
(Bryman, 2008: 53). This thesis has attempted to gain an in-depth account of the  
transfer of corporate governance and CSR principles to Africa, and therefore, a case  
study design was deemed appropriate.     
Having identified the relevance of conducting a case study, the challenge of 
beginning the case study was confronted. This was a process in which firstly, it was 
defined what was to be examined. Secondly, the specific case was selected that was to 
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be the subject of the case study. It is important here to highlight the distinction between 
the case and the case study. Yin (2004: xiv-xv) defines the case as ‘the real-life set of  
events from which data will be drawn’. The case study, on the other hand, is the  
substance of the research inquiry. This includes the research question, the theoretical  
perspectives, the empirical findings, the interpretations, and the conclusions.  
Nevertheless, researchers have benefited from defining a topic for a case study, and  
have then selected a relevant case from which to collect data. The relevant case does not  
necessarily have to be an extraordinary real-life set of events, but it may reflect a set of  
circumstances that can be viewed as being typical. It is therefore, useful for one to make  
the distinction between different types of cases. These are outlined in Box 3.1 on the 
next page. A case study may not necessarily have to be defined as just one of these 
distinct types of cases, as it can involve elements of two or more types of cases 
(Bryman, 2008: 55-56).  
The nature of the inquiry in this thesis is to discover whether the historical co-
evolution of the business principles of the firms involved can provide insights into the 
CSR packages that have emerged and are being implemented today in the oil sector in 
Africa. Angola was chosen as a critical case to develop an in-depth understanding of the 
issues in order to tackle the research question because all of the firms under 
consideration in this research project are engaged in operations there. Although Angola 
could also be considered to be an extreme or unique case because there are certain 
intrinsic factors that are unique to the country, for example, emerging from a long civil 
war; it should be regarded more as having features of a representative or typical case 
because Angola exemplifies the broader category of oil exploration and extraction in 
Africa. Angola has a growing oil sector which is perceived as essential for the 
development of the nation, and such development issues are applicable to other oil-
producing countries in Africa.   
3.4: Company reports.    
Transparency relates to the fact that the reporting of the external impacts of the actions  
of a MNC can be procured from the MNC’s reporting. Key facts should not be  
disguised in that MNC’s reporting mechanisms. Therefore, all of the effects of the  
activities of a MNC, including external impacts, should be available for all to view  
within the MNCs reporting mechanisms. Transparency is of particular relevance and  
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importance to external users of MNC’s reports because these users of this information  
tend to lack the background knowledge that internal users have. Consequently,  
transparency can be seen as being integral to the responsibility of a MNC, in relation to  
the fact that they are transferring power to external stakeholders (Aras and Crowther,  
2009: 146), suggesting that company reports can certainly be utilised, but what would 
be a correct approach?  
Balzer and Kroher (2006: 369, 374-377, 379) attempted a systematic assessment 
of the CSR practices of large European firms. Data and facts were gathered on the 
firms’ human resources, community service, environmental protection, financial 
strength and performance, transparency, and communication of CSR principles. A 
points system was adopted, and they scored each firm on how they performed according 
to the data and facts that they obtained, with the maximum for human resources being 
25 points, community service 25 points, environmental protection 20 points, financial  
 The critical case, where the researcher chooses a case to develop an in-
depth understanding of a phenomenon whereby a research question can 
be answered. 
 The extreme or unique case, where the researcher chooses a case that 
holds an intrinsic interest that makes it essentially unique. 
 The representative or typical case, where the researcher chooses a case 
that exemplifies a broader category of which it could be considered a 
part. A case is not chosen here because it is unique or unusual in some 
way. Rather, it is a typical example of a broader category of cases that 
could have been chosen to conduct the inquiry, and the case is chosen 
because it is viewed as being representative of a broader category. 
 The revelatory case, where the researcher has an opportunity to inquire 
about a phenomenon that was previously not open to investigation. 
 The longitudinal case, where the researcher chooses a case that may be  
investigated over time.  
Box 3.1: Different Types of Cases (Bryman, 2008: 55-56). 
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strength/performance 15 points, and transparency/communication 15 points, adding up  
to a possible maximum of 100 points. Their findings showed that BP had the best CSR  
practices of all large European firms, with a score of 74.3 points, with Anglo American  
second with 72 points. However, the flaw in their methodology is that it relied heavily  
on written materials supplied by the firms themselves, although they did draw upon data  
from the independent media. They did not appear to seek academic evidence, for  
example, in order to possibly gain a more critical insight on firm activities, which  
means that their research was seriously flawed. Therefore, is it appropriate to solely rely 
upon company material?   
BP is arguably the oil MNC that is the leader in reporting the impacts of their 
operations, certainly in comparison with the other four ‘majors’. This is highlighted in  
Table 3.1 on the next page. This table also highlights the lack of sufficient data on 
environmental impacts provided by the two Chinese NOCs that are engaged in 
operations in Angola. Indeed, as Frynas (2009: 85) states using the China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) as one example, ‘many oil companies from 
developing economies provide little concrete data on social and environmental issues’. 
However, as Frynas further states, ‘the introduction of CSR or sustainability reports by 
many firms from developing economies ... suggests that there has been some imitation  
of Western practices’. Therefore, concerning the Chinese NOCs, their company reports 
did provide some data upon the impacts of their operations for analysis.  
The Business and Human Rights Resource Centre
33
 considers BP, along with 
Anglo American, to be amongst the firms that produces the best company reports on 
human rights issues (Avery et al, 2006: 85). However, according to Crane (2008: 222) a 
firm like BP invests in defensive approaches to communicate their responsibility, such 
as social responsibility, sustainability, and human rights reports, in an attempt to deflect  
the wider ethical gaze of NGOs and other potential critics, all to protect the firms’  
reputation. Indeed, Doane (2004: 86-87) considered the issuing of company reports in  
which firms can mask negative impacts by excluding it from the report. BP engaged in  
an apparent transparent stakeholder dialogue in Papua, Indonesia concerning the  
                                                 
33
 The Business and Human Rights Resource Centre is the world’s leading independent resource on the 
subject, and aims to encourage companies to respect human rights, to provide easy access to information 
for companies and NGOs, and to facilitate informed decision-making and public discussion (Business and 
Human Rights Resource Centre, 2011).  
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                                                        REPORTING OF:     
               Hydrocarbon   Produced   Greenhouse   Flared   Energy    Environmental 
                     spills             water        emissions      gas        use          management  
                                                                                                                 systems  
BP                Yes                Yes              Yes           Yes        Yes               Yes             
            
Royal  
Dutch         Limited        Limited           Yes           Yes      Limited        Limited 
Shell            
Exxon          Yes                Yes              Yes           Yes        Yes             Limited 
Mobil            
Chevron       Yes                No               Yes        Limited     Yes               Yes 
Texaco           
CNOOC       No             Limited            No            No          No             Limited 
            
Sinopec        No             Limited       Limited      Limited   Limited        Limited 
            
 
 
Table 3.1: Reporting of Core Environmental Indicators (Selected Companies) in  
2006 (adapted from Frynas, 2009: 72-73). 
 
Tangguh liquefied natural gas project.
34
 Despite such dialogue, local community  
members in Papua believed that they were forced and tricked into selling their land by  
BP. However, this and other examples of negative feedback about the project were  
simply omitted from BP’s environmental and social report of 2001, when the project  
began, and there remains no opportunity for stakeholders to challenge the report.  
Therefore, so long as BP’s reputation is enhanced in the ‘glossy’ report, facts appear not  
to matter. This is what Albert Wong, global policy advisor to Royal Dutch Shell, calls  
the ‘heart and mind’ systems of corporate governance, where upholding reputation and  
protecting the brand is of great importance, and these factors are perhaps also of prime  
importance to BP (Fahy et al, 2005: 173).  
The particular specifics of social and environmental concerns about firm actions 
are therefore, possibly less important to the firm itself than the potential damage to the 
                                                 
34
 BP wanted to ‘get things right from the outset’ in this project, and engaged in environmental, social, 
and economic impact assessments. BP even contacted the UK’s Department for International 
Development and the USA’s Agency for International Development for advice, and consulted NGOs and 
other stakeholders (Lodge and Wilson, 2006: 56-57).  
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firms’ reputation. As a result of this, it can be considered that a firms’ company report 
obtained via their website that advertises their CSR principles is little more than a 
public relations exercise to protect the firms’ reputation, rather than reflecting a more 
actual concern about the very social and environmental issues that the report may claim 
the firm attempts to uphold (Godfrey-Isaacs, 2004: 86). Therefore, relying solely upon 
company reports, as Balzer and Kroher did, is an insufficient source of data on the 
impacts of BP’s operations. Nevertheless, information obtained from BP’s company 
reports were utilised, together with data from reports produced by Royal Dutch Shell, 
Chevron, CNOOC, and Sinopec; as and when it was deemed relevant to the research. In 
particular, in order to achieve a balanced analysis, information in company reports was 
tested by interviewee evidence in Part 3.  
3.5: Choosing a qualitative research strategy. 
In choosing a qualitative research strategy, the study is not attempting to measure 
attitudes or to specify the exact nature of relationships between variables. Instead, it is 
concerned with procuring in-depth accounts from people who are perceived as being 
knowledgeable about the issues in question, and in addition, the interviewees have the  
room to select which aspect they choose to emphasise (Barbour, 2008: 115). The nature 
of the inquiry in this thesis, the practical impact of the implementation and transfer of  
firms’ evolved business principles to Angola, means that procuring in-depth accounts  
from knowledgeable people was certainly applicable. The thesis did not attempt to  
measure or identify relationships between variables. Therefore, a qualitative research  
strategy was appropriate, rather than a quantitative strategy. Furthermore, Lewin and 
Koza (2001: x) considered that co-evolutionary studies should use event history 
modelling and contextual insights to understand which type of co-evolution is taking 
place, and this calls for qualitative insights to compliment event history descriptions. 
Smith (1998: 349) states that qualitative research can be conducted using a  
variety of research methods, including in-depth interviews to gain an informed account  
of the relations and processes involved. Smith feels that this kind of research strategy  
can generate informed and well illustrated accounts, and provides greater depth than  
quantitative research. Whilst quantitative research strategies collect evidence that is  
standardised and measurable, it lacks depth.  
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The first two stages of the literature review served to establish background 
knowledge and raised issues to be explored in the primary data collection phase of the 
thesis to compliment the literature study. The nature of the inquiry demanded that 
knowledgeable people’s views should be sought, and the strategy adopted for this will 
now be outlined. The research strategy is concerned with investigating development 
issues, which is appropriate given that the location of the inquiry is Angola, and to 
assess what resource-based firms can do to promote development. Although this thesis 
is within the international business paradigm and could be described as being concerned 
with business history, co-evolution, path dependence, strategic adaption, or corporate 
governance and CSR; Lawson (1994: 258) believes that social scientists should be 
flexible and innovative in choosing a methodology to conduct an inquiry,
35
 and perhaps 
in choosing a method that would not necessarily be normally applied to these areas 
meets this call for flexibility.  
3.6: The four-point strategy to seek people’s views. 
Woodhouse (2007: 159) proposed a four-point strategy to confront an inquiry that seeks  
people’s views. The strategy is concerned with investigative approaches that  
development managers and development policy investigators need when attempting to  
find out from other people. This four-point strategy will now be considered in turn 
within the context of how it was utilised in this thesis. 
3.7: The first point: defining the population. 
To begin with, the population was defined, that is, the boundary from within which 
people were selected to take part in the inquiry was identified. This decision involved 
the relative importance of expert and lay views (Woodhouse, 2007: 162). The nature of 
this thesis, which sought people’s informed opinions concerning the implementation of 
business principles, demanded that expert views were required. This is what Hanlon 
(1998: 67) describes as seeking ‘those who know’, who are experts that are already 
involved with the issues that can inform the inquiry. Therefore, the population that was 
                                                 
35
 Lawson (1994: 258) provides an example of attempting to use a particular method regardless. A stick 
cleans a dusty mat because it beats it, and with the assumption that if the stick works in one job then it 
will for related jobs, someone attempts to clean a dusty window with a stick, only to find that it breaks it. 
Lawson believes that objects of inquiry have complex internal structures, and this is of great consequence 
when it comes to selecting methodologies. In essence, Lawson believes that ‘one size does not fit all’, and 
social scientists should be flexible and innovative in choosing a methodology. 
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defined is those who have expert views. Such a population includes expert witnesses 
and key informants.   
3.8: The second point: deciding who to speak to. 
With the population defined, it was then decided who should be spoken to. There  
are two distinct approaches that can be followed, namely a sample survey or focused  
interviews. A sample survey aims to generate a description of a wider population,  
providing answers to ‘what?’ questions, such as what percentage of a workforce is  
satisfied with their jobs? The other main approach is the use of focused interviews, and 
this approach was chosen to procure the in-depth accounts that this thesis required. The  
two variants of this approach include purposive or theoretical sampling, where  
subgroups are sampled more or less heavily dependent upon their relevance to the  
research. Expert views were sought from the academic and the aid agency/NGO  
community. This thesis also sought key informants, who met Hanlon’s criterion  
of ‘those who know’, and they were chosen not because they are representative of a  
population, but because of their knowledge of the issues in question (Woodhouse, 2007:  
163-165). Key informants were sought from Anglo American and BP. 
3.8.1: Sampling expert witnesses.  
Conducting interviews with people who have expert views in a community is known as  
elite or expert interviewing of expert witnesses (Kvale, 2007: 70). The focus in  
interviewing expert witnesses was that it was used as a complimentary instrument  
for another form of research, the literature review or literature study. Expert  
witnesses have interpretive knowledge and perceptions that refer to their specific  
professional activity (Flick, 2009: 166, 168). Although such interviewees normally have  
powerful positions due to the fact that they were experts in their relative fields and were 
being interviewed by a PhD researcher with only ambitions to reach such a position, 
affecting the powerful position of the interviewer, this was balanced by engaging in an 
interview that was more like a conversation. In order to be an interesting conversation 
partner, the author of this thesis as the interviewer demonstrated knowledge of the 
issues in question during the interview. This was achieved by contributing the 
researcher’s perceptions of the issues in question, together with examples of the kind of 
insights being sought which provoked new responses. Indeed, confident respondents, 
such as the expert witnesses, were stimulated by this intellectual challenge. In addition, 
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some interviewees had further viewpoints that they wanted to communicate via the 
interview, and felt comfortable with doing this since the author had earned respect. 
Furthermore, familiarity with the position and biography of the interviewee was 
acknowledged so the kind of knowledge that could be procured during the interview 
was identified. However, the major problem with interviewing expert witnesses is 
obtaining access to such interviewees (Kvale, 2007: 70, 76), as will be seen below. 
Expert witnesses tend to have busy schedules, meaning that they either may not be 
willing to give interviews in the first place, or the interview itself may have to run to a 
tight schedule.  
For interviewing expert witnesses, the selection of interviewees was based  
upon purposive sampling (Flick, 2009: 168). Purposive sampling involves the selection 
of a community with the necessary characteristics (Gobo, 2008: 418-419). The aid  
agency/NGO community was regarded as having the necessary characteristics because, 
as Frynas (2009: 25) states, BP, relative to US-based oil companies who have little 
stakeholder pressure on them, face an ethical gaze from many powerful NGOs based in 
London.
36
   
Teegen et al (2004: 473) consider the neglected force in the institutional 
environment, NGOs. Neglected that is, by international business researchers. They call 
for international business researchers to catch up with other disciplines in incorporating 
NGOs into research. However, they are not clear on how incorporating NGOs into 
research may add to international business research, and consequently, this thesis 
addressed this issue by seeking the expert views that this community can provide. Initial 
contact letters were dispatched requesting face-to-face interviews, with a view to 
requesting an email interview if this was unsuccessful. However, the response from all 
of the organisations contacted
37
 was that they are overwhelmed with interview requests, 
and consequently, they have a policy of not granting interviews. Consequently, further 
letters were dispatched to request only email interviews, which were met with similar 
                                                 
36
 Furthermore, in attempting to focus on controversial issues, activists engaged in the field can play a 
significant role as expert witnesses (Carson, 2001: 18). 
 
37
 The organisations contacted within the aid agency/NGO community were Action Aid, Amnesty 
International UK, the British Council, CARE International, Christian Aid, Friends of the Earth, the 
Overseas Development Institute, Oxfam, Save the Children, TraidCraft, War on Want, and the WWF 
(GB).  
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answers or no response at all. To overcome this problem, it was decided to seek expert 
testimony from the aid agency/NGO community.  
3.8.2: Expert testimony.  
An expert witness can describe authoritatively the professional viewpoint of a 
community of organisations, even though that interviewee may not be directly involved 
in all of those organisations. This is known as expert testimony
38
 (Goodwin, 2002: 293). 
In order to seek expert testimony on the viewpoint of the aid agency/NGO community, 
a relationship was fostered with an expert witness within the Corporate Responsibility 
(CORE) Coalition.
39
 Although this expert witness is not directly involved in every 
organisation within the aid agency/NGO community, this witness was able to 
authoritatively describe the viewpoint of that community as a representative of the 
CORE Coalition. Such an expert witness should only agree to accept questions that can 
be answered with professional competence (Sanders, 2007: 1545), and thus it was 
established at the commencement of the interview whether he or she felt equipped to 
deal with the line of enquiry. 
In order to provide balance in interviewee evidence, Rubinfeld (1985: 1096) 
proposed choosing a neutral expert. As it turned out, the views of this ‘neutral’ expert 
witness provided decisive weight against the evidence provided by the academic 
community (see below) when the interviews were analysed (Posner, 1999: 96). It should 
be noted that this witness providing expert testimony is usually forced not to grant 
interviews because of a busy schedule, but was willing to grant a face-to-face interview 
                                                 
38
 A useful analogy can be made here by considering the defence of the Los Angeles police officers who 
were on trail for the beating of Rodney King. The event was caught on video tape, but the defence 
lawyers did not treat the tape as a record that spoke for itself. Rather, they contested that the tape could 
only be understood by embedding what happened within the daily work life of the law enforcement 
profession. Using expert testimony from law enforcement agents who were not present at the scene of the 
event, the defence established that the police officers could legitimately use force if they perceived 
Rodney King’s actions as aggressive and/or a threat as this is the common perceptual framework that is 
shared by all law enforcement agents. Therefore, expert witnesses who were not directly involved in the 
event described authoritatively how the police officers could legitimately act in their professional opinion 
(Goodwin, 2002: 292-293). 
 
39
 The CORE Coalition is an alliance of over 130 members including representatives from ethical 
businesses; women’s, religious, and development and human rights groups; all lead by a steering group of 
Action Aid, Amnesty International UK, Friends of the Earth, TraidCraft, War on Want, and the WWF 
(GB). All of the Coalition’s members within the aid agency/NGO community believe that to improve 
how UK companies behave, there is a need for greater transparency, and a greater accountability of 
businesses for their impacts on people and the environment (CORE Coalition: 2009).  
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on this occasion due to the fact that the initial contact was engaged with professionally, 
namely a letter of introduction stating the nature of the inquiry and the information 
required.  
Having identified a community with the necessary characteristics (purposive 
sampling), snowball sampling, can be used to identify other potential interviewees with 
the same characteristics (Gobo, 2008: 418-419). It should be noted here that the expert 
witness was asked to recommend other people/organisations who could provide similar 
testimony, and a couple of recommendations were made.
40
 However, after engaging in 
contact with them, they declined to grant interviews because of busy schedules.    
3.8.3: Sampling the academic community. 
In addition to the aid agency/NGO community, the academic community was also 
regarded as having the necessary characteristics. Academics that had a detailed 
understanding of the issues in question as they accommodated them within their 
professional activity were contacted. The position and biography of the academics was 
established in order to identify the kind of knowledge that could be procured. Once 
these academics regarded as having the relevant knowledge were engaged with, they 
were asked to recommend other academics with the necessary characteristics.  
However, such snowball sampling only produced a handful of academics who 
were considered to have adequate knowledge, as the selection criteria for interviewing 
this community was seeking those academics who were the leaders in their field. 
Nevertheless, qualitative research that involves conducting interviews usually means 
asking open-ended questions to small samples (Silverman, 2006: 19). Open-ended and 
flexible questions in a semi-structured interview obtained considered responses that 
reflected an interviewee’s views, understandings, and opinions. This achieved a level of 
in-depth understanding which is unique to this approach (Byrne, 2004: 182).  
3.8.4: The reason for selecting expert witnesses.  
An expert witness is not an advisor or consultant, but someone who testifies, offering 
what the legal profession would regard as evidence. The principal significance of this 
classification is that expert witnesses are invited to offer an opinion rather than being 
limited to merely testifying from personal knowledge. People acting as expert 
witnesses, including most business and economic expert witnesses, and unlike most lay 
                                                 
40
 This were Rising Tide and Tomorrow’s Company.  
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witnesses, have an interest in creating and preserving their professional reputation by 
being honest and/or competent respondents. This means that they are highly likely to 
only give answers and/or opinions that are based upon their expert knowledge. Even if 
an expert witness, in this case the academic expert witnesses, has no record of academic 
publication (such as was the case for Doctor Hale)
41
 or is providing expert testimony 
about matters on which he or she has never published (such as Doctor Gbadamosi), the 
witness would appreciate that their evidence will be subject to intense critical scrutiny 
in the analytical stage of the thesis, which would deter irresponsible testifying (Posner, 
1999: 92-94). This brings attention to the reason for seeking testimony from experts, 
especially the academic expert witnesses with extensive published material, which is the 
fact that during an interview, the interviewer can engage in probing.   
 In qualitative research the interviewer can ask probing and clarifying questions 
to establish more detailed accounts that would not be possible by, for example, simply 
reading an academic’s publications (Molloy and Woodfield, 2002: 6). Because the 
purpose of engaging in qualitative research interviews was to gain a deep understanding 
of the interviewee’s experience and perspective, using probes effectively was an 
important tool. By probing an interviewee, the richness of the data was enhanced, with 
the result that a better understanding of the phenomenon was generated (Maykut and 
Morehouse, 2004: 95). 
Patton (1990: 238) defines a probe as ‘an interview tool used to go deeper into 
the interview responses’, and the generation of deeper meaning required active 
questioning and probing (Hopf, 2004: 204). Probing questions generated full 
explanations as to why phenomena occurs (Molloy and Woodfield, 2002: 32). The 
probes were essentially a tool to communicate to the interviewee what was required, be 
it more detail, elaboration, or clarity. In this way, the probes provided guidance to the 
person interviewed.
42
 Furthermore, the probes provided the author of this thesis, as the 
interviewer, with a way to maintain control of the interview in order to extract the 
information required. (Patton, 1990: 327). 
 
                                                 
41
 See Box 3.6. 
 
42
 The kinds of probes that were utilised during the interviews are outlined in Box 3.2. 
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Probes were utilised to deepen the responses to a set of questions, and to give cues 
to the interviewee about the level of response that was required. The word probe 
itself was actually avoided during the conduct of the interviews. This is because 
the expression ‘let me probe that further’ tends to sound as if the interviewer is 
preparing to conduct an investigation into something illicit or illegal. Rather, a 
probe was used as a follow-up question to go deeper into the interviewee’s 
responses, and as such, the probes were conversational and offered in a natural 
style and voice. 
There were essentially three types of probes that were utilised during the 
course of conducting the interviews, as will now be outlined. 
Conversational probes. 
Conversational probes were an extension to the basic how and why questions, and 
were used to obtain a more complete and detailed picture. These probes were used 
to fill in the blank spaces of a response, and involved asking follow-up questions 
such as:  
How did that come about? 
Why did that happen? 
Elaboration probes. 
There were times during an interview when the requirement to keep the 
interviewee talking about an issue was necessary, particularly because it was 
deemed that the quality of the response being received was high and relevant. In 
such cases elaboration probes were used. Elaboration probes involve ways to cue 
interviewees that they should keep talking. The best cue that was utilised to 
encourage continued talking was a gentle nod of the head accompanied by a 
spoken ‘yes’, both of whom were intended to communicate that the interviewee 
was being listened to and the interviewer wanted to go on listening because the 
response was interesting and answering the question. 
Together with the simple spoken ‘yes’, elaboration probes with more 
direct verbal forms were used, consisting of a statement or request that the  
Box 3.2: Probes Utilised during the Interviews (Patton, 1990: 324-326). 
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An interview schedule
43
 is a set of questions or issues to be explored during the 
course of an interview. The interview schedule provided topics or subject areas within 
which there was a freedom to explore, probe, and ask questions that illuminated the 
issues. The idea was that a conversation could be instigated, but with a focus upon 
particular issues that were predetermined (Patton, 1990: 283). The ability to follow-up 
on the initial themes in the interview schedule was possible through careful probing, 
which on some occasions brought to light new issues that were actually beyond the 
scope of the original questions (Molloy and Woodfield, 2002: 23).  
The probes were not written into the interview schedule. Rather, they were held 
in reserve and used when the need arose (Maykut and Morehouse, 2004: 95). This is 
because probing is a skill that comes from knowing what information is being sought in 
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interviewee should keep talking: 
Can you give me some more detail about this? 
Clarification probes. 
There were times when an interviewee needed to be encouraged to keep talking 
because the response was not fully understood, and in such cases clarification 
probes were used. Clarification probes told the interviewee that more information 
was required, or that what was being said was not being understood, and involved 
a simple verbal expression such as: 
Could you clarify on that?  
It should be noted here that a clarification probe was used naturally and 
gently. This is because an interviewer must convey the notion that the failure to 
understand is the fault of the interviewer, since an interviewee could be made to 
feel uncomfortable and/or inarticulate if the impression is given that it is the 
interviewee’s fault that there is confusion. When such instances occurred, one 
attempt at achieving clarification was made, but then the issue was left behind 
with the possibility of returning to it later if confusion persisted. 
Box 3.2 continued. 
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an interview, listening to what is said and what is not said, and then utilising the probes 
accordingly. Clarifying questions were written down in the interview schedule as 
examples of probes to be used when necessary, but in practice, combinations of these 
were used (Patton, 1990: 327). 
Attention will now turn to why these particular academics were chosen to be 
expert witnesses. Professor Child, as can been seen in Box 3.3, has had a distinguished 
career in which he has acquired extensive knowledge of Chinese business issues, and he 
was indeed recommended as the leading academic expert in this field in the UK.
44
 
Professor Frynas was recommended as having extensive knowledge and experience that 
was highly appropriate for this thesis,
45
 especially when one considers his research 
interests.
46
 Both are world renowned experts; whereas Doctor Gbadamosi can be 
regarded as well informed with diverse experiences of the African environment,
47
 and 
from personal knowledge of his African experience gained from his supervisory role to 
the author of this thesis, he was thus deemed a valuable interviewee. These academics 
all have an impressive history of producing extensive published material. Although 
Doctor  Hale does not such a record, he was recommended as having a well informed 
viewpoint of the Chinese business environment
48
 that has been gained from extensive 
teaching experience on the subject (for which he has won an award),
49
 especially since 
he was able to offer a historical perspective which was deemed highly relevant.         
3.8.5: Sampling key informants. 
A key informant account was deemed appropriate as the inquiry demands in-depth 
information that cannot be expected to be procured from representative survey 
respondents. A key informant was not selected to be representative of the members of 
an organisation, but because they are knowledgeable about the issues in question and 
because they are able and willing to communicate them. In addition, a key informant 
should be closely associated with the phenomena under investigation. A key informant  
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 This recommendation was made by Doctor Hantang Qi, the external supervisor of this thesis. 
 
45
 This recommendation was made by Professor Child after the interview. 
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 See Box 3.4. 
 
47
 See Box 3.5. 
 
48
 This recommendation was made by Worcester Business School staff. 
 
49
 See Box 3.6. 
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is chosen on the basis of their formal position within an organisation, and is considered  
to be uniquely qualified to answer questions relating to the inquiry, or in other words,  
they have informant competency. This issue of informant competence is often tied with  
decisions not use multiple key informants.  
 
Professor John Child has both a Masters in Economics and a PhD in Management 
from the University of Cambridge, who also awarded him a ScD for outstanding 
scholarly work in 1984. He has been awarded honorary doctorates by the Helsinki 
School of Economics in 1996 and by Corvinus University, Budapest in 2009. He 
was elected a Fellow of the Academy of Management and of the British Academy 
of Management in 2002. In 2004, he received the Distinguished Contribution 
Award from the International Association for Chinese Management Research. In 
2006, he was made an Honorary Member of the European Group for Organisation 
Studies, recognising his contribution to the study of organisations, and in the 
same year, he was elected a Fellow of the British Academy.  
During his distinguished academic career, which includes being Dean of 
the Aston Business School from 1986 to 1989 and being seconded to the position 
of Dean and Director of the China-European Community Management Centre in 
Beijing during 1989-90; he has published numerous book chapters, together with 
articles in internationally recognised journals such as the Management and 
Organisation Review, Journal of International Management,  Journal of 
Management Studies, Strategic Management Journal, Journal of Business 
Research, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Journal of International Business 
Studies, Journal of Management and Governance, Organisation Science, and 
Organisation Studies for which he was Editor-in-Chief from 1992 to 1996. 
His research interests include management and economic reform in China, 
strategic alliances, and the evolution of new organisational forms. 
Box 3.3: Professor John Child. Source: http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/ 
schools/business/staff/profile.aspx?ReferenceId=4573&Name=professor-
john-child (accessed 29/02/2012). 
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According to Kumar et al (1993: 1634-1635), many scholars explain that their 
decision not to use multiple key informants is due to a lack of qualified people with 
adequate knowledge. However, few researchers formally report about the unavailability 
of suitable, multiple key informants. The issue of informant competence, together with 
the fact that it often requires significant efforts to obtain just a single organisational key 
informant, demands that a researcher explains the reasons for not using multiple key 
informants. In addition, potential key informants, just like expert witnesses, may have 
busy schedules which dictate that they may not be willing to grant interviews, or the 
time that they can spare for an interview may be short. 
Key informants must be knowledgeable of the issues under consideration 
(Walter et al, 2001: 369) in order for them to have informant competency. Suitable 
qualified key informants were contacted within Anglo American and BP, and these 
came from the relevant departments within these organisations in order for them 
 
Professor Jedrzej George Frynas has a BA/MA in History from the University of 
Cambridge and a PhD in Management, Economics, and Politics from the 
University of St Andrews. He is the founding member of the International 
Research Network on Business, Development and Society which embraces 
scholars from Argentina, Denmark, India, South Africa, the UK, and the USA. 
His research interests include CSR, international business strategy, MNCs, 
developing economies, and the oil and gas sector. He also has an extensive list of 
published works, which includes journal articles in the Journal of Business Ethics, 
Management International Review, Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, Third World Quarterly, Strategic Management Journal, International 
Affairs, and Socio-Economic Review. He has also jointly published/edited three 
books, together with his sole publication Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility: 
Oil Multinationals and Social Challenges (2009).  
Box 3.4: Professor Jedrzej George Frynas. Source: http://www.mdx.ac.uk/ 
aboutus/staffdirectory/Jedrzej_George_Frynas.aspx (accessed 29/02/2012). 
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to have the adequate knowledge. Multiple key informants would not have an adequate 
knowledge of the issues surrounding these firms’ operations.  
Anglo American, the corporation considered in this thesis for comparative 
purposes, was contacted prior to BP, since another corporate viewpoint upon the issues 
was deemed relevant. Although a relevant key informant within Anglo American who 
could suitably report on the issues under consideration did not have time to grant a face-
to-face interview, the alternative of offering an email interview was agreed to. This 
respondent understood and agreed that by engaging in an email interview, the right to 
anonymity was effectively being waived. Therefore, there was no problem with 
information being exchanged online.
50
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 See section 3.10.1.  
Doctor Gbola Gbadamosi has international teaching and research experience in 
organisational behaviour and human resource management. He has a diverse 
background that includes work and academic experiences from five countries, 
including Nigeria and Botswana, together with the UNDP. He is a member of the 
Chartered Management Institute, the Academy of International Business, and the 
International Management Development Association; together with acting as 
Track Chair for the World Business Congress, International Management 
Development Association and for the International Academy for African Business 
and Development, both since 2003. He has published a number of book chapters 
from conference proceedings together with journal articles in, for example, the 
Journal of Management Development, South Africa Journal of Economics and 
Management Studies, Journal of Global Business and Technology, Management 
Decision, and Journal of African Business for which he is currently a member of 
the editorial board. In addition, he serves as reviewer for over a dozen other 
scholarly journals. His research interests include unethical behaviour, 
organisational commitment, and management in developing countries. 
Box 3.5: Doctor Gbola Gbadamosi. Source: http://www.worcester.ac.uk/ 
discover/dr-gbolahan-gbadamosi.html (accessed 29/02/2012).  
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Concerning BP however, a similar response was received to that from the 
majority of the aid agency/NGO community. In reply to an introductory contact letter, 
also stating the nature of the inquiry and the information required, BP failed to grant an 
interview because they too are overwhelmed with interview requests and they 
subsequently have a policy of not granting interviews. Nevertheless, BP did point 
towards the secondary data that is already in the public domain, explaining that most of 
the questions that this research would want answering would be available via this 
secondary data, including company reports on their website. Acknowledging that this 
was a genuine attempt to help, BPs and other company reports were utilised.
51
 
3.9: The third point: formulating the questions to ask. 
With the population defined, and the interviewees selected, it was then necessary to 
formulate the questions to ask. The two main approaches for achieving this are the 
structured questionnaire and the semi-structured interview schedule. Structured  
questionnaires are applicable to sample surveys, mainly to answer ‘what?’ questions.  
However, as Woodhouse (2007: 165-166) stated, structured questionnaires are  
inappropriate for answering ‘why?’ or ‘how?’ questions. Such questions may include,  
for example, why do you implement this practice? Or how do present practices  
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 See section 3.4. 
Doctor Andrew Hale has a first degree in Economics and Economic History and 
his PhD examined the role of Canadian national policies in the nineteenth century. 
He was involved in teacher training on the PGCE Economics course at the 
University of Worcester for many years. He specialises in teaching on economics 
courses has been awarded the Student Recognition Award for his module 
‘Contemporary Global Systems’, which contains significant material on China. 
He is a member of the HEA Economics Network for which he is a link tutor, and 
he has been awarded a national ‘Outstanding Teacher Award’ by the Economics 
Network. His research interests involve the British economy and comparative 
performance.  
Box 3.6: Doctor Andrew Hale. Source: http://www.worcester.ac.uk/discover/ 
dr-andrew-hale.html (accessed 29/02/2012). 
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represent a change in relation to the past? Such questions were required by this research 
and can only be answered in the interviewees’ own words, in an open-ended format. In 
addition, since the answers to such questions tend to be complex and may require 
further questions for clarification, as well as probing, it is difficult to frame such 
questions in a standardised way that a structured questionnaire would demand. 
Therefore, the ‘why?’ and ‘how?’ questions demanded for the nature of this inquiry 
were addressed using a semi-structured interview schedule, as this allowed the issues to 
be explored with the interviewees in a flexible way, with supplementary questions for 
the purpose of clarification, and in addition, new unforeseen lines of relevant inquiry 
arose during most interviews.  
A semi-structured interview schedule uses pre-planned questions in order to  
initiate a conversation which can flow in various directions (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 
2008: 80). A semi-structured interview schedule has a sequence of themes to be 
covered, together with suggested questions. At the same time however, there is an  
openness to changes of sequence and forms of questions to enable the interviewer to  
follow-up upon the answers given (Kvale, 1996: 124). Silverman (2003: 229) believes  
that the reliability of interview schedules can be enhanced if the interviewees  
understand the questions and if themes can be identified without the possibility of  
misinterpretation. Silverman feels that this can be achieved by pre-testing an interview  
schedule.  
The interview schedule was thus pre-tested.
52
 This was be done by interviewing 
an African insider who was an existing well-informed contact, in order to refine the 
conversational nature of the interviews, and to receive ideas that could be formulated 
into further questions. In addition, although there was a pre-set list of themes and 
questions to be covered, as Saunders et al (2009: 320) suggested, these varied from 
interview to interview, and were even omitted from certain interviews, given the 
specific interviewee being encountered; namely aid agencies, NGOs, and academics at 
                                                 
52
 See Appendix 8, followed by the interview transcripts. Appendix 9 contains the transcript of the face-
to-face interview with Professor Child. Appendix 10 contains the transcript of the face-to-face interview 
with the CORE Coalition anonymous source. Appendix 11 contains the transcript of the face-to-face 
interview with Professor Frynas. Appendix 12 contains the transcript of the face-to-face interview with 
Doctor Gbadamosi. Appendix 13 contains the transcript of follow-up email questioning with Doctor 
Gbadamosi. Appendix 14 contains the transcript of the face-to-face interview with Doctor Hale. 
Appendix 15 contains the transcript of the email interview with Jonathan Samuel of Anglo American. 
Appendix 16 contains the transcript of follow-up email questioning with Jonathan Samuel. 
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one end of the spectrum, and Anglo American at the other end. This is known as an 
‘iterative, learning-process’ design, which provides flexibility, and importantly, a semi-
structured approach is suited to a situation where a researcher is trying to understand an 
unfamiliar social situation (Woodhouse, 2007: 166), and indeed, the African setting was 
relatively unfamiliar to the author at the outset of the project. In essence, the interview 
schedule was utilised as a guideline to stimulate a conversation, with many questions 
acting as cues. Nevertheless, since the interview with Anglo American was conducted 
via email, together with follow-up questioning via email, these questions had to be more 
structured.  
3.10: An ethical outcome in interviewing: what is right and good.         
The traditional position that ethics committees take is to view ethics as being what the 
researcher does to subjects (Kellehear, 1993: 14). Such controversies constitute what 
Schwandt (1995: 133-134) describes as wrestling with problems of identity and 
researcher-respondent relationships. Therefore, to achieve a truly ethical outcome, it 
was reflected upon ‘what is right to do and good to be as’ an ‘inquirer’. The first way 
that this was achieved was by recognising that the author was actually performing the 
primary research data collection, and was consequently, securing a role of dominance. 
However, this powerful position could have caused problems. For example, an 
ethnographer may encourage the sharing of personal information with interviewees to 
open windows to be explored, or in other words, act as a friend. However, this requires 
caution to make sure that what is discussed in an interview is not too open, which may 
result in the researcher being cast in the role of the exploiter or betrayer of a friendly 
relationship based upon trust (de Laine, 2000: 115, 136). This highlights the fact that 
appropriate boundaries have to be maintained when conducting interviews. Overlapping 
roles and relationships (researcher/friend) presents a potential boundary violation. As a 
result, the researcher needs to understand the importance of the power differential in the 
professional relationship (when conducting the interview) with an interviewee with 
which a prior attachment had been formed. To address this dilemma, an appropriate 
strategy was adopted which prevented the author from misusing their power (Biaggio 
and Greene, 1995: 99-118). This embraced the management of anonymity and 
confidentiality.  
Confidentiality and anonymity are often perceived as meaning the same thing.  
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King and Horrocks (2010: 119-120) regard this as a mistake. Whilst recognising that the  
two concepts are related, they feel that confidentiality and anonymity have quite distinct  
meanings that are critical in relation to interviews in qualitative research. 
Confidentiality can be viewed as being equivalent to the principle of privacy.  
Consequently, if a researcher assures confidentiality then that suggests that anything 
that is said in a qualitative interview would remain private and would not be repeated or 
reproduced. This was deemed unrealistic because the point of undertaking a qualitative 
interview was to report the findings. Therefore, rather than offering confidentiality, it 
was far more appropriate to offer anonymity to utilise the data generated in the 
qualitative interviews. Anonymity meant concealing the identity of the interviewee 
when the findings were reported, actively protecting the identity of research 
participants. Offering anonymity acted as an incentive to encourage the participation of 
interviewees. However, in some cases an interviewee may, for whatever reason, waive 
their right to anonymity. Nevertheless, it is still the researcher’s responsibility to offer 
anonymity, and consent was obtained from interviewees that wished to waive their right 
to anonymity. Therefore, by offering anonymity to any potential interviewee, and 
especially to participants with whom a prior attachment had been formed, an 
appropriate strategy to avoid misusing power was identified.  
Despite adopting a dominant professional role in an interview with an 
interviewee that could also be perceived as a friend, it is quite possible that the 
interviewee (adopting the guise of friend) revealed information that the participant 
would not normally divulge. Offering anonymity in this case is of great importance 
because the interviewee might be nervous about such information being reported, and 
having their identity protected may ease his or her fears.  
The key point in terms of ethics is that once the interviews were transcribed, the 
participants were shown the transcriptions in order to seek their approval to reproduce. 
All of the members of the academic community waived their right to anonymity and 
gave their consent, whilst the person who gave expert testimony from the aid 
agency/NGO community expressed that he or she had revealed information that he or 
she would not normally divulge, and consequently, preferred to be an anonymous 
source. In addition, the use of low-inference descriptors
53
 were utilised to assure the  
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respondents that the information reported would be accurate, and therefore, participants 
were asked if they are happy with the interview being recorded. When interviews were 
conducted by email, the need for low-inference descriptors was easily satisfied because 
the participants have already done their own transcribing. 
In contrast to the aid agency/NGO expert witness and academics, the key  
informant from Anglo American was the subject of the research. This had the  
potential to promote the situation, as de Laine (2000: 54) describes, of the ‘researcher as  
prey’. Acknowledging the fact that a participant-observer, new to fieldwork, might be 
manipulated to serve the self-interests of a group being researched, de Laine stresses 
that participants may exaggerate their positions, practices, and/or prowess. Adapting  
this idea to this research project, it was possible that Anglo American could have used 
the interviews with them to promote their own corporate interests, and indeed, 
exaggerate their positions, practices, and/or prowess. Anglo American could have, it 
may be argued, used this research project to defend and/or promote themselves. This 
highlights the ethical responsibility that, according to Sekaran and Bougie (2010: 222),  
participants must have, which is that misrepresentation should be avoided. The way that  
this problem was addressed was by using the research question as the guiding principle  
Silverman (2003: 226) believes that reliability in qualitative research can be 
achieved by the use of low-inference descriptors. This involves recording 
observations so that they are as concrete as possible. This means that accounts of 
what people say should not be the researchers’ reconstructions of the general 
sense of what was said, as this would allow the researchers’ personal 
perspectives to influence the accounts of what people say (Seale, 1999: 148). 
One can satisfy the need for low-inference descriptors by: 
 tape recording semi-structured interviews, 
 transcribing these tapes according to the needs of reliable analysis, 
 presenting lengthy extracts of the interviews in the thesis, along with the  
questions that provoked the answers.  
Box 3.7: Low-inference Descriptors (Silverman, 2003: 229-230). 
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for what was reproduced. Information that was divulged that provides insights for  
answering the research question was reported, whilst any information that may serve the  
participant’s own agendas was simply omitted unless it was perceived as being relevant. 
3.10.1: Face-to-face versus online interviewing.  
Face-to-face interviews hold a number of advantages over email interviewing. Probing  
can be more easily conducted during face-to-face contact, and it is much easier for the  
interviewer and interviewee to establish a rapport because of the conversational nature  
of a face-to-face interview. Consequently, this personal approach was capitalised upon 
in the face-to-face interviews, with the result that the quality of information that was 
received was higher (Bryman and Bell, 2007: 673). Nevertheless, the major advantage 
of email interviewing is that participants may be more able to fit the interview into their 
time. Online interviewing significantly diminishes the difficulties of scheduling which 
may be problematic for the interviewer and particularly for an interviewee with a busy 
workload (Markham, 2004: 362). Therefore, potential respondents were given the 
opportunity to engage in an email interview if they were unable to fit a face-to-face 
interview into their schedule. 
Conducting email or online interviews does run the risk of the participant  
dropping out of the exchange, and the interviewer is less able to have an impact upon  
the interview due to the fact that they are more remote. However, online contact did  
have the advantage of the author developing a relationship of mutual trust with  
respondents because of repeated interaction. Developing a relationship of this nature 
promoted a longer term commitment to the face-to-face interview contact. In addition, 
follow-up probes or questioning were made easier with online contact because of the 
difficulties of arranging follow-up face-to-face contact. Nevertheless, conducting email 
or online interviews did raise the issue of the participant’s privacy. Protection of the 
respondent’s anonymity is almost impossible in online contact due to the fact that the 
information concerning the origin of an online message, revealed in the header for 
example, is extremely hard to remove (Bryman, 2008: 642, 656). This could have had 
consequences once information was exchanged online, because the source of that 
information would not be anonymous. Therefore, when an email interview was engaged 
in, it was pointed-out prior to that interview that it was assumed that the respondent was 
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automatically waiving their right to anonymity due to the fact that the source of online 
contact is hard to remove. 
3.11: The fourth point: analysis of the responses. 
The final stage of the four-point strategy was to analyse the responses. The task here 
was to gather together the evidence that the inquiry had generated and to summarise the  
findings. The findings were validated by triangulation, which is whether the information 
obtained from different sources led to the same conclusions (Woodhouse, 2007: 166, 
171). Triangulation is a key way to provide rigour
54
 in semi-structured interviews. This 
is important in case study research so that findings, when open to challenge, can be seen 
to show that as more and more detail comes to light, the same basic explanations remain 
constant, which can be regarded as a useful result. (Thomas, 2007: 322). Data 
triangulation involves using a variety of sources within a single study
55
 (King and 
Horrocks, 2010: 164). Nevertheless, Woodhouse (2007: 170) states that the principle of 
triangulation reminds researchers that whilst pursuing their inquiry by talking to people, 
they need to cross-check the interview findings with other relevant sources, such as an 
earlier literature review. Whilst data was collected from a variety of sources, the 
interview findings were cross-checked against the literature and/or other interviewees.  
3.11.1: Interview analysis as bricolage. 
Many interview analyses are conducted without following one specific analytical 
method. Researchers are then free to change between differing techniques and 
approaches. This is known as interview analysis as bricolage. Such an eclectic form of 
generating meaning, by using a multiplicity of ad hoc methods, is common in interview 
analysis. Using this research as an example, the author read through the interview 
transcripts to get an initial overall impression, and then went back to identify key ideas 
that emerged, and put the parts of the interview that were significant to the inquiry into 
a narrative. By adopting this tactic, coding, as a key concept of content analysis, was  
used to reduce the interview’s meaning into categories that made it possible to identify 
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 Rigour means an ability to show that one has obtained enough evidence to justify one’s conclusions, 
that the evidence has been properly obtained, and that evidence to the contrary has been sought but found 
to be unavailable or relatively unconvincing (Thomas, 1998: 13).  
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 For example, if one were to conduct a study to understand children’s responses to crime, interviews 
would be conducted not only with the children themselves, but also with parents, youth workers, and the 
police (King and Horrocks, 2010: 164). 
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how often certain themes were addressed, or in other words, to identify patterns. In 
addition, another technique known as narrative analysis was utilised. Narrative analysis 
focuses upon the stories that are told during interviews and works out their plots and 
structures. Concrete episodes that are significant to the inquiry emerged from a story, 
and furthermore, a story told by an interviewee may be appropriate for inclusion in the 
narration of the thesis itself (Kvale, 2007: 105, 112, 115).  
 Baker (2003: 297) stated that coding after data collection should be the first step 
in reducing data to understandable patterns. Baker feels that the researcher would have a 
topic in which he or she would be interested in, and this would inform the selection of 
the material in the data to be analysed, or in other words, the nature of the inquiry 
should enable the researcher to identify relevant objects in the data. After coding, 
engaging in narrative analysis enables the researcher to analyse the conversation that 
has been conducted with an interviewee and identify what extracts can be drawn upon to 
suit the demands of a research project (Riessman, 2011: 312).  
Qualitative research has historically been grounded in the ethnographic field. 
Ethnography can be defined as producing a published story that gives the reader a word 
picture (or narrative) of and/or about a group of people. However, qualitative research 
practice has expanded to include a wide range of disciplines resulting in numerous 
methodologies, including case studies, participant–observation, grounded study, and 
action-research, all of which are epistemologically different. These differences have led 
to attempts to standardise analytical practices, such as coding.  
Coding involves breaking down the narratives told in interviews into sections, 
dividing the sections into bites, and then reorganising these bites according to perceived 
connections or themes. The problem with coding is that it assumes that narratives are 
too long and complex to use in their entirety, and that interview data can be controlled 
and best understood when it is divided up into smaller parts. Furthermore, breaking up 
the narratives told in interviews may not bring the qualitative researcher any closer to 
clarifying what the interview data tells. Information, findings, and conclusions do not 
magically emerge on their own from a series of data bites. They emerge from the 
researcher’s own intuitive/cognitive perceptions upon reviewing the data.  
Therefore, the author preserved the essential substance of some interview 
narratives when it was considered appropriate, whilst at the same time dividing other 
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interview data into smaller parts for the purpose of analysis (Mello, 2002: 234-235, 
242).   
3.11.2: Analytical narrative. 
Analytic narratives have been employed to explain complex phenomena in development 
issues. For example, Hesselbein (2007: 1) used an analytical narrative to investigate the 
varying nature and strength of the state in the Congo from colonial times through to the 
post independence years. Golooba-Mutebi (2008: 1) used an analytical narrative to 
examine developments in post-1994 Rwanda against the background of pre-1994 
politics and society to highlight the factors that led to war and eventual genocide. In 
studying history, institutions, and development, Bardhan (2005: vii) produced 
arguments that were more discursive than in technical journal articles, providing a 
coherent and logical structure and an analytical narrative. Bates et al (2000: 697) feel 
that although general laws may not be derived at, analytic narratives can employ theory 
to gain deep insights into the complex workings of what is happening in the real world. 
An analytic narrative was appropriate for this inquiry, as it is making use of a theory 
(co-evolution) and has sought in-depth understandings from specialists who possess a 
unique knowledge of the phenomenon. In addition, it has largely been applied to 
development issues which are important in this thesis.      
Krug (2007: 114) studied how new institutions and organisations (for example, 
firms) evolved in China, highlighting the casual factors, and believed that this called for 
a special methodology that Krug described as analytical narrative, whereby interviews 
provide raw data for understanding business evolution. With a combination of in-depth  
interviews and historical firm studies, a rich pool of information can be generated to  
facilitate an understanding of the phenomena. Krug used this approach following on  
from Greif (1993: 525), who believed that few studies have attempted to analyse  
historical institutional frameworks, even though such knowledge can facilitate an  
understanding of the institutional constraints that developing economies still face.  
Therefore, Greif presented a paper studying an economic institution using historical  
records, highlighting the interaction between differing economic institutions, and found  
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that agency relations were governed by a coalition, the Maghribi Traders Coalition,
56
 in  
which implicit contractual relations were negotiated.  
Bates et al (2000: 696) stress that in analytic narratives one is attempting to  
address several issues. Firstly, the researcher may be engaged in in-depth case studies,  
seeking to contribute to and/or to make use of theory. Secondly, a researcher may be  
attempting to gain an understanding from a specialist who possesses unique knowledge  
of a phenomenon. Thirdly, what benefits can be secured by formalising verbal  
accounts? Elster (1999: 2) claimed that social scientists should do no more than develop  
a repertoire of mechanisms. Elster believes that the failure of social science to predict  
and the predictions that failed can only be rectified by embracing an approach that can  
provide a measure of explanatory power.  
3.11.3: Analysing narratives. 
Denzin (1998: 407) observed that qualitative researchers could construct representations  
of lived experiences. Nevertheless, in so doing, qualitative researchers could also fall  
into the trap of producing texts that represent a person’s biases, beliefs, or agendas. To  
address this challenge, the author carefully placed the narratives and opinions of 
interviewees alongside the author’s own perspectives. This was achieved by connecting 
interview data. In essence, the author became a storyteller, linking the use and 
reproduction of stories that were told by interviewees with the analytical discourse of 
the literature study so that the reproduction of interview data complimented the 
literature study (Mello, 2002: 241). Narrative can be defined as a sequence of ordered 
events that are connected in a meaningful way to make sense of the world and/or 
people’s experiences and opinions. In contrast to a list or chronicle, a narrative actually 
adds up to something (Bell, 2009: 8). Determining what Bell described as ‘something’ 
was the task that the author faced. This task was achieved by engaging in a narrative 
analysis, where the author asked, for example: 
 How did the interviewee gain experience to tell this story? 
 Why was the story told? 
 What significance do specific words that an interviewee uses have?  
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 The Maghribi Traders were Jewish traders from the Abbasid caliphate (centred around Baghdad) who 
moved to North Africa in the first half of the tenth century, and later some moved elsewhere in the 
Mediterranean. The name Maghribi is the Muslim world’s West, and they got this name upon moving to 
North Africa, which is the Muslim world’s West (Greif, 1989: 861-862). 
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 What other interpretations are possible, beyond what the interviewee intended? 
By asking these questions in the analytical phase of reviewing the interview data, the  
author drew upon and expanded the data to suit the demands of the inquiry (Riessman, 
2011: 312-313).  
3.12: Summary. 
The literature review was important because the literature study complimented the 
secondary data (company reports) and the primary data, and a critical review of the 
literature was part of the research and was not a pretext to another form of research. The 
case study design meant that Angola was chosen as a critical case to develop an in-
depth understanding of the issues in order to answer the research question. 
Nevertheless, Angola is also an extreme or unique case because of the intrinsic factors 
that are unique to that country, although it is more of a representative or typical case 
because Angola exemplifies the broader category of oil exploration and extraction in 
Africa. Since this thesis is concerned with procuring in-depth accounts from people who 
are perceived as being knowledgeable about the issues in question, a qualitative 
research strategy was appropriate. This is because co-evolutionary studies should use 
event history modelling and contextual insights to understand what sort of co-evolution 
is taking place, calling for qualitative insights to compliment event history descriptions.  
In the semi-structured interview schedule the questions were worded so that the 
responses were open-ended. This open-endedness allowed the interviewee to contribute 
as much detailed information as they desired and allowed the interviewer to ask probing 
questions (Turner, 2010: 756). The four-point strategy to seek knowledgeable people’s 
views that was adopted is normally applied to development issues, which is highly 
appropriate when one considers that the case was Angola and what a MNC can do to 
promote development there. The interviews to procure knowledgeable people’s views 
were conducted at the final stage of the research project; and these interviews, together 
with relevant secondary data (company reports), were utilised to test out the research 
agenda that had previously been established via the literature review.  
The reproduction of the primary data from interviews was coded prior to being 
utilised, whilst other interview extracts were put into a narrative in which the author, in 
effect, became a storyteller by linking the use and reproduction of stories told by 
interviewees with the analytical discourse of the literature study. Then the information 
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obtained in company reports was tested by interviewee evidence and/or the literature 
study in a balanced analysis. 
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Chapter 4: The resource curse and business 
principles.     
“In recent years ... [being] socially responsible ... [has] become an 
integral part of corporate governance policies” (Mallin, 2004: 79). 
 
4.1: Introduction. 
This chapter will outline the issue of the recourse curse to set the stage for the CSR 
agenda. This is because business efforts to address the resource curse embraces a key 
feature of the broader development of the CSR agenda (Forstater et al, 2010: 14). In 
addition, it will establish an operational definition of CSR for the purpose of this thesis. 
Furthermore, before investigating the historical implementation of BP’s CSR principles 
and making a comparative study of Anglo American in Chapter 5, the business case for 
CSR will be established, before considering the general implementation of CSR 
principles in the Western extractive industry sector. Finally, the link between corporate 
governance and CSR will be outlined.  
4.2: What the resource curse is. 
Before outlining what the resource curse actually is, it is helpful to clarify what it is not.  
Firstly, as some believe, the resource curse is not a claim that natural resource  
abundance is always bad for economic development. There are powerful historical  
examples of successful resource-based development.
57
 However, there are only a few 
cases of successful economic development based on the export of oil.
58
 Secondly, the 
resource curse does not only refer to possessing oil and/or other minerals, but rather it 
refers to countries that are overwhelmingly dependent upon these revenues. Finally, the 
resource curse is not a claim that oil and mineral exporting countries would be better off 
without these resources. What matters is not the inherent character of the resource itself, 
but how the wealth generated by these resources are shared and utilised. Simply, the 
resource curse refers to the inverse relationship between high natural resource 
dependence and economic growth rates. Recent studies have shown that developing 
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 These include Australia, Canada, Chile, Norway, and the USA. 
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 Successful development based on the export of oil has only really occurred in the Middle East, in 
countries such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.  
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countries that depend on oil and mineral resources have underperformed when 
compared with their resource-poor counterparts. Countries dependent on exports of 
‘point source’ natural resources, which are those extracted from a narrow geographic or 
economic base such as oil, are more strongly associated with low economic growth 
(Karl, 2005: 22-23). 
Extensive empirical support for the resource curse does exist. Firstly, casual  
observation suggests that there is virtually no overlap in the set of countries that have  
large natural resource endowments, and the set of countries that have high levels of  
GDP. Numerous resource-rich countries have been developed for a long period of time.  
However, if natural resource extraction really does aid development, then why is there 
no evidence of positive correlations between natural resource wealth and other kinds of 
economic wealth? Secondly, casual observation confirms that resource-rich countries  
do not experience sustained high economic growth. In addition, empirical growth  
studies tend to confirm this casual evidence. High natural resource intensity tends to  
correlate with slow economic growth. Nevertheless, natural resource endowment in the  
USA largely explains why it surpassed the UK in the 19th century. However, the USA 
at this time never approached the level of natural resource intensity existing in today’s 
resource dependant developing countries (Sachs and Warner, 2001: 828, 832-833). 
4.2.1: Impacts of the resource curse. 
Explanations for this poor economic performance in resource dependent developing  
countries vary and are debatable, but there are three principal negative effects of natural  
resource abundance which are outlined in Box 4.1 on the next page. 
4.2.2: Discussing the resource curse: the role of institutions. 
Good institutions are vital for economic development, particularly in resource-rich  
countries. This is because, as Sharma (2007: 33-34) states, ‘institutions matter ... 
because they form the incentive structure of a society and provide the underlying 
determinants of economic performance’. Despite this fact however, the interaction 
between MNCs and host country institutions is not well understood, and this is 
unfortunate because MNCs are prominent and/or dominant actors in resource-rich 
economies. Therefore, what needs to be considered is whether MNC operations in 
resource-rich countries contribute to the resource curse or whether the activities of 
MNCs can reduce the institutional problems underlying this phenomenon (Wiig and  
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Kolstad, 2010: 178). Nevertheless, one must recognise that it would be a mistake to 
conclude that all resource-rich African countries suffer from the resource curse.
59 
However, as Mehlum et al (2006: 1, 3) stress, the rent-seeking hypothesis states that  
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 Botswana, rich in mineral resources, is indeed a notable exception. 
 
Economic impacts. The extractive industry sector generates large foreign 
exchange inflows which can lead to a country’s exchange rates being over-valued. 
This makes it extremely difficult to export non-extractive sector goods. This is the 
so-called ‘Dutch Disease’ where extractive industry sector exports crowd-out other 
promising export sectors, making economic diversification difficult.                                      
Governance impacts. In a country that depends upon revenues from the extractive 
sector, the government could neglect non-natural resource taxation and may lack 
incentives to develop other sectors and the quality of its institutions. Furthermore, 
natural resource-rich developing countries often suffer from high corruption and 
low education levels in comparison with non-resource rich developing countries.                                                              
Conflict impacts. The extractive industry sector does not provide much 
employment because of the capital intensive nature of the business. Consequently, 
extractive industries tend to be less affected by civil conflict than other sectors. In 
addition, oil MNCs for example, construct the necessary infrastructure for their 
operations and they have the ability to provide their own security. Furthermore, 
since the oil sector is very much an enclave economy, it has little reliance upon the 
local business sector. As a result of all of these factors, in natural resource-rich 
countries the government has little incentive to promote economic and political 
stability. Consequently, a resource-rich developing country suffers from a 
permanent threat of civil conflict, which may be further threatened by the 
formation of rebel and/or separatist movements who would like to gain control of 
the revenues of natural resource extraction.                                                                                                               
Box 4.1: The Three Principle Negative Effects of Natural Resource 
Abundance (Frynas, 2009: 134-135).  
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natural resource abundance leads to a deterioration of institutional quality
60
, which in 
turn hampers development. In addition, the institutions themselves may be decisive for 
how natural resource abundance effects economic growth even if resource abundance 
has no effect upon the institutions. Therefore, natural resource abundance tests the 
quality of the institutional environment, and the resource curse only appears in countries 
with inferior institutions. Thus, the resource curse is to do with institutional weakness, 
and not resources per se.   
Overdependence on oil exports is strongly associated with weak public 
institutions and poor governance systems. This means that the capacity to handle the 
challenges of oil-led development is absent, and is mainly the result of timing. If pre-
existing institutions are weak, the influx of oil rents produces a rentier state, which is a 
state that lives from the profits of natural resources. In such states, economic influence 
and political power are especially concentrated within entrenched elites so that effective 
interaction between the state and civil society is relatively absent, and rent-seeking as a 
strategy for wealth creation is rampant. Such high levels of corruption contribute to the 
resource curse by deforming policy choices because policymakers in oil-exporting 
developing countries tend to favour mega-projects in which the payoffs can be more 
easily hidden and the collection of bribes facilitated. This further lowers growth and 
income levels (Karl, 2005: 25-26). In contrast, countries with institutions that promote 
accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since 
these institutions overcome and avoid the perverse political incentives that such booms 
create (Robinson et al, 2006: 447). One could conclude that economic development is 
critically dependent upon institutions that restrain entrenched elites, who might 
otherwise dominate an economy to the detriment of its citizens (Singh and Zammit, 
2006: 4). Therefore, political-economic and institutional failures are the root cause of 
the resource curse (Dietz et al, 2007: 34), and it is not the resources as such.  
The error in most of the resource curse literature is the assumption that  
resources are fixed in quantity, and will run out over time. A country’s resource base  
might be extended by investments in knowledge and relevant technology. Wright and  
Czelusta (2002: 28) stress that because numerous examples of successful country- 
specific resource development exist, the question arises as to whether common  
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 See also footnote 10, section 1.4 for ‘rent-seeking’. 
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underlying processes in these countries exist. This possibility in turn leads to a  
reconsideration of the sustainability of natural resources as a base for economic  
development. Furthermore, if the resource curse only affects those countries with 
inadequate institutions, the value of natural resources as a base for economic 
development might be enhanced if the institutional environment is improved. A 
relatively new vision of governance is that of the new institutional economics school, 
for which governance is the exercise of authority and control. The purpose of a 
governance system, according to the institutionalist school, is to regulate the exercise of 
authority by setting up incentive schemes and commitment mechanisms. Governments 
must be given external incentives to seek social welfare instead of pursuing their own 
objectives.   
Whenever there is a poor institutional environment, there are ‘governance  
failures’ resulting from inappropriate incentive schemes. To change this situation, the  
institutional arrangements must be improved to encourage incentive schemes to  
promote welfare and development (Beausang, 2002: 13). A number of proposals have  
been put forward in recent years to correct these ‘governance failures’, and one of these  
proposals is the self discipline of economic actors such as MNCs (Schirm, 2004: 7-8). 
This indicates that they should not engage in corrupt activities such as bribery to seal 
the deals that they want.  
Another possibility is MNCs influencing the behaviour of the government in 
question to correct ‘governance failures’. In a poor institutional environment, MNCs do 
have the opportunity to engage in institutional co-evolution, where their objective is to 
act as a change agent for the institutions of a certain host country. MNCs may be able to 
introduce institutional elements that are absent from local institutional environments 
(Cantwell et al, 2010: 577). Institutional co-evolution will be discussed,
61
 and whilst 
this would tackle the first two negative effects of natural resource abundance in Box 4.1, 
namely economic and governance impacts, since improvements in governance would in 
turn promote economic development; when considering the third negative effect of 
having natural resources, the tendency of natural resource abundance to promote civil 
conflict, a further dynamic comes into play which will now be discussed.        
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 See also section 2.4.  
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4.2.3: Civil conflict resolution.  
MNCs, when engaging in operations in developing countries, are embarking upon  
activities in environments where they are often confronted with a political climate for a  
potential conflict, where a conflict is actually raging, or in a post-conflict situation  
where peace building and reconstruction is necessary. This current situation can only be  
put into context by considering the background of a change in the nature of conflict  
since the end of the Cold War. Currently, approximately 90% of all armed conflicts are  
civil wars in developing countries.  
Institutions in these conflict zones fail in their provision of public security 
because they lack the necessary resources. Consequently, the international community 
and civil society is increasing the pressure upon MNCs to contribute to maintaining 
peace and security. For example, considering the international community, the UN 
Global Compact’s first policy dialogue was on the role of private sector MNCs in 
conflict zones, offering a forum for MNCs to discuss the risks and impacts of their 
operations in such areas, and to discuss the promotion of the Global Compact’s 
principles in these zones. Furthermore, MNCs were given the opportunity to discuss 
how they could counter corruption which is a key element of many conflicts. As for the 
pressure from civil society, MNCs have been recently targeted by a number of 
campaigns and protests, including the ‘Blood Diamond’ campaign which considered  
how business fuelled conflicts in Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of  
Congo (DRC) by engaging in diamond dealing with actors within the conflicts, and the  
‘Publish What You Pay’ campaign which challenged MNCs to increase revenue  
transparency to counter the key conflict driver of corruption.  
To date however, academic research in business has tended, under the banner of 
CSR, to focus upon ‘low politics’ issues like social and environmental issues. The 
effects of MNC operations have been addressed by peace and conflict studies. However, 
this has mainly been to highlight the negative impacts of corporate activities upon 
conflict zones. For example, research in this field considers how business can promote 
conflict by arms sales to maximise profits, and the financing of repressive governments 
or rebels. In addition, peace and conflict studies have investigated how the business 
sector has exploited regulatory gaps in conflict or post-conflict zones that have resulted 
from weak state authority (Deitelhoff and Wolf, 2010: 2-4, 6-7). Therefore, this thesis 
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will aim to bridge this gap between business studies and peace and conflict studies by 
studying the contribution MNCs can make to the promotion of peace and security as 
actors in global governance. Whilst there is some truth that business research, under the 
guise of CSR, has focused upon ‘low politics’ like social and environmental issues, this 
thesis will put into context the fact that by addressing such ‘low politics’ issues, MNCs 
can contribute to the promotion of peace and security by encouraging economic 
development. In addition, MNCs can reduce corruption, a key driver of many conflicts, 
by attempting to promote revenue transparency (i.e. not using bribes).  
The nature of the oil-related conflict in the Niger Delta in Nigeria is outlined in 
Box 4.2 on the next page. Two root causes can be identified to explain this conflict. 
Firstly, there is the impact of the institutional environment, particularly in the sense that 
it fails to oversee a fair distribution of oil revenues. Secondly, there is the failure of the 
increasingly over-centralised state to deal with the social and environmental 
consequences of oil production at local levels (Anugwom, 2005: 98, 100-102). 
Therefore, the oil-related conflict in the Niger Delta highlights the fact that unless oil 
MNCs want their operations to become a potential target for conflict, they should 
promote a fair distribution of oil revenues, and address the social and environmental 
consequences of oil sector operations (socio-economic needs at the macro-level). In 
order to study this issue, Angola was chosen particularly because, as Chapter 7 will 
outline, it is emerging from a long civil war and the potential for conflict remains.
62
 In 
addition, the location of Angola will highlight, as Frynas and Paulo (2007: 233) state, 
whether the positive impact of today’s oil scramble in a country such as ‘Angola will be 
relatively insignificant’. 
4.3: The origins of CSR. 
CSR is a relatively recent term, but considerations with business ethics and the social 
impacts of business activities have been around ever since humans have engaged in 
enterprise. As Blowfield and Frynas (2005: 500) remind us, practices for business based 
on moral principles and controlled greed were pleaded for by pre-Christian thinkers in 
the West like Cicero in the first century BC, and also by their non-western counterparts 
like India’s Kautilya in the fourth century BC. Blowfield and Frynas also draw our  
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attention to the fact that Islam and the medieval Christian Church publicly condemned 
some business practices such as usury, but they rightly state that ‘the modern precursors 
of CSR can be traced back to nineteenth-century boycotts of foodstuffs produced with 
slave labour, the moral vision of entrepreneurs such as Cadbury and Marks, and the 
The Ogoni people in the Niger Delta, in 1990, began to protest against the 
operations on their land undertaken by Royal Dutch Shell. They accused Royal 
Dutch Shell of cooperating with the Nigerian government to deprive the Ogoni 
people of a fair share of the oil revenues and of their environmental resources. 
Subsequently, in 1993, Royal Dutch Shell was forced to cease operations in the 
area. Nigeria is still troubled by oil-related conflict in the Niger Delta, and the oil 
sector’s investments in conflict zones have been the subject of much debate.  
The ‘resource curse’ is a term that has been used to describe a situation 
where developing countries cannot translate natural resource wealth into 
economic development, which in turn fuels the duration of conflicts (Zimmer, 
2010: 58, 81). Indeed, MNCs in the oil sector usually attempt to engage in 
operations in war zones despite the conflict (Bennett, 2002: 405). Shell began to 
engage in oil prospecting in Nigeria in 1938 (Onuoha, 2005: 68), and 
subsequently, oil revenues became increasingly important for the Nigerian 
economy, which prompted rent-seeking behaviour and excessive corruption.  
In 1971, the Nigerian government partially nationalised upstream oil 
production, but production was also reorganised into joint-ventures, which 
enabled close alliances between the Nigerian government and oil MNCs (Frynas, 
2001: 30). Since then, Nigerian governments have backed oil MNCs operations at 
any cost and have been willing to suppress local community protests against oil 
production (Ibeanu and Luckham, 2007: 57). Whilst there have been some 
peaceful protests, violent protest proliferates. Militant groups that have emerged 
engage in violent conflict, targeting the oil sector, causing oil firms to suffer 
temporary ceasing of operations and production losses (Omeje, 2006: 60-63).  
Box 4.2: The Oil-related Conflict in the Niger Delta.  
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Nuremberg war crimes trials after the Second World War, which saw the directors of 
the German firm I. G. Farben found guilty of mass murder and using slave labour’. 
Therefore, CSR can be seen as the latest interpretation of what should be the societal 
role of business, and this has been pondered over ever since mankind has conducted 
business practices. What is new, according to Fabig and Boele (1999: 63), is that 
today’s debates about CSR are ‘conducted at the intersection of development, 
environment and human rights, and are more global in outlook than earlier’ 
manifestations of what should be the role of business in society. 
4.3.1: The resource curse and CSR. 
The efforts of business to increasingly tackle the resource curse represents a key  
characteristic of the broader evolution of the CSR agenda. CSR in differing countries  
has evolved to reflect the local business cultures, issues, and drivers of change. Despite  
this, a common emerging pattern can be identified. The first generation of CSR is  
characterised by ad‐hoc responses to social and environmental challenges that  
threatened business, whilst the second generation saw businesses taking a  
professionalised approach to their social and environmental impacts by setting  
commitments and targets, and measuring and reporting on their social and  
environmental performance. The more recent third generation involves businesses  
aligning their strategies more broadly towards sustainable development, which involves  
moving beyond merely controlling negative impacts to contributing to society as a  
whole and making positive impacts upon people and the environment.  
This evolution of the CSR agenda will be assessed against publications on BP’s 
activities (including their CSR/sustainability reports, together with a comparison against 
the reports of other selected Western firms) in the next chapter. During this evolution, it 
has become increasingly expected by governments and local communities that business 
should provide beneficial impacts in terms of addressing the resource curse to 
contribute to economic development (Forstater et al, 2010: 14).  
4.3.2: Defining CSR. 
Despite the fact that a common emerging pattern can be identified in the broad 
evolution of the CSR agenda, and although the CSR construct describes the relationship 
between firms and society as a whole, a precise definition of CSR has proved to be 
elusive because the beliefs and attitudes regarding this relationship tend to differ (Snider 
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et al, 2003: 175). According to Amaeshi and Adi (2007: 4-5) there are as many 
definitions of CSR as there are writers, leaving the construct fuzzy and open to 
conflicting interpretations. All these render CSR a multi-purpose and contested 
construct. Despite this surge in interpretations, Carroll’s (1991: 42) suggestion that ‘the 
CSR firm should strive to make a profit, obey the law, be ethical, and be a good 
corporate citizen’ is very popular. At the heart of this suggestion is McWilliams and 
Siegel’s (2001: 117) explanation of CSR as ‘actions that appear to further some social 
good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by law’.  
Carroll (1979: 498-499) originally proposed a four-part definition of CSR that 
was embedded in a conceptual model of corporate social performance (CSP). Together 
with differentiating between four types of corporate social responsibilities: economic, 
legal, ethical, and discretionary; Carroll also argued that firms wishing to effectively 
engage in CSP needed to have a basic definition of CSR, an understanding of the issues 
for which a social responsibility existed, and specification of the philosophy of 
responsiveness to the issues. Wood (1991: 691) revisited the CSP model and introduced 
important refinements by going beyond an identification of the different types of 
responsibilities to framing the issues relating to the CSR principles motivating 
responsible behaviour at institutional, organisational, and individual levels. In addition, 
Wood identified the processes of social responsiveness: environmental assessment, 
stakeholder management, and issues management.  
Despite the publication of these two, what could have been viewed by now, 
seminal articles in the earlier CSR agenda; the debate has deteriorated into a lingering 
confusion as to what CSR precisely entails, and two major camps have emerged. The 
first camp believes that the firm is a legal construct that has only the two responsibilities 
bestowed upon it by the law. This involves making profits for its owners and obeying 
legislation. The second camp advocates that firms act intentionally via the deliberate 
actions of their members, and consequently, must bear the duties and obligations of any 
good person or citizen, but on an organisational scale. This second camp translates into 
a broader conception of CSR that entails a wider range of economic, legal, ethical, 
moral, and philanthropic responsibilities (Jamali and Mirshak, 2007: 245); and is 
therefore more in alignment with Carroll’s original conception. 
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A definition is also dependent upon the type of organisation that is attempting to 
define CSR. As a result, there are numerous organisational definitions of CSR. Amongst 
governmental organisations, the UK government defines it as ‘the voluntary actions that 
business can take, over and above compliance with minimum legal requirements, to 
address both its own competitive interests and the interests of wider society,’ whilst the 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce defines it as ‘a concrete action taken by Chinese 
companies to implement the political aspiration of the new Communist Party collective 
leadership – putting people first to create a harmonious society.’ Amongst corporations, 
Gap states that ‘being socially responsible means striving to incorporate our values and 
ethics into everything we do – from how we run our business, to how we impact upon 
the communities where we live and work’ (Crane et al, 2008a: 6), and whilst BP itself 
does not appear to offer the same kind of definition of CSR (Cox, 2008: 34), BP 
(2006c) defines sustainability ‘as the capacity to endure as a group, by renewing assets, 
creating and delivering better products and services that meet the evolving needs of 
society, attracting successive generations of employees, contributing to a sustainable 
environment and retaining the trust and support of our customers, shareholders and the 
communities in which we operate’. For Christian Aid, a NGO, CSR is defined as ‘an 
entirely voluntary, corporate-led initiative to promote self-regulation as a substitute for 
regulation at either national or international level,’ whilst the Confederation of British 
Industry, a business association, defines it as ‘the acknowledgement by companies that 
they should be accountable not only for their financial performance, but for the impact 
of their activities on society and/or the environment’ (Crane et al, 2008a: 6-7). 
Therefore, when considering the numerous definitions and concepts surrounding CSR, 
it is difficult to procure a single definition of CSR for the purpose of conducting an 
investigation of its implementation. 
Nevertheless, as Wheeler et al (2002: 298) state, CSR terminology is widely  
employed by actors in the extractive industry sector who are members of the World  
Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD), another business association;  
and indeed, BP is a member of the WBCSD. The WBCSD offers numerous definitions  
of CSR. However, their main definition states that CSR requires a ‘continuing  
commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute to economic development  
while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families as well as of the  
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local community and society at large’. Taking this as a preliminary definition, this  
proposes three areas for an investigation upon their implementation.  
Firstly, there is ethical behaviour, which for BP (2010b: 39) relates to revenue 
transparency as ‘a mechanism for disclosing information about revenue flows from oil 
and gas activities in resource-rich countries.’ In effect, BP believes that nobody with 
connections to them, nor the company itself, should ‘engage in bribery or corruption in 
any form’. This question of transparency is a key issue of CSR that has been assessed in 
Part 3 of this thesis. Secondly, for improving the quality of life for society at large, CSR 
focuses upon negative externalities, to persuade firms to take into account the social and 
environmental side effects of their operations (Valor, 2005: 194). Therefore, the 
inclusion of social and environmental issues is an important consideration in this thesis, 
although how BP has treated its employees and dependents has not been neglected. This 
has been considered in a historical evolution of BP in the next Chapter, as well as in 
Part 3. Thirdly, contributing to economic development will be assessed at some length 
in Part 3. Therefore, a working definition of CSR for the purpose of this thesis has been 
developed as:  
‘The voluntary requirement for business to behave ethically, and to  
address negative externalities so that local communities can sustain  
their livelihoods, in order to contribute to economic development’.     
Before moving on to investigate the implementation of this working definition of CSR,  
the business case for CSR will be established, and then a general exploration of the  
implementation of CSR in the extractive industry sector in the West will be considered.  
4.4: Making the business case for CSR. 
Linnik and Skadegaard-Thorsen (2008: 107) state that ‘CSR includes a set of non- 
negotiable standards relating to how business treats its stakeholders and the  
environment; standards that all companies have the obligation to observe’. For many,  
there is only one ideal model in corporate governance, and that is either shareholding or  
stakeholding. The shareholding perspectives exclusively emphasise the priority of  
shareholders’ interest over other stakeholders. In contrast, the stakeholding perspectives  
try to legitimise wider stakeholders’ interests by rejecting the priority of shareholding  
value. Both sides, shareholding or stakeholding, claim that their own model is the ideal  
(or at least relatively perfect), and therefore their model is the only objective truth in the  
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world, believing the other to be simply false (Letza and Sun, 2002: 53-54).  
There are conflicting views about the purpose of the firm and, as a result, the  
ways in which firm success should be measured (Moir et al, 2007: 388).  In traditional  
neo-classical economics the objective financial function of the firm is profit 
maximisation. Simply, this means that managers must create as much wealth as  
possible for shareholders. To achieve this objective, any financing or investment  
decision is acceptable, if it is expected to maximise shareholder value (Pike and Neale,  
2006: 10).  
The alternative view is that we should widen the purpose of the firm, and it  
should be considered as a social institution that needs to create value for all  
stakeholders. Moir et al (2007: 388) believe that indeed the firm needs to create and  
sustain value, but not for just its shareholders, but for all stakeholders. Value needs to  
be created and sustained for both shareholders and for wider society if the firm is to  
continue to thrive. A firm that cannot raise capital and provide adequate returns on that  
capital would not survive as the capital would go elsewhere. Equally however, if a firm  
does not pay attention to satisfying its multiple stakeholders, be they dominant  
stakeholders in the short-term (customers and employees) or, in the long-run, wider  
society (global communities, NGOs and governments), the firm will cease to be  
legitimate. If firms cease to be legitimate and their reputation and image is tainted as a 
consequence, it would be bad for business because investor confidence would be 
undermined. Therefore, the problem for managers is how to make the business case for 
CSR, meaning paying wider attention to the needs of multiple stakeholders whilst 
delivering shareholder value at the same time.   
The business case can be made by seeking evidence linking CSR provision with  
shareholder value delivery. King (2001: 99) conducted a study with this in mind, and  
found that firms can indeed deliver multiple stakeholder objectives and provide  
shareholder value. King found, over a five year period, that the aggregate performance  
of firms delivering good corporate responsibility was superior to their peers who  
performed poorly when it came to CSR provision. Shareholder value was higher for  
firms who paid wider attention to the needs of multiple stakeholders. In addition,  
Fussler (2004: 282) studied the link between signatories to the United Nations Global  
Compact and profitability.  
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The coming of the 21
st
 century has seen an explosion of CSR standards from the 
global institutional environment to influence behaviour at the micro-level. These 
include supra-national and intergovernmental initiatives from the UN, the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, together with 
G8 and G20 initiatives. In addition, there are multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI),
63
 and principle-based initiatives 
such as the Equator Principles.
64
 However, perhaps the most widely embraced initiative 
is the UN Global Compact, and developing country firms, important for this thesis with 
the consideration that Chinese oil firms are under investigation, are actively encouraged 
to join (Horrigan, 2010: 9, 15, 55). According to UNCTAD (2006b: 235) the Global 
Compact asks firms to ‘embrace, support and enact, within their sphere of influence, a 
set of core values’, covering the areas of labour standards, the environment, anti-
corruption, and human rights.
65
 Fussler (2004: 282) found that as a group, the Global 
Compact signatories created greater shareholder value when compared with non-
signatories. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that when multiple stakeholders put 
forward the goals of CSR, managers are inspired to adhere to principles that are higher 
than just profit maximisation, and as a result business excellence is enhanced.  
Amongst multiple stakeholders, transnational networks are key players.  
Amongst the central network concepts that have been developed in relation to global  
environmental governance, for example, are epistemic communities
66
 and global civil  
society
67
 (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006: 147). Once all stakeholders have been identified, 
one way to gain a key insight into whether managers regard social and environmental 
issues as important is to ask them to prioritise all the stakeholders involved in a business 
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 See Section 8.5. 
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 The Equator Principles are a credit risk management framework for determining, assessing and 
managing environmental and social risk in project finance transactions (Equator Principles Association, 
2011). 
 
65
 See Appendix 1 for the Global Compact’s principles. 
 
66
 Epistemic communities are networks of experts who share a mutual understanding of the scientific and 
business/political nature of a certain problem. They are seen as influential because of their authoritative 
claims to knowledge, and an ability to create a scientific consensus on the issues. Decision-makers can 
refer to these under conditions of uncertainty (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006: 147).  
 
67
 Global civil society embraces the multiplicity of actors and institutions that influence the ways in which 
global environmental issues are addressed. By embracing civil society, there can be a pursuit of goals that 
function outside normal jurisdictions (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006: 148). 
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activity (Moir et al, 2007: 393). Mitchell et al (1997: 862-863) proposed the criteria of 
stakeholder legitimacy, based upon moral interests in the harms and benefits of a firm’s 
actions, stakeholder power, based upon the stakeholder’s power to influence firm 
behaviour, and to evaluate these two attributes in the light of the demands of urgency 
and as a method of prioritisation. Therefore, if a manager prioritises NGOs, for 
example, then social and environmental issues would have to be deemed as important to 
that manager.  
Nevertheless, there are possibly four important drivers for a firm, such as BP, to 
embark upon transferring their CSR principles, and these are: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These four drivers for transferring CSR principles represent the business case for CSR  
(Frynas, 2009: 116-121). It will be seen in Part 3 whether firms adhere to these drivers.  
 
1) Gaining a competitive advantage. Firms can be motivated to seek a 
competitive advantage over rival firms who do not address social and 
environmental issues. Numerous oil firms who present themselves as socially 
responsive have been favoured by the governments of oil-producing 
developing countries. However, it is possible that political motives still play a 
significant role in these oil firms being selected. 
2) To maintain a licence to operate. Addressing social and environmental issues  
can be seen as a way of seeking support from the local community. In 
Nigeria, where civil conflict continually interferes with oil MNC operations, 
engaging in local community development programmes is, in essence, a way 
of buying local community support. 
3) Improving reputation. Many CSR initiatives have been implemented in an  
attempt to improve a firm’s image in the light of bad publicity. Indeed, CSR 
is often implemented as a good public relations exercise. 
4) To maintain employee morale. Implementing CSR principles is often driven 
by a desire for firms to show to their own employees that they are ‘a positive 
force for development’. Criticism of oil MNCs can have a demoralising 
effect on their employees, especially when employees in developing 
countries can see that oil revenues do not benefit society as a whole. 
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4.5: CSR: from Friedman to the triple bottom line for the extractive 
industry in the West. 
In the rhetoric of Western firms and their stakeholders in recent years, the view that they  
should not only take into account the simple (profit) bottom line of their business  
operations has become very fashionable in some quarters. This economic bottom line  
should be considered as part of a three-dimensional perspective, the triple bottom line  
(Steger et al, 2007: 162). The term triple bottom line was first coined by John Elkington  
in 1994. The triple bottom line agenda requires firms to include the social and  
environmental implications of doing business, and not to just focus on the economic  
bottom line. It depends on seven closely linked revolutions to complete a transition to  
sustainable capitalism (Elkington, 2004: 1, 3). These seven sustainability revolutions are  
outlined in Figure 4.1 on the next page.  
Steger et al (2007: 162-163) believe that in reality however, the economic 
bottom line still dominates corporate decision making. This does not mean though, that 
firms completely ignore the social and environmental dimensions of their business. 
There are many laws that set standards for social and environmental behaviour in 
OECD countries. Economically speaking, these laws intend to internalise externalities. 
Externalities are the positive or negative effects of economic activity that are not 
reflected in market prices, such as income multiplier effects in local communities or 
carbon emissions. However, not all externalities are internalised, and therefore, 
stakeholders put firms under additional pressure to internalise more of the social and 
environmental externalities they create. This creates a dilemma for firms in that they 
must ensure their own economic survival whilst dealing with the social and  
environmental issues that stakeholders bring to their attention. The triple bottom line  
expectation is that equal weighting should be given to economic, social and 
environmental issues. This poses the question, how can firms live up to the expectations  
of their stakeholders? This has been assessed for BP in Part 3.
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Several theoretical frameworks on the relationship between corporate economic 
performance and corporate social and environmental performance have emerged.  
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 See section 8.4. 
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Figure 4.1: The Seven Sustainability Revolutions (adapted from Elkington, 2004:  
3).  
 
Perhaps the most influential over the years is that of Milton Friedman in 1962. His 
trade-off hypothesis states that firms have only one social responsibility, and that is to  
increase profits. This is known as the Friedman doctrine.
69
 Any increase in social or  
environmental performance would lead to unnecessary costs which reduces profitability  
(Chen and Bouvain, 2008: 269). In contrast, the social impact hypothesis of Cornell and 
Shapiro (1987: 5, 9, 13) stresses the importance of social and environmental 
performance. Overall, according to Cornell and Shapiro, improvements in social and  
environmental performance increases economic performance. Other stakeholders, aside  
from investors and management, play an important role in corporate policy. Therefore, 
social and environmental stakeholders make up a vital link between corporate strategy  
and corporate finance because improvements in social and environmental performance  
prevent market fears for investors. Cornell and Shapiro believe that the potential 
benefits outweigh the costs because firms can expect to distinguish themselves, not just  
to stakeholders but also to potential investors, by acknowledging stakeholder claims.  
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 The Friedman doctrine states that the sole role of business is to create profit for shareholders (Chen and 
Bouvain, 2008: 269). 
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Social and environmental concerns are embraced in the context of CSR (Werhane,  
2007: 460). In addition, McWilliams and Siegel (2001: 125-126) produced the supply 
and demand theory of the firm to find precisely how much a firm should spend on CSR.  
They found that there is a level of CSR investment that both maximises profit and  
satisfies stakeholder demand for CSR. This level of investment can be determined via  
cost-benefit analysis. They indicate that although firms that provide CSR may have  
higher costs than firms that do not provide CSR, they will still each have the same rate  
of profit. This is because CSR attributes are like any other attributes that a firm offers.  
Given the demand for CSR attributes and the cost of providing CSR attributes, the firm  
can choose the level of CSR attributes that maximises firm performance. This theory  
linking CSR to market forces shows that there is a link between economic performance  
and the demand for social or environmental performance. 
Steger et al (2007: 166-167) found that companies cannot manage downstream  
and upstream issues without involving other stakeholders, although they are often held  
fully accountable for them by the customer or other primary stakeholders. For example,  
whilst the most important environmental impacts in an industry can occur upstream of  
their operations, the consumer expects the industry to manage these problems as part of  
its brand integrity. Firm visibility is a strong moderating factor because a well- 
recognised brand would be strongly affected. However, some firms do recognise that  
embracing social and environmental issues are important. Several firms use social and  
environmental strategies as a tool to build their brand image. For many firms image is  
critical (Heal, 2008: 229-230), but even if a firm displaying its social and environmental  
responsibility is just clever marketing, the firm has to be responsible to make valid  
claims. 
Therefore, does the extractive industry sector, important for this thesis, in the 
West exhibit corporate responsibility? Managers’ perceptions of social and 
environmental issues are industry-specific. Overall, environmental issues are considered 
more significant than social ones in many industries. This can perhaps be attributed to a 
stronger tradition of environmental management in most industries. Unsurprisingly, 
extractive industries consider environmental issues to be highly important. In addition, 
compared to other industries, a high significance is given to social issues by extractive 
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industry firms like BP. This is mainly due to operating in developing countries, which 
are often associated with human rights and corruption issues, and local income effects.  
In all industries, environmental and social issue significance is determined by 
stakeholder demands to resolve the underlying social and environmental problems (i.e. 
to internalise externalities). While there are industry differences in the perception of the 
roles of both stakeholders and industry in contributing to corporate sustainability, a 
clear pattern emerges that covers all industries. Differing stakeholders play different 
(more or less proactive) roles. Firstly, consumers are considered the least proactive. 
This reflects consumer ignorance about corporate sustainability and governance issues, 
and perhaps an unwillingness to pay for rectifying such issues. Secondly, government at 
the institutional environment level is only slightly more proactive. Most industries find 
it easy to keep up with any legal regulations. In addition, industries are often only bound 
by soft laws, such as the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance
70
 which they only 
should adhere to. Therefore, if citizens and activists insist on more regulation, it is 
perhaps because industries are only bound by soft laws. Finally, NGOs are without 
doubt the most proactive stakeholder, and their role is to increase incentives for firms to 
internalise externalities. NGOs drive the CSR agenda by political lobbying for changes 
in regulations, and actions aimed at firms or even entire industries to trigger changes in 
corporate policy and behaviour. NGO action is most effective if they target highly 
visible firms and brands. However, NGO influence is limited, and is often contingent 
upon ad hoc reactions from consumers. Generally, managers are still sceptical of, and 
sometimes cynical about NGOs and their potential to undermine reputation and image. 
The question that arises therefore, is are firms’ attempts to deal with social and 
environmental issues mainly based upon incremental improvements aimed to appease 
NGOs at little or no extra cost? (Steger et al, 2007: 167, 169, 171, 174). 
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 The main elements of the OECD Principles are that a corporate governance framework should 1) 
protect shareholders’ rights, 2) ensure equitable treatment of shareholders and shareholders should have 
the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights, 3) recognise the rights of 
stakeholders, and encourage cooperation between firms and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and 
financially sustainable enterprises, 4) ensure accurate disclosure of a firm’s financial situation, 
performance, ownership, and governance, and 5) ensure effective monitoring of managers by boards, and 
the accountability of the board to the firm and shareholders (OECD, 2000: 4).  
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4.6: Introducing corporate governance. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 737) stated that ‘corporate governance deals with the ways  
in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on  
their investment’. A much broader definition of corporate governance to the one  
provided by Shleifer and Vishny is offered by the OECD (1999: 2), who describe it  
as ‘a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders 
and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through which 
the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance are determined’. Investment decisions are linked to corporate 
governance because investors prefer to invest in properly governed corporations and 
tend to avoid making investments in obscure environments. Investor confidence 
generated by sound corporate governance arrangements promotes efficient capital 
allocation across firms (Walkner, 2004: 2). 
The essence of the corporate governance issue is an aspect of the principal/agent 
problem. This refers to the need for appropriate checks and balances between the 
principal and the agent. Investors play the role of principal, while managers play the 
role of agent (Charreaux, 2008: 21-22). The principal/agent problem can be managed by 
focusing on internal firm structures and external safeguards (Walkner, 2004: 2). 
According to Denis and McConnell (2002: 2), the corporate governance mechanisms of 
firms can be broadly characterised as being either internal or external to the firm. The 
internal mechanisms of primary interest are the board of directors and the equity 
ownership structure of the firm.
71
 The primary external mechanisms are the legal 
system
72
 and the market for corporate control.
73
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 The US corporation was characterised by Berle and Means (1933, cited in Singh and Zammit, 2006: 8) 
as having widely dispersed share-ownership and separation of ownership from control, a situation that 
continues today. The board of directors is specifically charged with representing the interests of 
shareholders, and in theory, is an effective corporate governance mechanism (Denis and McConnell, 
2002: 2). However, Cadbury and Millstein (2005: 4) assert that boards can be weak because they may 
include some of the very insiders who are to be monitored. In addition, the nature of the selection process 
for boards is such that management usually has a strong hand in determining who the other members are. 
 
72
 See Box 4.3. 
 
73
 When the internal control mechanisms fail, resulting in the gap between actual and potential 
shareholder value being deemed too wide, there is an incentive for outside actors to seek control of the 
firm. Often, the mere threat of a change in control can provide managers with incentives to keep firm 
share value high (Denis and McConnell, 2002: 4). 
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4.7: CSR converging with corporate governance. 
In international business research, as Clarke (2007: 267) believes, ‘bridging the great 
divide between corporate governance and corporate social and environmental 
responsibility is the next great challenge’. Although these two concepts have different 
origins, there has been some progress in bridging this divide to a point where they are 
Jensen (1993: 24) acknowledges the legal system as an external corporate  
governance mechanism, but characterises it as being too blunt an instrument 
to deal effectively with principal/agent problems. However, LaPorta et al 
(1998: 1114-1116, 1151-1152) hypothesise that the legal system is important 
for determining how corporate governance mechanisms evolve. LaPorta et al 
argue that the extent to which laws protect investor rights, and the extent to 
which such laws are enforced, are the most basic determinants of how 
corporate finance and corporate governance evolve. Countries with a 
common-law tradition, which is English in origin, give investors stronger 
legal protection than countries with a civil-law tradition, which is Roman in 
origin. However, if legal protection for investors is weak, then substitute 
mechanisms can evolve. In the USA, with a common-law tradition, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (see below) was signed into law by President George W. 
Bush on 30
th
 July 2002. Many observers regard this as the most important 
piece of legislation to affect corporate governance in the USA since the early 
1930s and the then passing of US securities laws. This Act enhances corporate 
governance by requiring that the services provided by firm auditors should be 
pre-approved by the firm’s audit committee (Brown, 2005: 143, 156). NB. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, named after Senator Sarbanes and Representative 
Oxley, introduced major changes to the regulation of corporate governance 
and financial practice. It set a number of non-negotiable deadlines for 
compliance, and an over-arching public company accounting board was also 
established by the act (Soxlaw, 2003). 
Box 4.3: The Legal System. 
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converging. Indeed, Reed (2004: 287) considered social responsibility to be a broad 
category of corporate governance, and Albareda (2008: 434) believes that CSR can be 
seen as a new governance arena, being as it is a set of guidelines to manage the social 
and environmental consequences of economic activities. Nevertheless, as Amaeshi and 
Adi (2007: 11) state, it is far easier to identify with corporate governance as a business 
expression than CSR. Corporate governance is driven by corporate interests and to a 
large extent is a morally neutral concept. In this regard, they argue that CSR could find 
an easier means of expression and legitimacy through the corporate governance 
umbrella in order for its contents to be preserved.  
Over thirty years ago, Jones (1980: 59, 65) was the first to articulate a link 
between corporate governance and CSR, describing CSR as a method for corporate 
governance, or in other words, a form of self-control. In particular, Jones stressed that 
‘CSR ought not to be seen as a set of outcomes, but as a process’. The literature then 
goes rather silent on the issue, until Sacconi (2006: 262) described CSR as a model of 
extended corporate governance in which the firm has responsibilities ranging from 
fulfilling fiduciary duties towards stockholders to fulfilling more analogous fiduciary 
duties towards all other stakeholders.     
Good corporate governance in the post-Enron era
74
 has often meant that 
corporate morals and ethical behaviour find their expression in accountability 
mechanisms, transparency, and disclosure. Consequently, there has been a shift from the 
agency focus associated with ‘old school’ corporate governance to a ‘new school’ focus 
on ethics and accountability. Subsequently, this new view acknowledges that corporate 
governance is no longer just concerned with maximising shareholder value but rather 
about the relationships amongst the many players involved. The principal players are 
the shareholders, management, and the board of directors; whilst other players 
constitute employees, suppliers, customers, lenders, regulators, the environment, and the 
wider community; all of whom are embraced by being considered as the stakeholders. 
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 Enron, the US leader in world energy trading at the time, collapsed in 2001 with massive undisclosed 
debts resulting from corporate fraud. Essentially, the fall of Enron had many elements of what is known 
as a ‘Ponzi’ scheme, an accounting swindle which involves ‘borrowing from Peter to pay Paul’. In order 
to maintain reported earnings growth, Enron utilised aggressive accounting policies and practices to 
accelerate profits and hide debt (Hamilton and Micklethwait, 2006: 33-34). 
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Nevertheless, whilst corporate governance has evolved to embrace the ‘new school’ 
focus, CSR has also undergone a conceptual transformation.  
As it emerged in the political and academic landscape several decades ago, CSR 
first and foremost criticised the corporate shareholder primacy ethos. The CSR 
movement drew upon critiques by the law and economics school to challenge the 
economic rationales behind shareholder centralism, and proposed that business should 
go beyond aiming at higher stock prices and also attempt to internalise social and 
environmental externalities. Whilst these conceptual challenges can still be regarded as 
the essence of CSR today, the movement has evolved from advocating CSR’s voluntary 
nature with its focus on self-regulation, to campaigning for far more comprehensive and 
mandatory legislation.
75
 Moreover, the business reaction to the CSR agenda was to 
adopt ethical guidelines, consider stakeholder concerns, and internalise externalities. In 
addition, business also declared that a commitment to issues such as human rights, 
employees’ rights, and protecting the environment could go hand-in-hand with profit-
maximisation goals, or in other words, the triple bottom line. Consequently, the CSR 
movement has gradually been absorbed into the corporate governance ethos, and as a 
result, one could argue that as corporate governance becomes increasingly driven by 
ethical norms and the need for accountability, a potential convergence between 
corporate governance and CSR surfaces. Where there used to be two separate entities, 
with corporate governance being concerning with ‘hard core’ corporate decision-
making and CSR with ‘soft core’ society-friendly issues, the two are now converging 
into a hybrid conception of what should be corporate practice (Gill, 2008: 458-463). 
This corporate governance/CSR hybrid conception embraces the essence of this thesis. 
In the light of the discussion presented above, there is a distinct overlap between 
corporate governance and CSR. Good corporate governance entails responsibility and 
due regard to the concerns of all stakeholders. Therefore, questions arise as to whether 
corporate governance and CSR should be seen as independent or interdependent issues, 
and are they mutually exclusive or mutually coexistent and increasingly convergent 
functions? (Jamali et al, 2008: 446-447).  
Elkington (2006a: 522) hints at a potential convergence by claiming that ‘it is 
timely to review the increasingly complex cross-connects between the rapidly mutating 
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 See Appendix 2 on legislation. 
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governance agenda and the burgeoning world of CSR, social entrepreneurship and 
sustainable development’. Indeed, as Mullerat (2010: 50) suggests, ‘CSR, business 
ethics, and corporate governance should be integrated as a single domain’. Corporate 
governance and CSR are linked, but as Benn and Bolton (2011: 107-109) rightly stress, 
there has been little research that links these two concepts, despite the fact that CSR can 
be seen as ‘an extension to the model of corporate governance’. Instead, as Jamali et al 
(2008: 444) indicate, many researchers have focused upon corporate governance and 
CSR independently, and have treated the two entities as being unrelated accountability 
models. For many, corporate governance and CSR have guidelines, reporting standards, 
and oversight mechanisms that have evolved separately. However, Jamali et al feel that 
governance and CSR are intricately connected, and previous research has therefore 
fallen short in capturing the nature of this relationship.  
4.7.1: CSR: the principles of corporate governance. 
Perhaps one way that links corporate governance and CSR is to consider CSR as a part 
of the essential corporate governance principles. Aguilera et al (2006: 151) state that 
compared to the USA, companies and institutional investors in the UK pay more 
attention to issues of long-term CSR issues. There are several possible explanations for 
this, but Solomon et al (2004: 557) identify three specific ones; namely a general 
increase in concerns about ethics in British society, heightened awareness of risk and 
risk management, and the growth in media exposure concerning CSR.  
Nevertheless, to explain why institutional investors care about companies’ CSR 
performance, one must take into account the fact that some institutional investors 
believe social, environmental, and corporate governance issues to be financially 
material, either positively or negatively. Such investors care about companies’ CSR 
profiles because of the competitive advantage that may accrue to the companies from 
handling these issues well and the competitive disadvantage that may result from 
mismanaging them. Therefore, as investors, they care about the competitive advantage 
that they may derive from investing in companies that perform well on these measures. 
Furthermore, instrumentally motivated investors consider the manner in which a 
company manages its social, environmental, and ethical challenges to be a good 
indicator of the quality of management generally and consequently, this is a good 
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indicator of the corporate governance arrangements within the firm as a whole (Aguilera 
et al, 2006: 153-155).  
Because of these reasons companies cannot ignore the pressure for good 
corporate governance and CSR performance from shareholders, potential investors and 
other market actors. Corporate governance matters significantly to a company’s 
performance, market value and credibility, and therefore every company has to apply 
corporate governance principles.
76
 However, firms must know what the corporate 
governance principles are and how they will improve their corporate strategy to apply 
these principles. In practice there are four principles of good corporate governance, 
which are: 
 transparency, 
 accountability, 
 responsibility, 
 and fairness. 
All these principles are associated with the firm’s CSR (Aras and Crowther, 2008: 440-
441). This demonstrates the clear link between corporate governance and CSR since 
CSR embraces the essential principles of corporate governance. 
Nevertheless, according to Aras and Crowther (2008: 441-442), the definition 
and measurement of good corporate governance is still subject to much debate. Good 
corporate governance should address such points as keeping a balance between 
economic, environmental, and social benefit (environmental and social benefit should 
embrace the principles of sustainable development), and creating sustainable value; but 
the problem is that firms clearly do not understand this relationship and often confuse 
sustainability with continued existence, and BP provides a good illustration of this 
confusion. As BP state: 
“That is why we care about the sustainability of our activities and why, 
throughout the company, we work to ensure that the things we do and the 
way we do them are genuinely sustainable” (BP, 2006: 4). 
 
At first glance this suggests that they care about environmental and social issues to 
embrace the principles of sustainable development. However, later on there is a 
statement saying: 
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 Indeed, according to Warhurst (2011: 68), the responsible corporation should systematically address 
business accountability by utilising tools such as corporate governance principles. 
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“BP has now sustained itself as a company for almost 100 years through 
periods of dramatic economic, social, political, technological and 
commercial change” (BP, 2006: 5). 
 
This suggests that BP believes that sustainability means continued existence, and Aras 
and Crowther (2008: 442-443) found in their research that of the firms in the FTSE100, 
the majority do confuse this relationship between sustainability and continued existence, 
or do not think that it is important. 30% of the firms consider that their corporate 
governance is adequate because it complies with the UK’s Combined Code, whilst the 
other 70% are making efforts to comply. Therefore, the FTSE100 firms are doing no 
more than meeting their regulatory obligations. Nevertheless, Aras and Crowther found 
that 27% of the FTSE100 firms recognise that there is a clear link between corporate 
governance and CSR and are making efforts to link the two concepts. Although they do 
not state which firms recognise this link, they do draw attention to the fact that the 
Royal Dutch/Shell Group have an integrated vision of sustainability built on economic 
progress, social development, and environmental improvement; and that Shell is 
committed to sustainable development being incorporated into their corporate activities 
to meet the requirements of the Agenda 21 framework
77
 as outlined at the 1992 Rio 
Earth Summit.  
However, a relevant question for this thesis is what should be seen as the 
essential principles of corporate governance in the African setting? South Africa’s 
institutional environment has produced the King Report (2002), which identified seven 
essential principles of corporate governance, and these are: 
1. Discipline, 
2. Transparency, 
3. Independence, 
4. Accountability, 
5. Responsibility, 
6. Fairness, 
7. Social responsibility. 
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 Agenda 21 contains the bold goal to reverse the environmental damage that mankind has inflicted upon 
the world, and ‘to promote environmentally sound and sustainable development in all countries on Earth’. 
Agenda 21 calls for behavioural changes at all levels of society, and ‘includes concrete measures and 
incentives to reduce the environmental impact of industrialised nations, revitalise development in 
developing nations, eliminate poverty worldwide, and stabilise the level of human population’ (Sitarz, 
1994: 6). 
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The later King Report (2009) facilitated a greater understanding of this, by highlighting 
that good governance is about leadership, and that effective leadership is based on moral 
duties that are characterised by responsibility, accountability, fairness, and transparency. 
In addition, responsible leaders should direct company operations so that there can be 
sustainable economic, social, and environmental performance (du Plessis et al, 2011: 
11-12).  
Although South Africa is not the focus of this thesis, the King Report does 
impressively articulate the essential principles of corporate governance, perhaps even 
more so than the OECD Principles, and in an African setting. Indeed, Fremond and 
Capaul (2002: 7) regard South Africa’s King Report as more prescriptive than the 
OECD Principles. The two principles of transparency and social responsibility will be 
considered at some length in Part 3.  
4.8: Summary. 
The resource curse refers to the situation where recourse-rich countries suffer from 
institutional weaknesses, which in turn leads to a poor record of economic development. 
The principle negative effects of natural resource abundance are the so-called ‘Dutch 
Disease’ where extractive industry sector exports crowd-out other promising export 
sectors, governance impacts (where governments depend upon revenues from the 
extractive industry sector and as a result neglects non-natural resource taxation, lacks 
incentives to develop other sectors and the quality of its institutions, engages in 
corruption, and lacks incentives to improve education levels), and conflict impacts (due 
to the capital intensive nature of the business meaning that it tends to be less affected by 
civil conflict, major corporations providing their own security, and the fact that 
governments lack incentives to promote economic and political stability).  
Good institutions of governance are vital for economic development generally 
and especially in resource rich countries, and therefore, what needs to be understood is 
whether MNC operations contribute to the underlying causes of the resource curse, or 
whether their activity reduces the institutional problems underlying this phenomenon. 
The resource curse only appears in countries with inadequate and dysfunctional 
institutions, and a number of proposals have been put forward in recent years to correct 
such ‘government failures’. These include the self discipline of economic actors such as 
MNCs, and whether MNCs can influence the behaviour of the government in question 
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by engaging in institutional co-evolution. Furthermore, MNCs should contribute to 
maintaining peace and security by addressing social and environmental issues, and by 
tackling corruption, a key driver of many conflicts, by promoting revenue transparency. 
Therefore, whether BP, as the focus of this thesis, engages in institutional co-evolution 
to address resource curse issues will be assessed in Part 3   
The efforts of business to increasingly tackle the resource curse represent a key  
characteristic of the broader evolution of the CSR agenda. Governments and local  
communities increasingly expect businesses to demonstrate that their operations provide  
a beneficial impact in terms of addressing the resource curse to contribute to economic  
development. However, a precise definition of CSR has proved to be elusive because  
organisational beliefs and attitudes tend to differ. Consequently, a working definition of  
CSR has been identified to investigate the implementation of business principles, and  
this is ‘the voluntary requirement for business to behave ethically, and to address 
negative externalities so that local communities can sustain their livelihoods, in order to  
contribute to economic development’. In stating this definition, the author has 
acknowledged the various definitions of CSR and how the discourse on this agenda has 
evolved.  
Nevertheless, the business case for CSR must be established so that firms can 
see that behaving ethically to address externalities is in their interest. If a firm does not 
pay attention to satisfying the needs of its multiple stakeholders, its reputation and 
image would be damaged and, subsequently, investor confidence would be undermined. 
Together with linking CSR provision with shareholder value delivery, the business case 
can be made by considering the four important drivers for firms to engage in CSR, and 
these are to gain a competitive advantage, to maintain a licence to operate, to improve 
the firms’ reputation, and to maintain employee morale. Indeed, the extractive industry 
sector in the West has moved towards the triple bottom line which requires firms to 
include the social and environmental implications of doing business together with the 
economic bottom line, although this economic bottom line still dominates corporate 
decision making. Nevertheless, as will be seen in subsequent chapters, extractive 
industries consider environmental issues to be highly important, and in addition, a high 
significance is given to social issues. However, how effective their implementation is in 
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dealing with the resource curse and contributing to economic development is the subject 
of the remainder of this thesis. 
 This chapter has also highlighted the link between corporate governance and 
CSR. These concepts used to be two separate entities. However, they are now 
converging into a hybrid conception of what should be corporate practice. Despite the 
obvious link between corporate governance and CSR, little research has been done that 
links these two concepts, and this thesis explores this link by considering CSR as a part 
of the essential corporate governance principles. Therefore, one way that this can be 
achieved is by assessing the governance structure of the firm to discover if that firm has 
evolved to effectively embrace CSR issues, as the study of BP in the next chapter will 
consider.   
Essentially however, this chapter explicitly linked the resource curse with the 
integrity of key host country institutions, and highlighted the potential role that could be 
played by a MNC’s CSR principles in building capacity at the institutional environment 
level and addressing social and environmental issues at the macro-level of the co-
evolutionary institutional regime. The remaining chapters of Part 2 will consider 
initiatives from the global institutional environment level influencing firm CSR 
behaviour at the micro-level to fulfil this potential role in the wider institutional regime. 
This material will provide evidence of the development of CSR in Western and Chinese 
firms that are engaged in operations in Angola as a prelude to an examination of their 
implementation in Part 3.      
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Chapter 5: The history of BP’s and Anglo 
American’s corporate governance and corporate 
responsibility. 
5.1: Introduction. 
This chapter considers whether BP has had long-term experience of dealing with socio-
economic needs at the macro-level in the countries where they operate. In addition, the 
historical evolution of board composition issues will be explored. This is because the 
composition of the board is important in delivering CSR. Indeed, as BP (2010b: 15) 
state:  
“The board sets the tone from the top, and has established a set of ... 
principles, which ... [includes not engaging] ... in any activity without 
regard to health, safety and environmental consequence”.  
 
It will be examined why the composition of the board is important for the delivery of 
CSR. Then, BP’s history will be analysed in depth, drawing upon three published 
volumes
78
 to discover whether BP has had long time experience of embracing CSR 
issues. Then today’s CSR for BP will be examined utilising their reporting mechanisms, 
together with a comparison with two other oil firms engaged in operations in Angola. In 
particular, initiatives from the global institutional environment will be considered, along 
with the evolution of the CSR agenda. This chapter will then turn its attention to Anglo 
American to assess whether BP’s CSR principles are applicable to socio-economic 
needs in the African setting because it is a firm with long-term African experience.    
5.2: The role and structure of the board. 
Elkington (2006b: 101) states that the triple bottom line agenda that was outlined in the 
previous chapter is the responsibility of the corporate board, and today, according to 
Warhurst (2011: 68), rising societal expectations of the corporation means that the 
responsible corporation should bring corporate governance into the realm of CSR. To 
achieve this, the role and structure of the board of directors, together with the 
independence of its non-executives, is important for integrating CSR into the corporate 
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culture. Indeed, Finegold et al (2011: 258) noted that CSR related issues, ranging from 
global warming to labour conditions, have found their way into the boardroom; and 
consequently, as we saw in the Chapter 4, CSR can be seen as an ‘expanded view of 
corporate governance’.        
A review of the literature has revealed only three studies of how firms evolve 
their corporate governance structures to integrate CSR into their decision-making 
processes. De Wit et al (2006: 491-492, 497) produced a case study of Royal Dutch 
Shell that showed that the processes of hardwiring (involving having a continuing 
programme of aligning key business processes within a governance framework of 
commitments, policies, standards, and guidelines) and soft wiring (involving 
‘routinising’, where their members at all levels are made aware of and trained in 
implementing the programme) were both essential for embedding CSR issues within a 
global organisation. Ricart et al (2005: 24-25, 28) studied the 18 corporations that are 
leading the market sectors considered by the Dow Jones Sustainability World Index, 
and analysed how and to what extent they were integrating CSR into their corporate 
governance systems. They researched, amongst other things, whether board members 
had the skills, experience, and capabilities required for developing as effectively as 
possible their specific responsibilities regarding CSR. They expected all these firms to 
have in their boardrooms members and executives who are capable of providing 
essential new viewpoints and expertise on CSR, only to find that five of the boards were 
inadequately conversant with CSR issues, and only four firms had formal training 
programmes on CSR for their board members. Mackenzie (2007: 935) studied whether 
UK board activity is as effective as it could be at achieving corporate compliance with 
CSR standards, and found that board activity should do more to address market failure 
and misaligned performance management systems. Therefore, we will add to this debate 
by assessing whether BP has evolved a corporate governance structure to embrace the 
CSR agenda. 
5.3: Board composition and CSR. 
The best way to ensure that CSR issues are discussed at board level is to have a 
diversity of board members, not only with respect to their disciplinary expertise, but 
also in terms of their personality. The successful adoption of CSR can be explained by 
having board members who are creative thinkers (Cramer and Loeber, 2004: 11). When 
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it comes to effectively embracing CSR issues within the boardroom at the micro-level, 
it is often recommended at the institutional environment level that the board must have 
external directors. Resource dependency theory suggests that selecting external directors 
will provide more viewpoints, information, and legitimacy. External board members are 
more likely to oppose the narrow definition of organisational performance that focuses 
upon financial performance, and will instead promote the needs of the macro-level 
wider society. Furthermore, external directors should be more sensitive towards 
stakeholder issues and, in addition, they may feel inclined to promote costly or 
unpopular decisions that could potentially benefit wider society (Ayuso and Argandona, 
2007: 6).  
 Denis and McConnell (2002: 7-9) state that empirical evidence is perhaps open-
ended regarding the effect of board characteristics on firm value. Despite this, various 
European commissions have embraced the idea that appropriate board composition is 
important to good corporate governance. Codes of Best Practice from the institutional 
environment level have been issued in a number of European countries, starting with the 
UK in 1992. These codes ask for independent directors on the boards of firms at the 
micro-level. The problem is that codes are voluntary in nature, and naturally the degree 
of compliance varies across Europe. However, compliance is easier in the UK, due to 
the greater presence in the UK of controlling shareholders who do not wish to see their 
influence reduced by the addition of too many independent directors on boards.  
Dahya et al (2002: 461) consider the impact on board effectiveness of the UK 
Code of Best Practice, first put forth by the Cadbury Committee. The 1992 Cadbury 
Report is essentially self-regulatory in nature, and has since been joined by the 1995 
Greenbury and the 1998 Hampel Reports to comprise the Combined Code (Maclean and 
Harvey, 2008: 212). The Combined Code requires boards to maintain a ‘sound’ 
governance system (Woods, 2008: 1075), and consequently, any firm that adopts its 
principles has an O advantage of adhering to a recognised code of good corporate 
governance. Dahya et al (2002: 461-462, 469, 479) state amongst other things, that the 
Code recommends that the positions of chairperson and Chief Executive Officer (CEO)  
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be held by different people,
79
 and that corporate boards include at least three outside 
directors. Whilst the Code is voluntary, the London Stock Exchange does require that 
all listed companies explicitly indicate whether they are in compliance. If not, an 
explanation is required. Dahya et al found that CEO turnover has increased in the UK 
after the issuance of the Cadbury Report, and that the sensitivity of turnover to 
performance is stronger. They conclude that the increase in the proportion of outsiders 
on the board, rather than the separation of the Chairperson and CEO positions, explains 
this, and thus the presence of outsiders would increase CSR performance.    
5.4: BP: a history of board composition issues.  
Today’s Combined Code from the UK’s institutional environment to influence the 
micro-level recommends three outside directors on boards, and the company in the 
1920s had five. Empirical evidence to support the notion of limiting the number of 
outside directors has been provided by Franks et al (2001: 209), who examined a 
sample of poorly-performing UK firms, and found that boards dominated by outside 
directors impeded the performance of managing directors. Therefore, would the then 
chairman, Cadman,
80
 want the non-executive representation, including the five outside 
directors, thinned out? Long before the evidence of Franks et al it appears that Cadman 
did not want the aging outside non-executive directors to impede the performance of the 
more youthful managing directors, because Cadman did indeed rely on natural wastage 
to reduce the outside non-executive representation. When two outside non-executive 
directors died they were not replaced, reducing the number of outside directors to three, 
the number recommended today (Bamberg, 1994: 16).  
 From the end of the Second World War to 1951, the board’s organisation had all 
the hallmarks of a cautious approach to management and finance, reflecting the fact that 
all of the board members were somewhat aged. Consequently, the board membership 
underwent a high turnover, but this did not introduce a younger generation of 
executives. If advancement in years correlates to diminishing energy or freshness of 
ideas, this represents a cause for concern for the company because it would need to 
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 The board’s role in representing outsiders counts upon whether the chairman of the board is also the 
CEO, which is known as CEO duality. This is because if the chairman and the CEO is the same person, 
conflicts of interest may arise which may result in a lower level of voluntary corporate disclosure 
(Lattemann et al, 2009: 431).   
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avoid a ‘creeping movement towards gerontocracy’ at board level. However, Fraser, 
Cadman’s successor as chair, tended to replace aged board members with new 
appointments who were also well advanced in years, perhaps reflecting the cautious 
approach that was the hallmark of Fraser and the board generally at this time.  
By the end of the war, the three outside non-executive directors had financial 
backgrounds and they were replaced by more City men. These actions represent a set of 
built-in preferences (action determinism within strategic choice analysis),
81
 and 
therefore, the financial bottom-line was of prime importance at board level at this 
time.
82
 However, the company maintained three outside directors (Bamberg, 1994: 213-
215, 261-267).  
Today’s Combined Code in the UK also recommends that the positions of 
chairperson and CEO be held by different people. In the 1950s, Fraser held the positions 
of both chairperson and CEO. At this time, one of the most vital issues for the company 
was the search for a suitable successor to Fraser as chairman and CEO. It could be said 
that if the positions of chair and CEO were held by different people, then if the chair 
retires, for example, the CEO could be a ready-made successor. However, the main 
cause of the company’s succession problem was inadequate succession planning. A 
distinct absence of a younger generation of new talent on the board meant that there was 
an absence of suitable candidates to succeed Fraser.  
Between 1954 and 1960 the company’s succession problem became a matter of 
keen interest to the Conservative governments of the time, and consequently it was 
widely consulted about this issue. The result of the discussions was that when Fraser 
retired in 1956, his successor would be Jackson, with Gass as his deputy, even though 
they were both in their sixties. The vacancy on the board because of Fraser’s retirement 
would be filled by Bridgeman, who finally provided some younger talent by his 
presence. After less than a year in the chair, Jackson resigned because of ill health and 
he nominated Gass as his successor. However, Jackson apparently did not consult the 
British government, about nominating Gass, who were concerned by the lack of young 
talent. Gass soon announced his intention to retire, instigating another succession 
problem. However, the British government was fully consulted this time, and they 
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favoured the younger Bridgeman who took over as chairman in 1960. The government 
were even assured that more younger talent would be added to the board. Drake was 
soon marked out as a likely successor to Bridgeman, and consequently, when 
Bridgeman retired in 1969, Drake took over as chairman and CEO (Bamberg, 2000: 49-
57, 316-322).  
Walters succeeded Drake in 1981, and then, as Horton took over at BP in 1990 
he initiated Project 1990,
83
 whose shortcomings forced him to resign in 1992 and his 
role was split between Lord Ashburton and David Simon. Subsequently, Browne took 
over as BP’s chief executive in 1995 (Jones and Wolf, 2002: 49-50), whilst the 
chairman of the board was Sutherland, who was a non-executive and was appointed in 
1997 (BP, 2002a: 41). Hayward succeeded Browne as CEO in 2007 (BP, 2006a: 65), 
and in 2010, Svanberg became chairman and Dudley succeeded Hayward as CEO (BP, 
2010a: 84). 
Today, BP’s  
“board is actively engaged in succession planning issues for both 
executive and non-executive roles [in] pursuit of an orderly process of 
evolution to refresh the composition of the board without compromising 
its continued effectiveness. ... Our board is large
84
 but ... a board of this 
size allows orderly succession planning for key roles” (BP, 2005a: 159).  
 
Therefore, by the early 21
st
 century, adequate succession planning was in place, since 
BP had introduced mandatory retirement ages for board members, rather than relying 
upon the earlier natural wastage. Executive directors retire at age 60, while non-
executive directors normally retire at age 70 (BP, 2004a: 112). In making appointments 
to replace them, as BP state,  
“the opportunity is taken to ensure a broad range of skill-sets” (BP, 
2003c: 103).  
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 Project 1990 aimed to reduce organisational complexity, reshape the central organisation, and reduce 
costs. Horton sought to cut US$750 million from BP’s annual bottom line by changing the corporate 
culture, under the conviction that BP had become overly bureaucratic and, as a result, strategic flexibility 
was being handicapped. However, Project 1990 quickly came to represent wholesale job cuts and low 
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Wolf, 2002: 49-50).  
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One might assume that taking such an opportunity would mean that not merely the 
financial bottom line would be considered at board level, but also the triple bottom line 
(with also the environmental and social bottom line). However, BP feels that  
“a breadth of skills is required for the board to meet the demands of a 
business with global operations. These skills include deep operational, 
engineering, safety and financial expertise, experience of leading 
industrial, capital intensive or ‘long lead time’ businesses and insight into 
key emerging markets and technology development” (BP, 2008b: 70).  
 
All of these skill-sets seem to reflect a concern for the financial bottom line, operational 
and technical expertise, and knowledge of the competitive market. None of these skills 
would embrace a deep understanding of environmental issues and, in particular, the 
social impacts of BP’s activities. Indeed, BP feels that  
“the company has adequate resources to continue in operational existence 
for the foreseeable future” (BP, 2001a: 3),  
 
suggesting that continued existence and the financial bottom line still dominates 
corporate decision-making. 
 Today,  
 “BP has adopted a robust set of board governance principles, which 
reflect the UK’s Combined Code and its principles-based approach to 
corporate governance. As such ... BP’s board governance principles 
require that all non-executive directors be determined by the board to be 
independent in character and judgement and free from any business or 
other relationship which could materially interfere with the exercise of 
their judgement. The BP board has determined that, in its judgement, all 
of the non-executive directors are independent” (BP, 2009a: 106), 
 
and as of 1
st
 January 2011, BP’s board composed of the chairman, three executive  
directors (one of whom is ‘group chief executive’, so the issue of CEO duality has been 
resolved, possibly influenced by the Combined Code from the UK’s institutional 
environment) and 11 non-executive directors. Today, the 
“board delegates some of its oversight and monitoring activities to its 
committees, composed entirely of non-executives. The chair of each 
committee provides updates on committee activities to the wider board. 
One of the five permanent committees – the safety, ethics and 
environment assurance committee (SEEAC) – monitors the management 
of non-financial risk. [In addition,] an international advisory board 
advises the chairman, group chief executive and board of BP plc on 
strategic and geopolitical issues relating to the long-term development of 
the company” (BP, 2010b: 15).  
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This leads to a defined structure for BP’s corporate governance, as Figure 5.1 on the 
next page shows, representing a corporate structure that has evolved over time. As one 
can see from Figure 5.1, the board directs and oversees performance, and responsibility 
is designated downwards to relevant teams and committees who cover areas such as 
non-financial risks, sustainability performance, and local operations. Potentially, this is 
an effective governance mechanism that has evolved to embrace CSR, but whether BP 
actually does this effectively will be assessed in Part 3. Of all of these committees, the 
one that the casual observer might imagine fully considers environmental and social 
issues is the SEEAC. BP outline that  
“the role of the SEEAC is to look at the processes adopted by BP’s 
executive management to identify and mitigate significant non-financial 
risk, including monitoring process safety management, and receive 
assurance that they are appropriate in design and effective in 
implementation” (BP, 2011a: 128).  
 
Although a subsequent review of its role, as it was reported, revealed some concerns 
over the environmental consequences of oil spills from shipping, there is no mention of 
other environmental considerations, and no mention of considering the social impact of 
their operations. One wonders therefore, if there is no committee to embrace social 
issues, how socio-economic needs are considered.   
5.5: The first generation of BP’s CSR.  
As we saw in the previous chapter
85
 a common emerging pattern can be identified 
concerning the broader evolution of the CSR agenda, which contains three generations. 
Ad‐hoc responses to societal challenges characterises the first generation of CSR, and as 
will now be outlined, evidence on BP’s activities shows that this has been occurring 
since the company first engaged in operations, long before the CSR concept was 
actually emerging.  
In constructing the original D'Arcy Concession,
86
 an early social issue was 
raised concerning the nationality of the workforce by the Persian Imperial 
Commissioner, Sadigh al-Saltana, in 1909. Senior staff at that time comprised of five 
Austrian mechanics and five Canadian drillers. The general fields manager, assistant  
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Figure 5.1: BP’s Organisational Structure to Manage Sustainability Issues (BP,  
2010b: 15).  
 
fields manager, office manager, surveyor, transport officer, and doctor were all British. 
There were no returns on local staff. However, a tentative attempt was made to provide 
them in 1910. The acting-consul at Muhammara, Arnold Wilson, was consulted, and he 
produced a report on the local labour situation in which he stressed that the population 
of the Shatt-al-Arab delta region, where this activity was concentrated, was ethnic Arab 
rather than Persian. In the customs and shipping sector, for example, there was only a 
small employment of Persians compared with Arabs and Ottoman Turks. Wilson 
Executive Team BPBBP  
Supports the group chief executive (GCE) in his accountability to the board for 
BP’s overall business, including sustainability performance. Comprised of the 
GCE and the heads of businesses, including safety and operational risk. 
Group People Committee  
Overall responsibility for policy 
decisions relating to employees. 
Group Operations Risk Committee  
Monitors HSE performance across the 
group. Representation from safety and 
operational risk. 
Group Functions 
Functions (safety and operational risk) 
define and support implementation of 
group-wide standards. 
BP Board BPBBP  
Direction and oversight of BP for all aspects of BP’s business, including 
sustainability performance. Comprised of the chairman, group chief executive and 
other executive directors, and non-executive directors. 
Gulf of Mexico Committee 
Monitors BP’s response and 
delivery of commitments through 
oversight of the new Gulf Coast 
Restoration Organisation. 
SEEAC 
Reviews BP’s processes to 
identify and mitigate significant 
non-financial risks and receives 
assurance of appropriateness and 
effective implementation. 
Local Operations 
Specialists implement group-wide 
operating management system and 
other standards. 
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concluded that ‘no local resentment is therefore likely’ … ‘by’ … ‘importing foreign 
labour to fill vacancies which, it is universally accepted, cannot be filled locally’.
 Despite this reassurance, Greenway
87
 remained apprehensive about Sadigh al-
Saltana’s objection to the employment of Ottoman Turks. Greenway wrote to the local 
managing agents who ran the concession for the company, saying that he believed that 
serious difficulties may arise unless they can justify employing so many non-Persians. 
Although the managing agents remained unconvinced, citing the general inadequacy of 
Persian workers, Greenway continued to dismiss such comments (Ferrier, 1982: 92,  
144, 153-154), perhaps recognising the delicate relationship that has to be maintained 
with host country officials (institutional environment and micro-level interaction). 
  Social problems, together with technical problems, were indeed the weak spots  
in the administration of the managing agents. In 1920, Nichols, a loyal assistant to 
Greenway, arrived in Abadan, Persia. Nichols immediately impressed social issues  
upon the managing agents there by saying that it was necessary to recognise ‘the  
changing conditions and temper of labour everywhere’. By now, Greenway too was  
recognising such weaknesses in the managing agents. However, he believed that they 
could be improved by better staff. To that end, Wilson was appointed as a resident 
director, arriving in Muhammara, Persia in 1921; and subsequently, Nichols informed 
Wilson that he should replace the managing agents with himself. It is likely that this 
sudden change of heart resulted from earlier criticism of the excessive earnings of the 
managing agents. Wilson had raised this issue in 1919, and Greenway himself said in 
1921 that the earnings of ‘the managing agents were much in excess of the amount 
anticipated’ (Ferrier, 1982: 206, 308, 316-317). Therefore, the company had early 
concerns about social issues. However, it was concerns about the excessive earnings of 
the managing agents that instigated their replacement, not their failure in dealing with 
social issues. 
Between 1930 and 1938 there was an active movement towards ‘Iranianisation’ 
of the workforce, meaning the increased employment of Iranians relative to the 
employment of foreigners. Although the above evidence points to the fact that 
employment of locals was clearly an issue before this time, by now this had become a 
prominent issue in the company’s relations with the Iranian government. As a result, the 
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number of Iranians employed by the company rose from 86.8% in 1930 to 94% in 1938. 
The remaining 6% were mostly British and Indian. Therefore, Arab and Turkish 
employment had been phased out. However, the small minority of British staff led the 
life of a privileged elite, the stereotype of the British abroad during the age of empire. 
Although Iranians accounted for the majority of the workforce, they only performed 
menial tasks. Indians performed most of the clerical and foremen duties, whilst the top 
managerial, administrative, professional, and technical activities of the company’s 
operations were all performed by Britons. It was very much the case that the necessary 
skills, experience, and qualifications to perform these top activities could not be found 
in the local Iranian populace.   
Although Iranians mostly performed menial tasks at this time, some progress  
was made in training Iranians. This could be regarded as an early attempt to act as a 
agent for change since the company at the micro-level initiated change at the 
institutional environment level by improving education, which as can be seen in Figure 
2.2 is part of the institutional environment. By the time of the Second World War 
however, an Order-in-Council was introduced by the British government in December 
1941. This classified the company’s operations in Iran as ‘essential undertakings’ for 
the war effort, and British subjects employed in the company’s operations in Iran were 
not allowed to leave their jobs without express permission. However, the Order-in-
Council did not apply to Iranian employees, who preferred to leave the company to 
work for the British and American armed forces, who were large employers in Iran. 
Consequently, the company was forced to recruit replacements from a wide net, 
including Czechs, Poles, and Palestinians. In addition, personnel were recruited from 
the armed forces on loan, from Burmah Oil, and from the wives and older children of 
the company’s British staff. As a result, the pre-war progress in training and employing 
local Iranians was lost.  
It was Gass, responsible for concession, supply, purchase, and procurement  
under Fraser, who, at the end of 1947, emphasised the need for what one could interpret  
as improved social content. After visiting Iran, and recognising the need to employ  
more Iranians, he stressed the need for improved training facilities for local Iranians,  
coupled with wider educational facilities. Following on from this Elkington, in 1949 
after also visiting Iran, gave the board a detailed report on operations in Iran which  
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included the need for a housing programme for employees. Elkington had earlier, in  
1935, foreseen that production costs in Iran would be likely to rise, because of the  
responsibility that the company has to bear in providing employment and social  
infrastructure that it would not have to provide in other more developed countries. He  
recognised that the company would have to maintain housing, hospitals, and schools,  
‘all those functions normally furnished by state or private enterprise’.  
The company’s General Plan of 1936 had provided not only for employing more 
Iranians, but also for the training of Iranians as artisans, and for the training of Iranians 
for technical and commercial jobs. After the war, training schemes were continued by 
the company in Iran, and the company even sponsored Iranian students for study in 
Britain. A Technical Institute had been founded at Abadan, which was providing 
courses for graduates of Tehran University by the 1940s. The company furthered its 
links with Tehran University by providing its Engineering Faculty with a £150,000 
grant for laboratory equipment. The company even sent three British lecturers to the 
Faculty, together with staff from their training department, to train the Iranian lecturers 
how to use the new equipment.  
The company also financed a housing programme, and over 10,000 houses were 
constructed between 1946 and 1950 around Abadan. The company also provided 
shopping, restaurant, and leisure facilities for employees and their dependents. The 
leisure activities included nineteen cinemas, twenty swimming pools, and various sports 
grounds. In 1950 the International Labour Office (ILO) commented on how the 
company was responding to their social responsibilities, by saying that by ‘looking  
objectively … at the manner in which this problem has been tackled, the observer  
cannot fail to be impressed’. The ILO was also impressed by the health and medical  
services that the company was providing for employees and their dependents. In  
addition, the British Medical Association’s assistant secretary was impressed, reporting  
that the company’s clinics and health centres were, in 1951, the ‘fulfilment of a general 
practitioner’s dream’. The company was providing four hospitals with 853 beds and 35 
clinics, with 101 doctors of whom ten were specialists, seven dentists, and 130 nurses. 
The company also introduced a preventative medicine programme in Iran to eradicate 
cholera, dysentery, malaria, smallpox, and typhus in the wider population. The annual 
cost of the health and medical services that the company was providing in Iran was £2 
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million (Bamberg, 1994: 80, 84, 249-250, 266, 356, 361, 367, 374-375). Consequently, 
the company at the micro-level has been striving to improve socio-economic needs at 
the macro-level for a long time, but whether they have learnt from this experience will 
be assessed in Part 3. 
5.6: The second generation of BP’s CSR.  
The second generation of CSR saw a professionalised approach to social and 
environmental impacts being adopted, involving setting commitments and targets, and 
measuring and reporting on social and environmental performance.
88
 BP first started to 
report on their social and environmental performance in 1998, and in 2000, they stated 
that their policy commitments were  
“that, wherever we operate, our activities should generate economic 
benefits and opportunities for an enhanced quality of life for those whom 
our business impacts; that our conduct should be a positive influence; 
that our relationships should be honest and open; and that we should be 
held accountable for our actions. Our business policies focus on five 
areas: ethical conduct; employees; relationships; health, safety and 
environmental performance; and control and finance” (BP, 2000: 10). 
 
Concerning setting targets and measuring their performance, BP stated that: 
“We are moving towards sustainability by recognising and identifying 
our environmental and social impacts, setting targets for improvements, 
developing new tools and new businesses, learning from others and 
measuring progress so we can adjust our efforts as necessary” (BP, 2000: 
8). 
 
Concerning environmental issues, for example, BP stress, that: 
 “Assessing BP’s performance on biodiversity is not easy. We have 
developed ideas on biodiversity measures, both internally and in 
conjunction with others, to understand how best to measure, report and 
ultimately improve our performance” (BP, 2001b: 14). 
 
Specific observations that were reported from Ernst and Young
89
 include:  
“Nationalisation targets were in place in Angola, Azerbaijan and 
Colombia as required by their Production Sharing Agreements (PSA). 
Both Angola and Azerbaijan had plans in place to work towards 
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 See Section 4.3.1. 
 
89
 Ernst and Young are independent auditors to BP who are required to comply with the independence 
requirements set out in the Guide to Professional Ethics of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales, the Code of Professional Conduct of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, and well as the rules of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (BP, 2002b: 31). 
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achievement of the nationalisation targets and ongoing future 
requirements in their PSA. In Angola and Azerbaijan national employees 
recognized as having high potential were being developed and/or placed 
in leadership positions. The Colombia Business Unit had already 
achieved its PSA nationalisation targets” (BP, 2002b: 24). 
 
5.7: The third generation of BP’s CSR.  
The third generation of CSR involves the adoption of the broad aims of sustainable 
development,
90
 and 2003 marks the first time that BP’s reports were actually called 
sustainability reports. Subsequently, the essence of BP’s reporting ever since has been 
sustainability. For example: 
“The prospect of climate change is a challenge we have to address if we 
are to fulfil our aspiration to be a sustainable company in a sustainable 
world” (BP, 2003b: 23). 
 
 “We aim to make [community investment] programmes contribute to 
sustainable development, rather than end their beneficial impacts when 
BP funding ceases or we leave a location” (BP, 2010b: 40). 
 
BP believes that their reporting should now 
“demonstrate what sustainability means in an integrated manner, in a 
global and local context. We aim to show how environmental, social and 
ethical issues play their part in our business strategy and align with our 
governance processes” (BP, 2003b: 40). 
 
This brings us to what BP say that they are doing to address the issues that have been 
deemed relevant regarding this thesis. In line with the principles of sustainable 
development, BP report that they assist development:  
“We help provide sustainable solutions by bringing our collective 
experience and resources to bear [and] the major areas of our 
involvement are education, enterprise, governance and transparency” 
(BP, 2007b: 34). 
 
Regarding these ‘major areas of involvement’, BP says that, firstly, concerning 
education: 
“Investment in education ... can promote sustainable development as well 
as providing skilled workers for BP and other companies” (BP, 2008a: 
21). 
 
This is because:  
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 See Section 4.3.1.  
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 “Education is critical to development. As a key activity within our 
corporate responsibility framework, education focuses on issues that 
affect our future: energy and the environment, basic education and 
enterprise development” (BP, 2005b: 56). 
 
Secondly, concerning enterprise development (and in Angola specifically):   
“In Angola, where, along with Sonangol, we lead the industry group 
responsible for helping local companies become more competitive, we 
worked with the US NGO, Citizens Development Corps, to set up the 
Centro De Apoio Empresarial business support centre in September 
2005. The centre was launched as part of the Angolan government’s 
national participation development project, to help smaller Angolan 
companies do more business with the energy sector. Since launch, the 
centre has provided 39 separate training programmes, attracting 547 
participants, while 11 of the centre’s clients have been awarded 15 
energy-sector contracts. In September 2006, a BP-sponsored event 
brought together 35 energy sector companies and invited 100 local 
enterprises to explore business opportunities” (BP, 2006c: 41). 
 
 “In Angola, BP has been part of the industry wide drive to build up 
capabilities in the aftermath of the civil war. For example, we supported 
the Enterprise Development Centre in Luanda for five years before 
handing over management of the project to the local chamber of 
commerce in 2011.With a goal of building the capacity of Angolan 
businesses to participate more actively in the local economy as suppliers 
of goods and services, the centre has led to the development of more than 
300 contracts between local small to medium-sized enterprises and the 
oil and gas industry, creating an estimated 4,200 jobs” (BP, 2011b: 45). 
 
Thirdly, concerning supporting good governance:  
“In terms of assisting governments to advance sustainable development, 
we support projects to build skills and capacity among local government 
officials in the region. This includes technical assistance in budget topics 
and training in accounting and asset management” (BP, 2009c: 33). 
 
Finally, and related to the issue of good governance because, as BP themselves state:  
“Promoting good governance – transparency in public finances and 
prudence in managing revenues – in places where we operate is critical in 
helping ensure that wealth derived from energy resources is used 
effectively” (BP, 2007b: 35), 
 
concerning transparency: 
 “On some issues transparency remains a challenge for our industry, 
including payments to governments. In this area, BP has supported the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and will continue to 
114 
 
work with others to build frameworks for greater transparency” (BP, 
2003b: 40). 
 
To ‘work with others’, BP cooperates with 
 “governments, NGOs, international agencies and companies in the EITI, 
which aims to contribute to sustainable development and poverty 
reduction by increasing transparency about revenue flows” (BP, 2004b: 
13). 
 
How BP implements these ‘major areas of involvement’ will be assessed in 
Chapter 8. 
5.8: The evolution of the CSR agenda for Royal Dutch Shell and 
Chevron.  
In order to assess whether the above evolution of the CSR agenda is unique to BP, the 
reporting of Royal Dutch Shell and Chevron, two other oil majors that operate in 
Angola, will now be assessed. Royal Dutch Shell’s reporting reveals a similar evolution 
of the CSR agenda. Royal Dutch Shell 
“made a formal commitment to contribute to sustainable development in 
1997” (Shell, 1999: 22), 
 
and 
“consistent with their commitment to contribute to sustainable 
development, Shell companies have a systematic approach to health, 
safety and environmental management in order to achieve continuous 
performance improvement. To this end Shell companies manage these 
matters as any other critical business activity, set targets for 
improvement, and measure, appraise and report performance” (Shell, 
1998: 26). 
 
Therefore, this is in line with the second generation of the evolution of the CSR agenda 
(setting targets, measuring, and reporting performance), although the concept of 
sustainable development is more widely acknowledged in these earlier Royal Dutch 
Shell reports. Today, their commitment to sustainable development  
“means how to do business in economically, socially and 
environmentally responsible ways” (Royal Dutch Shell, 2011: 9). 
 
Nevertheless, fully committing the broad aims of sustainable development, and 
therefore, transferring to the third generation of the CSR agenda, may coincide with 
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adopting a global initiative, namely, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). In 2000, 
Royal Dutch Shell stated that 
 “This report has been produced within the spirit of the GRI guidelines” 
(Shell, 2000: 32). 
 
By 2005, the first time that the report was called ‘Sustainability Report’, they stated that 
“we continue to report in accordance with the Global Reporting 
Initiative” (Shell, 2005: 37). 
 
The global initiatives that are endorsed perhaps acquire some significance here, and in 
2001 they stated that 
“we support and are guided by the UN Global Compact, OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the Global Sullivan 
Principles when making foreign direct investments” (Shell, 2001: 10), 
 
although from 2003 onwards there is no mention of support for the Global Sullivan 
Principles in Shell’s reporting, the significance of which will be described below.  
 Chevron, in their first corporate responsibility report, appeared to adhere to the 
second generation of the CSR agenda because they stated that they were 
“working to better understand, measure and report our social impacts and 
performance” (ChevronTexaco, 2002: 9). 
 
Their first corporate responsibility report was 
“informed by the Global Reporting Initiative” (ChevronTexaco, 2002:  
4), 
 
and the following year they stated that they would  
 “continue to be informed by the Global Reporting Initiative” 
(ChevronTexaco, 2003: 1). 
 
However, in their first corporate responsibility report they stated that they would only  
“apply [the GRI] as appropriate for our company in future reports” 
(ChevronTexaco, 2002:  4),  
 
and the significance of this will be revealed below. 
Although a review of subsequent ChevronTexaco reports does not reveal a 
reference to the term sustainable development to the extent of BP and Royal Dutch 
Shell, the concept is mentioned, albeit briefly. For example:  
“Chevron has long ... endorsed the Global Sullivan Principles. The 
principles promote business support for human rights, economic justice, 
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racial and gender equality, sustainable development, and a healthy 
environment” (Chevron, 2008: 41).  
 
Therefore, sustainable development is only a part of their principles, whilst BP, for 
example, now treat sustainable development as encompassing their whole business 
principles. This raises the question as to what is Chevron’s approach? Their long-term 
endorsement of the Global Sullivan Principles is key the difference. Indeed,    
“Chevron was among the first supporters of the [original] Sullivan 
Principles in 1977, which called for equal treatment of employees 
regardless of race. That year, 40 percent of our more than 700 black 
workers were moved into refinery jobs traditionally held by whites” 
(Chevron, 2011: 24). 
 
Chevron stated that they 
“supported the relaunch of the Global Sullivan Principles in 2005. The 
principles retain their original objective of addressing a wide range of 
human rights issues. Two strategic objectives of the relaunch are to 
promote the principles in order to provide a leading voice for responsible 
development and to advocate for strong national governance. These two 
objectives underscore the Rev. Leon H. Sullivan’s vision of corporate 
responsibility (see below)” (Chevron, 2005: 18). 
 
Interestingly, there is no mention of the OECD Guidelines or the UN Global Compact 
in Chevron’s reporting, and the influence of the differing endorsement of global 
initiatives will be discussed below. Firstly however, we need to discover which global 
initiatives BP endorse. 
5.9: BP’s endorsement of global initiatives.  
As BP state: 
“Part of our responsibility as a company is to ensure that our work is a 
force for social and economic progress. This involves working with ... 
global institutions to create conditions in which resource development 
reduces poverty, improves living standards and creates jobs” (BP, 2004b: 
5). 
 
Working with global institutions involves the co-evolutionary interaction in which 
global initiatives from the global institutional environment is influencing BP’s 
behaviour at the micro-level. The global initiatives that BP endorse include, as BP state: 
“We ... respect the ... 1976 OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises [and] BP was involved in the discussions leading to the 
launch of the UN Global Compact, for which we have pledged support” 
(BP, 2000: 7). 
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Indeed, it has since been confirmed that 
 “BP is a signatory to ... the UN Global Compact” (BP, 2011b: 29).  
 
It should be noted here that there is no mention of the Global Sullivan Principles in 
BP’s reporting, and in 2003, BP stated that 
 “this year, for the first time, we are reporting in accordance with the 
guidelines of the ... GRI. The guidelines, launched in 2000 and revised in 
2002, provide a comprehensive set of indicators covering all dimensions 
of sustainable development” (BP, 2003b: 40). 
 
Indeed, it was that year that marked the first time that BP’s reports were actually called 
sustainability reports, and the concept of  sustainable development has since embraced 
the essence of BP’s reporting,91 marking their transfer to the third generation of the CSR 
agenda. We shall now engage in a critique of these various global initiatives in order to 
assess which ones are likely to be relevant to the Angolan setting, and their impact can 
then be assessed in Part 3.  
5.10: The global initiatives compared.  
Many supra-national institutions from the institutional environment level have issued 
guidance documents regarding good micro-level governance practice. Whilst these 
recommendations might be well-intentioned, their implementation in practice has the 
greatest impact on responsible corporate conduct (Spitzeck, 2009: 496). The initiatives 
from the global institutional environment under review have different sponsors, namely 
inter-governmental organisations, individuals, religious groups, and business 
executives. The issue of sponsors, in that whose ideas and/or principles the initiative 
represents, and how broad is the consensus underpinning the initiative, is a key 
consideration in trying to understand the channels through which these initiatives 
influence firm behaviour.  
The global initiatives under review include, firstly, the OECD Guidelines for 
MNEs, which are rooted in long-term inter-governmental co-operation and are closely 
linked to a broader framework for international investment, the OECD Declaration on 
International Investment. This initiative is an expression of the shared expectations of 
the adhering governments. Secondly, the Global Compact is also sponsored by an 
international organisation, the UN, and various UN Secretariats are involved in its 
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promotion and many firms have endorsed it. Thirdly, the Global Sullivan Principles 
were developed by Reverend Leon H. Sullivan, a religious individual and well-known 
anti-apartheid activist. The initiative is underpinned by Sullivan’s contacts and 
credibility with the international business community. The idea behind both the Global 
Compact and the Global Sullivan Principles is to establish general principles and then 
utilise the initiatives’ endorsement processes to influence firms to continuously improve 
their behaviour. Finally, the objectives of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) are 
distinct in that it seeks to help firms go beyond the commitment phase of CSR and into 
the monitoring and reporting phases. The sponsors of the GRI are a broad alliance of 
diverse organisations, although it is partially funded by an international organisation, 
the UN Environment Programme (Gordon, 2001: 3-4). This four global initiatives are 
further summarised in Box 5.1, and we shall now examine how they influence firm 
behaviour.  
5.10.1: The OECD Guidelines. 
The OECD Guidelines were first published in 1976, and although they are not legally 
binding, OECD member states have agreed to adhere to them and encourage their firms 
to observe them wherever they operate. The OECD Guidelines contain 
recommendations on human rights, employment and industrial relations, environment, 
bribery, consumer interests, science and technology, competition, and taxation.  
(Bantekas, 2004: 322).  
Figure 5.2 identifies 30 specific issue areas under six broad headings that have 
been deemed relevant to the developmental issues that embrace the research agenda of 
this thesis. The OECD Guidelines scores second in the comparison as it articulates 22 of 
these issues. Consequently, they can be considered to be one of the most wide-ranging 
global initiatives. However, despite their extensive nature, Cassel (1995: 1970) felt that 
the OECD Guidelines broke little new ground, and only reaffirmed the longstanding 
rights of workers to organise unions, bargain collectively, and to non-discriminatory 
employment. BP and Royal Dutch Shell both adhere to the OECD Guidelines, and its 
voluminous nature may mean, as Ruggie (2002: 28) stresses, that its supporters may 
have excessive expectations of what firms can actually deliver. Therefore, should there 
be initiatives that have more limited expectations of firms? 
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The OECD Guidelines for MNEs: (revised in 2000) The Guidelines are broad 
recommendations covering nine areas of business conduct addressed by 
governments to MNCs. While observance of the recommendations is purely 
voluntary, adhering governments sign a binding decision to participate in its 
implementation and to promote their observance by firms operating in or from 
their country. 
The United Nations Global Compact was launched 2000, and calls upon 
world business leaders to ‘embrace and enact’ a set of nine principles in their 
individual corporate activities. The initiative includes specific practices that 
endorsing companies must commit to enact.  
The Global Sullivan Principles were issued in 1999 and are what can be 
described as an aspirational standard that has been developed with the input of 
several MNCs. They were written by Reverend Sullivan, whose original 
Sullivan Principles provided guidelines for companies doing business in South 
Africa. Companies endorse the Principles by publicly pledging to incorporate 
them into their operations.  
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) was issued in 1999, but its 
development is ongoing, and it is an international reporting standard for 
voluntary use by organisations reporting on the economic, environmental, and 
social dimensions of their activities. The GRI has developed specific reporting 
indicators with input from reporters and report users (including academics, 
accounting firms, business associations, consultancies, corporations, and 
NGOs, amongst others), but it is led by the Coalition of Environmentally 
Responsible Economies (CERES) and is a non-financial reporting framework. 
Although it does not provide recommendations on business conduct, it is 
informed by the norms of business conduct. However, the GRI does not assess 
companies’ conformity with its reporting guidelines (Gordon, 2001: 9). 
Box 5.1: The Initiatives from the Global Institutional Environment.   
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   Global         Global      OECD         UN 
Reporting    Sullivan     Guidelines   Global         
 Initiative    Principles   for MNEs  Compact 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Transparency       yes            yes        yes yes 
 
Stakeholders/Stakeholder           yes              no                yes            no 
Engagement 
 
Reporting 
 
Performance related to  
standard                                      yes              yes               yes            yes 
 
Environmental  
performance                               yes               no               yes             no 
 
Human rights issues                  yes                no               no              no 
 
Monitoring/Verification 
 
Performance related to  
standard                                      yes               no               no              no 
 
Environmental  
performance                               yes               no               yes             no 
 
Human rights issues                   yes               no               no              yes 
 
Standard applies to 
 
Company                                    yes              yes              yes             yes 
 
Business partners                       no                yes              yes             yes 
 
Figure 5.2: CSR Issues to be Referenced (adapted from Gordon, 
2001: 12-15). 
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   Global         Global      OECD         UN 
Reporting    Sullivan     Guidelines   Global         
 Initiative    Principles   for MNEs  Compact 
 
BUSINESS CONDUCT 
 
General CSR                              yes               no               yes              no 
 
Compliance with the  
law                                              no                yes              yes              no 
 
Competitive conduct  
(e.g. price fixing,  
collusion,  
anti-trust)                                    no                yes              yes              no 
 
Corruption and  
bribery                                        no                yes               yes             no 
 
LOCAL 
COMMUNITY  
INVOLVEMENT 
 
Broad/ General  
reference                                    no               yes                no              no 
 
Employment of  
local and/or under- 
utilised workers                         no               yes                yes             no 
 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
Broad/ General  
reference                                   yes              yes                yes             yes 
 
Precautionary principles           yes               no                yes              no 
 
Product life cycle                      yes               no                yes              no 
 
Figure 5.2 continued. 
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5.10.2: The UN Global Compact. 
Endorsed by BP and Royal Dutch Shell, the Global Compact
92
 agenda is indeed limited 
to only a relative few stakeholder issues (Hopkins, 2004: 21). As Figure 5.2 shows, the 
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 See also Appendix 1. 
 
 
   Global         Global      OECD         UN 
Reporting    Sullivan     Guidelines   Global         
 Initiative    Principles   for MNEs  Compact 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Broad/General reference            yes               yes              yes            yes 
 
Health and safety                       yes               yes              yes            yes 
 
Child labour                               yes               yes              yes           yes 
 
Forced labour                             yes               yes              yes           yes 
 
Freedom of association/ 
collective bargaining                  yes               yes              yes           yes 
 
Wages and benefits 
(including living  
wage)                                          yes               yes              no             yes 
 
Indigenous peoples’ 
rights                                          yes                no               no             no 
 
Discipline                                   no                yes               no             no 
 
Use of security forces                yes                no                no            yes 
 
WORKPLACE/ 
EMPLOYEES 
 
Non-discrimination                    yes               yes              yes            yes 
 
Training                                yes                   no                 yes                no 
 
Figure 5.2 continued. 
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Global Compact scores fourth with 14 specific issue areas addressed. This therefore, 
could be the less voluminous initiative called for in the previous section. However, 
although it now demands an annual sustainability report from all its participants, there 
are no official guidelines regarding what information must be included in such a report, 
except for only recommending use of the GRI Guidelines (see below). The Global 
Compact does not enforce or even measure the behaviour of participating firms 
(Rasche, 2009: 200, 202), and it has further been criticised because MNCs, by 
endorsing it, can legitimise their actions by wrapping themselves in the UN blue flag 
without actually doing anything new, something that is referred to as a ‘bluewash’ 
(Blackett, 2001: 442).  
Nevertheless, both BP and Royal Dutch Shell endorsing a voluminous initiative 
like the OECD Guidelines and, at the same time, an initiative like the Global Compact 
that is limited to only a few stakeholder issues, highlights the problem with having 
numerous global initiatives coming from the institutional environment level. This is that 
stakeholders when judging a firm’s CSR performance are confronted with a variety of 
initiatives to choose from to inform that judgement, which they may find confusing 
(Gordon, 2001: 8). 
5.10.3: The Global Sullivan Principles. 
The review of Chevron’s reporting revealed no mention of the OECD Guidelines or the 
Global Compact, but long-term endorsement of the Global Sullivan Principles,
93
 which 
evolved from the original Sullivan Principles.
94
 The focus of these Sullivan Principles 
was social improvement, and its anti-Apartheid efforts illustrated the potential power of 
CSR. Firms operating in South Africa were not pressured to change their behaviour 
because their activities were illegal, but because they failed to meet expectations for 
responsible behaviour (Coombs and Holladay, 2012: 2). 
In studies evaluating the effectiveness of global initiatives,
95
 frequent reference  
                                                 
93 Corporations that have endorsed the Global Sullivan Principles include American Airlines, British 
Airways, ChevronTexaco, DaimlerChrysler, Fannie Mae, Hershey Foods, Pfizer, and Tata Industries of 
India (White and Taft, 2004: 475). 
 
94
 See Box 5.2. 
 
95 For example, see Charnovitz, S. (1994) ‘The World Trade Organization and social issues, Journal of 
World Trade, 28 (5): 17-33; and Perez-Lopez, J. (1993) ‘Promoting international respect for worker rights 
through business codes of conduct, Fordham International Law Journal, 17 (1): 5-26.  
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During the 1970s and 1980s, there was one outstanding experiment in 
corporate initiatives for human rights, and these were the Sullivan Principles 
for South Africa (Cassel, 1995: 1970). Developed by Reverend Leon H. 
Sullivan, a Baptist Pastor in Philadelphia and General Motors board member 
(Hess and Dunfee, 2000: 616), these principles were initially adopted in 1977 
by US firms engaging in operations in South Africa, including Chevron and 
General Motors itself.   
Despite the fact that these original Sullivan Principles were limited to 
protecting human rights in one country, influenced by a desire to deflect 
growing calls for divestment from a country ruled by the Apartheid regime, 
the firms that took part adopted unprecedented, far-reaching commitments for 
addressing macro-level socio-economic needs. These included paying fair 
wages above the minimum cost of living, to provide managerial training 
programs for all locals (Cassel, 1995: 1970-1971), desegregated workplaces, 
fair employment practices, equal opportunity, and to improve the lives of 
workers outside the workplace (Hassel, 2008: 239). This last category 
involved providing employees with supportive services for housing, health 
care, transportation and recreation. 
The major objective of the Sullivan Principles was to use corporate 
influence to help end South Africa’s Apartheid regime. It was therefore, an 
initiative that was also attempting to bring about political change at the 
institutional environment level. However, as far-reaching as they were, by 
1987 Reverend Sullivan pronounced these principles a failure as they had not 
ended Apartheid, and he disassociated himself from them (Cassel, 1995: 
1971). Nevertheless, the Sullivan Principles are often accredited for making a 
contribution to the end of Apartheid (Pattberg, 2005: 600). As Hess and 
Dunfee (2000: 617) stress, ‘even though the principles did not end Apartheid 
within the timeframe set by Sullivan, they fostered significant progress and 
were ... one of the factors that led to its abolition’. 
Box 5.2: The Sullivan Principles. 
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is made to the Sullivan Principles as an example of an effective initiative. This is 
because these studies found it had several positive effects, particularly because firms 
found the Principles useful in that it provided a focus for their addressing of socio-
economic needs in South Africa, and it led to increased funding by firms of social 
causes in South African local communities (McCrudden, 1999: 170, 177). 
Reverend Sullivan, who developed the Sullivan Principles, went on to support 
and promote a more general set of principles: the Global Sullivan Principles.
96
 These 
broader principles represent a general policy commitment by an endorsing firm to 
macro-level social issues, including ideals of equal opportunity and quality of life. 
Despite the continued focus upon macro-level socio-economic needs, the Global 
Sullivan Principles far exceeds its predecessor and encompasses a commitment to 
sustainable development (Hess and Dunfee, 2000: 618). The Global Sullivan Principles 
are an initiative that was devised by Sullivan and a group of MNCs with input from 
inter-governmental organisations, national governments; and, in particular, a broad 
range of NGOs (Blackett, 2001: 408). Therefore, the Global Sullivan Principles can be 
characterised as NGO-based guidelines (Bantekas, 2004: 346). 
Figure 5.2 shows that the Global Sullivan Principles scores third with 18 specific 
issue areas addressed, and thus it is more prescriptive than the Global Compact but not 
as voluminous as the OECD Guidelines. However, one should also note in Figure 5.2 
that it is the only initiative that has a broad/general reference for local community 
involvement, highlighting that as it evolved from the original Sullivan Principles (with 
its focus on social issues), perhaps the Global Sullivan Principles are (also as an NGO-
based set of guidelines) more relevant than the OECD Guidelines and the Global 
Compact for addressing socio-economic needs at the macro-level? This will be assessed 
in Chapter 8.  
5.10.4: The Global Reporting Initiative. 
The GRI differs from the other standards compared in this review because it is a 
reporting standard with recommendations on what indicators companies should use in 
reporting social, environmental and economic performance. It does not include 
recommendations for specific standards of performance, policies or practices (Gordon, 
2001: 12). However, when one considers that the GRI evolved from the CERES 
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Firms that endorse the Global Sullivan Principles should: 
 express their support for universal human rights and, particularly, 
those of their employees, the communities within which they operate, 
and parties with whom they do business; 
 promote equal opportunity for their employees at all levels of the 
company with respect to issues such as colour, race, gender, age, 
ethnicity or religious beliefs, and operate without unacceptable 
worker treatment such as the exploitation of children, physical 
punishment, female abuse, involuntary servitude, or other abuse; 
 respect their employees’ voluntary freedom of association; 
 compensate their employees to enable them to meet at least their basic 
needs and provide the opportunity to improve their skill and capability 
in order to raise their social and economic opportunities; 
 provide a safe and healthy workplace, protect human health and the 
environment, and promote sustainable development; 
 promote fair competition including respect for intellectual and other 
property rights, and not offer, pay or accept bribes; 
 work with governments and communities in which they do business to 
improve the quality of life in those communities – their educational, 
cultural, economic and social well being – and seek to provide 
training and opportunities for workers from disadvantaged 
backgrounds; 
 promote the application of these principles by those with whom they 
do business;  
 and be transparent in their implementation of these principles and 
provide information which demonstrates publicly their commitment to 
them. 
Box 5.3: The Global Sullivan Principles (Source: http://thesullivan 
foundation.org/about/global-sullivan-principles 
 
127 
 
environmental principles,
97
 it is not surprising that it is, as Hopkins (2004: 16) states, ‘a 
little hamstrung by environmental considerations’. BP uses professional auditors, Ernst 
and Young, to verify its social responsibility claims and data against the GRI guidelines 
(Rondinelli, 2006: 22), and as the GRI had in origins in the CERES environmental 
principles,
98
 it is inevitable that BP would be preoccupied with performing, and 
subsequently reporting, on their environmental performance. 
 There is no doubt that, of these global initiatives, the GRI is the most wide-
ranging. Concerning the 30 specific issue areas in Figure 5.2, the GRI scores first with 
23. However, this leaves it open to criticism due to the fact that it may be too 
voluminous and, as a consequence, it may discourage some firms from attempting to 
report under all of its guidelines. This highlights the major problem with the GRI, which 
is that it is attempting to make CSR reports mean something to everyone, to all 
stakeholders, rather than allowing firms to produce their own accounts of their CSR 
performance. Whilst one must recognise that allowing firms to do this would not suit 
every stakeholder’s perceived needs, it may result in far more meaningful reports 
(Hopkins, 2004: 15). In fact, the GRI guidelines can be regarded as being so 
voluminous and inflexible that many organisations might find them irrelevant (Hess and 
Dunfee, 2007: 25-26), and thus, an important note here is that some firms prefer to 
produce their own reports that are only based on the GRI guidelines (Bantekas, 2004: 
346).  
In a publication by the GRI itself, Tort (2010: 12) outlined that ‘GRI reports by 
public agencies has ... disclosures provided by the different public agencies [that] were 
very diverse and predominantly narrative/descriptive, with little quantitative 
performance data’. This suggests that the GRI would perhaps prefer a presentation of 
quantitative datasets, but would external stakeholders necessarily understand such data? 
Therefore, to communicate sustainability, firms should develop their own sustainability 
narratives in an informed way, rather than adhering to a set of generic guidelines that 
may be too complicated and/or voluminous, resulting in reports that are difficult to 
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 See Box 5.1. 
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 The CERES Principles committed signatories to protect the biosphere, use natural resources 
sustainably, conservation, reduce waste, produce safe products, publicise health or safety dangers, and 
other environmental goals (White and Taft, 2004: 472); and it gained so much credibility that it provided 
the basis for the reporting guidelines operated by the GRI (Pattberg, 2005: 599). 
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understand for external stakeholders. If this is indeed the solution, then this raises the 
question as to whether there is a need for the GRI guidelines, or whether the current 
GRI guidelines can be revised to embrace a more narrative approach. However, is there 
any evidence from the reporting under review whether the firms want to ‘tell their own 
story’ of sustainability practices in preference to GRI disclosures of abstract indicators? 
(Dumay et al, 2010: 542).  
Indeed, Chevron does tell their own story and only uses the GRI Guidelines 
‘where appropriate’.99 However, the problem with firms producing their own accounts 
concerning their CSR practices is that a firm might only report what it chooses to report. 
Within this scenario, a firm with a poor performance record in addressing 
environmental issues might simply highlight another area of corporate citizenship to 
mask these deficiencies (Williams, 2004: 762). For example, if Chevron is enjoying 
relative impressive performance on social issues, they could mask the fact that their 
performance concerning environmental issues is not so impressive. Indeed, as 
Rondinelli (2006: 24) reports, Chevron’s oil terminal in Escravos, Nigeria, was seized a 
few years ago by approximately 600 women villagers who were protesting about the 
degradation of the local environment resulting from the company’s operations. 
5.11: Endorsing the principles of sustainable development.  
Despite which initiatives the firms under consideration above endorse from the global 
institutional environment, we saw earlier that they all, at some level, embrace the 
principles of sustainable development.
100
 Sustainable development involves pursuing 
economic growth, environmental quality, and social equity simultaneously. Therefore, 
firms that are aiming for sustainability need to perform against the triple bottom line 
(Elkington, 1999: 397). The idea of sustainable development arose because of an 
increasing awareness that the planet could no longer sustain the exhaustion of its finite 
resources to accommodate mankind’s global drive toward continuing economic growth 
(Ehrenfeld, 2005: 23). As a result, the concept of sustainable development emerged in 
the 1980s to explore this relationship between development and the environment. In 
particular, sustainable development’s broad aim is to address the environmental 
problems caused by economic growth. What should be sustained does not appear to be 
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 See Section 5.8. 
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 See Sections 5.7-5.9. 
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open to question because, as Hart (1997: 67) points out, the challenge is ‘to develop a 
sustainable global economy: an economy that the planet is capable of supporting 
indefinitely’.  
Concerning BP in particular, Elkington (1999: 311) stated that ‘in moving 
towards sustainability and the triple bottom line, BP is now very clear about what they 
are aiming for. Leaders at the board level of BP are taking centre-stage and they know 
that they face tough challenges, but BP’s board are leaving their employees in no doubt 
about the directions in which they should be heading’. This further explains the 
importance of the board issues as outlined in Sections 5.2-5.3, with the subsequent 
examination of the history of BP’s board composition issues in Section 5.4. The firms 
under review above embrace sustainable development, and in particular BP, but 
precisely what is sustainable development?     
Although there are many definitions of sustainable development, the one most 
commonly used is that of the Brundtland Commission (Banerjee, 2003: 144, 151), and 
this definition has been highly instrumental in developing a global view with respect to 
the planet’s future (Mebratu, 1998: 494). Brundtland defined sustainable development 
as ‘a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, direction of investments, 
orientation of technological development, and institutional change are made consistent 
with future as well as present needs’ (World Commission for Economic Development, 
1987: 9).  
This concern for future generations is problematic in its operationalisation 
though. This is because potential consumers (future generations) are unable to access 
the present market (Banerjee, 2003: 152). As Martinez-Alier (1987: 17) highlights, 
‘individuals not yet born have ontological difficulties in making their presence felt in 
today’s market for exhaustible resources’. However, the main problem with the concept 
of sustainable development is that it has its roots in environmentalism, and 
consequently, there is an inherent danger that social justice is being relatively 
overlooked. Although the sustainable development agenda of Brundtland does also 
point towards social justice and human development, according to Banerjee (2003: 
152), despite the primacy of social justice in the sustainability agenda, the position is 
often reversed. This is because, as Dobson (1998: 242) stresses, social ‘justice is looked 
upon as subordinate to sustainability’. Indeed, Elkington (1999: 2) highlights that the 
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sustainability agenda has long been understood as an attempt to harmonise the 
traditional financial bottom line with the environmental bottom line, whereas we should 
be thinking terms of the triple bottom line that also focuses on social justice, which is an 
element that business has tended to overlook. 
In the context of its environmental focus, the major issue with the concept of 
sustainable development as regards this thesis is that the sustainability of local 
environments in developing countries is not addressed. Instead, sustainable 
development means the survival of the planet, and it is thus an articulation that favours 
notions of environmentalism from the developed world. Environmental concerns for the 
developed world include damage to the biosphere, for example, whereas for the 
developing world, especially in local rural communities, it is about maintaining control 
over natural resources to avoid local environmental degradation. Indeed, the so-called 
‘greening’ of industry in developed countries has been achieved at the expense of 
developing country environments through the relocation of polluting industries to 
developing countries (Banerjee, 2003: 157-159), and the primary driver of local 
environmental degradation in the developing world, natural resource extraction, has 
burgeoned since the discourse on sustainable development began (Sneddon et al, 2006: 
254). Fundamentally, the global definition of environmental problems as outlined by the 
developed world results in local problems for the developing world because the global 
agenda is set by a small number of industrialised countries who are guided by global 
environmental concerns (Shiva 1993: 150). Consequently, according to Banerjee (2003: 
173), the concept of sustainable development includes nothing concerning the 
empowerment of local communities in the developing world. Empirical evidence for 
this will be presented in Part 3.   
5.12: Anglo American. 
The discussion above highlighted that whilst BP does have a history of embracing social 
issues in developing countries (in Iran particularly) as part of their ad-hoc response in 
the first generation of the CSR agenda, today, as Chapter 8 will also establish, it focuses 
largely upon the climate change agenda because of its embracement of the concept of 
sustainable development. However, placing social issues higher on the agenda is 
arguably more applicable when investing in developing countries. Therefore, this 
chapter will now seek evidence of embracing social issues in a corporation that has a 
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significant experience of the African macro-level setting, and whether historical 
experience has influenced their CSR principles today.   
During Apartheid, Anglo American was publicly critical of the system. 
However, Apartheid’s opponents attacked it by claiming it was profiting greatly from 
the system, and in practice it was doing little to change Apartheid’s social effects. Since 
the collapse of Apartheid, the firm has been preoccupied with protecting itself against 
pressures to nationalise some assets and with weakening its domination of the South 
African economy (Katzenellenbogen, 2003: 30). Therefore, if it was doing little to 
change Apartheid’s social effects, is the history of the firm essentially a story of not 
living up to their corporate responsibilities? This question will be answered by 
examining the history of Anglo American to firstly, gain an insight into their corporate 
culture, secondly, by seeking any evidence of a history of corporate responsibility, and 
thirdly, by exploring their CSR principles today.   
Foremost amongst the earliest so-called Randlords was Cecil Rhodes, who 
amalgamated South Africa’s diamond mines into De Beers. Sir Ernest Oppenheimer 
(the company’s founder)101 was considered to be one of these Randlords as he 
conformed to the anglophile culture prevalent amongst them. However, with German 
Jewish descent, Sir Ernest upon starting out had to cope with the caricature that stated 
that many German Jewish mining owners were ‘Hoggenheimer’, a name derived from a 
London musical comedy. This production labelled a Hoggenheimer as a greedy 
exploiter of workers and a political manipulator. This reputation became attached to the 
early Randlords. Although this label was not intended to be aimed at Oppenheimer, the 
tag was to stick with the family and Anglo for decades.  
However, despite such an obstacle, Anglo grew and prospered because at every 
critical point during Anglo’s rise, the company and the South African state co-operated 
via bridging for each other’s mutual survival, therefore embracing institutional 
environment level and micro-level interaction. Even the 1948 victory of the Afrikaner 
Nationalist Party, to whom the anglophile Oppenheimers were not disposed to, did not 
impede this co-operation in reality, despite traditional Afrikaner dislike of ‘foreign’ 
mining capitalists who they believed were trying to achieve economic power. The state 
realised Anglo’s importance in the development of South Africa, and ensured that a 
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 See Appendix 4. 
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cheap supply of black labour was organised. Therefore, can it be argued that the 
Oppenheimers were greedy exploiters of workers and political manipulators, and is the 
history of Anglo (operating at the micro-level) one of addressing socio-economic issues 
at the macro-level?  
What does come across from Sir Ernest’s letters and speeches is a sincere belief 
in racially separate housing. The Oppenheimers did share the general white view, 
although they tended to resist the virulent racism of a Cecil Rhodes. They did plan 
settled mining villages for Africans. However in 1956, a year before his death, Sir 
Ernest visited the south-western townships
102
 outside Johannesburg for the first time. 
He was apparently shocked by the appalling living conditions there, and arranged a R3 
million loan to rebuild some of the worst slums, although this final gesture of 
philanthropy can be seen as ‘too little, too late’.  
 Minorco, Anglo’s international investment firm, had its origins in the Zambian  
Copperbelt which Sir Ernest had exploited in Anglo’s early days. In 1928, Sir Ernest  
formed Rhoanglo in London to finance the expansion of the Copperbelt in what was  
then Northern Rhodesia. Rhoanglo moved to Northern Rhodesia in 1954, and was  
renamed Zambian Anglo American (Zamanglo) upon independence in 1964 and the  
country being renamed Zambia. When the Zambian government took 51% of Zamanglo  
in 1970, it moved to Bermuda to receive compensation payments in the form of  
dividends from government bonds. In 1974 it was renamed Minorco and became  
Anglo’s overseas investment flagship.  
Minorco provides an insight into the actual practice of Anglo, as opposed to its 
rhetoric. The much-vaunted claim of Sir Ernest was that Anglo’s objective was to 
benefit the communities in which Anglo operated. (Pallister et al, 1988: 48-49, 61, 65, 
69, 71, 75-76, 122). This was further elaborated on by Harry, Sir Ernest’s son and 
successor who, in 1964, stated that Anglo was ‘an international group called upon and 
prepared to work under widely different political and social conditions … to the mutual 
benefit, as we hope, of our shareholders and of the people of the countries where we 
operate’ (Anglo American Corporation, 1990: 25). Therefore, Anglo has had a long 
history of considering such issues. However, has this always been the actual practice of 
Anglo, or just empty rhetoric? 
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 The south-western townships were later called Soweto. 
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 This indeed proves to be empty rhetoric when examining the state of Zambia at  
the time of independence. Copper made Zambia one of Africa’s richest countries with  
one of the fastest growth rates in the region. However, the level of development in  
Zambia was extremely uneven, and Anglo was largely responsible for this. Together  
with the US firm American Metal Climax (AMAX), Anglo had expropriated £260  
million out of Zambia in the form of dividends, interest, and royalties between 1954 and  
1964. After independence, three-quarters of the profits of the two firms were sent out of  
Zambia in the form of dividends.  
By 1968, Zambian President Kaunda declared that both firms must retain half of 
their profits in Zambia. In response, Anglo and AMAX increased their capital holdings 
and their accounting policies were readjusted to keep up dividend payments without 
going over the 50% profit cap. When the Zambian government responded by taking 
51% of their mines in 1970, Anglo and AMAX demanded compensation, and Kaunda 
had to reluctantly grant generous tax concessions and freedom from exchange controls. 
This compensation became Minorco’s start-up finance in Bermuda. Therefore, Minorco 
began with money fleeced from a former British African colony, and the money was 
deposited, suitably sanitised, in Bermuda; while Zambia itself, including the 
communities where Anglo operated, received little or nothing. Minorco went on to 
provide a launch-pad for Anglo’s penetration into the USA (Pallister et al, 1988: 122-
123).  
All the time that Anglo continued to expand, African resistance to the Apartheid  
regime grew. Resistance was suppressed during the 1960s. However, the political and  
social unrest found an outlet by a series of strikes that hit South Africa in 1973. Then  
the Soweto rising of 1976 further served notice that the mining industry would have to  
deal with a broader range of issues than had previously been the case. The Wiehahn  
Commission recommendations in 1979 made the first changes to affect the sector by  
legalising African trade unions. In addition, the Commission cautiously suggested  
ending job reservation for whites. However, this process was delayed until 1986  
because of opposition from white labour. The vast majority of mining firms stood aside  
at this time, believing that social and political issues should be resolved on the political  
scene although some cautiously encouraged change behind the scenes. However, Anglo  
led the way by openly welcoming the legalisation of African unions and even calling for  
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the end of the migrant labour system (Reichardt, 2007b: 49). Therefore, Anglo openly  
embraced difficult social issues in South Africa whilst their competitors did not.  
Harry Oppenheimer openly and often criticised the Apartheid regime (the 
government at the institution environment level). However, it was widely accepted that 
he did not intend to attempt to change the system. Rather, he was prepared to work 
within it whilst pressing for social changes to improve the position of Africans primarily 
because it made good business sense (Katzenellenbogen, 2003: 34). This suggests a 
certain degree of de facto CSR. However, Pallister et al (1988: 84) believe that Anglo 
did little about difficult social issues in South Africa in reality, and indeed only 
embraced them to a certain extent when they were forced to do so by black militancy 
(socio-economic needs at the macro-level influencing Anglo’s behaviour at the micro-
level) and international pressure. Welcoming the legalisation of African unions could be 
seen in this context as merely a token gesture. 
In the 1980s, Anglo was at the centre of political controversy in South Africa.  
This was not just because of its economic strength, but also because the Oppenheimers  
and Anglo itself took a public stand on the Apartheid question, pressing for a relaxation  
of certain aspects of the system. They were particularly interested in decreasing  
dependence on migrant labour as they believed that a more settled, stable labour force  
was more productive and efficient. In 1987, Anglo began to replace migrant workers’  
hostels with low-cost family accommodations. However, many civil society activists 
saw this as too little too late, like many other changes in their view. Other commentators 
saw this as merely a new method of social control, as Anglo was not prepared to raise 
African wages high enough to allow workers effective freedom of housing choice. 
Perhaps the central point here is the fact that although the Oppenheimers pressed for a 
relaxation of certain aspects of the Apartheid system, they were not in favour of black 
majority rule (Katzenellenbogen, 2003: 34). Indeed, Harry Oppenheimer never 
subscribed to the view that Apartheid was morally wrong. He viewed it as an honest 
attempt not to repress but to find a solution for overwhelming racial problems.  
However, many believed that it was physically impossible to continually 
separate the races in South Africa. Anglo perhaps saw the writing on the wall in 1985 
when, in Zambia, they instigated dialogue with the then banned African National 
Congress (ANC). This was the first step to impress on the possible future leaders of 
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South Africa that Anglo, in some form, was indispensible to South Africa’s economic 
growth. If a full accommodation could not be reached with a black-governed South 
Africa, with the ANC, along the lines of the long-running relationship with the old 
white regime, the firm could always relocate its headquarters (Pallister et al, 1988: 83, 
144). Indeed, it is interesting to note that around this time, Anglo had embarked upon a 
massive image-building campaign in the British press, and subsequently, in October 
1998, it was announced that the company intended to move its headquarters to London 
(Katzenellenbogen, 2003: 34-35). Therefore, political change at the institutional 
environment level in South Africa influenced a strategic move for Anglo at the micro-
level. The company is now more of a global concern, and being located in the UK and 
being subject to the Combined Code possibly represents an O advantage that has 
enabled them to engage in outward FDI more effectively. Nevertheless, the ad-hoc 
responses to social issues presented here are in line with the first generation of the CSR 
agenda, which brings us to how they view CSR today.   
5.13: Anglo American: corporate responsibility today.  
Sir Ernest in 1954 stated Anglo American’s long-term aim (Jones et al, 2007: 229). 
Rajak, (2006: 195) reported this aim as ‘to make profits, but profits in such a way as to 
benefit the people and communities in which we operate’. This comment applied to the 
old Anglo American Corporation of South Africa. However, how does the new UK-
based Anglo American address socio-economic needs at the macro-level today? In their 
first sustainable development report, marking the transfer to arguably both the second 
and third generations of the CSR agenda because firstly, they are reporting their 
performance in which they are  
“guided by the ... Global Reporting Initiative”103 (Anglo American, 2002: 
2), 
 
and secondly, as Anglo American states:  
 “In the spirit of Sir Ernest Oppenheimer’s statement, we are committed 
to the principles of sustainable development”104 (Anglo American, 2002: 
58). 
                                                 
103 In addition, Anglo American “are signatories to the Global Compact” (Anglo American, 2005: 1), 
were “actively engaged in .... the OECD Guidelines” (Anglo American, 2009: 3), “support the ... EITI” 
(Anglo American, 2010: 13), and they operate “in accordance with the UK Corporate Governance Code” 
(Anglo American, 2011b: 14). 
 
104
 See Box 5.4. 
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The very fact that from the start of their reporting, all such publication have been 
called ‘Sustainable Development Reports’, is a testament to this commitment.105 
As argued above, this may suggest that they focus upon developed world 
environmental issues. However, is this the case? 
Before the fall of the Apartheid regime in 1994, South Africa’s mining industry 
was confronted with a government with limited priorities, and a government that was 
organised hierarchically to benefit a minority. The South African government today 
confronts the mining sector with broader socio-economic aims. This involves passing 
legislation at the institutional environment level that forces firms at the micro-level to 
address socio-economic needs at the macro-level, instigating a climate of raised 
stakeholder and community expectations concerning social and environmental 
performance, in order to contribute to the sustainable development of South Africa 
(Reichardt, 2007c: 53). 
 Until recently in the South African mining industry, executives rarely had to  
worry about the environmental impacts of their operations. However, today the crucial 
issue revolves around the legal right to hire real estate. New South African minerals  
legislation in 2004 stated that natural resources are vested with the state, and to receive 
a mining license, a firm must have a social and environmental plan. In South Africa this 
                                                 
105 Furthermore, Anglo American seeks “to promote the observance of human rights in the countries 
where [they] operate” (Anglo American, 2004: 13), and “to engage more with government to ensure [that] 
funds are well spent” (Anglo American, 2007: 23). 
 
Anglo American’s commitment to sustainable development involves: 
 being an efficient, ethical and value creating business; 
 creating meaningful employment in safe, healthy environments; 
 reducing our environmental footprint and contributing to biodiversity 
management; innovation, technology and process improvement; 
 and contributing to building more adaptable societies. 
Box 5.4: Anglo American’s Approach to Sustainable Development. 
Source: Anglo American, 2003: 4. 
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is conceived to be all under the umbrella of sustainable development, of which 
Corporate Social Investment (CSI) is the key strand.  
CSI for Anglo American is managed by Tshikululu Social Investments, a non-
profit organisation based in Marshalltown, Johannesburg. The CEO of Tshikululu 
Social Investments, Margie Keeton, believes that CSI is not a concept that should be 
massaged into a good business symbol, because CSI is business (McKay, 2007: 61-62). 
However, why should a South African concern manage Anglo’s CSI, a firm that is now 
based in London? Perhaps it is possible that since most of Anglo’s operations remain in 
South Africa, the South African concept of CSI remains relevant in order to receive a 
mining license. Therefore, Anglo today does embrace wider issues in the arena of  
corporate responsibility, but it does recognise the importance of retaining CSI.  
 Today, a CEO when asked about social responsibility would rarely quote the 
dictum of Milton Friedman, who said that the business of business is business. Over the 
past ten or so years South African firms have made huge strides in becoming better 
corporate citizens, and nowhere is this more evident than in the mining industry. The 
mining sector is one of the largest employers in South Africa, and the sector’s 
commitment to CSI was evident even before the South African Mining Charter of 2002, 
which was part of Section 100 of the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development 
Act. The Mining Charter of 2002 was a broad-based socio-economic empowerment 
charter specifically designed for the mining sector.  
However, mining firms had been investing in the communities in which they 
operate for many years. Anglo have been spending more than R50 million annually on 
CSI in the South African communities where their mines are located (micro-level 
improving the socio-economic needs at the macro-level), together with supporting 
complimentary campaigns such as Anglo American’s nationwide HIV/Aids initiative. 
The Corporate Social Investment Handbook
106
 published a survey stating that Anglo’s 
Chairman’s Fund, for seven consecutive years, has been the top CSI fund in South 
Africa. Since 1994 in South Africa, the Chairman’s Fund has spent over R786 million 
(Breitenbach, 2007: 69-70). Even before then, the Chairman’s Fund, mostly in the field 
of education (micro-level improving education at the institutional environment level), 
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 The Corporate Social Investment Handbook celebrates the diverse contributions that South African 
businesses make in CSI (Inyathelo, 2010).  
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has been donating to ‘special projects’, together with more general donations for many 
years. This included, for example, funding the Soweto College of Education in 1978, 
which was the first black tertiary education institution to be opened for 30 years in the 
Johannesburg area (Anglo American Corporation, 1990: 31). Today, education 
continues to be the focus of their community engagement. As they state: 
“The primary objective of Anglo American’s socio-economic 
development programmes in the communities associated with its 
operations is to help empower local people with an appropriate mix of 
skills [and] education” (Anglo American, 2008: 45). 
 
 Therefore, improving education at the institutional environment level is highly 
applicable to Africa. 
5.14: CSR for Anglo American. 
Anglo American directs virtually all of its CSR policies to solving concerns outside of  
the UK (Farnsworth, 2004: 165). Anglo American has recognised that a shift in the  
discourse on CSR from solely environmental concerns to also embracing, by the late  
1980s to the early 1990s, broader community involvement is a business imperative for  
large corporate endeavours. As a firm with operations in developing countries, Anglo  
American believes that environmental impact assessments must also be accompanied by  
community involvement studies, or in other words, social issues (Bezuidenhout et al,  
2007: 42).  
However, Anglo American has a relatively long history of considering socio-
economic needs. As early as the 1940s and 1950s, the old Anglo American was an 
important advocate of family accommodation for black workers in South Africa 
(Hamann and Bezuidenhout, 2007: 101). By 1976, in the wake of protests in Soweto, 
Anglo American, in conjunction with Rembrandt,
107
 set up the Urban Foundation 
initiative in an attempt to address urban development issues in South African townships  
(Bezuidenhout et al, 2007: 19).  
 Anglo American’s long history of considering social issues in South Africa  
reflects the fact that it was initially founded as a South African concern. It is now  
considered to be a UK firm since moving its headquarters to London and being listed on  
the London Stock Exchange. Anglo American considers that the relocation to London  
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 Rembrandt is a tobacco firm (Taylor, 2007: 159). 
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was critical, because they were then subject at the micro-level to the UK’s Combined 
Code on Corporate Governance from the institutional environment level. Being subject 
to the Combined Code is seen by Anglo American as vital because of the need to 
internalise the costs of business, which has become a prominent element of CSR 
discourse.  
In the mining industry, internalising externalities has been expressed in terms of 
safety, health, and environment (SHE). One Anglo American SHE manager expressed 
that the UK’s corporate governance climate requires ‘a formal and transparent system of 
internal controls to identify management risks’. Another Anglo American representative 
claims that good CSR ‘gives the impression that you are a more secure investment in a 
risky environment’. Therefore, investor confidence, risk management, and brand 
reputation appears to be important drivers of Anglo American’s CSR principles. 
However, how effective are these principles?  
With this in mind, Anglo American appointed Karin Ireton in mid-2001. Her job 
title was ‘Group Manager: Sustainable Development’. There were some critics that 
argued that this post was little more than a public relations exercise. However, Ireton 
was adamant that she had been given a real mandate for change, which was to include 
the social aspects of CSR. As part of this, during 2002, Anglo American adopted 
community engagement guidelines that contained the objective that by the end of 2003, 
over 90% of Anglo American’s operations would have community engagement plans in 
place. However, by 2004, this objective had yet to be achieved (Hamann and 
Bezuidenhout, 2007: 105-109). 
5.15: Anglo American: measuring impacts. 
Anglo American attempts to measure their corporate responsibility by the Socio-
Economic Assessment Toolbox (SEAT). The objective of SEAT is to help Anglo 
American understand the impacts of their operations on local communities, understand 
the needs, priorities, and concerns of these communities, and also acknowledge the 
range of interested stakeholders. The SEAT process starts by profiling an operation and 
the communities associated with it, then the socio-economic impacts are identified and 
the results are shared with stakeholders. After this, management responses are 
developed to the issues that are raised, and then the results are reported (Jones et al, 
2007: 235). As they state: 
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“SEAT has ... reminded us that a community’s perceptions are their 
realities and we must ensure that we address them” (Anglo American, 
2006: 25). 
 
It does not appear however, to attach a monetary valuation to physical effects 
(MVPE).
108
 Without a MVPE, how much should be spent on addressing such impacts 
may not be clear. However, increasing community trust is an issue that cannot be 
calculated in a financial sense, and therefore, concentrating upon making a monetary 
valuation to assess firm impacts may mean that such social issues get neglected. This 
will be developed further in Section 8.3.  
5.16: Discussion. 
Throughout its history BP has grappled with board composition issues. It has been a  
story of largely embracing the recommendation of today’s Combined Code that there  
should be at least three outside non-executive directors, before this recommendation 
even came into being. Nevertheless, this board has evolved into one that has the 
potential to fully embrace sustainability and the triple bottom line agenda, although the 
impression one gets from BP’s reporting is that the financial bottom line still dominates 
corporate decision-making, and therefore, its effectiveness will be assessed in Part 3. 
However, such institutional environment/micro-level interaction can also occur 
with the micro-level having a negative influence on the institutional environment. 
Banerjee (2007: 147) states that corporations can benefit by avoiding or even pre-
empting legislation, and indeed corporations actually lobby the institutional 
environment for regulation when it suits them (bridging within strategic choice 
analysis). Banerjee stresses that BP is guilty of lobbying for regulation when it suits 
them, because BP often engages in negotiation with governments for standards and 
regulations on climate change so that BP’s competitors cannot undercut them. 
 In the early years Greenway was concerned by the company not employing  
locals, recognising the delicate relationship that has to be maintained with host country  
officials. Later there was a movement towards ‘Iranianisation’ of the workforce, 
although when Iranians did account for the majority of the workforce, they only initially 
performed menial tasks. However, this was addressed by training and educating local 
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 Natural resource extraction can damage local environments which can reduce property values. This 
highlights the fact that an environmental impact will cost someone money. As a result, a MVPE is 
required (OECD, 1995: 57).  
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Iranians. In addition, the company went on to implement a housing programme in Iran, 
and provided shopping, restaurant, and leisure facilities for employees and their 
dependents. Furthermore, the company provided health and medical services. The  
company learnt from experience that socio-economic needs had to be addressed,  
representing dynamic O advantages that have evolved over time. Therefore, despite the  
fact that the CSR agenda only emerged in recent times, the story of BP has been one of  
embracing social issues, even if only on an ad-hoc basis, long before the CSR construct 
came into being.  
A professionalised approach to CSR emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
with firms adopting targets and measuring their CSR performance. As Elkington (1999: 
306) articulates at the time, ‘soon we will see ... businesses ... signing up for 
sustainability and pushing towards zero impact regarding their operations. Zero impact 
in this sense means zero defects, zero waste, zero pollution, and zero ethical stumbles. 
Whilst we know that companies like BP have no hope of reaching zero impact targets 
any time soon, their movement towards sustainable development will depend upon their 
willingness to set tough targets and year after year, moving towards meeting them’. 
Central to this emergence of this second generation of the CSR agenda, evolving as it 
did from its earlier ad-hoc basis, is reporting CSR performance. However, as Rondinelli 
(2006: 23) states, one criticism of what have become increasingly slick, glossy reports 
on CSR is that they are public relations exercises that do not reflect what firms actually 
do. More importantly, according to Rondinelli, producing reports has little impact upon 
how firms behave, especially when faced with a competitive challenge such as a new 
entrant into the market. This will be assessed in Chapter 9. 
Although the transfer to the third generation, involving full adherence to the 
broad principles of sustainable development, may seem to overlap with the second 
generation, this transfer to the third generation coincides with firm embracement of the 
GRI which may point firms in the direction of developed world notions of 
environmentalism. Therefore, as Robinson (2004: 376) asks, is the concept of 
sustainable development, with its developed world notion of environmentalism, 
distracting researchers from the real problems and potential solutions by focussing 
attention on the wrong issues? This question depends upon whether one’s concerns are 
primarily environmental or social, but in the context of this thesis, it is the 
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developmental needs of Africa, which are primarily social and with a developing world 
notion of environmentalism. The problem here is that the triple bottom line approach 
separates the social bottom line from the environmental bottom line. However, the 
social bottom line clearly encompasses environmental issues as one of its many other 
considerations (Hopkins, 2004: 16). Furthermore, the initiatives from the global 
institutional environment have enormous potential for influencing firm behaviour, 
especially when one considers the impact of the original Sullivan Principles (Ruggie, 
2002: 28). This will all be explored and assessed Part 3, particularly Chapter 8. 
 At every critical point during Anglo’s rise, the Oppenheimers and the South 
African state co-operated for each other’s mutual survival. The state realised Anglo’s 
importance in the development of South Africa, and ensured that a cheap supply of 
black labour was organised. However, as a firm with significant experience of the 
African setting, is the history of Anglo one of addressing socio-economic issues?  
If Anglo benefited the communities in which they operated, as they claimed, 
why did Anglo expropriate £260 million out of Zambia when the local Zambian 
communities where Anglo operated received little or nothing? Nevertheless, Anglo led 
the way by openly welcoming the legalisation of African unions and calling for the end 
of the migrant labour system, embracing difficult social issues whilst their competitors 
did not. However, in reality Anglo did little about difficult social issues, and only 
embraced them when they were forced to do so by black militancy and international 
pressure.  
Today, the South African government confronts the mining sector with broad  
socio-economic aims, in order to contribute to the economic development of the  
country. Following the minerals legislation of 2004 a firm must have a social and 
environmental plan to receive a license to operate. This is embraced within the concept 
of sustainable development for which CSI is considered vital. However, Jones et al 
(2007: 233) believe that when one considers Anglo American’s stated commitment to 
sustainable development, one must wonder why only 2% of Anglo American’s CSI is 
spent on environmental projects. Although this figure may reflect the extent to which 
spending on the environment has become integrated into Anglo American’s daily 
business operations, only spending 2% of CSI expenditure on the environment 
highlights the importance of social issues for Anglo American which may be influenced 
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by their extensive learnt experience of the African setting. Indeed, Anglo American was 
quick to recognise that the shift in the discourse on CSR from solely environmental 
concerns to also embracing social issues is imperative for large corporate endeavours.  
 CSI is still managed for the company by a South African-based organisation, 
and this is significant because BP, in comparison, has never outsourced its corporate 
responsibility to organisations based in host nations. If BP did, then perhaps their 
corporate responsibility could be more applicable to the localities of their operations. 
Indeed, Anglo recognises the importance of retaining CSI since most of their operations 
remain in South Africa and the neighbouring countries. Consequently, CSI can be seen 
as applicable to the African setting. They have spent generously on CSI in the South  
African communities where they operate and supported complimentary campaigns such 
as a HIV/Aids initiative, and their Chairman’s Fund has been donating to special 
projects for many years, mostly in the field of education.
109
 Therefore, the lesson that 
can be learnt from this study of Anglo American is that it is reasonable to assume that 
placing social issues high on the agenda is applicable to the African setting, and that 
education is a highly relevant social project to invest in throughout Africa.
110
 The 
implications of this will be considered in Part 3.  
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 Indeed, Crane et al (2008b: 266) report that throughout Africa, Anglo American annually distributes 
US$10 million via its Chairman’s Fund, and that more than half of this figure goes on education. 
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Chapter 6: China as the new entrants: how they 
will behave.  
6.1: Introduction. 
Attention in this thesis will now turn to the new entrants in the institutional regime,  
China, and assessing the status of the Chinese competitors in order to discover whether 
the Chinese firms are likely to enter the market as a distinct entity which provides a new 
competitive dynamic that BP has to deal with. This will be done by exploring the wider 
corporate governance agenda because, as outlined in Chapter 4, CSR and corporate 
governance are linked, and as Sinopec state:  
“Corporate governance is the important bedrock supporting Sinopec’s 
sustainable development. We strive to improve corporate governance to 
protect and balance the interests of shareholders, clients, employees, the 
society and other stakeholders. Improved corporate governance allows 
the company to make rational decision-making, mitigate risks, achieve 
operational excellence and sustainable development” (Sinopec, 2010: 
10).  
 
Davis (2005: 43) believes that contemporary research should analyse corporate 
governance in terms of the dynamics of institutions, that is, how institutions originated, 
their operation, and how they have evolved beyond their original purposes. In this 
respect, China offers a novel context for researching corporate governance. State 
institutions continue to have a relatively significant influence on firms in China and 
obviously, such an institutional difference in comparison to the West affects corporate 
governance development and reform. Therefore, by examining the interplay between 
firms, state institutions, and legal codes and frameworks (Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2008: 
64), one can contribute to a robust institutional perspective of corporate governance 
(Davis, 2005: 153). 
This chapter will begin by drawing upon the work of Goetzmann and Köll 
(2005) to develop the idea that today’s corporate governance is influenced by the past. 
The study of historical evolution is important to understand how institutions and 
organisations implement practices today. In order to do this, co-evolutionary path 
dependent analysis
111
 can be used to discover how sequences of events throughout 
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history have shaped today. A basic type of path-dependent analysis, involving reactive 
sequences of actions, highlights that events within a sequence are a reaction to, or a 
recreation of, what has occurred previously. Consequently, analysing the long-term 
evolutionary history of corporations in China as a sequence of events can provide an 
understanding of China’s corporate governance. This study of the interplay between the 
institutional environment level and the micro-level shows that many enterprises within 
China have historically embraced Western influence and adapted them for their own 
purposes.   
Rajagopalan and Zhang (2008: 64) believe that a deep understanding of the 
historical evolution of corporate governance rules, laws, and regulations, and the 
location-specific challenges of the case to be studied would permit a researcher to 
identify more appropriate research questions. Sections 6.2-6.6 of this chapter will 
therefore consider the historical evolution of corporate governance in China. It will 
consider the early adoption of the corporate form and institutional environment level 
legislation prior to 1949. This will be achieved by, firstly, considering the China 
Merchants’ Steamship Navigation Company and how this firm at the micro-level coped 
with state patronage and changes at the institutional environment level. Secondly, the 
case of Liu Hongsheng will be analysed to see how Chinese entrepreneurs embraced 
Western ideas at the micro-level when they were subject to them, and adapted them to 
the Chinese business environment. This will include his involvement in coal mining and 
distribution in order to align with the extractive industry sector focus of this thesis. 
Thirdly, legislation at the institutional environment level will be detailed in an attempt 
to discover how this influenced the micro-level.  
In order to bring this discussion up to date, the re-emergence of the corporate 
form and legislation today will then be analysed in depth to discover whether what is 
occurring today is a reaction to, or a recreation of, what has occurred previously. In 
particular, evidence from the reporting of the Chinese firms operating in Angola, 
namely CNOOC and Sinopec, will be examined to assess their embracement of 
initiatives from the global institutional environment, together with how today’s Chinese 
national institutional environment influences how these firms are likely to behave when 
they invest in Angola prior to examining their impact in Chapter 9.  
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6.2: Chinese corporate governance: background.  
Prior to the modern industrial age, China’s economy was a world leader for a 
considerable amount of time. By the 17th century however, China had ceased to be 
innovative and vigorous so that by the 1800s, China was well behind the Western 
economic powers. This economic stagnation at the end of China’s feudal system can be 
linked to the non-development of corporations at the time. Therefore, by the late 19th 
century, Chinese intellectuals began to introduce corporate concepts into China, 
promoting the adoption of a corporate system by attributing the rise of the West to the 
practice of corporate activities. In addition, some Qing officials at the time had the 
desire of industrialising China by corporate activities, and subsequently, the earliest 
Chinese corporations were established and ultimately, the first Chinese Company Law 
was passed in 1904.  
From then until 1949, the concept of a business corporation and the 
accompanying notions of legal personality and limited liability developed significance 
in China. However, corporate practice did not develop well at that time. The causes for 
this included social instability, a weak economic development structure, political 
corruption and foreign economic and military dominance. In addition, there was a 
significant gap between the Western corporate experience and Chinese culture. China 
adopted the corporate system from the West by establishing it in law. However, in 
reality, the Chinese dealt with corporate matters in their own way. Abuses of power by 
directors and managers, the impotence of shareholders’ meetings, and the malfunction 
of the stock markets at the time highlights the fact that legal acceptance does not 
amount to social acceptance (Wei, 2002: 99-100). 
6.3: Early business institutions in China: state governance through  
patronage and sponsorship. 
Napoleon Bonaparte referred to China as a ‘sleeping dragon’. However, when one looks  
at the recent developments in China, it can be concluded that nowadays the dragon is 
awake (Braendle et al, 2005: 390). In recent years China’s market liberalisation and 
enterprise reforms have brought high economic growth and privatisation initiatives. 
After decades of socialist economic policies controlling production via SOEs, China is 
now experimenting with corporate enterprise, firstly, by issuing minority share 
ownership in SOEs and creating stock markets, secondly and more recently, by 
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developing legal and regulatory frameworks that seek to protect shareholder rights and 
promote managerial responsibility.  
What continues to distinguish modern Chinese corporations from their Western, 
and particularly Anglo-Saxon counterparts is that they preserve a joint public-private 
ownership structure that also characterised China’s first large-scale firms before the 
People’s Republic was founded in 1949. Consequently, one potentially useful 
comparative model for today’s capitalism with Chinese characteristics is China’s 
creation and adoption of its own code of corporate governance prior to the founding of 
the People’s Republic. Prior to 1949, some of China’s most important enterprises were 
structured as public-private partnerships that were financed partly by equity capital and 
governed under the auspices of state oversight. In addition, before the founding of the 
People’s Republic a Western-style corporate code was adopted which had limited but 
instructive effects. Analysing the history of corporate ownership in China illustrates not 
only the economic and political conditions in which Chinese corporate governance 
originated, but how corporate governance responds to regulatory innovation in China 
(Goetzmann and Köll, 2005: 149-150). Therefore, studying the historical evolution of 
corporate governance in China provides insights for how the Chinese firms engaging in 
operations in Africa have evolved in relation to regulatory innovation.   
 Apart from a few state-controlled monopolies in salt, silk and porcelain  
production, the extended family business was the predominant form of business 
institution in China until the late nineteenth century. Although family business 
institutions were quite substantial and financially successful, the Chinese imperial 
government, preferring to retain some control, did not allow private business to engage 
in large-scale industrial production.  
This attitude changed at the end of the nineteenth century, and the introduction 
of the Company Law from the institutional environment level in 1904 to create a 
framework for modern, Western-style limited liability corporations at the micro-level 
can be interpreted as the imperial government’s belated response to the then ever-
increasing competition from foreign enterprises in China. The new corporate structures 
were based on Western business models and contrasted with existing managerial and 
financial structures previously influenced by kinship networks and state patronage.  
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Then, as today, China imitated Western corporate governance without fully 
installing all of the essential structures and features. However, this first corporate code 
did contain many elements of the modern formula for privatisation. This includes 
requirements for transparency, the separation of ownership from control, and annual 
auditing and reporting. 
During the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1911) dynasties, prior to the  
introduction of the first Company Law in 1904 and the founding of the Chinese  
Republic in 1911, private household businesses were the main institutions for domestic  
private economic activities in China, and many of these were of substantial size and  
scope. Extended family businesses have a long tradition in China and have been highly 
successful in producing and/or distributing commercial goods, particularly long-
distance trade. However, the largest and most successful of these enterprises relied upon 
some form of state sponsorship (Goetzmann and Köll, 2005: 150-152).  
For example, in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Tianjin salt 
merchants benefited from the nurturing policies of the Qing government. These 
included deferment and extensions of tax payments, salt price adjustments that 
responded to fluctuations in the exchange rate, deposits and loans with the Imperial 
Household Department, and administrative measures that countered salt smuggling. 
However, as these merchant businesses depended upon state patronage, they were 
forced to stay in good favour with the state by contributing large sums to military 
campaigns and making huge donations to public and imperial projects (Kwan, 2001: 37-
45).  
Large private enterprises for the industrial production of the gas and brine wells 
for salt production, operated by merchants in Zigong, Sichuan province, were an 
exception among business institutions in nineteenth-century China. The state interacted 
with these contract-based unlimited liability shareholding companies only through 
taxation and market regulation. The state did not interfere in their business organisation 
and/or management structures (Zelin, 2005: 1-3).  
Nevertheless, the absence of a law of limited liability and a law of bankruptcy 
had an increasingly negative impact on the expansion of these businesses by the end of 
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the nineteenth century. Therefore, only changes in business law, which came about first 
in the Treaty Ports
112
 and then in 1904 in the rest of China, were conducive to the  
incorporation of the private business institutions.  
Foreign corporate enterprise had been developing vigorously in Chinese treaty  
ports during the late nineteenth century. Shares of foreign registered corporations  
engaging in operations in China began trading on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in the  
1860s, and this exchange served as a conduit for domestic and foreign investment in  
China for the next seventy years. Chinese domestic corporations were not allowed to 
trade on this colonial stock exchange. However, the evolution of a domestic Chinese 
corporate code must be considered against this backdrop of colonial business because 
colonial business was regarded by the Qing government as a foreign competitor to 
domestic business. Furthermore, colonial business ideas were eventually developed as a 
useful structure for adaptation to China’s own purposes.  
Although there is a good deal of agreement that China, before Western 
influence, possessed the seeds of a long-distance/interregional banking system, 
experience with large business institutions, the capacity to plan and execute large 
infrastructure improvements, and countless manufacturing and mercantile entrepreneurs 
whose business ventures were extensive; the adoption of a Western-style corporate code 
in 1904 is best thought of as foreign financial and managerial technology being adapted 
to Chinese business needs. The term ‘technology’ is appropriate here because the early 
champions of adopting Western-style corporatism in China, as those discussed below, 
considered it to be a tool to advance the goal of improving China’s social and economic 
well-being, and not as a means of ‘Westernisation’ and/or convergence to foreign 
practices. Indeed, the adaptation process began well before the formal introduction of 
the 1904 corporate code, and these processes were motivated by a sense of competition 
with the West, rather than a sense of imitation.  
The first attempts to build large-scale industrial enterprises based upon the 
Western model were undertaken after the end of the Taiping Rebellion in 1864. In the 
wake of this civil war, which lasted for fourteen years and resulted in catastrophic 
economic consequences, the Qing government’s central political authority and fiscal 
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 The Treaty Ports came into being following the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing. Subsequently, China 
conducted its international economic transactions via a system that was characterised by legal 
extraterritoriality. The Treaty Ports were designated locations for foreign trade (Cox and Chan, 2000: 95). 
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stability was weakened. Subsequent political debates about the weak national economy, 
together with fears of foreign economic and political aggression, led to moderate 
attempts at reform which manifested themselves as adaptation processes.  
The Qing government maintained some control over this early adaptation, since 
any industrial enterprise founded before 1895 not only required sanction or permission 
from the government, but in addition, the government gave active supervision and 
sponsorship. During the 1860s and 1870s, examples of this government sponsored 
promotion from the institutional environment level of industrial enterprise at the micro-
level included the China Merchants’ Steamship Navigation Company in Shanghai, and 
the Kaiping Coal Mines near Tianjin as discussed below (Goetzmann and Köll, 2005: 
152-154). 
6.4: The China Merchants’ Steamship Navigation Company. 
The China Merchants’ Steamship Navigation Company (CMSNC) was formed in 1857 
from a business proposal by a Yale graduate, Yung Wing, one of many Chinese 
students sent to study abroad to embrace foreign ideas. He drew upon his studies at Yale 
to propose innovations. The concept of beating the West at its own game was present in 
Wing’s conception (Feuerwerker, 1958: 97). This suggests that the policy of the Qing 
government at the time had parallels with that of Japan during the Meiji restoration. 
Japan also conducted the pursuance of wealth through the adaption of Western 
technology (Beasley, 1972: 316). Therefore, adapting Western-style corporate practices  
to government-controlled enterprise can be seen not a means of Westernisation but a 
tool to improve the economic well-being of China. No foreigners were allowed to hold 
stock in the company. It was a purely Chinese-owned company, exclusively managed 
and worked by Chinese. The company went on to compete effectively with Western 
shipping firms in Shanghai (Feuerwerker, 1958: 97).  
To stress their close relationship with the government’s agenda, new industrial 
enterprises such as the CMSNC were joint-stock companies, partly funded by the 
issuance of shares to Chinese merchants, but they were controlled and nurtured by the 
government (Goetzmann and Köll, 2005: 155). Therefore, they were in effect, economic 
agents of the Qing government, just like large SOEs in the China of today. Between 
1872 and 1884 the operational management of the company was in the hands of 
Chinese merchants, and the company enjoyed government support in the form of 
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subsidies. As a result of this arrangement, the company prospered. However, from 1885 
government interference in the management of the company increased, which actually 
caused it to fail (Lai, 1996: 99). Nevertheless, this early example does highlight the fact 
that if a firm is nurtured by the government, but the management can enjoy sufficient 
autonomy, then a firm can be successful.  
The CMSNC had enjoyed the personal patronage of Li Hongzhang, an 
influential official of the Qing government. Initially, Li Hongzhang’s sponsorship 
secured sufficient financial support and merchant management autonomy. It was only 
when Li Hongzhang was unable to prevent the government from assuming more direct 
management control that the company encountered problems. Mismanagement and 
misappropriation of funds inevitably resulted from the government’s increased 
intervention in the company, which led to decreased merchant investment. Many such 
government sponsored firms suffered from a lack of auditing procedures and a tendency 
to equate private and company funds. However, the concept of private merchant 
investment had been established, and as a result, introducing the 1904 Company Law 
was not intended to promote shareholding as this was already a familiar concept. Its 
introduction was to establish limited liability in legal terms in order to make firms more 
attractive to Chinese investors (Goetzmann and Köll, 2005: 158-161). 
6.5: Early business institutions in China: Liu Hongsheng adapting  
Western business practices.  
Morgan (2003: 1-2, 6-7, 12) believes that most writers on Chinese management ‘have a  
kind of historical amnesia’. Both Western and Chinese contemporary scholars write as  
though they were unaware of the experience of management practice in the inter-war  
years. The experience of this period includes the adaptation of Western management  
practice in a Chinese business environment that was not so dissimilar from today.  
The leading management theory of the time was scientific management, or 
Taylorism, based on the ideas of Fredrick W. Taylor (1856-1915). Chinese 
industrialists, government officials, and business academics embraced the ideas of 
scientific management for the advancement of China. The Minister for Industry and 
Commerce Kong Xiangxi in the Kuomintang government of the time convened a 
meeting of Shanghai industrialists in May 1930 who had agreed to become co-sponsors 
of a Chinese Industry and Commerce Management Association (CICMA). Kong 
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Xiangxi’s speech at the meeting called for the promotion of scientific management to 
overcome the problems of China’s inadequacies in management, technical skill, and 
organisation. 
 The CICMA founding conference elected a 15-member board of directors, 
chaired by Kong Xiangxi, which included a powerful businessman of inter-war China, 
Liu Hongsheng. The aims of CICMA were, firstly, to collect research materials on 
scientific management, and secondly, to discuss, publish, and put into practice methods 
to improve Chinese management. Essentially, CICMA was concerned with how ideas 
about managerial and organisational forms could be received from abroad and adapted 
to Chinese businesses. An entrepreneur-manager such as Liu Hongsheng had embraced 
ideas concerning Western organisational and accounting systems as a comprador
113
 with 
a British firm, and had adapted them to his own businesses. Therefore, Liu Hongsheng 
was a key board member because management knowledge cannot be readily transferred 
across firms within a single country, let alone from a developed economy to a 
developing economy such as China, and his experience of transferring Western 
management technology to the Chinese business environment was vital.  
Initially, compradors acted as house stewards for Western agency houses in the  
Treaty Ports, with the responsibility of procuring day-to-day necessities and managing  
the Chinese staff. Compradors went on to provide financial services, and to engage in  
up-country purchasing. In addition, they acted as interpreters, gave market intelligence,  
found customers, and engaged with the Chinese authorities with whom they were  
usually closely connected (Cox and Chan, 2000: 96- 97). Therefore, in essence, the  
comprador acted as an economic intermediary between the foreign firms and the 
Chinese economy.  
By the 1890s however, the compradors had almost ceased to act as a bridge, and 
had become more of a barrier to entry to the Chinese market by pinning foreign firms to 
the Treaty Ports (Hao, 1970: 11-12). One British firm that wanted to expand in China 
without depending upon their earlier compatriots’ reliance upon compradors was the 
Kailan Mining Administration (KMA)
114
 (Cox and Chan, 2000: 100). The reason for 
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in Canton and Macao who provided provisions for foreign merchants (Cox and Chan, 2000: 95).  
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 The British formed KMA in 1912, to be under their control, to mine and sell coal (Wright, 1984: 123).  
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not wanting to rely too much upon their comprador is that KMA became suspicious 
about the other activities that he was engaged with.  
Liu Hongsheng became the comprador for KMA. In addition to his role of 
comprador, just like other compradors, he also ran his own businesses. These included 
coal distribution and wharf operations that were linked to coal distribution. Liu 
Hongsheng used his position as comprador to further his own business interests and to 
learn about modern business. In particular, he used his financial responsibility with 
KMA to development his business acumen. He went on to establish firms and engage in 
activities that were in direct competition with KMA, and this was largely done without 
KMA’s consent. In addition, he was able to learn about the corporate form of British 
enterprises and adapted the corporate form in his own businesses (Chan, 2006: 49, 51, 
75-76). Therefore, Liu Hongsheng learnt about and then adapted Western-style 
corporate practices to his own business activities.  
6.6: The Chinese Company Legislation of 1904. 
Based upon Japanese and English company laws, China’s first Company Law was  
issued by the newly created Ministry of Commerce on January 21, 1904. The intention  
of this code was to define the terms of Chinese corporate enterprise and to create an  
improved legal environment to encourage private investment, leading to greater  
economic well-being for China. Such a late appearance of business legislation could be  
seen as a lack of clear definitions of property rights and their enforcement by the state.  
However, this is a misinterpretation since China has had a widespread use of informal  
contracts in its business culture for centuries which performed the role of defining  
property rights. In addition, China in fact did not lag too far behind Western legal  
corporate reform. For example, the UK’s institutional environment only codified limited 
liability in 1862 with the passing of the Companies Act.  
By the 1870s and 1880s, the Western corporate model itself was evolving in 
order to address the challenges of international investment and business enterprise. 
British firms had been trading as early as 1866 on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, 
suggesting that China was being exposed quite early to the evolving financial 
technology of British-style corporate capitalism. Rather than continuing with a laissez-
faire approach of allowing continued firm level adaptation under state patronage and a 
hands-on inclusion of government officials in the governance structure, such as the 
154 
 
government assuming more direct control of the CMSNC, the code was hands-off. It 
eliminated the direct participation of the government by introducing a set of external 
rules and structures to make corporations responsive to shareholders. It also attempted 
to encourage the establishment of Chinese corporations, modelled upon Western 
corporate structures that could compete with foreign firms operating in China. 
 The 1904 Company Law contained 131 articles in eleven sections. It stipulated  
issues such as organisational forms of firms, ways to report a firm’s founding, business  
management methods, and shareholder rights. For example, the code stipulated that the  
board of directors should be elected at a general meeting of shareholders. In addition,  
shareholders also had the right to pass resolutions at general meetings. Firms in the form  
of partnerships with unlimited or limited liability, joint-stock companies with unlimited  
or limited liability, and sole proprietorships with unlimited liability were allowed to  
register with the Chinese government according to the code (Goetzmann and Köll,  
2005: 162-163). According to Chan (1977: 180-82) 272 firms registered with the  
Chinese government between 1904 and 1908 in response to the issuance of the code,  
and over half of these were joint-stock companies with limited liability.  
The Qing government took a back seat in the registration process. According  
to the code, businessmen had to register their firms with the local chamber of commerce  
who, in turn, forwarded the registration to the central government. This practice was 
abolished when the code was revised in 1914 after the republican government came to 
power in 1911. The 1914 revision stipulated that registration had to take place directly 
with the central government.  
Concerning financial transparency and control, the code did reform the process 
of creating and controlling accounts in Chinese firms. According to stipulations in the 
code, corporations had to produce detailed company reports at least once a year. These 
reports had to contain a profit and loss statement, a written statement on the firm’s 
commercial situation, the exact loss or profit figures, amounts paid out as dividends and 
set aside for reserves, and a balance of the firm’s assets and liabilities. Most firms did 
comply with these basic formal requirements in annual company reports. However, the 
code contained no stipulations on the way company accounts should be compiled and 
recorded, whilst the regulations for annual financial statements were too brief. Not even 
the revised code of 1914 contained any specifications for standardised bookkeeping in 
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the company accounting section. Therefore, the code called for an annual company 
report but no uniform system for accounting. Modern, Western-style bookkeeping 
methods only found their way into China in the 1930s (Goetzmann and Köll, 2005: 164, 
169-170).  
Kirby (1995: 48) considered that because the code did not introduce a uniform 
system for accounting, and the fact that only a relatively small number of Chinese firms 
actually registered with the government, meant that the code had a limited impact upon 
the development of Chinese firms at the micro-level. In addition, of those firms 
registered as stockholding companies with limited liability, only a few were large and 
evolved into sustainable businesses. Nevertheless, of the firms that actually did register, 
the expectation that incorporation would make the firm more attractive to potential 
investors was a key incentive for registration. Goetzmann and Köll (2005: 165, 171) 
suggest this in their consideration of the Dasheng cotton mills. Zhang Jian was a famous 
scholar with government service experience who was invited to found and manage the 
Dasheng cotton mills. Zhang Jian registered the No. 2 branch Dasheng cotton mill in 
Chongming with the Ministry of Commerce in 1905, two years before the mill would be 
ready to operate. Goetzmann and Köll point out that Zhang Jian was keen to have all of 
his industrial interests registered with the government, and they believe that he expected 
that incorporation would make the Dasheng cotton mills more attractive to potential 
investors. 
6.6.1: The limited effect of the 1904 code. 
The 1904 code clearly brought Chinese business arrangements more in line with 
established Western corporate practice. It created limited liability and attempted to enact 
transparency and accounting requirements to protect the rights of shareholders. In many 
respects, it resembles corporate governance legislation that is being adopted in today’s 
emerging markets. Then, just like today, the intention was to create a capital market to 
support the development of Chinese industry, and in this context, the 1904 code can be 
regarded as a visionary document (Goetzmann and Köll, 2005: 176). However, the 1904 
code, legislation at the institutional environment level, had a limited effect upon the 
micro-level.  
Hamilton (1996: 43, 53-54) offers a cultural explanation for this limited effect, 
by claiming that scholars have argued that ‘kinship and collegiality in China play roles 
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… played by law and individuality in the West’, suggesting that Chinese family 
business and networking play more important roles in China than any legislation could. 
Indeed, as Hamilton points out, there is a correlation between increased economic 
opportunities in China with a simultaneous expansion of networks.  
Goetzmann and Köll (2005: 176-178) offer an institutional explanation. 
Adopting a Western-style corporate code in 1904 represents embracing a top-down 
approach, with ‘the visible hand of the state’ attempting to create a robust corporate 
sector whilst overlooking the public capital markets as a key disciplinary institution for 
corporate managers. In addition, they argue that the 1904 code was not accompanied by 
an appropriate regulatory framework.  
Goetzmann and Köll also offer a historical explanation. At this time the Chinese 
capital markets suffered boom and bust cycles. Stock market crashes in 1883 and 1922 
eroded investor confidence and can be seen, in the eyes of Goetzmann and Köll, as 
‘accidents of history’. Goetzmann and Köll question whether the visible hand of the 
state in China today will succeed in creating structures of capitalist ownership with 
greater success than it did prior to the founding of the People’s Republic. Today, 
although there is still a lack of supporting regulatory institutions, appropriate legislation 
is being introduced, and the state nurtures large SOEs in key sectors. So long as these 
large SOEs continue to enjoy state patronage and still be granted management 
autonomy, then the example of the early years of the CMSNC, enjoying state patronage 
but granted management autonomy, suggests that they will be successful. 
6.6.2: The importance of a legal system. 
Allen (2005: 174) states that one of the themes of much of the literature on corporate 
governance is the importance of having an effective legal system at the institutional 
environment level. China however, provides an example where the legal system does 
not appear to play an important role. China’s legal system today is significantly under-
developed in comparison to other countries, and corporate governance, accounting 
standards, and investor protection systems are poor at best, while the banking system is 
not well developed and is to a large degree inefficient.  
The Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange have grown very 
fast since their foundation in 1990, or in the case of Shanghai, reforming. Whilst these 
stock exchanges have attracted a lot of attention from both investors and researchers, 
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their scale and importance are still not comparable to other channels of financing, in 
particular the banking sector. How can, Allen asks, the poor status of China’s legal and 
financial systems be reconciled with China’s spectacular economic growth since 1979? 
Allen concludes that there are very effective non-standard mechanisms to support the 
financing and growth of China’s economy. One of the most important mechanisms that 
drive good management and corporate governance is competition. Competition appears 
a particularly important factor driving corporate governance in China. In many 
industries there is ferocious competition from both domestic and foreign firms. 
Another form of effective governance is family-run firms, as it has been shown  
that these firms emerge as the dominant form of ownership structure in countries with  
weak minority shareholder protections. Many of China’s successful private-sector firms  
have a very high fraction of the firm’s stake owned by their founders and executives,  
and these have performed very well. A final very important factor is reputation and 
trust. Greif (1989: 881-882) argues that certain traders’ organisations, such as the 
Maghribi Traders in the eleventh century, were able to overcome problems of 
asymmetric information and the lack of legal and contract enforcement mechanisms 
because they had developed institutions based on reputation, implicit contractual 
relations, and coalitions.
115
 Certain aspects of the growth of these institutions resemble 
what works in China today. For example, a managerial reputation effect can replace 
governance in an initial public offering firm.  
There is an historical example to illustrate that the legal system may be  
secondary compared to other factors, such as reputation and trust, and this is provided  
by the UK. In the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century minority  
shareholders in the UK had very little legal protection. However, this did not prevent  
the development of large and successful securities markets. Strong legal protections  
were finally introduced in the middle of the twentieth century, and this did not alter the  
rate of equity issuance and the dispersion of ownership. In other words, the protection  
of minority shareholders did not affect these two factors at all, and trust and reputation  
could be largely responsible for this (Allen, 2005: 174-175). 
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6.7: Chinese government interference in the corporate governance of  
the early corporation and SOEs.  
A major feature of Chinese corporate development immediately prior to the founding of 
the People’s Republic in 1949 was that the state at the institutional environment level 
often interfered in corporate practice at the micro-level. There were businessmen who 
tried to get the government’s protection by inviting the state to supervise their firms. As 
a result, firms that were invested in by businessmen but managed by the government 
were commonplace. State capitalism was promoted by the Kuomintang government, to 
restrict private enterprise in important economic sectors such as banking, the railways, 
and the utilities.
 
Consequently, state monopoly nurtured what was regarded as the most 
corrupt government in the world at that time, resulting in disastrous consequences for 
China’s economy. Government officials used their control of firms to make personal 
gains, by misappropriating public assets and creating their own personal shareholdings, 
and in addition, these firms were burdened by excessive bureaucracy. The state 
monopoly severely undermined the healthy development of a Chinese corporate system, 
serving as a lesson for today’s reforms in China (Wei, 2002: 100-101).   
Concerning government interference in the corporate governance of SOEs,  
McNally (2002: 92-93, 111) wrote that most analyses of governance failures in China’s  
state sector focus upon administrative interference by state institutions, and that ‘no  
detailed analysis of Communist Party institutions in the governance of Chinese SOEs  
has been conducted’. Centrally planned economies, including China, had historically  
integrated the entire economic system within two parallel hierarchies, which are the  
economic management bureaucracy and the Communist Party’s nomenklatura, an elite  
subset. Of the two hierarchies, the nomenklatura took precedence. The Party acted as  
the central monitoring agency, collecting information about economic actors and  
controlling their behaviour. With the introduction of market reforms the decentralisation  
of decision-making became necessary and consequently, the Party’s economic  
monitoring and control functions became dysfunctional, hindering fundamental  
corporate governance reforms. Therefore, the Party’s continued exercise of authority  
over state sector executives negatively impacted three aspects of corporate governance,  
namely personnel management, corporate decision-making, and corporate transparency.  
In researching this however, McNally found that whilst continued state authority had  
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negative effects on such day-to-day corporate governance aspects in the state sector as a  
whole, the Chinese state was extremely capable of effectively managing a small number  
of high-profile corporations in relation to these three aspects of corporate governance,  
such as the national champion energy concerns active today in Africa. 
6.8: Modern Chinese corporate governance. 
There are two evolutionary stages of government control in corporate governance in 
China. The first stage is between 1979 and 1993, and the second stage began in 1994. 
Both stages are characterised by significant political continuity between them. At the 
beginning of China’s economic reform in 1978, the country operated a centrally planned 
economy in which state ownership in the non-agriculture sector was complete. Private 
ownership of the means of production was completely prohibited. In the first stage of 
the evolution of government control in corporate governance over the next fifteen years, 
privatisation of SOEs was delayed. In fact, the state sector expanded in size in terms of 
assets, investment, employment, and output. As a result, state control in corporate 
governance did not decrease, but increased due to the increased size of the SOEs. In the 
second stage, the development of the relationship between the Chinese government and 
business took a new direction. Small- and medium-sized private enterprises emerged as 
a new engine of growth when many of these were privatised. Privatisation in China was 
not driven by ideology or a political agenda, but by economic and financial reality. 
Large-sized SOEs in vital sectors were not privatised, and began to be nurtured by the 
government. This policy at this second stage of ‘grasping the large and releasing the 
small’ to transform SOEs was slow between 1994 and 1998 and produced little results 
up to 1998 (Qian, 2000: 6-10).  
Preparations for entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001  
prompted China to improve its competitiveness. WTO entry became a major factor that  
pushed China to reform large SOEs (Saich, 2004: 85). The Chinese government, in late  
1998, ordered all Communist party and government administrative organs to cut their  
direct links with the firms they controlled, in order to increase management autonomy  
(Tenev and Zhang, 2002: 23).  This policy of corporatisation of large SOEs continued to  
develop management autonomy. Following on from this, the September 1999 decision  
on SOE reform introduced three major new policies:  
 to readjust the layout of the state economy to narrow its scope, 
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 to diversify the ownership structure for firms for whom the state wishes to maintain  
control, 
 to establish effective corporate governance according to international standards. 
In the light of this, developments followed such as the China Securities Regulatory  
Commission (CSRC) publishing regulations on selling state shares (Qian, 2000: 10).  
6.9: Government control in Chinese corporate governance. 
The explosive growth of small privatised enterprises is often credited for the rapid  
economic development that has occurred in China recently. However, it is more, as 
Nolan (2001: 16) argues, the large firms that have remained in state hands that have 
played the key role in China’s economic development. The economic policy to ‘grasp 
the large, let go of the small’ shows the determination of the Chinese government to 
create and nurture, through direct control, large corporations to enable them to compete 
globally. Therefore, small SOEs have been privatised, while the privatisation of large 
SOEs has been delayed. 
However, in China, one now has two kinds of large SOEs. Firstly, there is what  
can only be described as a set of rather problematic SOEs, who have not yet been  
privatised despite the fact that their future now rests upon their performance. Redding  
and Witt (2006: 14, 25) believe that these, perhaps what must be described as ‘old-style  
SOEs’, will decline or even fail. They point out that these firms are hampered by the  
lack of institutions, and overcapacity is endemic. Secondly, on the other hand, there are  
large SOEs that have been selected as ‘national champions’. They have been 
specifically chosen and are being prepared for global competitiveness. In contrast to the  
old-style SOEs, the national champions are protected, and it is easy to perform well  
when protected. Therefore, for the large SOEs, the Chinese government continues to be  
the major shareholder.  
On purely economic grounds, there are a number of sound reasons for delaying  
the privatisation of large SOEs. A hurried privatisation may result in high costs because 
of a lack of institutional supports. These include a lack of legal safeguards for investors, 
a lack of regulatory institutions for industry, and a lack of a social safety net.  
The lack of a social safety net outside firms is a particularly important reason 
why privatisation has been delayed. SOEs in China are an institution not just for 
generating profits. The SOEs serve many other purposes such as the provision of social 
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welfare. In the absence of a social safety net, laid-off workers could protest, for 
example, directly threatening the power of the ruling group. In turn, such an unstable 
social environment could indirectly have an adverse affect on the rest of the economy’s 
development. Consequently, maintaining social order could be viewed as a public good, 
an externality that private owners would not take into consideration (Qian, 2000: 19-
23). Therefore, in China the possibility of laid-off workers protesting is an important 
consideration for the ruling group, highlighting the fact that Chinese SOEs have a broad 
remit, which is to maintain the social order. The consequences of this will be discussed 
in Chapter 9.
116
  
6.9.1: Grasping the large: the corporatisation of Chinese state-owned enterprises. 
As early as July 1980, a State Council policy document was published recognising the  
existence of economic links between different firms that had developed, whilst these  
firms were gaining increasing independence from their relevant ministries. Such  
enterprise groups are in contrast to what had previously occurred under the planned  
economy, where a firm only had links with the relevant ministry. By 1991, and then  
again added to in 1997, the State Council formally selected a national team of 120 large  
enterprise groups in sectors believed to be of national importance, such as the mining  
and oil sectors. These are the national champions that have benefited from high levels of  
protection, including high tariff barriers, together with other non-tariff barriers. Such  
non-tariff barriers included foreign importers having to make technology transfers,  
having to use components from Chinese suppliers, and being denied access to Chinese  
distribution channels. In addition, the national champions were:  
 allowed to retain profits,  
 allowed to make their own investment decisions,  
 allowed to engage in international trade,  
 allowed to establish their own internal finance firms,  
 allowed to manage other firms owned by the state within the enterprise group, 
 given R&D centres to nourish their technical progress,  
 given substantial management autonomy, therefore they were at the forefront of  
separating ownership from control,  
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 recognised as an independent legal entity, with their property rights established  
under the Company Law, 
 allowed to list themselves on stock markets to raise capital, 
 given large-scale state financial support (Nolan, 2001: 18-19).    
Chinese SOEs used to suffer from a relative lack of efficiency because, amongst  
other things, they tended towards traditional management practices (Clarke and Yuxing,  
2005: 275). One of the key measures that corporatisation set in motion is ownership  
restructuring, moving away from traditional management practices. The main objectives  
of the ownership restructuring are to: 
 make clear the ambiguities in SOEs’ property rights, 
 continue developing management autonomy, 
 provide incentives for management to improve corporate governance (Zhang, 2008: 
35).    
In order for the Chinese government to make SOEs operate more efficiently,  
SOEs have to be subjected to a new set of rules, namely the rules of organisation under  
the modern enterprise system. This is the key purpose of the policy of corporatisation.  
Chinese policymakers then find that they have to adjust the rules to take into account  
continued state ownership (Clarke, 2003: 495).  
To subject SOEs to the rules of the modern enterprise system, the 
corporatisation policy has developed stock markets and allowed SOEs to raise capital 
via equity issues. The Chinese stock market was organised as a vehicle for SOEs to 
raise capital and improve operating performance. However, a fundamental dilemma 
stems from the state policy of maintaining a full or controlling ownership interest in key 
SOEs. The state wants SOEs to be run efficiently, but not solely for the purpose of 
wealth maximisation. The state, therefore, wants to continue to be involved in the build 
up of the Chinese stock market. However, state involvement such as this creates a 
conflict of interest between the state as controlling shareholder and other shareholders. 
In addition, the state plays two roles, that of controlling shareholder and regulator. 
Developing the stock market in China serves several purposes other than shareholder-
value maximisation. Protection of minority shareholders is not a prime objective. 
Furthermore, providing investors with timely and accurate information is not a priority. 
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Despite the fact that laws and regulations have been introduced, corporate transparency 
in China is low (Liu, 2006: 445-446).  
6.9.2: The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China. 
China’s selected national champion SOEs have been allowed to list themselves on stock  
markets. In 2001, the CSRC issued the Code of Corporate Governance for all listed  
companies in China (Ho, 2008: 232). In accordance with the basic principles of the  
Company Law (see below) and other relevant laws and regulations, together with  
commonly accepted standards in international corporate governance, the Code of 
Corporate Governance for Listed Companies (CCGLC)
117
 promotes the establishment 
and improvement of the modern enterprise system by listed companies, to standardise 
the operation of listed companies, and to bring forward the healthy development of the  
securities market of China. Among other things, the CCGLC sets forth the basic  
principles for corporate governance of listed Chinese companies, the means for the  
protection of investors' interests and rights, and the basic behaviour rules and moral  
standards for directors, supervisors, managers and other senior management members of  
listed companies. The CCGLC is the benchmark for evaluating whether a listed  
company has a good corporate governance structure. What the CCGLC stipulates is  
outlined in Box 6.1 on the next page. If major problems exist with a listed company’s 
corporate governance structure, the CSRC can instruct that firm to make corrections in 
accordance with the CCGLC (China Securities Regulatory Commission, 2002: 1). 
6.9.3: Other issues in Chinese corporate governance. 
Definitions of corporate governance in China tend to cover system regulating  
relationships amongst all parties with interests in a firm, often singling shareholders out  
as a particularly important group. However in practice, Chinese corporate governance  
discourse focuses mainly on agency problems and within two types of firms. These are  
SOEs provided for under the Company Law and listed firms. Listed firms must be 
Companies Limited by Shares under the Company Law. The Company Law speaks of a  
duty of loyalty (Clarke, 2003: 494, 505).  
China’s Company Law (effective in 1994) reflects the state’s intent to provide a 
legal framework to modernise SOEs without abandoning socialist principles of public 
ownership and state control. The Company Law specifies a hybrid corporate governance  
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system, modelled on the Anglo-Saxon system but complemented with elements from 
the German two-tiered board system and the Japanese main-bank system. Such an 
eclectic mix of institutional elements, successful in their institutional environments of 
origin, has led to the creation of an organisational hybrid which is particularly weak in 
exerting effective corporate controls, be they market-based or stakeholder-based (Opper 
 Controlling shareholders, the state, will support the listed company to 
reform labour, personnel and distribution systems, to transform 
operational and managerial mechanisms, to select management through 
bidding and competition, and to hire employees on the basis of 
competitive selection. 
 The state, as controlling shareholder, owes a duty of good faith toward 
the listed company and other shareholders, and should not interfere with 
the company's decisions or activities conducted in accordance with laws. 
 The state should respect the financial independence of the company and 
should not interfere with financial and accounting activities of the 
company. 
 The board of directors (to include independent directors), the supervisory 
committee and other internal offices should operate independently.  
 The board of directors should treat all shareholders equally and should 
also be concerned with the interests of all stakeholders.  
 No institution or individual should interfere with a listed company's 
recruiting procedure for management personnel. 
 A listed company should respect the legal rights of employees, 
consumers, suppliers, the community and other stakeholders.  
 The listed company should be concerned with the welfare, environmental 
protection, and public interests of the community in which it resides, and 
should pay due attention to the company's social responsibilities.  
Box 6.1: Some Stipulations of the Code of Corporate Governance for 
Listed Companies (adapted from China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, 2002: 3-4, 6, 9-10). 
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and Schwaag-Serger, 2008: 253-254). This is an example of the fact that policymakers 
in China favour a stylised Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system, but only in 
principle. In reality, China’s corporate governance can be seen as a mixture of both the 
Anglo-Saxon and German-Japanese models
118
 (Chen, 2005: 147). Therefore, a system 
of corporate governance has emerged that, as Redding and Witt (2006: 28) points out, 
pays ‘lip service to Anglo-US ideals’. However in practice, they stress that control 
largely rests in the hands of insiders.  
China’s corporate law has certainly imported qualities from foreign corporate  
laws, particularly Anglo-American and German corporate laws. However, the Chinese  
Company Law, in comparison with other jurisdictions, has some distinctive, one could  
almost say ‘Chinese’, characteristics (Wei, 2003: 106). The Company Law requires  
directors, supervisors, and managers to execute their official duties and to protect firm 
interests without exploiting their positions and power within the firm. This is  
highlighted in Box 6.3, where the first five bullet points emphasise what directors, 
supervisors, and managers must do. The final three bullet points highlight that 
competition and self-dealing with the firm are prohibited under the Company Law (Lin, 
2004: 4). 
6.9.4: The advantages of, and justifying, government control in Chinese corporate  
governance. 
Politics is a major force shaping any national corporate governance structure. In an  
emerging market such as China, the role of political interests is even more important.  
While Western corporate governance systems were developed according to an  
endogenous evolutionary process based upon the free exchange of property rights and  
profit making objectives over time, China has had to develop a new corporate  
governance structure virtually overnight. Perhaps this can only be achieved via a top- 
down approach where the state plays the major role (Opper and Schwaag-Serger, 2008:  
251).  
Normally, a state wealth maximisation policy would mean that the state 
acquires, maintains, or releases control according to what would maximise wealth for 
the state. However, the Chinese government does not have such a policy. The Chinese  
government uses its control of firms and in corporate governance for purposes other  
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than its own wealth maximisation, such as maintaining employment levels and direct 
control over sensitive industries, which are their higher national goals. Furthermore, 
political interference such as politically motivated job placement is another purpose 
(Clarke, 2003: 495). Therefore, the Chinese state maintaining control produces an 
effective corporate governance system because the state acts as the principal and 
pursues higher national goals.  
In addition, there is a growing amount of literature arguing that large Chinese 
SOEs, especially the so-called national champions pursuing higher national goals, have 
been crucial elements in China’s extraordinary economic growth. For example, Lo and 
Smyth (2005: 12) believe that large Chinese SOEs can be seen as being engines of  
growth. Indeed, Willner (1996: 28) believes that public ownership is not harmful for  
economic growth. If it was, Willner asks, then how can it be explained that economies 
such as Japan and South Korea have enjoyed high growth rates with prominent state- 
The Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance is also known as the outsider 
system. It compares with the German-Japanese model, or the insider system. 
These are based on the outsider-based and the insider-based systems of 
ownership and control respectively. These two stylised models of corporate 
governance differ as follows: 
 The Anglo-Saxon model: This is characterised by dispersed 
shareholding, shareholder sovereignty, and the alignment of manager 
and shareholder interests. It stresses the importance of monitoring, 
disclosure of information, and accountability. 
 The German-Japanese model: This is characterised by cross-
shareholdings, cross-representation of directors, investor involvement 
in decision making, and the concentration of share ownership. This 
system is said to have huge potential for inter-firm co-operation (Chen, 
2005: 22-23). 
Box 6.2: The Anglo-Saxon and German-Japanese Model of Corporate 
Governance.   
167 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
owned sectors?  
Most arguments that support the notion that political control in firm decision- 
making has a negative impact on corporate performance assume that politicians  
maximise social goals rather than the wealth of shareholders (Chang and Wong, 2002:  
4-5). However, this depends on how one defines performance. Corporate performance  
in the traditional Western notion is to perform to achieve the goal of maximising  
shareholder wealth. For a Chinese SOE, especially a national champion, there may be  
different goals, such as the pursuance of higher national goals (employment levels, for 
example). Shleifer (1998: 133) points out that historically, politicians have used firms to 
correct market failures such as natural monopolies and externalities. In addition, Willner 
(1996: 13) suggests that politicians can use firms to accelerate technical progress. 
However, Shirley and Walsh (2000: 19, 21) believe that most social goals can be 
achieved via taxation, subsidies, and/or contracting. Therefore, there is no need for 
politicians to be directly involved in firm decision-making. However, in defence of 
 comply with the firm’s constitution, 
 perform their duties faithfully and uphold the interests of the firm and must 
not use abuse their position to seek personal gain, 
 not take bribes or misappropriate firm property, 
 not deposit firm funds in their personal accounts or other persons accounts, 
 not use the firm’s assets as collateral for personal debts, 
 directors are prohibited from engaging in the business operations of another 
firm, 
 directors are prohibited from engaging in activities that may adversely affect 
the interests of the firm, 
 directors and managers are not permitted to enter into any activity with the 
firm unless the constitution says otherwise or unless they have shareholders’ 
consent.  
Box 6.3: The Duties of Directors, Supervisors, and Managers under the 
Company Law (adapted from Lin, 2004: 4). 
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Chinese SOEs, politicians perhaps should be directly involved in firm decision-making 
to pursue the higher national goals that otherwise might not be achieved. 
The fundamental dilemma of Chinese corporate governance is the state policy of  
maintaining full or controlling ownership in firms. To justify a policy mandating state  
ownership, the state wants firms to be run efficiently, but not only for the goal of wealth  
maximisation. The pursuance of higher national goals such as maintaining employment 
levels justify continued state ownership, suggesting that the Chinese corporate 
governance system is evolving to suit China’s own specific purposes. However, two 
major problems do arise. Firstly, higher national goals cannot be easily measured, 
creating monitoring difficulties. Secondly, a conflict of interest can arise between the 
state and other shareholders. The state can exploit minority shareholders who have no 
other way to benefit from their investment (Clarke, 2003: 495). 
SOE managers in China welcome the continuation of direct state-firm linkages  
to secure preferential access to resources in an insecure and rapidly changing  
institutional environment (Opper and Schwaag-Serger, 2008: 252). In fact, reflecting the  
economic dominance of SOEs and their preferential access to capital, SOEs continue to  
get a high proportion of investment. 58% of total fixed asset investment went to SOEs  
in 2004 (Rudman, 2006: 35). Close and continuing state-firm relations gives rise to a  
new, hybrid economic order of ‘politicised capitalism’. In this, the state remains directly  
involved in guiding transactions at the firm level and the Chinese government rejected a  
complete privatisation of SOEs. Instead, large SOEs were corporatised, which is partly  
privatised with the government maintaining controlling shares, the goal being to raise  
equity capital without losing state firms as convenient policy tools to achieve higher  
national goals (Opper and Schwaag-Serger, 2008: 252). SOEs receiving preferential  
access to resources may be viewed by some as corruption. As perceived in the West, the  
allocation of resources to favourites is just one of the many forms of corruption that  
exist (Khan, 2006: 3). However, such preferential treatment may be viewed differently 
in China. It may be viewed as not corrupt at all, but part of their politicised capitalism.  
6.10: CNOOC and Sinopec’s sustainability reporting. 
In the light of the discussions presented above, attention will now turn to assessing how 
the Chinese firms that operate in Angola behave. Established in 1982, CNOOC is the 
dominant offshore oil and gas producer in China. (CNOOC, 2005: 5). Their reporting 
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contains elements of the second generation of the evolution of the CSR agenda
119
 in that 
they set targets and state commitments. Regarding setting targets, for example: 
“In August 2006, CNOOC signed the energy saving agreements with five 
subsidiaries included in the Energy Saving Campaign of 1,000 
Companies launched by the state government. The agreements clearly 
outline the energy saving targets of the five units during the 11th Five-
year Plan period (2006-2010)” (CNOOC, 2006: 14). 
 
“Between 2005 and 2010, the Company’s production grew at 16.3% 
CAGR (Compound Annual Growth Rate), exceeding 7-11% CAGR 
target set in early 2005. For 2010 to 2015, the Company will strive to 
achieve the production target of 6-10% CAGR” (CNOOC, 2010-2011: 
8). 
 
“CNOOC achieved historical high operating performance exceeding its 
annual production and operating targets, oil and gas output and 
production volume of major products increased significantly, the quality 
of development kept improving, its corporate image and brand influence 
were further improved, and accomplished all the targets set for the 
Eleventh Five-year Plan” (CNOOC, 2010: 18),  
 
but without articulating how this was measured. Nevertheless, the general theme in their 
reporting concerns measuring performance according to the financial bottom line. This 
raises the question as to whether CNOOC adheres to the triple bottom line and the 
sustainability agenda. Their reporting contains the concept of sustainability from the 
third generation of the CSR agenda
120
 as a statement of their commitments. For 
example:   
“CNOOC ... is committed to ... pursuing a sustainable growth” (CNOOC, 
2008-2009: 6). 
 
However, the concept of sustainable development for CNOOC involves continued 
existence.
121
 For example, they state that they are  
“committed to continuing our efforts in [the] sustainable development of 
the company, taking on more social responsibilities and making [a] 
greater contribution to [the] harmonious development of society” 
(CNOOC, 2005: 1). 
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Therefore, CNOOC feels that they should be sustainable as a company first, prior to 
addressing societal needs because, as CNOOC states: 
“A company must first grow itself in making [a] contribution to 
sustainable development” (CNOOC, 2006: 38). 
 
Nevertheless, being ‘sustainable as a company first’ requires creating value for their 
shareholders first, perhaps, for now, in preference to all other stakeholders because, as 
they state: 
“We are continuously improving our core competiveness and striving to 
achieve sustainable development in order to create more value for our 
shareholders” (CNOOC, 2010-2011: 44). 
 
Sinopec too state commitments in their reporting. For example: 
“We are committed to increasing the value of state-owned assets, 
protecting and balancing the interests of our shareholders, customers, 
employees and communities and other stakeholders, improving decision-
making and risk prevention capabilities, ensuring effective and efficient 
business operations and promoting [the] sustainable development of the 
organisation” (Sinopec, 2009a: 8).  
 
Sinopec’s first Sustainable Development Report outlined their contribution to the 
economy, environment and society (Sinopec, 2006: 1), and they state that they fulfil 
“a corporation’s responsibility and obligation to promote harmonious and 
sustainable development among economy, society and environment” 
(Sinopec, 2008: 2),  
 
which follows 
 “the principle of organic integration of its economic goals with social 
and environmental responsibilities” (Sinopec, 2009b: 5).  
 
Therefore, Sinopec embraces the environmental and social bottom lines alongside 
economic growth, the triple bottom line, and arguably more so than CNOOC. 
6.10.1: Global initiatives.  
Sinopec’s first Sustainable Development Report also  
“outlined their ... efforts in promoting the Global Compact” (Sinopec, 
2006: 1), 
 
and the first time that the Global Compact and the GRI are mentioned in CNOOC’s 
reporting is in 2007: 
 “This report was prepared in accordance with the GRI guide, and in the 
light of our commitments to the Global Compact. We understand that the 
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new standards require us to do more ... and ... in order to fulfil our 
commitments to ‘providing clean energy and creating a better life’, we 
are willing to apply ever higher standards” (CNOOC, 2007: 3).  
 
As we saw in Section 5.10.4, the GRI is arguably preoccupied with environmental 
issues, and therefore, does CNOOC behave this way? They state that:  
“It is the primary task for companies to promote the development of 
social economy. We are fully aware that a company can only be 
recognised and accepted by society and fulfil the goals of sustainable 
development through continuous contributions to the progress and 
development of social economy” (CNOOC, 2006-2007: 35).  
 
In addition,  
“Social responsibility undertaking is an integral condition for an 
enterprise’s sustainable development. An enterprise that fulfils its social 
responsibility will be rewarded by the society” (CNOOC, 2007: 59).  
 
Therefore, CNOOC is not overly concerned with environmental issues, despite 
endorsing the GRI. Nevertheless, environmental issues are not ignored. For example:  
“As a state-owned energy company, CNOOC took the initiative to help 
optimise energy consumption mix in China, promulgate industrial 
transformation, foster innovation, and participate in the building of an 
energy-saving and environment friendly society. We regard it as the most 
important area that we can help realise sustainable development” 
(CNOOC, 2005: 2-3).  
 
It can be concluded therefore, that CNOOC has embraced the concept of sustainable 
development, but adapted it to their own needs, just as earlier Chinese enterprises 
embraced Western notions and adapted them. CNOOC needs to develop as a company 
first, and that is primarily what the concept of sustainable development means to them. 
Indices are at the end of CNOOC’s Sustainability Reports from 2009 onwards, 
starting with:  
“Content of GRI Index” (CNOOC, 2009a: 58),  
 
to show how the reports adhere to the GRI guidelines. However, when this first 
appeared, in the 2009 Sustainability Report, an English language version of that 
particular report appears to be unavailable. This opens to question the clarity of 
CNOOC’s reporting because, as the GRI guidelines clearly state: 
“The data and information in the report is available to stakeholders, 
including those with particular accessibility needs [such as] language” 
(Global Reporting Initiative, 2000-2011: 16). 
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More importantly, concerning the GRI, CNOOC state that their reports are  
“prepared with reference to the applicable standards recommended by the 
Global Reporting Initiative” (CNOOC, 2011: ii). 
 
Furthermore, Sinopec 
“endeavours to apply the ... principles of the Global Reporting Initiative” 
(Sinopec, 2006: 1).  
 
However, their reporting also  
“does not include all relevant indicators” (Sinopec, 2011b: 75).  
 
This suggests that they both provide their own accounts of sustainability, and they are 
not fully adhering to the guidelines. As we saw in Section 5.10, the problem with firms  
producing their own accounts is they may only report what they want to report to mask 
negative impacts. Of equal concern is the fact that firms could use their reporting not 
just to mask but to misstate their performance (Burgstahler et al, 2004: 14), and this 
potential will be examined in Chapter 9. 
6.10.2: Higher national goals and symbolic relationships. 
As national champion SOEs, both CNOOC and Sinopec pursue the higher national 
goals that otherwise might not be achieved such as maintaining employment levels, and 
they both compensate for the lack of a social safety net in China. This involves valuing 
their existing employees because, as Sinopec state,  
“Sinopec ... believes that [its] employees are its most important resources 
for sustainable development” (Sinopec, 2007: 7).  
 
In addition, CNOOC considers that the  
 “wellness of our staff is [the] priority for our sustainable development” 
(CNOOC, 2005: 3).  
 
Furthermore,  
“CNOOC attaches great importance to ... building stable and harmonious 
relations between employees and the enterprise” (CNOOC, 2008: 49).  
 
This raises the question as to what will happen when CNOOC invests overseas, and 
thus, the consequences of this will be assessed in Chapter 9. Nevertheless, a clue to how 
the Chinese engage with potential host countries is provided by Mr. Zhang Ming, the 
Chinese Ambassador to Kenya, who stated that:  
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“CNOOC is a large oil company of our country. The Voyage of Love122 
it launched is an act of benevolence and kindness to African People, well 
timed against the opening of the Beijing Olympic Games. It exemplified 
CNOOC’s commitment to social responsibility, shows Chinese people’s 
lasting friendship to Africa and also echoes the Olympic spirit of Peace, 
Cooperation and Friendship. This activity is of great significance and 
value” (CNOOC, 2008: 36).  
 
This represents an example of the symbolic building of relationships with Africa which 
is a key consideration for Chinese SOEs when they engage in outward FDI.  
6.11: Discussion. 
Goetzmann and Köll were concerned with why legislation at institutional environment  
level, the 1904 Company Law, did not have a larger influence on the behaviour of  
corporate management at the micro-level, given that the law itself contained many of  
the modern features found in such laws today. They believed that it did not work  
because the lack of supporting institutions meant that the legislation was not strong  
enough to overcome business practices at the micro-level that were deeply rooted in  
historical and family-based ways of doing business, together with the weakness of the  
Chinese stock market with its early boom and bust cycles. Nevertheless, the problem  
did not lie with the quality of the law itself. China did not have an evolved legal system  
sound enough to sufficiently enforce and implement the law. However, Allen (2005) 
concludes that there are very effective non-standard mechanisms to support the growth 
of China’s economy today, with the most important mechanism driving good 
management and corporate governance being competition at the macro-level. 
Competition from foreigners was one of the incentives that instigated adopting 
the corporate form and 1904 Company Law, and this is also a key incentive that drives 
corporate governance reform today. In addition, Greif gave a historical example of 
traders successfully overcoming a lack of legal enforcement mechanisms by developing 
institutions based on reputation and trust, resembling what works in China today. 
Therefore, history tells us that strong legal frameworks have not necessarily been 
required for success at the micro-level.  
                                                 
122
 During 2008, the year of the Beijing Olympics, CNOOC made a ‘Voyage of Love’ to celebrate the 
Games to its overseas operations in Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, and Kenya. CNOOC sent Olympic 
Games mascots and cultural and sports articles to primary schools in the local communities, and helped 
local educational authorities to raise education and teaching standards. In addition, CNOOC sponsored all 
of the attire for the national Olympic delegation of Equatorial Guinea (CNOOC, 2008: 36). 
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 Historical evidence suggests that government interference appears to have  
negative effects upon firm performance in both the early corporations in China, and the  
listed SOEs of today. McNally (2002) found that continued state authority had negative 
effects on corporate governance in the state sector as a whole. However, McNally did 
recognise that the Chinese state was extremely capable of effectively managing a small 
number of high-profile corporations in relation to corporate governance, and this would 
include the two national champion oil firms that are considered in this thesis. 
Nevertheless, increased management autonomy today is avoiding the problems of direct 
interference in the running of firms, and Chinese managers are embracing good business 
practices from abroad via overseas educational opportunities, following on from how 
foreign business practices were embraced earlier.   
The case of Liu Hongsheng and the development of his enterprises whilst  
acquiring knowledge of managerial technology with KMA shows that China has had a  
history of embracing Western business practices and adapting them to Chinese business  
needs at the micro-level. Today, as Christoffersen (1998: 6) states, China’s integration  
into the international oil market has been nurtured by Japan and the USA, although it  
was resisted by Chinese cultural conservatives. This integration was driven by the need  
for foreign technology to be transferred to China, both managerial and technical. This is  
perhaps a lesson learnt from this earlier period with Liu Hongsheng embracing Western  
managerial technology, which is that a developing country such as China needs  
technology transfer from the developed world in order to be competitive. China’s earlier  
adoption of the corporate form, just like its adoption today, is driven by a sense of  
competition with the West. Indeed, China’s chosen national champion SOEs in the oil  
sector, do, according to Nolan (2002: 121, 125), process significant ‘requirements for  
technology transfer’. However, Nolan believes that they have absorbed modern  
management techniques together with making major technical advances (technology  
transfer from the macro-level to the micro-level). Indeed, Chinese firms have  
historically been perceived as imitators rather than taking the lead in technological  
innovation (Gugler and Boie, 2008: 14).  
Khanna et al (2006: 71) state that a nation may have de jure convergence to  
Western models, referring to the adoption of similar corporate governance laws across  
countries. Conversely, convergence may be de facto, referring to a convergence of  
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actual practice. Nevertheless, a nation might only have de jure convergence because the  
acceptance of a recognisable Western interpretation may significantly lag in its  
codification for several reasons, including path dependence. From an economic history  
viewpoint, Mahoney (2000: 508-509) states that within the framework of path  
dependence, economic scholars consider self-reinforcing sequences characterised by the  
formation and long-term reproduction of a given pattern. Adopting a path dependent  
analysis involving reactive sequences, which are chains of causally connected events,  
one can see that each event within the sequence is in part a reaction to what has  
occurred previously.  
Features of the early corporate form described by Goetzmann and Köll have re-
emerged in the adoption of the corporate form today, such as a sound Company Law but 
a lack of supporting institutions, and the management autonomy experienced in the 
early years of the CMSNC, but with state patronage. The state patronage today takes the 
form of the state retaining a majority shareholding to nurture the national champion 
SOEs, and this has been influenced by the previous sequence of events instigated by the 
Communist Party reforming SOEs that led to the SOEs of today becoming wholly state-
owned or joint-stock companies with limited liability. Che and Qian (1998) believe that 
in the foreseeable future, continued state patronage for large Chinese SOEs remains 
desirable. Indeed, the Chinese government feels that high social costs would result from 
the departure of state ownership from firms, and the Chinese government considers it 
important to nurture large firms in key sectors, such as the oil industry. Therefore, the 
two large Chinese oil firms, CNOOC and Sinopec, that are active in Angola must be 
considered, as Clarke (2008: 8-11) stated, as divisions of ‘China, Inc’. In this sense, 
they must be viewed as divisions of the overall energy policy of China, and they have 
altered, or features have remained (state ownership), by reacting to or recreating the 
past. CNOOC and Sinopec are controlled by state-holding companies, and they conduct 
their operations through a great many wholly-owned and joint-stock subsidiaries 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2006: 11). Therefore, the impact of the new entrants will 
not be considered, in Chapter 9, by just looking at the firms themselves but also by 
assessing Chinese involvement as a whole.  
Additional sequences of events have also shaped today’s SOEs. State  
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interference in the management of firms during the time of the later years of CMSNC 
during the time of the Kuomintang regime, and even during the transitional SOE period, 
had negative effects which highlighted the requirement for management autonomy 
today. Consequently, path dependence analysis in this sense, by considering reactive 
sequences, shows that reacting to past events can promote innovation and reform, rather 
than normal path dependent analysis which is used to explain persisting with outdated 
practices. Furthermore, recreation of what has happened in the past, such as embracing 
Western techniques in the name of technology transfer and adapting them, can aid the  
competitiveness of today’s Chinese SOEs. 
During the first stage of the evolution of government control in corporate  
governance the privatisation of SOEs was delayed. However, in the second stage small-  
and medium-sized private enterprises emerged as a new engine of growth. Nevertheless,  
large-sized SOEs in vital sectors were not privatised and began to be nurtured by the  
government. Large SOEs were corporatised and significant management autonomy was  
developed. These ‘national champion’ SOEs have been specifically chosen and  
prepared for global competitiveness, and the Chinese government continues to be the  
major shareholder. These are the types of firms that are engaging in resource-seeking  
outward FDI in Africa. Continuing state-firm relations, which may be regarded as a set  
of built-in preferences (action determinism within strategic choice analysis), has given  
rise to a new, hybrid economic order of ‘politicised capitalism’, and SOE managers in  
China welcome the continuation of direct state-firm linkages to secure preferential  
access to resources in an insecure and rapidly changing institutional environment. In 
addition, the lack of a social safety net is an important reason why SOEs continue to 
play a key role in China. Nevertheless, what kind of firm organisational form has 
emerged in China?  
At any one time, a firm occupies a position along the state socialist versus 
market orientation continuum. This continuum has at one end of the extreme a situation 
whereby the allocation of resources is controlled by political-bureaucratic institutions, 
the state. At the other end of the extreme the allocation of resources is controlled by the 
market. In between these two extremes is a situation whereby the allocation of resources 
involves a mixture of both market and political-bureaucratic mechanisms. Krug and 
Kuilman (2007: 226, 231-232) state that only a few firms in China work under pure 
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market conditions, whilst at the other end of the extreme China has the unreformed, old-
style SOEs that are still subject to planning quotas and they are still controlled by 
government ministries. However, Krug and Kuilman state that in China the most 
common form of firm organisation is an organisational hybrid containing a mixture of 
state and market resource allocation mechanisms. During the planned economy period, 
SOEs received the most distribution of resources as this was controlled by the state. 
With the coming of the market reforms, the old-style SOEs have lost out when it comes 
to resource distribution as there has been a shift towards the allocation of resources 
being mostly given to organisational hybrids and market orientated firms. Nevertheless, 
this shift towards the market orientated firms receiving the most resources has some 
way to go, and consequently, it is the organisational hybrids that benefit the most from 
the allocation of resources. However, from a purely identity perspective, Chinese SOEs, 
both old-style SOEs as these are remnants of the planned economy and reformed SOEs 
that are now organisational hybrids, are distinct from market orientated firms. 
Therefore, if one attempts to place the firms under consideration in this thesis into 
organisational categories, the Chinese national champion SOEs are organisational 
hybrids whilst BP is a market orientated organisation, and consequently, the Chinese 
firms and BP have distinct characteristics. 
One of the key problems in China’s corporate governance is the insider control  
of corporate affairs. The control of China’s firms rests primarily with insider-managers,  
who in turn are often controlled in various forms by their Communist Party and  
ministerial associates, who do not always act in the best interest of shareholders.  
Instead, they may pursue ‘higher national goals’ such as employment which may be  
regarded as built-in preferences (action determinism within strategic choice analysis),  
and the consequences of this will be assessed in Chapter 9.
123
 Another problem is the 
fact that although on paper Chinese laws on corporate governance follow international 
standards, which should provide a positive influence coming from the global 
institutional environment to the micro-environment, falsification and fabrication of 
financial data by listed firms is commonplace. Firms are able to conceal corrupt 
dealings (Lin, 2004: 9). This may affect their willingness to be transparent when they 
                                                 
123
 See section 9.10. 
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invest abroad, and assumingly, accounts for their willingness to invest overseas with no 
conditions attached. The consequences of this will also be assessed in Chapter 9.
124
  
Nevertheless, a number of distinctions can be indentified from this chapter and 
the previous chapter. Firstly, Chinese corporations that are engaging in operations in 
Africa are generally undeterred by risk, unlike Western firms. This is due to the very 
fact that they are state-owned and consequently, they are not accountable to any 
investors (Taylor, 2009: 21). Western firms, under the watchful eye of investors and 
other potential critics, are obliged to consider risk and the governance climate, whereas 
Chinese corporations merely have to serve their political masters who require energy 
security. Furthermore, according to Gill and Reilly (2007: 49), ‘China’s newly crowned 
national champions leading the go-out strategy are the same large-scale, inefficient, 
highly subsidized SOEs that have resisted previous reform efforts in China. It is 
unlikely that they have suddenly become models of efficiency simply because they are 
operating abroad, particularly given the political interests involved, the SOEs’ lack of 
experience, and the moral-hazard problem’.  
As Blowfield and Frynas (2005: 500-501) state, since there is no common 
definition on what the concept of CSR actually is, it is interpreted and used differently 
by different people. However, one way of looking at CSR is to consider its cultural 
roots. Whilst the notion of corporate responsibility is not unique to the West, the most 
publicised approaches to today’s CSR may be regarded as Anglo-Saxon, and this has 
evolved because of a rediscovery of the social concerns of business in Anglo-Saxon 
countries. Whilst there certainly has been an embracement of Western practices, 
whether CSR is being implemented by Chinese firms in Africa in the same way that 
Western firms do is open to question. This is because, for example, BP is a private firm 
that has a defined corporate structure to embrace CSR, together with long-term 
experience of operating overseas. In comparison, Chinese firms, as SOEs, are 
essentially tools utilised by the Chinese government to secure energy security, and they 
operate within an insider system whilst BP operates within an outsider system. In 
essence, the Chinese state will play a key role when CNOOC and Sinopec invest 
overseas, and the consequences of these different approaches will be examined in Part 
3. 
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 See section 9.8. 
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Chapter 7: Angola’s developmental needs.  
7.1: Introduction. 
Angola represents a distinct case because of the combination of numerous historical,  
social, and economic attributes that are rarely found elsewhere in Africa. Angola is in  
the hands of an all-powerful president, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, whose support is  
largely drawn from a homogeneous social and cultural elite. This elite, known as the  
Luanda Creole community, has a long history of dominating the social, economic, and  
political scene in Angola. Having been in power for over thirty-five years, dos Santos 
has ensured for himself almost total political and economic hegemony. However, as 
distinct as this situation may be to Angola, it does represent a political condition that is 
far from uncommon in Africa. The president conspires to remain in power using a 
careful balancing act between cooperation and repression, and the fact that he can enjoy 
almost absolute control means that dos Santos has the kind of power that many 
authoritarian rulers in Africa have enjoyed.  
In addition, Angola has the same implications of having an oil economy as other 
oil-producing states in Africa, like Nigeria and Gabon, in that Angola can dispose of oil 
revenue rents at will. Oil revenue surpluses are used for unproductive activities such as 
patrimonial purposes and personal enrichment, and the large amounts of oil revenues 
enables a government to buy political support and even buy their way out of political 
problems. For these reasons, it is unlikely that the Angolan government will bow to 
international pressure and make their oil revenues subject to greater transparency and 
financial accountability. Indeed, all such previous attempts by the international 
community have failed (Chabal, 2007: 11-14). Furthermore, a total political and 
economic hegemony like Angola’s promotes a situation where there is no distribution of 
resources to the large majority of the people. Consequently, public services collapse and 
as a result, poverty thrives (Vidal, 2007: 203). As Doctor Gbadamosi comments:  
“Much of what you will find in Angola is typical of what is likely to be  
the scenario in most of ... Africa involved in oil production, ... and much 
of [these countries] will have similar problems of poverty, of poor  
infrastructure and lack of institutional support for businesses. 
[Nevertheless], Angola specifically has been a country having been 
ravaged by war for ... thirty years and it’s very different, it’s very unique 
in its own way” (Gbadamosi, G., personal interview, 30th September, 
2010). 
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Therefore, Angola is representative of African oil-producing countries, but it is more of  
a critical case because the African-wide problems of poverty, poor infrastructure, and a  
weak institutional environment which have been worsened by a long civil war.  
Consequently, this chapter will outline the factors that require consideration 
when identifying the country’s own development needs. We will begin by looking 
briefly at the historical background of Angola and suggesting that the country represents 
a lost potential. Then the colonial legacy will be explored, before addressing Angola’s 
institutional capacity, an important factor for promoting economic development. The 
recent civil war will then be considered because conflict must be taken into account 
when attempting to identify how to assist in economic development. Finally, the 
Angolan oil sector will be outlined prior to identifying six ways in which international 
oil corporations should contribute to Angola’s development. Whether the international 
oil corporations focused upon in this thesis contribute in the ways suggested below can 
then be analysed in subsequent chapters.          
7.2: Angola: background.  
Prior to independence in 1975, Angola served the needs of its Portuguese colonial  
masters for almost 500 years. The characteristics of the colonial economy were  
determined by exports. At first, this was the export of slaves, and then it became the  
export of primary commodities, like rubber and coffee. By the early years of the  
twentieth century however, Angola was in the first stages of development based upon  
railway building, diamond mining, and plantation agriculture. Nevertheless, rapid  
economic growth only really ensued after the Second World War, based firstly upon  
coffee plantations, and then upon oil extraction. In the years between 1960 and 1974,  
the Portuguese colonial authorities invested heavily in Angola’s infrastructure,  
including transport, whilst restrictive investment laws were liberalised in 1965 to  
encourage inward FDI (World Bank, 2007: 11-13). This led to key agricultural and  
mining ventures being taken over by American, British, German, and Japanese  
corporations (Roque, 1997: 15-16).   
However, economic development under the Portuguese did not benefit the mass 
of the Angolan people. The best land was taken away from Angolans and given to 
Portuguese settlers, since the colonial authorities encouraged Portuguese immigration, 
and such compulsory relocation was extremely disruptive to traditional agriculture. 
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Angolans were denied access to any education by the colonial power, and consequently, 
locals were absent from managerial and technical employment. In addition, semi-skilled 
and low-skilled jobs were reserved for poorly educated Portuguese immigrants (World 
Bank, 2007: 11-12).  
Nevertheless, despite such deficiencies, Angola was relatively well-placed to 
enjoy sustained economic growth upon independence. The country had efficient 
agricultural and mining sectors, a sizeable and diversified manufacturing sector, and a 
well-developed transportation infrastructure. However, this potential was not realised 
because of: 
 high levels of corruption,  
 an increasing dependence upon oil to produce revenues, 
 the government instituting a centrally-planned, command economy that was  
subordinated to a military agenda,  
 a long and bitter civil war.            
As a result, the Angolan economy has been mismanaged and exploited, and is now in 
the position of requiring a long-term development strategy that should encompass 
investment in human capital, investment in infrastructure, improved governance, and a 
broad-based poverty alleviation program (Roque, 1997: 17-19).  
Angola is now highly dependent upon oil revenues, despite once being a major 
producer of coffee and other commodities. Agricultural activities have declined 
dramatically, and although diamond mining has continued, on both the artisan and 
capital-intensive levels, the revenues earned are a fraction of those earned from oil 
production (Shankleman, 2006: 99-100). Today consequently, the Angolan economy’s 
performance is closely tied to world oil prices (Koyame and Clark, 2002: 214).   
7.3: The colonial legacy. 
There are perhaps three major legacies from Angola’s colonial era. Firstly, there is the  
lack of a democratic tradition. In British and French African colonies, independence 
was preceded by a short period of parliamentary government and multi-party politics. 
Over time however, such a democratic tradition did not prove to be strong enough to 
cope with the social and economic challenges facing these former colonies, but at least 
attempts were made. Angola had no such democratic tradition. Upon independence, 
Angola inherited a highly centralised administrative system and a repressive political 
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climate. Therefore, colonial Angola replicated the environment that existed in the 
homeland of their colonial masters before Portugal’s revolution in April 1974. This 
background did little to promote political openness, arguably less than in other former 
African colonies.  
The second legacy of the colonial era is the lack of educational opportunities for 
Angolans. Prior to independence, Angola’s institutions were overwhelmingly staffed by 
Portuguese expatriates at the managerial and technical levels. In the British and French 
African colonies there were conscious attempts to train and educate local Africans, with 
a view to them assuming control. This did not happen at all in Angola, partly because 
local Angolans were largely denied access to education in the colonial era. Despite the 
fact that during the 1960s primary school enrolment did increase, by the time of 
independence 85% of Angolans were still illiterate. In addition, few Angolans had 
received a secondary education, and even fewer received a university education. There 
was an establishment of a university in 1963, but by 1973, 73% of its students were 
foreign. The consequence of all this is that upon independence, when most of the 
Portuguese settlers emigrated from Angola, the country’s institutions and all the sectors 
of the economy that relied upon Portuguese expatriates were left with a skills gap that 
would be hard to fill (Hodges, 2004: 48-49).  
The third legacy of colonialism is the problem of unrepresentative internal 
borders. Throughout Africa boundaries were drawn up to meet the convenience of 
colonial power and they did not represent the structure of native constituencies on the 
ground. This problem is particularly acute in the case of oil-producing states today as it 
gives rise to disputes concerning the allocation of oil revenues between regional 
enclaves and the central government, such as with the enclave of Cabinda in Angola 
(Klare, 2009: 45).  
Often referred to as Angola's forgotten war, there has been a decades-long 
secessionist conflict in the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda between the Front for the 
Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) and the central government. The FLEC 
and other separatist factions argue that self-determination is justified because, unlike the 
rest of Angola, Cabinda was not a Portuguese colony, but a protectorate. In addition, 
separatists claim that Cabinda has its own culture, history, and identity. Therefore, in 
the point of view of the FLEC and other separatist movements, Cabinda was illegally 
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occupied after independence by the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
(MPLA) government (IRIN, 2003: 1). It remains unlikely that the central government 
will grant self-determination to Cabinda, since a significant proportion of Angola’s oil 
reserves are located within the enclave.   
7.4: Angola’s institutional capacity. 
The institutional environment is highly important when it comes to promoting economic 
development. This is because corruption is likely to exist in all developing countries, 
and indeed, in developed countries too. However, successful countries have the 
institutional capacity and governance capabilities to manage the structural drivers of 
corruption in such a way as to still promote economic development, which in turn can 
create the environment for sustained improvements in governance practices (Khan, 
2006: vii). As Park and Lee (2005: 13) state ‘institutions matter for economic growth’, 
and therefore, the question is whether Angola has the institutional capacity to manage 
and prevent corrupt practices. 
 Angola’s state oil company, Sonangol, is in charge of leasing oil concessions. In  
addition, Sonangol is a shareholder in, or directly operates, many of the oil production 
blocks (Shankleman, 2006: 99). Sonangol was founded in 1976 to manage the oil 
industry on behalf of the Angolan government. Consequently, Sonangol plays a key role 
in the legal and contractual framework governing the oil sector. Angola’s Petroleum 
Activities Law makes it clear that the state owns all oil rights, and makes Sonangol the 
sole concessionaire with the rights to all exploration and drilling activities. The law 
states that any oil corporation that wishes to engage in exploration and drilling must do 
so in association with Sonangol. This association has to be either as a commercial firm, 
a joint venture, or as part of a contract for production sharing. In addition, Sonangol can 
become an equity participant in an oil field according to the law.  
The Angolan government, through Sonangol, enters into two different types of 
agreements with international oil corporations. Firstly, there are Concession 
Agreements, applying to onshore and shallow-water offshore blocks, mainly in 
Cabinda, and secondly, Production Sharing Agreements, applying to deep-water and 
ultra-deep offshore blocks. The World Bank (2007: 39, 43-44) considers that such 
concessionaire decrees, in general, ‘cover appropriate topics and are clear and modern 
in style’. However, such a legal regime is complex, and consequently, it requires an 
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adequate institutional capacity to manage it. Therefore, there is nothing really wrong 
with the law itself. The question is whether Angola has the appropriate institutional 
capacity to deal with such a complex legal and contractual framework. 
 The institutions in question are the Ministry of Petroleum (MOP), the Ministry  
of Finance (MOF), and Sonangol. The MOP has the responsibility of determining prices  
that are to be used for fiscal purposes. Contractors submit price information on their  
transactions to the MOP, from which the MOP determines a market price for that  
financial quarter. This system is generally regarded as one which works well. The MOF  
has the responsibility for assessing and collecting royalties and taxes. The MOF’s office  
contains only three to four professionals, and although it performs its tasks relatively  
well considering its limited resources, it is often forced to rely upon outside auditors.  
Therefore, the MOF is clearly ill-equipped to perform its functions adequately,  
despite the fact that its small number of sufficiently educated staff members perform 
well. 
 Sonangol is the final institution in question. One of the responsibilities that  
Sonangol has, as concessionaire, is to pass on the oil revenues that are due to the  
Angolan government (World Bank, 2007: 46). It is here that one can have concerns  
about a lack of transparency regarding tax payments made by international oil  
corporations. These corporations do not pay their taxes directly to the Angolan  
Treasury. The IMF noted, in its March 2002 report, that Sonangol has complete control  
of these payments made by the international oil corporations, and Sonangol had ceased  
channelling them through Angola’s central bank, which Angola’s law requires. Such  
payments were now being channelled through the bank accounts of the company’s  
subsidiaries. When the tax payments finally reach the Treasury, they are usually late and  
less than expected. The MOF and the Angolan government are unable to verify that all  
the tax payments made to Sonangol by international oil corporations really do reach the  
Treasury. This is due to the fact that Sonangol’s accounts have no history of having ever 
been subject to an independent audit (Hodges, 2004: 167). Doctor Gbadamosi 
comments upon funds being channelled via Sonangol by saying that this: 
“case with Angola is quite peculiar. Although there are problems of  
corruption [throughout] Sub-Saharan Africa, [this] kind of scenario [is]     
very blatant” (Gbadamosi, G., personal interview, 30th September,  
2010). 
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Sonangol is not only a tax payment watchdog. In addition, it has many other  
responsibilities, including an investor of public funds, an oil sector regulator (as  
concessionaire), and Sonangol also engages in quasi-fiscal operations that have been  
assigned to it by the government. These operations include supplying oil products  
within Angola at subsidised prices, making oil product deliveries to public services  
below cost, and managing public debt. Such powers give Sonangol a hugely  
independent role within the Angolan economy. However, due to the fact that Sonangol  
receives little reimbursement from the government for carrying out these tasks on their  
behalf, it claims credit or offsets its tax liabilities in lieu of reimbursement. Therefore, a  
limited receipt of reimbursement from the Angolan government provides Sonangol with  
an incentive to be less than transparent when it comes to passing on the tax payments  
that are due to the government.  
Oil-rich developing countries, the example here being Angola, do not score well 
against such governance indicators like levels of transparency. Weak governance 
practices often pre-date oil sector development in many such countries, making it 
difficult to manage oil revenues from the outset. The task of managing oil revenues 
often overwhelms the existing institutional capacity, and furthermore, wealth procured 
from the oil sector may even provide little incentives to create effective institutions. 
This is because decision makers may feel that oil money flows so easily that there is no 
need to manage it, and additionally, actors who benefit from oil revenues may regard 
effective institutions as unwanted regulators (World Bank, 2007: 48-49). 
7.5: The civil war. 
Gauged from the situation that exists in the DRC, Afoaku (2005: 195) comments that in 
Africa generally, it is extremely difficult for governments to meet the demands of the 
people to provide sustainable economic development and security, and as a result, civil 
conflict has become the defining feature in most of the countries on the African 
continent. 
The civil war in Angola requires consideration due to the fact that conflict 
should not be treated as an exogenous factor when attempting to identify relevant 
strategies to assist in economic development. Conflict is one of the key determinants of 
poor economic growth, and the consequences of conflict have to be taken into account 
in any efforts to promote economic development (Gudmundsson, 2004: 62-63).  
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Angola’s civil war originated in the early 1960s when differing liberation 
movements sought independence from Portugal. In 1961, the MPLA began the armed 
struggle by launching an attack on a prison in Luanda, whilst the National Liberation 
Front of Angola (FLNA) organised a rebellion in the northwest of Angola. Later, in 
1965, came the formation of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(UNITA).  
The 1974 revolution in Portugal led to a sudden decision to grant independence 
to Angola, at a time when the MPLA, FLNA, and UNITA opposed each other together 
with objecting to Portuguese colonial rule. All three of these key nationalist movements 
had differing ideologies, differing regional bases of support, and differing external 
backers. All three signed up to the Alvor Accords in January 1975, which was designed 
to instigate a power-sharing regime prior to elections being held later that year. The 
Alvor Accords were never implemented however, and the subsequent fighting between 
the three nationalist movements resulted in the MPLA seizing control of Luanda, with 
UNITA being forced to regroup in southern Angola whilst the FLNA were largely 
forced into exile. In addition, separatist movements in the enclave of Cabinda sought 
independence. However, they were not included in the Alvor Accords, and Cabinda 
separatists still seek independence from Angola today.  
 November 11
th, 1975 saw the declaration of independence of the People’s  
Republic of Angola, with a MPLA Marxist-style government, following the departure  
of the Portuguese the previous day. Angola then became embroiled in a continuous civil  
war until the late 1980s between UNITA and the ruling MPLA, with both sides used as  
pawns in the Cold War (Shankleman, 2006: 93-95). This is known as ‘war by proxy’125  
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2004: 571). The Soviet Union provided the MPLA government  
with support via loans, military advisors, and arms. Cuba, a Soviet ally, actually sent  
troops, reaching a deployment of 50,000 at its height. The USA assisted the UNITA  
rebels in much the same way the Soviet Union did, whilst South Africa attacked  
Angolan targets in an attempt to curb Soviet and Cuban interference in southern Africa.  
With the thawing of the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the USA retreated from their  
                                                 
125
 War by proxy is when foreign governments finance military forces, often those that oppose incumbent 
governments, but do not get involved in the conflict directly. During the Cold War, both the Soviet Union 
and the USA attempted to destabilise those countries allied to the opposing power by deploying such 
methods, avoiding direct conflict in the process (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004: 571). 
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indirect involvement, their ‘war by proxy’; whilst under the New York Accords of  
December 1988, Cuban and South African troops withdrew from Angola. Nevertheless,  
the conflict between the MPLA and UNITA continued.  
Between 1988 and 2002 there were periods of intense fighting that were 
interspersed with peace initiatives and ceasefires. By now, the ideological differences 
between the MPLA and UNITA had waned. However, their regional bases of support 
remained. The Bicesse Accords in 1991 led to a ceasefire, followed by the first ever 
elections in September 1992 for a national assembly and for the position of president in 
Angola. For the national assembly, the MPLA received 54% of the vote, whilst UNITA 
received 34% of the vote. For the position of president, the MPLA’s Jose Eduardo dos 
Santos received 49.5% of the vote, whilst UNITA’s Jonas Savimbi received 40.1% of 
the vote. However, before a second round of presidential elections could be held, 
Savimbi withdrew UNITA troops from a previously negotiated combined army and,  
subsequently, fighting resumed until the Lusaka Protocol was negotiated in 1994. This  
built upon the Bicesse Accords by addressing its weaknesses, providing for power  
sharing between the MPLA and UNITA within a government of national unity.  
Following the Lusaka Protocol, four years of ‘quasi peace’ ensued, with sporadic  
fighting between areas of Angola controlled by the MPLA and UNITA. This sporadic  
fighting broke out into full civil war again in late 1998, until six weeks after the death of  
Savimbi; the Luena Memorandum of Understanding was signed on April 4, 2002. This  
ceasefire, restoring the Lusaka Protocol, has held until today.  
This civil war however, although initially a struggle between differing  
ideologies, became, certainly by the late 1980s, fundamentally a struggle for power and  
domination between the MPLA and UNITA, with both groups holding regional power  
bases. Civilians in these areas were drawn into a conflict that was based upon the rivalry  
between these two competing political elites. Nevertheless, the April 2002 ceasefire that  
has continued to hold, did not involve any significant restructuring of power away from  
the MPLA at the national level, although there has been a redistribution of provincial  
administrative posts.  
The consequences of this prolonged conflict are that Angola has lost many years 
of potential development. Instead, much of Angola’s infrastructure was destroyed, 
including railways and roads, and rebuilding infrastructure is one of the key priorities of 
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Angola’s Strategy to Combat Poverty, which was released in February 2004 
(Shankleman, 2006: 95-98). In addition, the revenues from oil and gas exploitation were  
redirected away from productive endeavours that could have been conducive to  
development, in order to fund the civil war (Winston, 2003: 79). For example, between  
1975 and 1985, the MPLA government spent 60% of its revenues on the military to  
enable it to engage in the civil war. In the same period of time, Angola spent just US$49  
per capita on the productive endeavour of education, but spent US$133 per capita on the  
military (Osman, 2007: 55).  
The tasks that face Angola now, as a post-conflict country, is the promotion of 
economic development which should prevent future conflict. This can be achieved, 
amongst other things, by reducing primary commodity dependency and promoting 
economic diversification, infrastructure reconstruction, and developing a good quality 
institutional environment (Yartey, 2004: 119). In addition, the importance of 
transparency and overall good governance cannot be underestimated when it comes to 
promoting development. Low transparency and corruption in public management is not 
unique to post-conflict, oil-producing countries like Angola, but such countries are 
particularly vulnerable. Efforts by, for example, international oil corporations to 
enhance transparency in their dealings with a country like Angola can be instrumental in 
changing the overall perceptions concerning governance in the country (Cossé, 2006: 
10-11).       
7.6: The destroyed transportation infrastructure. 
The World Bank compiled a study, in 2005, to assist Angola’s government in  
developing a framework for the reconstruction of Angola’s infrastructure, a particularly 
important socio-economic need at the macro-level. The World Bank believes that the 
required investment in the destroyed infrastructure following the civil war requires 
multiple funding sources, and these should include the Angolan government’s own 
resources, the private sector, and international donors.  
If one focuses upon transport infrastructure, a large part of the existing road 
network was built during the colonial era. When the World Bank study was compiled, 
much of the road network had received hardly any maintenance due to the fact that 
many roads are situated in former war zones and they have hardly carried any traffic. 
The responsibility for managing Angola’s road network lies with the Angola Roads 
190 
 
National Institute (INEA). The INEA had little or no knowledge of the destroyed state 
of the road network or of the possible reconstruction costs.  
The World Bank study also considered the condition of the railway network. 
The Luanda Railway is run by the Empresa de Caminhos de Ferro de Luanda (CFL), a 
state-owned enterprise, and its services had been disrupted by the civil war and floods. 
In addition, CFL were not able to cover its operational costs. Another state-owned 
enterprise, namely the Companhia de Caminho de Ferro de Mocamedes (CFM), runs 
the Mocamedes
126
 Railway. CFM was suffering from a severe lack of trained technical 
staff in all categories. The Benguela Railway is run by the Companhia de Caminho de 
Ferro de Benguela (CFB). CFB was originally Belgian-owned because of a 99-year 
concession that ran out in 2001, and it is now formally state-owned. The Benguela 
Railway played a key role in the transportation of imports and exports to and from 
landlocked southern African countries, as well as to and from Angola’s central region, 
in the third quarter of the last century, prior to the civil war. Damage caused during the 
civil war had closed this interregional and international transport of goods and 
extractive industry sector resources along the Benguela Railway (World Bank,  
2005: 11, 75-76, 80-81). 
7.7: Angola’s oil sector: what international oil corporations can do to  
promote development. 
The oil sector first rose in Angola with an onshore discovery in the Kwanza basin in  
1955. Oil later became a major industry in the late 1960s when offshore production  
began in the shallow waters off the coast of the enclave of Cabinda (Hodges, 2007:  
176). Oil production rose rapidly, particularly after 1969. By 1973, oil production was  
already at 144,000 b/d, and following the increase of world oil prices in that year, oil  
overtook coffee as the leading export, accounting for about one third of total export  
revenues (World Bank, 2007: 12). Despite a brief downturn in oil production during the  
transitional period surrounding independence, new shallow-water offshore blocks were  
granted licences to operate, leading to steady increases in production beginning in the  
early 1980s. In the 1990s, major international oil corporations began to apply for  
licences to operate in deep-water offshore blocks, due to an increase in deep-water  
exploration and drilling technologies that had been pioneered in oil fields such as the  
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 Mocamedes is now called Namibe (Hodges, 2004: 102). 
191 
 
North Sea. Intense competition was sparked off amongst international oil corporations  
after a rapid succession of major discoveries, and by 1999, the first licences to operate  
were being negotiated for so-called ultra-deep offshore blocks. Such investment in  
offshore blocks caused oil production to increase from 136,000 b/d to 996,000 b/d  
between 1980 and 2004 (Hodges, 2007: 176-177).  
Therefore, the rise of Angola’s oil sector was not disrupted by the civil war. This 
is because oil sector operations, which are mainly offshore, had little or no interaction 
with the conflict that was occurring within Angola itself. In addition, neither the MPLA 
nor UNITA wanted to risk destroying the industry that the country now relied upon, and 
consequently, increases in investment and production continued throughout the period 
of the civil war (Shankleman, 2006: 100-101).  
Angola joined OPEC in 2007, and held the organisation’s presidency in 2009. In 
that year, Angola’s oil production had reached 1,820,000 b/d, making the country the 
largest oil producer in Africa and placing it as the seventh highest oil producer among 
OPEC members. Most of Angola’s oil production continues to come from offshore 
blocks, partly because onshore exploration was limited because of the civil war. 
Nevertheless, there are some proven onshore reserves around the northern city of Soyo 
and in the disputed enclave of Cabinda (Energy Information Administration, 2010: 2). 
However, because of the limited onshore presence that international oil corporations 
have, there are few incentives for them to become involved in local development 
activities (Shankleman, 2006: 110). Despite this, BP themselves acknowledge that:  
“part of the challenge of peace is to ensure that the massive investments 
made by companies such as BP result in social and economic benefits for 
Angola as a whole. This ... requires that companies, including BP, are 
open to partnership with government, civil society and international 
organisations to play their role in Angola’s development” (BP, 2002b: 
24). 
 
‘Partnership with government, civil society and international organisations’ would 
constitute co-evolutionary interaction, and speaking in November, 2004 on business 
ethics,  
“Lord Browne [of BP] said that the purpose of business gave it a distinct, 
unique and indispensable role in society that embraced ... contributing to 
the development of countries” (BP, 2004b: 5). 
 
192 
 
Consequently, international oil corporations, either individually by engaging in 
institutional co-evolution, or in collusion, have a duty to contribute to Angola’s 
development in six ways: 
1) Promoting transparency in Angola (Shankleman, 2006: 110). Sound economic  
governance is one of the minimum requirements to encourage development  
(Grobbelaar and Sidiropoulos, 2002: 29). Various proposals have been put  
forward by governments, private business, international organisations, NGOs,  
and academics in recent years to improve global economic governance. One of  
these proposals is the self discipline of economic actors such as international oil  
corporations, and this would embrace transparent accounting (Schirm, 2004: 7- 
8). In Angola, where oil revenues are the key for future development, oil  
corporations have an obligation to promote revenue transparency in order to  
discourage rent-seeking behaviour. Oil revenues that are used for unproductive  
activities could be diverted to, for example, a poverty alleviation program  
(Shankleman, 2006: 110). Furthermore, an international oil corporation should  
provide high quality financial disclosures anyway, as this is one of the key  
responsibilities that the board of directors have. Corporate governance codes  
around the world, including the Cadbury Report and the OECD Principles,  
require the board of directors to provide shareholders and other stakeholders  
with high quality financial disclosures (UNCTAD, 2006a: 3). 
2) Developing a strong civil society in Angola. For a country like Angola that has  
been embroiled in civil war for most of its time since independence, developing  
a strong civil society is vital for sustained peace (Shankleman, 2006: 110). This  
is because the participation of a strong civil society creates a middle ground  
when negotiating in the peace process. Therefore, the political leadership on  
both sides of the conflict can be urged to compromise (Grobbelaar and  
Sidiropoulos, 2002: 13). Indeed, Angola’s transition to a peaceful democracy  
largely depends upon the willingness of the MPLA and UNITA to cooperate and  
compromise (El-Khawas and Anyu Ndumbe, 2006: 59).  Oil corporations can  
contribute to this by delivering social investments. 
3) Increasing employment opportunities for locals in Angola. This is important  
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since it is a country that has a long history of indigenous people being denied 
access to education, and subsequently, locals lack the necessary skills to engage 
in meaningful employment. Oil corporations can contribute by training locals to  
enable them to engage in employment in oil sector operations, as well as  
ensuring that the maximum possible level of locals are employed within those  
operations. 
4) Increasing opportunities for locals in Angola to make a living by business,  
commerce, and agriculture. Oil corporations can achieve this by contributing to  
social investment funds which can help to support livelihoods. 
5) Engaging in impact assessments in Angola. International oil corporations have  
extensive experience in engaging in environmental and social impact  
assessments, and these are necessary to ensure that corporations limit the impact  
of their operations upon local environments and the local community  
(Shankleman, 2006: 110-111). Recently, the environment has moved up the  
African corporate responsibility agenda. Environmental sustainability is  
important because locals still need to sustain their livelihoods in the areas where  
international oil corporations operate, and the oil sector impacts local  
environments through exploration, drilling, and transport. For example, the  
practice of flaring gas in the Niger Delta pollutes the local environment, which  
destroys crops resulting in negative effects upon local agricultural livelihoods  
(Hayes, 2006: 96-97). In Angola, offshore operations may pollute local fishing  
grounds, affecting the livelihoods of local fisherman, and if the proven onshore  
reserves are extracted local agriculture will be affected.     
6) Investing in the Angolan transportation infrastructure. Angola is a country that  
has seen railway lines severely damaged during the civil war, or has allowed  
them to decay due to a lack of maintenance or modernisation. Angola is also a  
country in which many roads have been mined, de-mined and then re-mined  
during periods of conflict, relative peace, and then resumed conflict, together  
with a lack of road maintenance (Hodges, 2004: 108). This is not a problem that  
is unique to a post-conflict environment such as Angola. Many countries in  
Africa lack an adequate transportation infrastructure, and this is a resource that  
supports economic development and corporate activities (Ahunwan, 2003: 37- 
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38). Therefore, international oil corporations must have an interest in rebuilding  
the transportation infrastructure in order to transport resources to and from their  
operations, and locals can also benefit from the improved transportation links.               
These six contributions to Angola’s development would be achieved by engaging in  
institutional co-evolution. However, one could argue that international oil corporations  
have no role to play when it comes to contributing to Angola’s economic development  
because, for example, they would have little or no influence upon the government of a  
sovereign nation. However, there is evidence to suggest that this is far from the case. As  
Cohen (2004: 9) explains, when the UN attempted to intervene in the Angolan civil war  
in February 2001, the Secretary General sent his envoy to meet with international oil  
corporations operating in the country. This was because international oil corporations  
operating in Angola could, according to UN Undersecretary General for Africa Ibrahim  
Gambari, contribute to peace initiatives due to the fact that they had a significant  
“leverage on the government”. He went on to state that “the government will listen to  
them”.  
Clearly therefore, international oil corporations can make an important 
contribution to Angola’s economic development because of the significant influence 
that they have on the government. Hypothetically therefore, if an international oil 
corporation attempts to engage in institutional co-evolution in Angola, the country  
might take the influences on board because of the significant leverage that such  
businesses have upon the Angolan government. Nevertheless, as Doctor Gbadamosi 
comments:  
“I suppose one of the issues would be ... if, as an organisation, ... we 
have to pay so much tax to the government, and it is not our 
responsibility to do that, why should we be then putting a lot more of our 
resources in getting the [institutional] environment right? I think that is 
one of the questions that organisations should probably be asking at the 
beginning” (Gbadamosi, G., personal interview, 30th September, 2010). 
 
Therefore, why should BP put resources into getting the Angolan institutional  
environment right? For international business activity, the institutional environment  
becomes increasingly more important over time. This is because long-term investment  
is dependent upon the development of complex institutions that can deal with the  
increasing uncertainties that arise from increasingly more complex forms of exchange  
(Cantwell et al, 2010: 571). Consequently, one could argue that it is in BP’s long-term  
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interest to engage in institutional co-evolution in Angola and elsewhere, so that the  
institutions in the countries where they operate are strong enough to deal with the  
complexities and uncertainties that those environments may contain.  
7.8: Discussion. 
Angola’s oil reserves represent an L advantage for the attraction of inward FDI. Even  
though the country has suffered from a long civil war, having extensive offshore  
reserves means that oil exploration and drilling is not affected by conflict on land.  
Nevertheless, the case of Angola highlights the problems that exist in African oil- 
producing states that largely encompass having a weak institutional environment.  
One of the legacies of the colonial era is the lack of educational opportunities for 
Angolans. Angola’s institutions and all the sectors of the economy were left with a 
skills gap that was hard to fill when Portuguese expatriates left the country. Angola’s 
legal regime is complex and requires an adequate institutional capacity to manage it. 
However, the MOF suffers from a lack of sufficiently educated staff members, whilst a 
limited receipt of reimbursement from the Angolan government provides Sonangol with 
an incentive to be less than transparent when it comes to passing on the tax payments 
that are due to the government.  
The major task that Angola faces now, as a post-conflict country, is the  
promotion of economic development which should prevent future conflict. This can be  
achieved by, firstly, addressing socio-economic needs at the macro-level. This involves  
promoting economic diversification so that local communities can sustain their  
livelihoods and the country can reduce its primary commodity dependency, helping to  
develop a strong civil society, and infrastructure reconstruction. Secondly, developing  
good quality institutions can be promoted by, for example, international oil corporations  
enhancing transparency
127
 to change the overall perceptions concerning governance. 
Whether BP engages in such institutional co-evolution will be assessed in the next 
chapter.  
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Chapter 8: Oil MNCs acting as change agents in 
Africa, with particular reference to Angola.  
“There is so much companies can do in ... Africa in terms of improving 
the state of the ... institutional environment” (Gbadamosi, G., personal 
interview, 30
th 
September, 2010). 
 
 “[The responsible corporation should] ensure transparent, accountable, 
and strategic engagement with government” (Warhurst, 2011: 69). 
 
8.1: Introduction. 
According to Frynas (2009: 139) the example of BP in Azerbaijan represents ‘by far the  
most wide-ranging attempt by a single company to address governance shortcomings’,  
and consequently, engage in institutional co-evolution. By actively co-operating with  
the Azerbaijani government, BP was able to provide expert advice upon the 
management of Azerbaijan’s state oil fund together with the country’s oil revenues. Of  
the 30 or so resource rich developing countries that have signed up to the EITI,
128
 only 
Azerbaijan is deemed to be in compliance with the EITI principles (Wiig and Kolstad, 
2010: 183), possibly helped to a significant degree by BP. Therefore, BP can act as an 
effective agent for change, and indeed has experience of doing so. In fact, BP 
themselves state that:  
“business has always been an important agent of change. Companies are 
part of society. They reflect ... potential and ... embody an inherent belief 
in ... positive change. [Furthermore,] a wider role is expected of large 
companies [and] responsible business now has a clear choice whether to 
engage to be both part of the debate and part of the solution” (BP, 2000: 
4). 
 
The question arises as to how successful BP’s attempts have been to address governance 
shortcomings in Angola and other African oil-producing countries. Kostova (1999: 308) 
considered the transnational transfer of strategic organisational practices within MNCs. 
Based upon the idea of the contextual embeddedness of the process of transfer; it is 
proposed that three factors relate to successful transfer, namely the country, the 
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organisation, and individual actors. However, Kostova only considered internal 
transfers of O advantages to corporate subsidiaries globally. Nevertheless, it is  
highlighted that scholars have acknowledged how important strategically it is to transfer  
organisational practices within MNCs, and that these transfers are rarely smooth and/or  
successful. However, according to Wiig and Kolstad (2010: 184), influencing the 
Angolan government so that they improve the institutional environment to reduce rent-
seeking behaviour does ‘not appear to be an important part of oil companies’ portfolio 
of CSR activities. Governance issues are hence not a priority for oil companies in 
Angola’.  
This chapter develops Kostova’s idea, but rather than focusing upon 
organisational practices, it is the organisational business principles that are the subject 
of whether successful transfer is possible, and not to just within the MNC but to the 
wider institutional regime. Therefore, this chapter will assess whether governance issues 
are a priority for oil companies in Angola and Africa in general. There will be a focus 
upon BP, although other Western oil firms will be mentioned where appropriate. The 
issues under consideration will be BP measuring the impacts of their operations, 
whether they disappoint stakeholder expectations, revenue transparency, the problem of 
liability of foreignness, oil MNCs contributing to social projects, and the importance of 
the social consequences of environmental degradation. Finally, whether oil MNCs 
engage in strategic CSR will be considered, before discussing the findings to see if BP 
can successfully act as an agent for change.  
8.2: The context: learning from experience. 
BP has been embracing macro-level socio-economic needs for a long time,
129
 and they 
clearly believe that they have learnt from their experience in embracing social concerns. 
In their 2007 Sustainability Report, under the heading ‘learning from experience’, they 
state that:  
“BP is ... working to ensure that appropriate consideration is given to 
social issues, such as worker welfare, including child and forced labour; 
security and human rights; community health; community engagement; 
community investment; involuntary resettlement; and indigenous 
people”,  
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suggesting that they have and/or are learning from their experience in implementing 
social issues. Under the same heading, concerning their Environmental Requirements 
for New Projects (ERNP),
130
 they state that:  
“the requirements should ... support continuous improvement in 
operations where we have been active for many years. For example, an 
ERNP peer review process for a pipeline replacement project at Wytch 
Farm,
131
 UK, highlighted that ecological priorities change as does the 
technology available for mitigating potential impacts. This resulted in a 
better solution for the project and the environment” (BP, 2007b: 14). 
 
However, the question is whether BP has really learnt from this long-term experience 
and whether it does implement CSR principles effectively. The CORE Coalition 
anonymous source refutes the claim by BP by saying that:  
 “BP clearly doesn’t deal with environmental and social abuse  
effectively. I think it clearly hasn’t learnt from its experience, so I  
don’t think anyone could reasonably ... say that BP was a company  
[with] which a new company would be in a worse position in, in  
terms of its performance [in addressing environmental and social  
issues]” (Anonymous, personal interview, 2nd November, 2010). 
 
This suggests therefore, that Chinese firms would not be in an inferior position in 
comparison with BP when it comes to embracing sustainability issues because BP has 
not actually learnt from its extensive experience. Evidence for this will be investigated 
in the next chapter. Nevertheless, as Doctor Gbadamosi comments:  
“I think most organisations that work in that part of the world [Africa]  
are very clear how they can deal with the [institutional] environment.  
I think most of the time, in my opinion, it’s just about the will. It is the  
will to do it or the .... governmental constraint, because of the  
institutional high level of corruption that we have in the system. 
[Furthermore,] when you talk about businesses like the oil sector ... I’m 
not sure the African people are benefitting anything from that sort of 
businesses. I think ... it’s largely for now the elite and the government, 
officials of bureaucracy, and everything has been sunk in there, and 
everything has been lost in there, ... it’s not going down the channel to 
the people yet from those type of businesses” (Gbadamosi, G., personal 
interview, 30
th 
September, 2010). 
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 BP launched the ERNP in 2006. Developed primarily for major projects associated with oil and gas 
where the potential for environmental risk is often the greatest, the requirements also apply to wind farms, 
biofuels and to smaller projects that might have the potential for similar levels of impact (BP, 2007b: 14). 
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 Developed by BP to be one of Western Europe’s largest onshore oil fields, Wytch Farm is located 
under Poole Harbour and Poole Bay in Dorset, one of the most environmentally sensitive areas of the UK 
(BP, 2003a: 1). 
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This view is confirmed by Shaxson (2007a: 1132), who outlined that African elites act 
with impunity to abuse the public good to advance their own narrow interests, and Bates 
(2008: 104, 124), who stated that in Africa, bureaucracies ‘that had been created to 
facilitate the lives of the citizens began instead to undermine their welfare. Its members 
began to feed themselves by consuming the ... money of those they once had served’. In 
Angola specifically, Bates stated that whilst ‘the MPLA [government] speaks of serving 
the needs of the people, it in fact channels little of Angola’s oil wealth to them’. 
Therefore, we will investigate these issues because, as the CORE Coalition anonymous 
source states:  
“There's no international law for these companies, there's no 
governance of these companies. You have poor countries who are 
prepared to compromise on environmental and social standards for 
things like foreign direct investment and plenty of wealthy countries who 
are quite happy to receive the funds and then the profit at the expense of 
the breach of these environmental and social standards” (Anonymous,  
personal interview, 2
nd
 November, 2010). 
 
Indeed, as we saw in Part 2, oil firms do endorse global initiatives but these are only 
soft laws, and as Frankental (2001: 22) states, there are no compliance frameworks in 
place to comply with these international standards which are not subject to hard law.  
Furthermore, as Jonathan Samuel, the Social and Community Development Manager at  
Anglo American, states:  
“Behaving in a responsible manner is critical to securing that formal 
and social licence to operate” (Samuel, J., email interview, 10th 
December, 2010).  
 
Indeed, pressure should be put on firms to enact their social responsibility initiatives  
because of the potential comparative advantage of business over governments, NGOs,  
or other organisations to solve certain social problems. Because of competition in the  
marketplace, firms develop unique competencies that give them not just a competitive  
advantage over other firms, but in addition a comparative advantage over governments,  
for example, in responding to some social problems. BP provides a good example of  
this, because BP had cost, expertise, and technical advantages over local government in  
Zambia when it came to providing solar-powered refrigerators for the storage of anti- 
malaria vaccines (Hess et al, 2008: 276-277).  
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8.3: BP’s implementation of CSR principles today: measuring  
impacts. 
In a speech on the 8
th
 November, 1999; CEO Browne highlighted the key drivers for 
BP’s CSR by saying their first driver is that:  
“people ... expect them to behave as leading citizens in a complex world. 
... The second driver is also about expectations. Internal expectations”. 
  
Browne continues on this theme, concerning their employees receiving job satisfaction: 
“We can offer good money, but of course for someone of real talent that 
isn't the issue. They want a great job - which means a job which offers 
them substantive personal progress and which gives them a chance to 
contribute to the progress of society” (BP, 1999). 
  
However, refuting this claim, the CORE Coalition anonymous source emphatically 
states that CSR is:  
“entirely about protecting the brand, [although] that’s not saying that 
BP or another company isn’t considering environmental and social 
issues from another lens or prospective” (Anonymous, personal 
interview, 2
nd
 November, 2010). 
 
This view has to be believed since, as Hamann and Bezuidenhout (2007: 107) reiterate, 
‘reputation assurance … is … commonly identified as [an] important [driver] of CSR’. 
Nevertheless, if BP does consider macro-level socio-economic needs from another 
perspective, perhaps they attempt to measure the impacts of their operations and then 
implement sustainability, in the same way that Anglo American does with SEAT.
132
  
To measure their social and environmental impact, BP (in conjunction with 
other firms) has developed an accounting tool in an attempt to evaluate the extent to 
which BP’s operations conform with the principles of sustainable development. This 
accounting tool is the Sustainability Assessment Model (SAM), which attempts to track 
the economic, resource, environmental, and social impacts of projects over its life span, 
and translate such impacts into a monetary measurement. SAM is a form of full-cost 
accounting, which attempts to define the focus of the costing exercise, specify the scope 
and/or limits of analysis, identify and measure external impacts, and then cost the 
external impacts. However, Baxter et al (2004: 113-114, 118-119) believe SAM should 
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 Anglo American’s Socio-Economic Assessment Toolbox to help them understand the impacts of their 
operations (see Section 5.15).  
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only be the first step in a project’s evaluation. To use SAM to see if a project is 
sustainable, an operational definition of sustainability is required. In addition, whilst 
SAM offers an elegant visual presentation of external impacts in the form of a graph, for 
example, it is hard to make sense of the graph in isolation. Baxter et al feel that the data 
should be converted into a ratio which would provide a better indication of a project’s 
nearness to sustainability. Despite these criticisms, SAM is a worthwhile tool to 
estimate the MVPE.
133
  
Nevertheless, some companies give significant resources to CSR in some 
countries, and yet relatively that same company devotes precious little resources to CSR 
in other countries. BP provides a perfect example of this, due to the fact that BP has 
spent millions on CSR, in particular on social initiatives, in Angola; and yet at the same 
time BP is the greatest investor in Algeria, but devotes precious little resources to its 
CSR activity there. Perhaps the reason for this differential is stakeholder pressure, or it 
could be that in the other country where little is spent on CSR, that host country’s 
government engages in significant social and/or environmental policies so that the 
company feels there is relatively no need for them to attempt to transfer their CSR 
principles there (Frynas, 2009: 52-53). Nevertheless, perhaps relying too heavily upon 
SAM means that BP is unable to indentify things that cannot be measured in a financial 
sense. Jonathan Samuel states that Anglo American attempts to:  
“measure and report on our good citizenship principles using a wide  
range of metrics, not just SEAT, ... [because] the motivations for 
responsible business are not primarily monetary. [Anglo American does] 
value aspects of our CSR ... performance in financial terms when it  
makes sense, but many things cannot be reliably valued. For example,  
what is the value of increasing community trust? We don’t believe this  
can be calculated in a financial sense, although we certainly believe it 
is valuable” (Samuel, J., email interview, 10th December, 2010). 
 
Increasing community trust is indeed an issue that cannot be calculated in a financial  
sense, and therefore, concentrating upon making a monetary valuation to assess firm  
impacts, which arguably BP does, may mean that such social issues get neglected.  
8.4: Disappointing stakeholder expectations. 
The implementation of CSR principles to address macro-level socio-economic needs 
often disappoints the expectations of stakeholders. Amongst oil MNCs, BP took the 
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lead by speaking about the need for international action on climate change in the late 
1990s. However, BP has, since becoming more engaged in the US market and acquiring 
US assets, tended to now stop speaking out on international action (Tindale, 2004: 53). 
This shift represents just one way that BP disappoints the expectations of stakeholders. 
BP is perhaps the firm with the highest CSR profile of all the major oil firms  
that target green groups and NGOs. Several NGOs acknowledge BP’s endorsement of  
human rights policies, and acknowledge BP’s transparency by the fact that BP allows  
public scrutiny of its operations with reports of their social and environmental impacts  
(Banerjee, 2007: 55). Transparency is indeed important in the oil sector and particularly  
important when considering oil investment in Africa because the oil sector there is  
prone to abuse and mismanagement due to the high amounts of potential revenues at  
stake and the enclave nature of the sector with few people involved. Efforts to enhance  
transparency can therefore be vital for changing the overall perception about  
governance in a country (Cosse, 2006: 10-11).  
Environmental impacts are particularly significant for a firm engaged in natural 
resource extraction because that firm must undertake a serious and systematic review of 
its operations to protect biodiversity where they operate. BP’s approach involves their 
biodiversity action plan, which is applied at site and regional levels, and is developed 
after dialogue with relevant stakeholders and partnerships with local groups and experts 
to ‘involve consideration of wide impacts’ (Henriques, 2004: 31). However, some 
NGOs and other stakeholders have complained about BP’s operations. For example, at 
the Greenwash Academy Award Programs in 2002, CorpWatch and Friends of the Earth 
awarded BP the ‘Best Greenwash Award’ for greenwashing.134  
In 2000, BP strategically positioned itself as a leader in social and environmental 
responsibility with the £135 million ‘Beyond Petroleum’ public relations campaign135 
                                                 
134
 The term ‘greenwashing’ involves trying to convince people that what you are doing is good for the 
environment. However in reality, your activities damage the environment (Ongkrutraksa, 2007: 374).  
 
135
 BP rebranding itself as ‘Beyond Petroleum’ was part of an effort to portray themselves as an energy 
company, not just an oil company. As part of ‘Beyond Petroleum’, the company adopted a logo with a 
green, white, and yellow sunburst named after Helios, the ancient Greek sun god. This was to highlight 
that it was incorporating solar energy within its portfolio (Beder, 2002: 26). According to Christiansen 
(2002: 14), ‘this bold ... public-relations move should be seen firstly as an effort to extol BP’s genuine 
concern for the environment. Moreover, it was most likely intended as a symbol of its readiness to assume 
the responsibilities of a progressive energy company in the fight for ethical business principles’. 
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(Banerjee, 2007: 55). Indeed, BP has accepted the inevitability of the Kyoto Treaty, and 
has worked to shape the climate change agenda (Frynas, 2009: 27). However, some 
commentators, such as Munshi and Kurian (2007: 438) dismissed ‘Beyond Petroleum’ 
as a marketing tool to give BP an edge over its competitors.
136
 Nevertheless, despite the 
green positioning and the public backing of the Kyoto Protocol, the core business of BP 
remains oil exploration and drilling (Banerjee, 2007: 55), perhaps to the disappointment 
of concerned stakeholders. The trap for a firm such as BP is that spending on public 
relations campaigns such as ‘Beyond Petroleum’ has the effect of raising stakeholder 
expectations to such a high level that the firm is not capable of meeting those 
expectations (Ongkrutraksa, 2007: 375). This is what the author of this thesis calls the 
‘CSR expectations trap’. Therefore, is BP stuck in this trap?     
With the initiation of the ‘Beyond Petroleum’ campaign, BP stressed that they  
believed in alternative energy (Murphy, 2002: 1), and they have invested in renewable  
energies such as wind and solar power (Frynas, 2009: 28). Expenditure on research and  
development for such renewable energy sources has the potential to have social value in  
excess of its cost. Value of external benefit credits to BP can enhance firm reputation by  
the social value added by such non-market activities (Heal, 2008: 222). However,  
between 1995 and 2001 BP spent just US$200 million on solar power. To highlight how  
small this expenditure was, this amount was less than BP’s annual advertising budget.  
In addition, BP spent US$8.5 billion in 2001 alone on fossil fuel exploration and  
development. Indeed therefore, exploration remains a core business, and low  
expenditure on renewable energy disappoints stakeholder expectations. Murphy (2002:  
1) points out Fortune magazine’s comment on this situation, ‘if the world’s second  
largest oil company is beyond petroleum, Fortune is beyond words’.   
Despite the protests of local communities in the Arctic and environmentalists,  
BP stands to make healthy profits from drilling in the Arctic’s coastal plain as the Arctic  
National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska is opened up to oil drilling. This is one example of  
the fact that it is likely that so long as drilling is profitable, and as long as their  
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 Portney (2008: 266) refers to the USA’s General Electric rebranding itself as the company with 
‘Ecomagination’ together with BP’s metamorphism into ‘Beyond Petroleum’, and states that ‘in both of 
these cases, it is difficult to tell whether there was any significant change in corporate philosophy, or 
whether these companies have merely attempted to give new names to their familiar activities’. Portney 
goes on to highlight that whilst ‘BP has invested money in some alternative forms of energy, it still 
derives the overwhelming share of its revenues and net income from the sale of gasoline’. 
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competitors do so, drilling will also remain a core business (Banerjee, 2007: 56), again  
disappointing stakeholder expectations as community protests are ignored. Indeed,  
Doane (2004: 82) believes that for a firm that is often hailed as the most socially and  
environmentally responsible oil firm, BP remains intent on increasing oil production,  
and Doane also feels that BP ‘sees no immediate profitability in renewable energy’. In  
fact, BP is amongst the most ambitious oil firms in the world when it comes to  
increasing their targets for the extraction of oil and gas (Monaghan, 2004: 148).   
BP publicly committed itself to reducing greenhouse emissions by 10% in 2010 
(Banerjee, 2007: 56). This followed the stand that BP took on climate change in 1997 
by acknowledging the scientific evidence behind the Intergovernmental Panel on  
Climate Change forecasts and the subsequent appropriateness of reducing greenhouse  
emissions (Heal, 2008: 10). BP did achieve this target nine years ahead of schedule. On  
the surface this may look impressive. However, this masks the fact that committing  
itself to reducing greenhouse emissions by 10% in 2010 was a win-win scenario for BP.  
This is because the emissions reductions project cost just US$20 million, while a  
US$650 million cost saving resulting from increased energy efficiencies was achieved  
as a direct result of the emissions reductions project (Banerjee, 2007: 56).  
One efficiency gain was in waste reduction. Oil fields have natural gas at high 
pressure over them. This is called associated gas, and BP had previously burned this gas 
off (flaring gas), producing large scale greenhouse emissions. BP then discovered that 
capturing associated gas meant that it could be transported and then sold, providing a 
new revenue source that exceeded the cost of capture. In effect, BP realised in the 
emissions reductions project that the operating costs, or private costs, were less than the 
social costs of its activities, and they attempted to bring them into line
137
 (Heal, 2008: 
10-11, 24). As a result BP was able to internalise some externalities. Banerjee (2007: 
56) considers that subsequent emission reduction targets would involve much higher 
costs, and energy efficiencies may not be so great. Therefore, it may be interesting to 
see if BP would be willing to commit to such targets in the future. If not, stakeholders 
would once again be disappointed.  
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 Bringing private and social costs into line is attributed to Arthur Pigou. When private and social costs 
are the same, or close to being the same, markets can then work well for society with a greater alignment 
of corporate and social interests (Heal, 2008: 8).  
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However, one must remember that some of BP’s greenhouse emissions are 
passed on to the consumer. BP produces and sells oil and gas, both of which are major 
sources of greenhouse emissions. Once sold, they are not used by BP, they are used by 
BP’s customers who then become directly responsible for the emission of greenhouse 
gases. BP is not directly responsible for the emissions once the product is sold to the 
consumer, but they are clearly indirectly responsible by the fact that they play a major 
role in the production. This highlights the difficulty of measuring corporate 
responsibility, and how easy it is to pass on responsibility (Heal, 2008: 223).  
Nevertheless, the academic evidence so far suggests that BP today places a 
strong emphasis upon environmental issues relative to social issues. Therefore, BP has 
decided today to focus upon the climate change agenda, but this is influenced by the fact 
that they are a corporation based in a developed country. Consequently, this raises 
questions as to the applicability of focusing upon the climate change agenda when BP 
invests in developing countries, as a developing country may prefer social issues to be 
focused upon. As Professor Frynas comments: 
 “BP [has] decided to tackle the climate change agenda. Whereas in  
developing nations ... you have very, very different priorities” (Frynas,  
J.G., personal interview, 20
th
 December, 2010). 
 
This comment suggests that placing social issues higher on the agenda is more  
applicable when investing in developing countries, and perhaps, as will be seen below, 
other environmental issues should be embraced other than the climate change agenda.       
Another way that stakeholder expectations may be disappointed is the fact that  
CSR strategies may be more beneficial for corporations than for the very society that it  
is supposed to benefit. Corporations are not legally required to document their CSR  
principles. Therefore, when they do document their CSR principles, corporations can  
gain enhanced reputation (Banerjee, 2007: 147). BP certainly documents their CSR  
principles, and as a result BP does have a relatively strong CSR reputation and they are  
prospering as a result (Vogel, 2008: 205). Consequently, if Hamann and Bezuidenhout,  
(2007: 107) are correct in their assessment that reputation assurance is one of the most  
important drivers of CSR, being a good corporate citizen and reporting that they are is  
all about protecting the brand.  
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8.5: Revenue transparency. 
Oil MNCs, NGOs, and policy-makers are now all in agreement that revenue  
transparency is the priority initiative to address governance shortcomings in developing 
countries that suffer from the resource curse. The primary expected benefit of revenue 
transparency is a reduction of corrupt practices (Frynas, 2009: 140-141), and represents 
a micro-level initiative to influence the institutional environment, which would help in 
promoting a developmental state rather than a rentier state.
138
 As Henriques (2007: 137) 
states, the transparency of revenues from firms to governments should help to promote a 
reduction of governmental corruption as it is thought of as its solution. This is important 
because corruption involves actors abusing their powerful positions. BP feels that: 
“Transparency and good governance reflect our values and our 
commitment to generate mutual advantage. We have to understand the 
economic and social impact of the investments we make. Without care, 
that impact can be negative, shifting relative prices and disrupting the 
established balance of local economies. The ‘resource curse’ is not 
inevitable and we have an interest and role in trying to ensure that the 
wealth created through the development of resources is used effectively” 
(BP, 2006c: 40).  
     
Furthermore, BP believes that:  
“Governments have the primary responsibility to create conditions of 
growth for their countries. We believe that, by unlocking the value of oil 
and gas resources, we can help provide the financial opportunity for 
countries to develop. Governments decide how the ensuing revenues are 
used. However, we can provide support and assistance to strengthen 
national capacity in legal, financial and other institutions. Our approach 
to these major issues is to form partnerships, particularly with non-
governmental organisations, multilateral organisations and government 
departments. These organisations comprise people who have knowledge 
and experience that complement our own. For example, we ... are 
supporting the strengthening of the rule of law in areas of conflict and 
helping humanitarian aid in post-conflict Angola. We support initiatives 
on transparency of payments to governments. These are not issues that 
can be remedied quickly. They require concerted effort over many years 
with partners who may hold different views from our own. They are, 
however, an integral part of BP’s plan for future business success” (BP, 
2002b: 15). 
 
BP’s approach for promoting revenue transparency and management is, as they explain:  
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“the quality of a government’s revenue management is critical in 
determining whether opportunities for development are seized or 
squandered. While we recognise the primary role of sovereign 
governments in these matters, we support sound revenue management in 
two ways. First, we support transparency – clarity on how much money 
is flowing from companies to governments and from governments into 
public services and investment. Second, we help promote understanding 
of issues linked with resource-rich economies and sharing of best 
practice in addressing their challenges” (BP, 2005b: 52).  
 
Assuming that this approach defines the way that BP implements their revenue 
transparency principles, the question is does it provide a model that can be adopted 
elsewhere?  
Amongst oil MNCs, BP pioneered revenue transparency (Frynas, 2009: 141), 
because they unilaterally decided, in February 2001, to publish information annually on 
its production, the shares transferred to Sonangol under their production sharing 
agreements (PSAs), and their tax payments to the Angolan government (Hodges, 2004: 
168). This was not just to make transparent their payments to Angola because BP 
announced that it would reveal its payments to oil-country governments worldwide 
(McMillan, 2005: 163), all to promote revenue transparency in their accounts. A year 
later (Hodges, 2004: 168), as Shaxson (2007b: 216) highlights ‘the Angolans reacted 
with fury. Their riposte came from the state oil company Sonangol, which threatened – 
in a letter copied to the other oil companies in case they missed the point – to terminate 
BP’s contract in Angola’. It was the president of Sonangol, Manuel Vicente, who wrote 
this letter which accused BP of breaking confidentiality agreements. The letter also 
stressed that Sonangol hoped to retain the good relations that exist with all the oil firms 
engaged in operations in Angola, and in order to maintain this relationship, other oil 
companies were strongly urged not to adopt similar actions (Hodges, 2004: 168). The 
CORE Coalition anonymous source commented upon BP’s attempt to be transparent, 
echoed by the view of Professor Frynas (see below) by saying that:  
“some companies do make difficult decisions that then means they're put 
in a position where countries make it impossible for them to be 
transparent about what they're doing” (Anonymous, personal interview, 
2
nd
 November, 2010). 
 
Despite the fact that BP were subsequently not expelled from Angola, none of the other  
major oil MNCs followed suit by making transparent their payments to host countries.  
208 
 
However, BP’s unilateral action on revenue transparency was considered a major step  
forward by NGOs, most notably by Global Witness, who had been campaigning for  
transparency in the oil sector (Frynas, 2009: 141). Commenting upon whether BP had  
anything to be gained by promoting transparency, Professor Frynas stated that:  
“there was potentially a genuine willingness to come forward and to  
either respond to critics including groups like Global Witness or  
themselves to be more proactive and show that yes we are, for whatever  
reason, becoming more transparent. But this hasn’t provided the best  
practice as an example to be followed by others or even to be continued  
by [BP] all around the world” (Frynas, J.G., personal interview, 20th 
December, 2010). 
 
Commenting upon why is this the case, Professor Frynas states that:  
“it’s difficult to find consensus between companies and ... you have  
free riders [who] can potentially benefit if some companies do it but  
others don’t” (Frynas, J.G., personal interview, 20th December, 2010). 
  
Commenting upon the transfer of organisational principles to address such issues of  
transparency, Professor Frynas states that:  
 “I don’t think in terms of corporate governance, including transparency,  
that there is much best practice established or implemented” (Frynas,  
J.G., personal interview, 20
th
 December, 2010). 
 
Consequently, BP’s approach for implementing their revenue transparency principles 
does not provide a model that can be adopted elsewhere either by themselves or other 
companies. Furthermore, BP’s Angolan experience in attempting to promote 
transparency does highlight the collective action problem that exists when attempting to 
implement such an initiative to address governance shortcomings. This is the fact that 
all companies would benefit from addressing governance shortcomings. However, an 
individual company may be unwilling to undertake such an initiative because of the 
potential of that company suffering as a result (Frynas, 2009: 141). As Professor Frynas 
states:  
“There’s a lot at stake [and] you could potentially enrage some actors,  
particularly host governments” (Frynas, J.G., personal interview, 20th  
December, 2010).  
 
This is indeed what happened in Angola, as noted above. Nevertheless, if collective  
action was engaged in, where all companies implemented such an initiative, such action  
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may be more successful (Frynas, 2009: 141). Professor Frynas commented upon BP’s 
Angolan experience by saying that:  
“It didn’t go very well and it’s very, very clear that it will only work with 
collective action, and ... it’s a long way from that” (Frynas, J.G., 
personal interview, 20
th
 December, 2010).  
 
Commenting upon whether a company should try to make things more transparent by  
acting alone or in some kind of with cooperation with other bodies, the CORE Coalition 
anonymous source states that:  
“there's a clear need for a cooperative effort both nationally, regionally, 
and also internationally” (Anonymous, personal interview, 2nd 
November, 2010).  
 
Nevertheless, BP’s experience in Angola was a major step forward because it partly  
informed the launching of the EITI in 2003 (Frynas, 2009: 141). As BP themselves 
state: 
“BP believes that transparency is important to ensure that international 
investment in emerging market economies provides benefits to the 
community as a whole. We recognise that this is a challenge and are 
therefore supportive of transparency initiatives that develop corporate 
and government accountability while respecting legal and contractual 
positions on confidentiality. At the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable 
Development in Johannesburg, UK prime minister Tony Blair proposed 
the [EITI]. Sponsored by the UK Department for International 
Development, the initiative has involved a wide range of stakeholders, 
including BP, in looking at ways to achieve greater transparency in 
payments and contributions made by companies and revenues received 
by governments for natural resource extraction” (BP, 2002b: 5). 
 
The intention of the EITI was to improve revenue transparency for payments made to 
host countries by the extractive industry sector, limiting corruption.
139
 The EITI is a 
coalition of firms, state governments, civil society groups, and other organisations that 
aims to address governance shortcomings in resource-rich countries by promoting the 
publication and verification of company payments and government revenues in the 
extractive industry sector. The major strength of the EITI is that it believes that it should 
involve all the companies supporting the initiative that are engaged in operations in a 
member country, and this would solve the collective action problem that was 
experienced by BP in Angola. A number of African countries have signed up to the 
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EITI principles, including oil-producing states such as Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria 
(Frynas, 2009: 141-143). However, according to Isaksen et al (2007: 45) the EITI has 
‘been pushing for openness’ ... ‘in the Angolan case, but with very little success’, and 
indeed, Angola has not signed up to the EITI principles.  
In recent reports, BP seems to promote the example of Azerbaijan to highlight 
success in their actions instigating the EITI and their continuing support for it. For 
example:  
“Towards the end of 2004, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
setting out the process for implementing the EITI in Azerbaijan was 
signed by the government, the state oil company SOCAR, foreign oil 
companies and NGOs. BP is committed to ensuring this process moves 
forward and is supporting it with the publication of relevant data and 
information on our activities” (BP, 2004b: 49). 
 
Another example states that: 
“During 2005, we participated in the International Advisory Group for 
the EITI. Azerbaijan is one of the leading countries in implementing EITI 
and there we were active in developing a [MOU] on transparency of 
aggregate payments from extractive industry companies to government. 
In [the] BP Azerbaijan Sustainability Report 2004, we disclosed 
individual payments and we plan to disclose our individual payments in 
the future. In March 2005, the Azerbaijan government publicly disclosed 
its first reports on the revenues received from the extractive industries in 
2003 and early 2004” (BP, 2005b: 52),  
 
suggesting that the approach of BP has certainly been successful in promoting revenue 
transparency in the Azerbaijani government. However, the relative success of BP’s 
approach in one country does not mean that it is necessarily applicable to other 
countries, as the case of Angola highlights, and despite this, 
“BP will continue to work within the bounds of the EITI to ensure that 
this historic opportunity is developed to the full” (BP, 2004b: 498),  
 
which perhaps suggests that BP does feel that it is a model that can be adopted 
everywhere. Nevertheless, as Professor Frynas comments:  
“At the moment ... you only have the [EITI] which doesn’t really go 
anywhere near enough” (Frynas, J.G., personal interview, 20th 
December, 2010). 
 
This is because the EITI assumes that revenue transparency will provide benefits for  
member countries, and this is far from clear. This is due to the fact that according to  
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Frynas (2009: 154-156), studies on transparency that have been undertaken  
demonstrated that transparency benefits arise from the transparency of government  
spending and not from transparency of government revenues. Consequently, the  
assumption that a transparency of revenues flowing from firms to governments would 
provide positive benefits has not been verified. Therefore, the EITI is unlikely to be 
effective because it does not focus upon the government spending of revenues.  
8.6: Liability of foreignness.  
Orr and Scott (2008: 566) considered what they termed the institutional exception, a  
construct that employs organisation theory. In an information-processing view of  
organisations, exceptions describe situations where an actor lacks the sufficient  
information necessary to perform a task. Following-on from this, the term institutional  
exception describes a situation where a knowledge gap about certain requirements  
interferes with implementation. Institutional exceptions can result from ignorance of  
local conditions which can be grounded in differing cultural-cognitive elements, when  
an entrant (for example, a firm) and a host country find themselves on differing  
wavelengths. The defining characteristic of institutional exceptions is the naivety of the  
offending actor. It can result not from intentional incorrect implementation, but from  
well intentioned interventions that prove to be non-applicable. The learning capacity of  
a MNC may give them the ability to operate in varieties of host country macro-level 
environments, and may give a MNC the ability to solve the problem of institutional 
exceptions which can reduce their liability of foreignness (Cantwell et al, 2010: 578). 
Many attempts to implement CSR prove to be ineffective because donations of  
‘philanthropic gestures’ such as schoolbooks or mosquito nets to local communities are  
often carried out without prior consultation with that community and/or development  
specialists about what is actually required. For example, BP distributed Asian-made  
condoms in Angola as part of a HIV/Aids campaign. However, the condoms that were  
distributed turned out to be not large enough for African males. This raises the issue 
of the liability of foreignness. This is when foreigners, due to inadequate local 
knowledge, make unwarranted assumptions about what is required. Part of this lack of 
understanding can be due to what a firm has habitually done over time. For example, 
when BP wanted to educate their managers about issues connected with development 
and sustainability such as biodiversity and global warming; rather than turning to a 
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development institution, BP habitually turned to the Judge Management Institute at 
Cambridge, a business school (a built-in preference within strategic choice analysis).
140
 
In addition, BP’s asset managers are rotated every four years between their subsidiaries 
in different countries. This means that they cannot gain long-term experience of local 
content requirements in a specific host country; and furthermore, they may lack a long-
term commitment to the local community (Frynas, 2009: 121, 127). In comparison, as 
Doctor Gbadamosi states:  
 “ChevronTexaco [the company that has had the most experience in  
Angola]
141
 in my opinion, from what I know on the ground [having]  
visited most of oil producing areas in Nigeria, ... they’re the ones who  
have warmed most significantly and impressively to the rural and local  
population in the communities where they operate. Because what they  
have done is ... they have identified those developmental issues as very  
basic to that community” (Gbadamosi, G., personal interview, 30th 
September, 2010). 
 
Therefore, Chevron impressively identifies the developmental issues that are relevant to 
the communities where they operate, and consequently, this helps to overcome the 
liability of foreignness. It was seen in Chapter 5 that Chevron have been long-term 
endorsers of the Global Sullivan Principles which focuses upon macro-level societal 
issues,
142
 and arguably, endorsement of this global initiative influences them to make 
positive impacts. This view is confirmed by Flemming (2005: 1) who provides the 
example of the Angola Partnership Initiative,
143
 which enabled Chevron ‘to broaden its 
understanding of what it can achieve as an agent of positive social and economic 
change’.  Identifying relevant local content requirements (macro-level socio-economic 
needs) is important because, as Doctor Gbadamosi stresses:  
“in Africa people don’t want ... a listed building, ... they just want a  
building. They just want ... a rectangular building, where there are  
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 Since they first began drilling for oil in Angola about fifty years ago, Chevron has grown to become 
one of Angola’s top producers, responsible for one-third of the country’s annual production. Among 
foreign oil firms engaging in operations in Angola, Chevron is the largest employer (Chevron, 2006: 26). 
 
142
 See Section 5.10.3. 
 
143
 ChevronTexaco’s Angola Partnership Initiative promotes peace, better health, and improved 
educational opportunities in the local communities where they operate (Chevron, 2012: 1).  
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enough classrooms, classes, windows, two toilets, and that’s it. 
[Furthermore,] ChevronTexaco ... as they put the building in place, put 
the hospitals in place, it also empowers the local community people to be 
able to find places to work” (Gbadamosi, G., personal interview, 30th 
September, 2010). 
 
Indeed, Frynas (2005: 593-594) specially identifies Chevron as an oil MNC that has 
been involved in projects which could be regarded as best development practice. In 
conjunction with Statoil,
144
 Chevron funded the Akassa project in Bayelsa State, 
Nigeria. This project has come to symbolise the potential positive benefits of oil 
company development work. With the aid of development NGO ProNatura in 
implementing the project, its distinguishing feature was that it was based entirely upon 
local content requirements and not driven by outsiders deciding which specific 
initiatives should be implemented. The project was fully community-led, with the 
planning process involving not just the local chiefs (as in many oil company schemes) 
but also local women and youths. Crucially, the project empowered the local 
community to help themselves by, amongst other things, providing training and advice 
to locals to improve their employment potential.  
This highlights the fact that the issue of reducing liability of foreignness 
embraces the wider arena of considering the social issues in the communities where an 
oil MNC operates, as will now be considered in greater depth. 
8.7: Contributing to social projects. 
Oil MNCs in Angola can contribute to improving socio-economic needs at the macro-
level via three different channels. Two are required by the Angolan government and one 
is voluntary: 
 Production Sharing Agreement (PSA): PSAs are contracts requiring firms to  
support social projects, and these are commonplace in Angola.  
 Signature bonus: Signature bonuses are the price for a licence to operate that is  
paid up front. Parts of these payments are earmarked for social purposes. 
 Post-tax voluntary contributions: Voluntary contributions involve spending on  
various social projects by firms from their after-tax profits. This is what is  
usually thought of as being CSR. Oil MNCs manage these on their own  
according to the individual firm’s CSR principles. 
                                                 
144
 Norway’s state oil company. 
214 
 
A PSA is the most important channel for funding social projects in Angola. These social  
projects are treated as ordinary production costs, whose level and composition are not  
disclosed by contract. As PSA agreements are non-transparent, oil MNCs run the risk of  
punishment by the Angolan government if the activities are disclosed (as BP ran the risk  
of). Therefore, oil MNCs are unwilling to make public any information about how these  
funds are used. Initiatives for the use of these funds are primarily decided upon by  
Sonangol which means that any activity that may be related to improving governance is  
highly unlikely 
 Signature bonuses were made public from 2004, when Chevron was granted the 
Block 0 contract extension. Since parts of these payments are earmarked for social 
purposes, a significant amount of funds are therefore available in principle for the 
financing of social projects. This channel has become more transparent in recent years  
in terms of the size of the funds available. However, the use of the funds remains non- 
transparent because, just as for PSAs, Sonangol is decision maker about the use of the  
funds. Therefore, one can reach the same conclusion as for PSAs in terms of improving  
governance. 
 Post-tax voluntary contributions are modest in comparison with PSAs and  
signature bonuses. However, they are much more visible and they are enthusiastically  
reported on by the firms. Contributions are made annually, with Chevron contributing 
around US$10 million and ExxonMobil around US$5 million. BP, in comparison, 
donates only around US$1 million, meaning that they do not contribute as much as 
these two US oil MNCs to social projects via post-tax voluntary contributions (Wiig and 
Kolstad, 2010: 183-184). BP contributes a tenth of the amount that Chevron donates, 
and a fifth of that donated by ExxonMobil. Therefore, is this due to the fact that BP’s 
presence in Angola is not as large as the two US giants?  
Chevron’s subsidiary CABGOC has a 39.2% stake in Block 0, and a 31% stake 
in Block 14. ExxonMobil has a 25% stake in Block 31, 20% stakes in Block 17 and 
Block 24, shares a 20% stake in Block 32, and via their subsidiary Esso a 40% stake in 
Block 15. BP has a 50% stake in Block 18, a 27% stake in Block 15, a 26.7% stake in 
Block 31, and a 16.67% stake in Block 17.
145
 These statistics suggest that BP’s presence 
in Angola is not significantly lower than that of Chevron and ExxonMobil. However,  
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    Shallow Water Blocks 
Block Stakes 
Block 0 
(Cabinda) 
ChevronTexaco’s subsidiary Cabinda Gulf Oil Company 
(CABGOC): 39.2%, Sonangol: 41%, TotalFinaElf: 10%, 
Agip/Eni: 9.8% 
Block 1/ 
Safueiro 
Eni: 50%, Total: 25%, Petrogal: 10%, Naftaplin: 7.5%, 
Naftgas: 7.5% 
Block 1/ 
06 
Tullow Oil: 50%, Sonangol: 20%, ProdOil: 20%, Force 
Petroleum: 10% 
Block 2/ 
80-85 
Petrobras: 27.5%, Total: 27.5%, Sonangol: 25% 
Block 3/ 
Canuku 
Sonangol: 100% 
Block 3/ 
85-91 
TotalFinaElf: 50%, Agip/Eni: 15%, Ajoco: 12.5%, Sonangol: 
6.25%, Svenska: 6.25%, Naftaplin: 5%, Naftgas: 5% 
Block 4 Sonangol: 100% 
 Deepwater Blocks 
Block Stakes 
Block 14 
(Cabinda) 
ChevronTexaco’s subsidiary Cabinda Gulf Oil Company 
(CABGOC): 31%, Agip/Eni: 20%, Sonangol: 20%, Total: 
20%, Petrogal: 9% 
Block 15 ExxonMobil’s subsidiary Esso: 40%, BP: 27%, Agip/Eni: 
20%, Statoil: 13% 
Block 17 TotalFinaElf: 40%, ExxonMobil: 20%, BP: 16.67%, Statoil: 
13.33%, Norsk Hydro: 10% 
Block 18 BP: 50%, Sinopec: 50% 
Block 24 Devon Energy: 40%, ExxonMobil: 20%, Petronas and 
Sonangol: 40% 
 Ultra-Deepwater Blocks 
Block Stakes 
Block 31 BP: 26.7%, ExxonMobil: 25%, Sonangol: 20%, Statoil: 
13.3%, Marathon Oil: 10%, Total: 5% 
Block 32 TotalFinaElf: 30%, CNOOC, ExxonMobil, Marathon Oil, 
Sinopec, and Sonangol: 20% 
 
Figure 8.1: Stakes in Angola’s Offshore Oil Fields, as of 25th May 2011,  
(Zhao, 2011). 
 
these figures do not capture the size and productive capacity of the oil fields, and 
indeed, Chevron boasts a major stake in Block 0, Angola’s most prized oil asset. 
Nevertheless, BP’s presence in Angola may not be a tenth of that of Chevron and a fifth 
of that of ExxonMobil, so why does BP donate a relatively modest amount via post-tax 
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voluntary contributions? Perhaps BP contributes significant amounts via the two other 
channels instead. One can therefore speculate that BP was motivated to publish their 
accounts in 2001 to make transparent the shares transferred to Sonangol under their 
PSAs and their signature bonus payments so that they could report that they do 
contribute significantly to social projects in Angola.
146
   
 However, although information is more transparent with post-tax voluntary  
contributions, the oil MNCs do not coordinate their activities, apart from partnership  
agreements on environmental issues, and they do cooperate with NGOs on projects such  
as enterprise development and vaccination. Chevron has the leading role in these 
partnership arrangements. Nevertheless, according to Wiig and Kolstad (2010: 184), 
‘there are no partnerships that directly attend to governance issues. Voluntary projects  
focus on service provision, and governance is not addressed’. 
8.8: The importance of environmental issues. 
It was seen in Chapter 5 that Anglo American has placed an importance historically 
upon macro-level socio-economic needs as it has evolved and been influenced by 
originally being based in South Africa. This is because, as Professor Frynas stated: 
“in developing nations ... you have very, very different priorities”  
(Frynas, J.G., personal interview, 20
th
 December, 2010). 
 
Nevertheless, as Jonathan Samuel states, today, although placing social issues high on 
the agenda remains relevant to the African context, Anglo American is: 
 “placing a greater emphasis on ... climate change than we were five 
years ago to reflect international issues” (Samuel, J., email interview, 
10
th
 December, 2010). 
 
Therefore, environmental issues at the macro-level are becoming increasingly important 
internationally. However, we saw in Chapter 5
147
 that the major issue with the concept 
of sustainable development that has now been embraced by all of the firms under 
consideration in this thesis as part of the third generation of the evolution of the CSR 
agenda, including BP, is that it is an articulation that favours developed world notions 
of environmentalism, and it therefore, focuses upon climate change. The sustainability 
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of local environments in developing countries is not addressed. This is arguably further 
reinforced by adherence to and/or the influence of the GRI from the global institutional 
environment and its roots in environmentalism.  
The major research themes on Africa since the 1960s has been, according to 
Kreike (2004: 8-9), political and socio-cultural reconstruction to address the impacts of 
colonial conquest and other external influences, and to address the impacts of internal 
actors. The sustainability of local environments and addressing the related social 
consequences of environmental degradation, or at the very least a consideration of 
environmental issues, has received little or no attention despite the extensive 
environmental degradation that has been caused by numerous actors. Frynas (2000: 
149) did consider the environmental and related social impacts of oil sector operations 
upon Nigerian village communities, but to illustrate oil sector impacts Nigerian court 
judgements were utilised. The major weakness of using this approach was that the 
courts relied too heavily upon the interpretations that were presented by legal counsels 
and witnesses in court, and as a result it largely failed to identify the processes leading 
to environmental degradation. Doctor Gbadamosi comments upon the fact that local 
environmental issues in Africa have become significantly important recently. As he 
states:  
“I have seen it firsthand and I know that it is ... a real issue. ... In 
Nigeria, ... if you ask the average citizen [about environmental issues] in 
the oil prospecting areas they will tell you eighteen, twenty years ago, 
thirty years ago, they’ll probably tell you, ‘what does that mean?’ They 
probably wouldn’t have a clue what you were talking about. But today, 
in the last ten years, it is the only issue that is important to people who 
live in these communities” (Gbadamosi, G., personal interview, 30th 
September, 2010). 
 
Confirming that local environmental issues are increasingly becoming relevant, together 
with social issues, Professor Frynas states that:  
“Social investment ... [is]  ... key ... because it’s very tricky, it’s difficult 
to get it right and [it is] important to get the social licence to operate in 
developing countries which cannot be done without some sort of social 
investment. But then it doesn’t mean that everything else isn’t important” 
(Frynas, J.G., personal interview, 20
th
 December, 2010).  
 
 Doctor Gbadamosi proceeds to provide an enlightening account, concerning oil 
spillage:  
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 “What has happened with the Gulf of Mexico ... has been going on in  
Nigeria for about twenty five years” (Gbadamosi, G., personal interview, 
30
th 
September, 2010). 
 
BP states that: 
 “oil spill avoidance is critical to our industry and society because of the 
potentially serious impacts on health, safety and the environment. Oil 
released into the environment can contaminate land, air and water. It is a 
highly flammable material that, if ignited, can cause severe injuries and 
damage to property. The three fundamental approaches taken by BP to 
address oil spills are:  
 recording and targeting the reduction in the number of oil spills,  
 inspection of vessels and pipelines used for storage and transportation of 
oil,  
 ensuring our preparedness for oil spill response, including clean-up and 
restoration.  
If our systems fail and we spill oil, we take all feasible steps to ensure 
that as much of the oil as possible is recovered and not left in the 
environment. About half of our total spills are contained, so never reach 
land or water” (BP, 2000: 18). 
 
BP reported that in November 2000 there was:  
“a major leak of million litres of light condensate oil from a tank at 
[their] operations in Sharjah, UAE ... [resulting] in the release of 3.3 
million litres of oil to the desert environment. The spill, caused by 
undetected corrosion in a large storage tank, had relatively little impact 
on the surrounding environment” (BP, 2000: 18).  
 
Although it is commendable that BP were open and honest about this leak, it is 
difficult to believe that such a spill ‘had relatively little impact on the 
surrounding environment’. Nevertheless, the Gulf of Mexico issue that Doctor 
Gbadamosi refers to is explained in Box 8.1 on the next page, and as BP state: 
“BP has substantial deepwater assets around the world, including the 
Gulf of Mexico [and] Angola” (BP, 2009c: 10).  
 
Therefore, the Gulf of Mexico incident should cause concern for Angolans assuming 
that BP is using similar technologies. Nevertheless, BP states that:  
“we are committed to working with the industry and governments to 
share lessons learned [from the Gulf of Mexico incident], as well as the 
new equipment and technology developed in response to this accident. In 
the Gulf of Mexico, BP has joined the Marine Well Containment 
Company (MWCC), an initiative with ExxonMobil, Shell, 
ConocoPhillips and Chevron designed to quickly deploy effective 
equipment in the event of another underwater blowout. The well  
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containment equipment used in the Deepwater Horizon response will 
preserve existing capability for use in the Gulf of Mexico while the 
MWCC builds a system that exceeds current response capabilities” (BP, 
2010b: 13). 
 
A gas release and subsequent explosion occurred on the Deepwater Horizon oil 
rig in BP’s Macondo exploration well in the Gulf of Mexico on the 20th April, 
2010. A fire burned for 36 hours before the rig sank, and hydrocarbons leaked for 
87 days before the well was closed and sealed. The accident was caused by a loss 
of control over the pressure in the well following a failure in the well’s blowout 
preventer. Following the initial explosions, the blowout preventer’s emergency 
functions failed to seal the well which allowed the leak to occur. Eleven people 
died and many others were injured.  
BP acted to take responsibility for the clean-up and to compensate people 
affected, spending US$17.7billion on their response activities by the 31
st
 
December, 2010. In addition, in agreement with the US government, BP set up a 
US$20billion fund, the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust, to provide confidence 
that damage claims funds would be available. Throughout their response, BP 
worked closely with the US government, local residents, shareholders, 
employees, the wider industry, and the media. BP launched an investigation 
which concluded that there was no single cause for the accident. Rather, it was 
caused by an interlinked series of mechanical, human judgement, engineering 
design, operational implementation, and team interface failures. The investigation 
concluded that the responsibility of these failures rested with several companies, 
including BP. An external investigation conducted by the US National 
Commission, requested by President Barack Obama, identified failures of 
management and decision making within BP and its contractors, together with 
regulatory failures. 
Box 8.1: The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (BP, 2010b: 7, 9).   
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One can only hope that such cooperation can be achieved to respond to a similar oil 
spill in Angola’s offshore oil fields, or that the new equipment and technology that has 
been developed will actually prevent such an accident occurring in the first place. 
However, as BP acknowledges:  
“We recognise that the Deepwater Horizon accident has raised questions 
about finding and producing oil and gas in deepwater environments. We 
are working with governments, regulators and our industry so that the 
lessons learned from the accident are not forgotten and become part of 
industry best practice. We believe any future industry-wide governing 
principles or framework for deepwater drilling should include shared 
capacity for response to incidents, should they occur; consistent policies 
and equipment, wherever possible; and active engagement with 
regulators and other relevant government officials. In addition to any new 
governmental oversight mechanisms and processes that may be 
introduced, we believe our industry should focus on contingency  
planning and response capability; overall reliability of well design and 
construction; operational capability and competence; and financial 
capability. Deepwater resources are an important part of the energy mix, 
especially in the US, where offshore production in the Gulf of Mexico  
has reversed a 23-year trend of declining domestic oil production. 
Globally, deepwater resources account for around 7% of global oil 
production, a figure that we expect to rise to nearly 10% by 2020” (BP, 
2010b: 23). 
 
Nevertheless, Doctor Gbadamosi comments upon oil spills by stating that:  
“This is an everyday activity problem in Nigeria [and] it’s not in the  
news .... [unlike] the Gulf of Mexico incident, and I have seen it 
firsthand. ... The people who live in that part of the country [the Niger 
Delta], unlike Angola, where everything is ... mainly off-shore, ... in 
Nigeria it is fifty-fifty, both on-shore and off-shore, and much of the coast 
has villages ... inhabited by people who live on fishing. ... So what has 
happened is that all of a sudden somebody comes in there with a ship 
and they’re drilling oil there, and within a couple of days ... they have oil 
spilling everywhere. So the entire community have to evacuate ... [as] 
they can’t do any fishing. ... When they talk about all the crime and all 
the fighting in that part of the world, [the Niger Delta], it becomes very 
easy to recruit people who are already very angry, the same way Al 
Qaeda is able to recruit and reach people for different reasons around 
the world” (Gbadamosi, G., personal interview, 30th September, 2010).  
 
This is because, as Doctor Gbadamosi explains, civil conflict can result from the fact 
that:  
“oil companies have not bothered to do anything about the clearing up ... 
[and] I am not seeing any legislation ... from government” (Gbadamosi, 
G., personal interview, 30
th 
September, 2010). 
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Therefore, this account highlights one of the main processes that have led to  
environmental degradation, namely oil spillage. Furthermore, this account identifies that  
local fishing communities are unable to sustain their livelihoods. Such a view is 
confirmed by Aluko (2004: 64-65), who stated that oil sector operations have ‘brought 
incessant oil spills and pollution which [has] disrupted some of the traditional 
occupations of the people in the Niger Delta, the main ones being farming and fishing. 
A direct fallout from this is that most people whose main occupations are farming and 
fishing have thus been deprived of their means of livelihood’. This is because, as 
Uyigue and Agho (2007: 9) also confirm, the ‘activities of multinational oil companies 
[have] devastating effects on ... farmlands, crops, creeks, lakes, economic crops and 
rivers [and] are so severe that the [African] people can no longer engage in productive 
farming, fishing and hunting’.  
Tuodolo (2009: 537) further acknowledges this problem, and outlines the 
processes and consequences involved. As Tuodolo states, there are ‘oil spills from well-
heads, flow stations and pipelines; discharge of drilling and production waste; and gas 
flared
148
 from the different oil fields - all occurring on/in the land, sea, creeks and air; 
[and] farm lands and fish ponds are destroyed in the process; forest and sea animals and 
plants are destroyed or forced to migrate; and the air is polluted. The impacts of such 
environmental degradation result in low farm produce, loss of livelihood (fishing and 
farming), diseases, limitation of economic activities, food shortage, polluted waters, etc. 
In a few instances, oil [spills have] led to the death of unsuspecting fishermen. The 
negative impact ... on the people’s health and livelihood is enormous’. 
Hodges (2004: 102, 151) also highlights that this scenario could be occurring in 
Angola. The sea off the southern coast, around Benguela and Namibe, has one of the 
best fishing resources on the continent, despite over-fishing reducing stocks. However, 
offshore oil production is threatening to pollute these rich fishing resources, affecting 
the ability of the local communities to sustain their livelihoods. As Doctor Gbadamosi 
comments:  
“If it’s a bad issue in Angola now, it will be an issue when they begin to  
have [oil] spillage. ... I wouldn’t want that to happen in Angola because 
that would kill the fish, and it’s going to render other people 
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unemployed, and that creates more social problems” (Gbadamosi, G., 
personal interview, 30
th 
September, 2010). 
 
Chevron does acknowledge that:  
“Fishing in the Cabinda Bay area [of Angola] is an important means of 
income for local communities and a commercial resource for the region” 
(Chevron, 2006: 27). 
 
Nevertheless, commenting upon whether all Western oil firms are responsible for 
extensive oil spillage, including BP, Doctor Gbadamosi states that it is: 
“all of them. It’s ... really terrible. But the people of the area [the Niger 
Delta] claim ... that Shell is the worst culprit” (Gbadamosi, G., personal 
interview, 30
th 
September, 2010). 
  
Indeed, Evuleocha (2005: 338) states that calls from the Nigerian government for 
maintaining safe environmental practices have to be aimed at all of the major oil firms. 
Nevertheless, this refutes BP’s claim that not much oil is left in the environment. 
Although  Doctor Gbadamosi’s statement that the people of the Niger Delta claim that 
‘Shell is the worst culprit’ is probably due to the fact that, as Tuodolo (2009: 539) 
states, ‘Shell’s role in the environmental and social damage of Ogoniland cannot be 
easily wished away’,149 Shell does provide a forceful statement on the cause of oil 
spillages. Shell claims that:  
“in recent years most spills from [our] facilities have been caused by 
sabotage and theft. But some are operational spills due to equipment 
failure or human error” (Royal Dutch Shell, 2010: 18).  
 
However, as Doctor Gbadamosi comments:  
“As far as I know [from] the evidence on the ground ... it is almost 
entirely operational spills. Human errors [and/or] equipment failure for 
environmental degradation can only happen for so long. We are talking 
about spillage that happened for well over a decade. Responsible firms 
will not close their eyes and let it continue for even a full month (in 
today's world) and that is really the point for me. As far as theft and 
sabotage [is concerned] it will certainly not apply to the timeframe we 
are talking about. Theft and sabotage are a lot more recent relative to 
the time of the spillage occurrence in Nigeria. I think the real issue is 
that the government of Nigeria may have significantly indulged Shell 
(and other Multinational Oil Firms) with little or no control (which is 
their over sight function) hence these companies acted as they pleased at 
that time. All these have changed and Shell can now rationalise it and 
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attribute it to others. I think it is a failure of CSR on their part and this is 
why they have more or less acknowledged their failure in this respect and 
are willing to pay the heavy financial atonement for it
150
 (Gbadamosi, G., 
email interview, 4
th
 October, 2011). 
 
Indeed, to confirm this, Badejo and Nwilo (2004: 5) stated that a Nigerian government 
committee that investigated Shell found that it was responsible for the majority of the 
oil spills and environmental incidents in the Niger Delta, including an epidemic in 
1993-1994 in which 1,400 people were killed. Furthermore, the committee blamed the 
prevalence of cancer in the Niger Delta on the exposure to the company’s oil spills.  
Nevertheless, when it comes to actually cleaning up the pollution caused by the 
oil spills, as Doctor Gbadamosi highlights:  
“the UN says it cannot be cleaned up in 30 years!” (Gbadamosi, G., 
email interview, 4
th
 October, 2011). 
 
Another process that significantly affects local environments is flaring gas. As Doctor 
Gbadamosi states: 
“Gas flaring ... goes on forever, and we’ll find it all over the rivers and 
the land of southern Africa [and] you will find it there ... twenty four 
hours [a day] ... which is a lot of pollution” (Gbadamosi, G., personal 
interview, 30
th 
September, 2010). 
 
Eregha and Irughe (2009: 165-166) confirm that this problem of flaring gas does exist, 
and in fact, it ‘has been practiced in the Niger Delta for over four decades’. As they 
further highlight, ‘it is not an exaggeration that gas flaring is environmentally unethical 
and has contributed significantly to the degradation of the environment in the region. 
This practice may have altered the vegetation of the area, replacing natural vegetation 
with stubborn grasses and the presence of these grasses indicates that the soil is no 
longer fertile for [the] cultivation of crops’. Hodges (2004: 151-152) also confirms that 
this problem exists, and that it is associated with virtually all the onshore oilfield 
discoveries in Cabinda and the Lower Congo basin in Angola. Despite the fact that, for 
example, limited amounts of liquefied petroleum gas are exported, virtually all the 
associated gas is flared.  
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Therefore, there are significant local environmental issues facing oil MNCs in 
Africa that are important to the local communities where they are engaged in operations. 
This suggests that in order to continue to receive a social licence to operate, oil MNCs 
should address the related social consequences of environmental degradation. However, 
oil MNC’s endorsement of the concept of sustainable development and its focus upon 
the climate change agenda means that developing world local environmental issues are 
being ignored, as this above evidence suggests.    
8.8.1: Answering an audience in developed countries.  
As Professor Frynas comments: 
“Developed countries ... put a lot of emphasis on climate change and  
carbon emissions. I think that the leaders [of BP] should ... still  
consider ... other things because they’ve managed to reduce their own  
operational emissions, to a much larger extent than any other oil  
company. But ... that was partly to answer to an audience in developed  
countries” (Frynas, J.G., personal interview, 20th December, 2010).  
 
BP has recognised that:  
“the priorities for meeting economic, social and environmental needs in 
emerging markets in a sustainable way will be as important as, but 
different from, those in developed economies” (BP, 2000: 7). 
 
Nevertheless, BP continually stress in their reporting a focus upon the climate change 
agenda to answer an audience in the developed world, certainly influenced by their 
adherence to the concept of sustainable development and its developed world notion of 
environmentalism,
151
 as they have now been influenced to endorse this concept by 
initiatives from the global institutional environment For example:   
“Energy [is] a major topic of debate among policy-makers and the public, 
with particular concerns over ... climate change” (BP, 2006c: 4),  
 
suggesting that indeed, BP is more concerned with answering an audience in the 
developed world. Furthermore, BP stated in their 2006 Sustainability Report that:    
“public awareness and concern over climate change intensified during 
2006. New research was published that highlighted the increasing future 
risks of the impacts of climate change and the growing acceptance that 
much of the observed warming and associated impacts result from human 
activity. There was also significant legislative activity, especially in 
Europe and the US” (BP, 2006c: 5), 
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which suggests that it is not only the developed world audience that they are 
concerned about, that is, the public in the developed world; but also developed 
world legislation. BP also state that: 
 “we have a continuing commitment to improve operational energy 
efficiency and to seek out [greenhouse gas] emission reductions” (BP, 
2007b: 13),  
 
confirming the view of Professor Frynas that BP is reducing their own operational 
emissions to a much larger extent than other oil companies. In 1998, the company stated 
that:  
“if climate change is the long-term challenge for [the oil] industry, air 
quality in our cities is a more immediate concern” (BP Amoco, 1998: 6).  
 
Climate change is indeed a long-term challenge. However, this statement suggests that 
the company does consider day-to-day environmental challenges. Nevertheless, ‘air 
quality in cities’ is perhaps another example of the way BP only answers to an audience 
in the developed world. 
A mainstream firm such as BP and their ethical ‘Beyond Petroleum’ rebranding  
campaign attempted to satisfy an audience of customers in developed countries who  
may be concerned about ethical factors. However, the key factors for a firm that moves  
towards the mainstream ethical concerns market is not necessarily the lure of increased  
sales by satisfying customers’ ethical concerns, but more protecting the brand from  
attack, or in other words, the firms’ reputation, and risk. (Crane, 2008: 216, 222).  
Therefore, BP’s environmental principles tackle the climate change agenda to answer an  
audience in developed countries.  
One way that BP perhaps achieves this in the field of education at the 
institutional environment level. BP emphasises the importance of education to their 
overall CSR strategy. Support for education has been the highlight of BP’s community 
programme for many years. In the UK BP works with education authorities, the local 
Education Business Partnership, and schools to form the basis of what BP considers to 
be highly successful ongoing activities that are delivered by BP staff working with 
schools and BP’s Educational Coordinator (Farnsworth, 2004: 168). In the UK in 
November 2006, the BP Educational Service launched the Carbon Footprint Toolkit, 
which is an educational resource designed to help secondary school students understand 
more about climate change and their own carbon footprints. Developed in conjunction 
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with teachers and BP experts, the toolkit enables students to examine the carbon 
footprint of their school, and create realistic carbon reduction plans accordingly (BP, 
2009a: 1). In addition, the BP Educational Service supplies schools and colleges 
throughout the UK with material about their business activities. However, by allowing a 
corporation to promote their brand in such a way presents a clear danger, as recognised 
in criticism by both the Consumers Society and a committee of MPs. In their view, a 
corporation producing such materials, and in the way BP allows it to be presented, 
amounts to little more than just company propaganda (Farnsworth, 2004: 168). 
Nevertheless, a toolkit examining the carbon footprint of schools could be interpreted as 
a deliberate attempt to focus attention towards the climate change agenda and away 
from everyday pollution from oil sector operations in the developing world, such as oil 
spillage and flaring gas, and that is what is appropriate to the African setting and this is 
not being addressed. 
8.9: Strategic CSR. 
The implications of engaging in strategic CSR depends upon the motivations MNCs  
have for implementing CSR principles. MNCs may be motivated by internal guidelines  
that are set at the corporate board level, and external guidelines such as complying with 
global initiatives. CSR can also be driven by stakeholder pressure. CSR behaviour could 
also be motivated by the opportunity that implementing CSR principles presents in 
terms of securing licences to operate, or in other words, strategic CSR (Wiig and 
Kolstad, 2010: 182). The previous section noted that social issues, and now today 
environmental issues, should be embraced by an oil MNC to receive a social licence to 
operate. However, to what extent do firms devise CSR policies merely to secure a 
licence to operate from a host governments’ institutional environment?  
Researching the co-evolutionary interaction between the Angolan government 
and oil MNCs engaged in operations in the country, Wiig and Kolstad (2010: 179) 
found firstly, that oil MNC’s CSR principles are largely unimportant for securing a 
formal licence to operate in comparison with other factors such as technological 
prowess and financial strength. Nevertheless, regarding the extent to which CSR matters 
in securing a licence to operate, human rights and charitable activities are relatively 
unimportant, whereas other dimensions of CSR principles are far more important, and 
these include local content requirements and employing local staff together with some 
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environmental considerations. Secondly, to the extent that CSR matters, it seems to be 
used strategically by oil MNCs. Therefore, influencing Angolan officials to increase the  
likelihood of securing a licence to operate is a major motivation for transferring CSR  
principles. Thirdly, oil MNCs do not address the poor institutional environment, and in  
turn they do not promote economic development in Angola by transferring their CSR  
principles. Commenting upon whether oil multinationals use CSR strategically,  
Professor Frynas states that: 
“In terms of actually getting some specific [formal] licences ... there’s 
certainly been some of it. ... ChevronTexaco in Angola is one example 
and [there are] a few other places that it is certainly the case that it’s 
been used strategically. ... Usually it’s been [about] spending on social 
investment in general or on a specific government-favoured social fund. 
So certainly companies are trying to get an advantage in some way and 
some companies are certainly keenly aware that this sort of activity 
offers a [competitive] advantage” (Frynas, J.G., personal interview, 20th 
December, 2010). 
 
Indeed, oil firms that engage in operations in Angola are encouraged to contribute, for  
example, to the Social Bonus Fund of Sonangol (Frynas, 2009: 116), and to the Eduardo  
dos Santos Foundation (Fundação Eduardo dos Santos, FESA) initiated by the  
president. FESA has been said to be contributing to dos Santos’s personality cult, and is  
characterised as being within the ‘system of clientelist domination’ (Messiant, 2001:  
288, 296). What Messiant is referring to by ‘clientelist domination’ is the fact that  
Angolans do not enjoy real political and social rights as one might understand them in  
the democratic West. Instead, Angolans only have the ability to be part of patrimonial  
networks, and being part of these networks enables accessibility to certain resources and  
enables an avoidance of certain penalties (Messiant, 2007: 120). Therefore, contributing  
to social funds is a way of being part of a patrimonial network. Indeed, Chevron has 
strategically implemented their CSR principles in this way to renew their stake in  
Angola’s most prized oil asset, Block 0. An announcement in November 2002 of a  
partnership between Chevron, USAID, and UNDP worth US$50 million coincided with 
the negotiations over Block 0. Chevron’s concession was subsequently extended, in 
early 2004, from 2010 to 2030 whilst Chevron contributed another US$80 million to a 
social fund. Therefore, Chevron transferred their CSR principles strategically to gain a 
competitive advantage (Frynas, 2009: 117) as Professor Frynas states above, possibly 
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by making sure that they are part of a patrimonial network to ensure accessibility to 
Angola’s oil resources.  
The problem of patronage is the key factor behind the resource curse. This  
involves the fact that government officials do not use resource revenues for  
economically beneficial investment that would promote development. Instead, resource  
revenues are utilised by those government officials to strengthen their hold on power.  
By engaging in strategic CSR to secure formal licences to operate, it is possible that oil  
MNCs facilitate patronage problems which exacerbate the resource curse (Wiig and  
Kolstad, 2010: 179). Nevertheless, commenting upon whether firms use CSR  
strategically, the CORE Coalition anonymous source confirms the view of Professor 
Frynas by stating that:  
“I think that CSR initiatives can be very important in companies securing  
a social license to operate, yes. ... BP has tried very hard to put in place 
systems or schools or projects which will win over the support of the 
local community, which clearly is in BP’s best interests ... so yes of 
course some of the CSR initiatives are strategic” (Anonymous, personal 
interview, 2
nd
 November, 2010).  
 
Therefore, CSR is used strategically not just to receive a formal licence to operate, but  
also a social licence to operate as it is in an MNC’s best interests to gain the support of  
the local community. However, as the CORE Coalition anonymous source further 
states, some CSR initiatives: 
“are very un-strategic, like for example building two schools in a very  
small village, which has already got a school” (Anonymous, personal  
interview, 2
nd
 November, 2010). 
 
This refers back to the problem of the liability of foreignness, and it is very important to  
get local content requirements (socio-economic needs) correct. Nevertheless, once an 
MNC is able to understand what is required in the local context, they have to deliver on 
their promises. Professor Child commented upon multinationals using CSR strategically 
by stating that:  
“Using it strategically doesn’t necessarily mean that they’re not going to  
follow that up with action. It’s not just what they can get away with in a  
local situation. It’s also going to put them in the face of public opinion  
and even shareholders in their own countries” (Child, J., personal  
interview, 25
th
 November, 2010).  
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Therefore, although one could criticise firms for engaging in strategic CSR, it is 
possible to conclude that so long as firms ‘follow that up with action’, as Professor 
Child states, strategic CSR is not really detrimental to the host communities. However, 
the CORE Coalition anonymous source provides a note of caution, which refers to the 
liability of foreignness. This issue of strategic CSR will be revisited in Section 9.13. 
 8.10: Discussion: institutional co-evolution. 
BP believes that business has always been an important agent of change and that large 
companies can be part of the solution to address governance shortcomings. Therefore, 
BP obviously feels that they engage in institutional co-evolution.
152
 However, Wiig and 
Kolstad (2010) state that influencing the Angolan government to improve the 
institutional environment does not appear to be an important part of any oil companies’ 
CSR activities. Another issue is whether businesses learn from experience over time, 
and as we saw in Chapter 5, BP has been embracing social issues throughout their 
history, and they even suggest in their 2007 Sustainability Report that they have learnt 
from their experience of embracing social and environmental issues. However, the 
CORE Coalition anonymous source states that BP does not deal with social and 
environmental issues effectively because it clearly has not learnt from its experience. 
This discussion therefore, will review the evidence to discover whether this viewpoint is 
correct.
153
  
BP’s CEO Browne highlighted that their employees want job satisfaction in the 
context of them being able to contribute to the progress of society, and that this is one of 
their most important drivers for CSR. However, the CORE Coalition anonymous source 
states that CSR is entirely about protecting the brand. Hamann and Bezuidenhout (2007) 
confirm this view by stating that reputation assurance is indeed an important driver of 
CSR. In addition, BP disappoints the expectations of stakeholders in a variety of ways.  
BP’s approach for promoting revenue transparency and management is to 
support the issue of revenue transparency, and to ‘promote understanding of issues 
linked with resource-rich economies and sharing of best practice in addressing their 
challenges’. The questions that arise here is does BP share best practice effectively, and 
does it provide a model that can be adopted elsewhere? The example of BP attempting 
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 Aim 4 in Section 1.1. 
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 Aim 1 in Section 1.1. 
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to promote transparency in Angola highlights, as the CORE Coalition anonymous 
source comments, that companies do make such difficult decisions, only to find that 
they are ‘put in a position where countries make it impossible for them to be 
transparent’, and the fact that none of the other major oil MNCs followed the example 
of BP means that best practice was not effectively shared, and surely therefore, it did 
not provide a model for adoption elsewhere. Indeed, it did not provide the best practice 
to be followed by other companies (or themselves), which is disappointing because such 
an initiative could only work with collective action. Nevertheless, BP’s experience in 
Angola can be seen as major step forward because it led to the launching of the EITI, 
which BP continues to support, suggesting that the company does believe in this 
initiative as best practice that can be adopted worldwide. Indeed, BP highlights the 
example of Azerbaijan in their reporting to support this claim. However, the EITI does 
not ‘go anywhere near enough’, because it focuses upon the transparency of government 
revenues rather than government spending.  
Furthermore, oil MNCs in Angola can contribute to addressing social issues via 
PSAs, signature bonuses, and post-tax voluntary contributions. However, PSA 
agreements are non-transparent; and although signature bonuses were made public from 
2004, the use of the funds remain non-transparent because Sonangol is the decision-
maker about their use, just as they are for PSAs. In comparison, post-tax voluntary 
contributions are much more visible, although they are much smaller than PSAs and 
signature bonuses.  
If BP has learnt from its experience, then they would be able to reduce their 
liability of foreignness. However, when BP wanted to educate their managers about 
issues connected with development and sustainability, they habitually turned to a 
business school instead of a development institution. In addition, their asset managers 
are rotated so they cannot gain long-term experience of local content requirements in a 
specific host country. Therefore, BP managers are not in a position to reduce their 
liability of foreignness.  
Environmental issues are becoming increasingly important, not just 
internationally with the climate change agenda, but in the African setting. Doctor 
Gbadamosi provides an enlightening account of why environmental issues in Africa 
have become significantly important recently. Oil spillage and flaring gas hampers the 
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ability of local communities to sustain their livelihoods. Therefore, oil MNCs should 
address the related social consequences of environmental degradation, as it is these local 
environmental issues that are applicable to the African setting, not the climate change 
agenda that BP focuses upon. Chapter 5 showed that BP does have a history of 
embracing social issues, but addressing the social consequences of environmental 
degradation is perhaps a lesson that has not been learnt from the company’s history. 
This is important in order to continue to receive a social licence to operate. Especially 
concerning oil spillage, the Gulf of Mexico incident should cause concern for Angolans 
assuming that BP is using similar technologies for deepwater drilling and exploration. 
BP states that it is learning the lessons from the accident so that they become best 
practice. Nevertheless, oil spills are an everyday problem in Africa, using Nigeria as the 
example, and all Western oil firms are responsible, including BP. This is despite BP’s 
claim that they limit the impact of oil spillage on local environments. Nevertheless, 
Shell is considered to be the worst offender. Shell claims that most oil spillage is caused 
by sabotage and theft. However, evidence on the ground reveals that it is almost entirely 
due to operational spills.  
To the extent that CSR matters, it is used strategically by oil MNCs to secure a 
formal licence to operate.
154
 Indeed, Chevron strategically implemented their CSR 
principles to gain a competitive advantage and renew their stake in Angola’s most 
prized oil asset, Block 0. It is possible that they achieved this by making sure that they 
are part of a patrimonial network to ensure accessibility to Angola’s oil resources. Wiig 
and Kolstad (2010: 183) state that if the requirements of Angolan authorities are 
reported as a motivation for engaging in CSR, then this has severe implications in terms 
of the types of CSR activity MNCs would engage in. This is because instead of MNCs 
acting as a change agent by attempting to influence the Angolan institutional 
environment, MNCs would be adapting their CSR policies so that they are in tune with 
the requirements of the Angolan government. Therefore, they would be engaging in 
institutional adaptation. This suggests that MNCs would not engage in any activities 
that would improve the Angolan institutional environment. By engaging in strategic 
CSR to secure formal licences to operate, oil MNCs facilitate patronage problems which 
exacerbate the resource curse. Furthermore, CSR is also used strategically to receive a 
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social licence to operate because it is in the best interests of oil MNCs to gain the 
support of the local community. As the anonymous source from within the CORE 
Coalition states, BP has tried very hard to implement projects to win support from the 
local communities. However, Professor Child commented that using CSR strategically 
in this way is not necessarily a bad thing because it does not mean that oil firms are not 
going to implement their CSR principles, and therefore, society can benefit as a result. 
Nevertheless, no evidence appears to be available to suggest that using CSR 
strategically embraces addressing the social consequences of environmental 
degradation.  
To conclude, although BP does implement projects to win local support, their 
CSR is entirely about protecting the brand, suggesting that engaging in institutional co-
evolution to improve the institutional environment does not appear to be an important 
part of their CSR principles, as Wiig and Kolstad (2010) stated. Nevertheless, the 
example of BP attempting to promote transparency in Angola is a genuine attempt to 
improve the institutional environment. However, it did not provide a model of best 
practice, although it did lead to the launching of the EITI. The fact that BP continues to 
support the EITI suggests that they believe that this is a model of best practice, although 
this initiative is insufficient, and therefore, BP appears to have not learnt from this 
Angolan experience. BP is not in a position to learn from its experience when it comes 
to reducing their liability of foreignness, and it has not learnt from its experience that 
addressing the social consequences of environmental degradation is important to 
continue receiving a social licence to operate. Therefore, the viewpoint of the CORE 
Coalition anonymous source that BP has not learnt from its experience appears to be 
valid. If BP is indeed not learning from their experience, perhaps it is because they 
attempt to measure the impacts of their operations with SAM, and relying too heavily 
upon SAM means that BP is unable to indentify things that cannot be measured in a 
financial sense, unlike Anglo American who measure their business principles with a 
wide range of metrics.  
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Chapter 9: The influence of China and 
comparison with Western firms. 
“Some people say [that the Chinese] are in their honeymoon period now 
when ... we just want someone else for the competition ... not just the 
West” (Gbadamosi, G., personal interview, 30th September, 2010). 
  
“[China is] not a resource-rich country so therefore she’s competing 
with the West to make a bad job of Africa” (Hale, A., personal interview, 
22
nd
 November, 2010). 
 
“We will keep supporting local public welfare undertakings and 
contributing to the sustainable development of local economy and 
society” (Sinopec, 2011a: 75).  
 
 
9.1: Introduction. 
Doctor Hale states that: 
“what China is trying to do is to catch up with the West [and] they want  
to get back to the situation where ... they were the centre of the economic 
universe” (Hale, A., personal interview, 22nd November, 2010).  
 
Alden (2007: 8, 14) echoes this view by highlighting that this re-emergence of China 
means that the country’s energy security needs have increased dramatically in recent 
times, and nothing symbolises Africa’s increasing importance in China’s energy 
security needs than the fact that in 2006, Angola overtook Saudi Arabia as China’s 
largest supplier of oil. Angola now supplies 18% of China’s total oil imports, making 
her China’s top trading partner on the continent. Since natural resource extraction by 
any global corporation largely involves activity in developing countries, the impact of 
Chinese firms engaging in outward FDI in developing countries is of particular concern 
to Western observers because Chinese firms have a relatively short history of 
conducting sound corporate governance, if indeed, in some Western eyes, they conduct 
sound corporate governance at all.
155
 However, perceived weak corporate governance 
practices in China are at odds with the fact that Chinese businessmen are setting their 
sights high. They seek to establish global giants for the next generation. The Chinese 
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 For example, Malkiel et al (2005: 8) say that in China’s short market history, many an investors’ 
wealth has been lost by false accounting due to poor corporate governance, and Kato and Long (2006: 31) 
believe that a broad program of reform, including more comprehensive investor protection, is required to 
improve China’s poor corporate governance.   
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emerging market companies therefore want to learn more about international norms and 
standards. While they may not have the experience or in-house resources to adopt them, 
they have enormous appetite for absorbing the lessons of success in international 
markets. A growing number of Chinese firms have demonstrated a willingness and 
desire to improve corporate governance. (International Finance Corporation, 2005: 4). 
Nevertheless, the element of corporate governance that is CSR is problematic because it 
is generally a Western concept. As the CORE Coalition anonymous source states: 
“in terms of CSR I think that Western companies do have some 
advantages ... because CSR is ... a kind of Western brand and the kinds 
of things that CSR promotes and is interested in comes from a Western 
culture” (Anonymous, personal interview, 2nd November, 2010). 
 
This raises the question as to whether it represents a set of principles that the new 
entrants in the institutional regime, China, should also adopt. However, the Chinese face 
the same ethical dilemmas as a Western firm when they invest abroad. Professor Frynas 
takes issue with the CORE Coalition anonymous source, commenting that:  
“international firms always pay a lot more lip service to CSR and try to  
do something about it because they’re forced to. When you become  
international you are much more in the public eye, you’re much more  
open to criticism, ... so I’m sure Chinese managers are grappling with 
the same question as British or American ... managers, ... how to deal 
with those social and environmental challenges” (Frynas, J.G., personal 
interview, 20
th
 December, 2010). 
 
Indeed, we saw in Chapter 6 that both CNOOC and Sinopec have embraced global 
initiatives that consider CSR, such as the GRI, the Global Compact, as well as the 
concept of sustainable development,
156
 and CNOOC does provide an example of 
‘grappling with the same question’. CNOOC’s overseas CSR concepts involve 
supporting:  
“the wish of the host countries for development of education and medical 
causes, and improvement of infrastructure. The Company participates in 
activities related to education and culture, poverty alleviation, disaster 
relief, infrastructure construction and health care” (CNOOC, 2009b: 9). 
 
Consequently, this chapter will consider the new entrants in the institutional 
regime, China, by analysing the Western perceptions on Chinese involvement in Africa, 
whether China could be a development partner for Africa, and whether Chinese 
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investment would be preferred by Africans governments. We shall then move on to 
assess the implications of the fact that Chinese investment comes with ‘no conditions 
attached’, the role of the Chinese state, the implications of the complimentary 
investment by the Chinese state together with their building of infrastructure, the 
implications of the Chinese bringing their own labour, whether Western fears of the 
Chinese firms free riding on social and environmental issues is justified, their liability 
of foreignness, before considering the Western response to Chinese involvement. Prior 
to considering these issues, we will begin with a discussion of the Chinese in Africa 
generally, before examining the evidence in the context of having a particular focus 
upon Angola.  
9.2: The development of Sino-African relations. 
In the 1990s Segal (1992: 126) predicted that China, as a rising global power, would be 
more important to Africa than vice versa. He even prophesied that Africa would be the 
region of least importance to China’s foreign policy. However, one only has to look at 
current Sino-African relations to cast doubt on the validity of Segal’s prediction.  
Egypt became the first African nation to establish diplomatic relations with the 
People’s Republic of China in 1956, and since then Sino-African relations have gone 
through a fundamental shift. Prior to 1978, ideology heavily influenced China’s Africa 
policy as the country positioned itself on the front line in the struggle against 
colonialism and imperialism (Anshan, 2007: 69-70). Nevertheless, Cornelissen and 
Taylor (2000: 616) describe China’s aims in Africa at the time as promoting Maoism. 
China provided free aid as the basis to build bilateral relations by 1963-64, and during 
this time, China also supported African independence movements. In this period, China 
began building a number of landmark structures, such as stadiums, hospitals, and 
conference centres, in many African countries. 
These projects were intended to be symbols of independence and they embodied 
the spirit of decolonisation. At this time the primary objective toward Africa was 
exporting revolution, which deviated from China’s much vaunted principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of other countries, although this objective was 
abandoned by the end of the 1960s when China started to provide more free and 
unconditional aid to Africa. All of this laid the foundations for contemporary Sino-
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African relations, and by 1978, diplomatic relations had been established with 43 
African countries  
In 1982, the 12th National Assembly of the Communist Party of China officially 
formulated the shift in foreign policy from one that emphasised war and revolution to 
one that emphasised peace and development. The focus shifted to a spirit of developing 
together. The 12th National Assembly also formally established the principles of 
interstate political relationships based on independence, complete equality, mutual 
respect, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Relations based 
on these principles convinced many Africans of China’s sincerity in respecting African 
political choices and helping to promote development. Since then, China has attuned its 
economic assistance to Africa by attempting to help Africa help itself. Economic 
assistance began to include preferential and discounted loans; and the principles of 
equal treatment, a respect for sovereignty, non-interference, mutual benefit, and co-
development have endured. 
China shares the principle of non-interference with the African Union. This has 
had implications when one considers Zimbabwe. In 2005, when Robert Mugabe 
demolished numerous urban dwellings in Harare to crack down on illegal shantytowns, 
the UK and the USA called for action from the African Union. However, the African 
Union took the position that it was not appropriate to start interfering in the internal 
affairs of member-states and gave Mugabe its blessing to resist sanctions imposed by 
the West. Nevertheless, China’s principle of non-interference reflects China’s respect 
for the economic and political choices that African countries make. This position does 
not always give an advantage to China. For example, despite China’s aid commitments 
and support for Sudan; in 2003 when a Canadian oil firm decided to sell its interests in 
Sudan, an offer made by China was rejected in favour of an Indian firm, a decision that 
was respected and accepted by the Chinese without interfering (Anshan, 2007: 71-77). 
9.3: Summit diplomacy. 
What can be described as summit diplomacy (major meetings between Chinese and 
African heads of state) is utilised to reveal China’s core policy principles regarding 
Africa. Such meetings have been a key way to establish direct communication at the 
highest levels of government since the 1960s, and they set the tone of relations and 
bilateral policies (Anshan, 2007: 80). China certainly does have an advantage by 
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engaging in diplomacy since, as Jakobson and Zha (2006: 62) stress, the lack of a global 
policy for the oil trade provides ‘ample space for both exporting and importing 
countries to manoeuvre by mixing economics with politics’. The result has been the 
creation of mutual trust between the respective heads of state. Importantly however, 
summit diplomacy has attempted to instil confidence amongst African leaders regarding 
the transfer of China’s foreign policy principles. China’s foreign minister made visits to 
African nations in every year from 1991 to 2007, and since the turn of the century, two-
way visits have increased dramatically. In addition, the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC)
157
 has been established, which has ambitious plans for Sino-
African cooperation and provides a mechanism for routine meetings between heads of 
state (Anshan, 2007: 80).  
9.3.1: The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). 
In 2006, the Chinese government released a white paper regarding its relations with 
Africa called China’s African Policy. This elaborated a detailed plan for future relations 
with Africa including political cooperation (on international affairs and between 
political parties and political organisations), economic cooperation (resource 
exploration and financial dealings), and cooperation in the fields of education, science, 
culture, health and social work, together with peace and security. Whilst this white 
paper is a blueprint for future relations, the FOCAC is the vehicle to explore and 
implement effective methods to realise the goals of China’s African Policy (Wenping, 
2007: 36).   
Since its initiation at the Ministerial Conference in Beijing in 2000, the FOCAC 
has become the lynchpin of Sino-African relations. The Forum, held every three years 
since 2000, aims to foster ‘solidarity and cooperation based on equality, consultation, 
consensus, friendship, partnership and mutual benefit’. The Beijing Declaration 
emerged from this first Forum which contained three major goals. Firstly, China and 
Africa has the desire to promote mutual economic development by eliminating 
poverty.
158
 Secondly, China and Africa seek to nurture their international  
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 Indeed, according to Lucien (2011: 368), ‘China’s traditional investment packages have been modified 
to include important social and community outreach dimensions such as the initially US$9 billion, 
eventually revised to US$6 billion, resource against infrastructure agreement concluded with the DRC. In 
this agreement, 31 hospitals and two universities are to be built’. 
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FOCAC 1, held in Beijing in October 2000, was the first summit to 
institutionalise relations between China and Africa. The commitments made at 
FOCAC 1 include the following: 
 China will make available increased development aid to Africa, 
containing a specific focus on promoting African industry, utilising local 
materials, and local job creation. 
 The formation of the China-Africa Joint Business Council to work 
alongside the Chambers of Commerce in African countries. The remit of 
the Council will be to provide support for Chinese investment and 
promote economic partnerships. 
 China will assist Africa in promoting economic and social development 
by utilising the principle of South-South cooperation in supplying aid and 
loans. 
 Providing back-up for Chinese corporations to contribute to the 
construction of infrastructure and other development projects in Africa. 
 China would establish the African Human Resources Development Fund 
to train African personnel.          
FOCAC 11 was held in Addis Ababa in December 2003. The Addis Ababa 
Action Plan was the main outcome, which can be summarised as recommending 
cooperation in four keys areas: 
 Political affairs. 
 Multilateral cooperation. 
 Development. 
 The social realm. 
FOCAC 111 was convened back in Beijing in November 2006. One of the key 
outcomes was the declaration of the Beijing Summit. Chinese president Hu 
Jintao presented an eight-point plan that would provide a framework for China’s 
assistance to Africa in this summit, and these were: 
Box 9.1: The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). 
  
239 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. China’s assistance to Africa would double by 2009. 
2. China would provide US$3 billion worth of preferential loans 
3. China would set up the China-Africa Development Fund providing a 
US$5 billion incentive for Chinese firms to invest in Africa. 
4. China would build a conference centre for the African Union. 
5. China would cancel debt that entailed all interest-free loans that matured 
at the end of 2005. 
6. China would open up their market to Africa by increasing zero-tariff 
treatments. 
7. China would establish up to five special economic zones in Africa. 
8. Up to 2009, China would ‘train 15,000 African professionals, send 100 
senior agricultural experts to Africa, set up 10 special agricultural 
technology demonstration centres in Africa, build 30 hospitals in Africa, 
... dispatch 300 youth volunteers to Africa, build 100 rural schools in 
Africa, and increase the number of Chinese government scholarships to 
African students’. 
Sharm el-Sheikh held FOCAC 1V in November 2009, where eight new measures 
announced by Premier Wen Jiabao succeeded the ones outlined at FOCAC 111, 
which had, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce, been ‘basically 
implemented’. The eight new measures were: 
1. Establishing a China-Africa partnership to address climate change. 
2. A Chinese promise to enhance cooperation in science and technology 
with Africa. 
3. A Chinese promise to help Africa build up financing capacity. 
4. A further Chinese promise to open up its market to Africa. 
5. A further Chinese promise to increase assistance in the field of 
agriculture. 
6. A deepening cooperation in the field of health. 
7. Enhancing cooperation in human capital, with a Chinese commitment to  
Box 9.1 continued. 
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competitiveness so that they can both raise their status globally. Thirdly, China and 
Africa aim to develop cooperation to strengthen their bargaining stance with the West in 
order to create ‘a new, just, and equitable international economic and political order’ 
(Enuka, 2011: 222). However, Tull (2008: 6) reports that the European Commission has 
observed that ‘the FOCAC is simply a Forum to announce the aggregate results and will 
not establish a new structure of cooperation in Africa. It does not provide an impulse for 
multilateral cooperation or better African coordination. Indeed, the process lacks proper 
monitoring and accountability’.  
9.4: Chinese activity in Africa generally: the importance of oil. 
The Chinese have reopened Zambia’s Chambezi copper mines and are exploring 
supposedly exhausted oil reserves in Gabon. Of the thousands of projects under way, 
500 are being exclusively directed by the China Road and Bridge Corporation, a SOE, 
helping to place 43 Chinese companies amongst the 225 global leaders in Africa. China 
is involved in telecommunications in Ethiopia (Servant, 2005: 58) where they have also 
been building roads (Zafar, 2007: 105); in the DRC they have done work for Gecamine, 
‘build 50 schools and train 1,500 school principles and teachers’ from 
Africa; together with China increasing its ‘government scholarships to 
Africa to 5,500’ and China training ‘20,000 African professionals over the 
next three years’. 
8. China and Africa will expand people-to-people and cultural exchanges. 
FOCAC 1V concluded with the Sharm el-Sheikh Declaration which, amongst 
other things, agreed to increase the number of high-level visits between China 
and Africa; and the Sharm el-Sheikh Action Plan which included a Chinese 
pledge to build major infrastructure projects as a way of promoting Africa’s 
development. China pledged US$10 billion worth of preferential loans to Africa 
up to and including 2012, which would be used in the main to support 
infrastructure and social development projects (Taylor, 2011: 35-43, 51-57, 70-
73, 81-89).      
Box 9.1 continued. 
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the state-owned mining company; in Kenya they have repaired the road linking 
Mombasa and Nairobi (Servant, 2005: 58), worked with the electricity sector, and they 
have been servicing mobile phone networks; and together with also servicing mobile 
phone networks in Nigeria (Zafar, 2007: 105), China have even launched Nigeria’s first 
space satellite (Servant, 2005: 58). Throughout Africa, Chinese companies are 
constructing vital infrastructure, including dams, ports, and roads; and helping to 
renovate government offices and other buildings (Zafar, 2007: 105). 
However, Enuka (2011: 221) states that of all the natural resources that captures 
China’s interest in Africa; which are for example aluminium, bauxite, copper, 
diamonds, iron ore, manganese, oil, and uranium;
159
 oil is the most important. Oil 
makes up 62% of the total African natural resource exports to China, with Angola 
supplying 47% of the total, followed by Sudan supplying 25%, the DRC 13%, 
Equatorial Guinea 9%, and Nigeria 3%. For example, the China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) has invested in oil assets in Sudan and Chad. CNOOC has 
acquired energy interests in Morocco, Nigeria and Gabon. China already procures over 
a quarter of its oil and natural gas from Africa, with Sudan and Angola being the 
leading suppliers (Alden and Davies, 2006: 87-88). Boxes 9.2-9.5 provide background 
to Chinese oil sector activity in Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria, and Sudan.   
9.5: Western perceptions on Chinese involvement in Africa. 
Tull (2008: 5-6) identifies four major areas for concern coming from the West 
concerning China’s involvement in Africa. Firstly, in cases where Western budget 
support has lead to a situation where this is used to finance the operations by Chinese 
firms, resentment has been the result amongst the Western donors. Secondly, China 
itself is becoming a major donor to Africa, and when one considers that the West still 
provides China with development aid, then it must be questioned whether it is still 
appropriate to continue giving China development assistance. Thirdly, in development 
circles it is considered frustrating that China is giving loans to African countries at the 
precise time that Western donors have granted African countries debt relief. Finally, the 
biggest problem concerning China’s involvement in Africa, in Western eyes, is the lack  
                                                 
159
 To highlight China’s non-oil interests in Africa, China imports copper from the DRC and Zambia; 
cotton from Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, and Mali,; diamonds from South Africa; 
ferrochrome and platinum from Zimbabwe; timber from Cameroon, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
and Liberia; and tin and tantalum from the DRC (Enuka, 2011: 221).  
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Gabon is a relatively small producer of oil, but it represents more than half of the 
state’s revenues. In 2004, on the occasion of Hu Jintao’s African tour, Total 
Gabon signed a contract with Unipec, a subsidiary of Sinopec, under which 
Gabonese crude oil will be sold to China for the first time. Sinopec and the 
Gabonese energy ministry also signed a protocol at that time covering exploration 
and production, and an accord that is said to involve staff training and technology 
transfer. Sinopec subsequently received three oil blocks to develop. In addition, 
CNPC is said to have spent US$350 million on the purchase of several refining 
businesses in Gabon. Furthermore, China is constructing a deepwater port at 
Santa Clara, north of the capital Libreville, and two railway lines that will be 
necessary for the joint production of iron ore in the northeast of the country. 
 Nevertheless, Sinopec is involved in a highly controversial oil 
prospecting project in the Loango National Park in southern Gabon, where it is 
said that Sinopec is ‘using methods that respect neither the law nor the 
environment’, causing much local discontent (Meidan, 2006: 79-81). In October 
2006, Gabon ordered Sinopec to cease oil exploration in Loango National Park 
after an American conservation group accused Sinopec of destroying the forest 
environment and operating without an approved environmental impact study (Gill 
and Reilly, 2007: 46).  
Box 9.2: Chinese Oil Sector Activity in Gabon. 
 
On the last leg of President Hu Jintao’s visit to Africa in 2006, Kenya became a 
Chinese target. An offshore oil exploration deal was signed that allows CNOOC 
to explore in six blocks in the north and south of the country. In addition to the 
oil agreement, several other cooperation deals were signed. China gave Kenya 
grants of approximately US$8.7 million, including an economic and technical 
cooperation package, donations of rice for drought victims, and anti-malaria 
drugs (Meidan, 2006: 81). 
Box 9.3: Chinese Oil Sector Activity in Kenya. 
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In December 2004, Sinopec and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC) signed an agreement to develop the Niger Delta’s Oil Mining Leases 
OMLs 64 and 66. In addition, Sinopec has a contract with the Nigerian Petroleum 
Development Company and with Eni to develop the Okono and Okpoho oil 
fields, whilst CNOOC and NNPC signed a US$800 million contract guaranteeing 
oil exports to China in July 2005. In April 2006, Nigeria built on such 
developments to offer CNPC four exploration licenses in exchange for US$4 
billion worth of infrastructure developments (Taylor, 2009: 47-48); and 
furthermore, CNOOC, in January 2006,  agreed to pay US$2.3 billion for a stake 
in a Nigerian oil and gas field. The CNPC deal involves China buying a 
controlling stake in Nigeria’s Kaduna oil refinery and building a railway and 
power stations (Meidan, 2006: 81), whilst the CNOOC deal was complemented 
by the Chinese committed themselves to building a railway connecting Lagos 
with Abuja, the capital; and to install telephone services in rural areas using 
Chinese government loans of more than US$200 million (Zafar, 2007: 120). This 
CNOOC deal eclipsed the much reported US$1.25 billion (rising to US$1.75 
billion by assuming US$500 million worth of debt) purchase by Chinese 
computer manufacturer Lenovo of IBM’s personal computer business in 
December 2004, which was then China’s largest foreign acquisition (Ling, 2006: 
363-364), and was despite that fact that industry analysts believed that the 
Chinese had over-estimated the potential returns. Undoubtedly, an additional 
promise to provide US$7 billion in investments, together with the rehabilitation 
of two power stations and a willingness to sell arms for use in the on-going 
conflict in the Niger Delta, secured this deal (Alden and Davies, 2006: 91-92). 
Similar to Angola, Nigeria is governed by a small political elite that has 
grown wealthy at the expense of the rest of the population. This has implications 
for Nigeria’s development, since the political elite, according to Lewis (2004: 
100), is ‘impelled by short time horizons [which gives] rise to strategies focused  
Box 9.4: Chinese Oil Sector Activity in Nigeria. 
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on the expedient redistribution of resources rather than the systematic 
mobilisation of resources for production and growth’. This has led to the 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) conducting attacks 
against the national government for many years because they believe that oil 
producing areas do not receive a fair share of oil revenues. MEND has warned 
the Chinese and other potential foreign firms against investing in the Niger Delta. 
Indeed, over a dozen Chinese nationals from a variety of Chinese firms have been 
kidnapped recently, but later released (Enuka, 2011: 226-227). 
Box 9.4 continued. 
 
In Sudan, 13 of the 15 largest foreign firms engaged in operations are Chinese, 
and these are primarily in the oil sector. CNPC owns a 40% stake in the Greater 
Nile Petroleum Operating Company, whilst Sinopec is constructing a 1,500-ki-
lometer pipeline to Port Sudan on the Red Sea, where China’s Petroleum 
Engineering Construction Group is building a tanker terminal (Gill and Reilly, 
2007: 40).   
China has aided infrastructure development such as schools, hospitals, 
and water projects in Sudan; all of which tackles the root cause of conflict, 
poverty, which China’s aid targets (Anshan, 2007: 77). In addition, China 
launched an ongoing programme in 1996 to construct a modern export industry 
that would serve not only as a source of oil but also as an opportunity to 
showcase Sinopec’s growing expertise to the world.  
However, Chinese military hardware and diplomatic support for the 
policies of Sudanese government in Darfur and its ongoing conflict in the South 
have played a significant role in maintaining this relationship (Alden and Davies, 
2006: 92). 
Box 9.5: Chinese Oil Sector Activity in Sudan. 
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of proper monitoring and accountability in Sino-African relations and business dealings. 
For example, the growth of Chinese arms sales is an important aspect of Chinese 
relations and business dealings with some African governments, particularly with 
governments that are banned from procuring arms from traditional Western sources.
160
 
In 2003, China sold arms worth US$1.3billion to Africa, over twice as much as the UK 
(Alden, 2007: 25). The CORE Coalition anonymous source states that:  
“I think that there's generally a lot of scepticism about foreign direct  
investment, particularly in the extractive sector in terms of the impact on  
the environment and people, and [in addition,] the resource curse; the  
Chinese companies certainly aren’t going to be exempt from all of that. 
[Nevertheless,] I am conscious of the fact that there is a lot of anti-
Chinese feeling going on which drives this debate ... and I think that 
there is a quite patronising colonial attitude by a lot of Western ...  
people. [However,] in terms of ... [Westerners] voicing concerns about 
the lack of Chinese standards ... I take a lot of that with a pinch of salt” 
(Anonymous, personal interview, 2
nd
 November, 2010). 
 
The Western media has certainly voiced concerns considering Chinese involvement in 
Africa.
161
 Professor Child commented upon the Western media’s negative perceptions 
on what China is doing in Africa by stating that:  
“There’s always a tendency to criticise a powerful nation ... particularly 
if that nation starts to flex its muscles and is seen to be throwing its 
weight around” (Child, J., personal interview, 25th November, 2010). 
 
Professor Child then confirmed the view of the CORE Coalition anonymous source that 
one should take Western concerns about the lack of Chinese standards ‘with a pinch of 
salt’ by saying that: 
 “They’re just as concerned about their future as any other nation. I 
think criticism of China’s ascendancy isn’t entirely fair” (Child, J., 
personal interview, 25
th
 November, 2010). 
 
These views that the criticism of China is unfair was echoed by Jonathan Samuel, 
regarding them to be hypocritical when one considers, as he states:  
“it is important to note that some Chinese firms do have high standards,  
                                                 
160
 Such governments include ‘pariah’ states like Sudan and Zimbabwe (Alden, 2007: 25). 
 
161
 For examples see: ‘Chinese thrown out of Africa’, available at http://www.asianews.it/index.php?1 
=en&art=11266; 
Trimberg, C. (2006) ‘In Africa, China’s trade brings growth, unease’, Washington Post, 13 June; 
Johnson, R.W. (2006) ‘China’s empire-builders sweep up African riches’, Sunday Times, 16 July.   
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and that many Western ... ones don't. Indeed, I could name highly 
corrupt UK-based ... companies” (Samuel, J., email interview, 26th 
February, 2011). 
 
9.6: China as a development partner.  
At the heart of China’s rapid entry into Africa is a deliberate policy of ‘no  
strings attached’ (see below), particularly in the arena of governance (Alden, 2007:  
8). The CORE Coalition anonymous source commented upon Western firms being 
affected by Chinese investment by stating that:  
“I think developing countries have got governments that generally have  
got a strong desire for foreign direct investment. It’s obvious that they  
want to maximise that investment with minimal risk and with minimal  
conditions attached” (Anonymous, personal interview, 2nd November, 
2010).  
 
This represents a direct challenge to the traditional Western pre-eminence in African  
economies because Western entrance into Africa often had ‘conditions attached’ in the  
arena of governance, and Western firms viewed themselves as conductors of sound  
corporate governance in their activities there, something that Chinese firms may not do.  
However, some observers consider that the West had never promoted sound governance  
in Africa, and engaged in a resource grab.
162
 Nevertheless, other observers believe that a  
resource grab in Africa is just what China is now engaging in, adding to the West’s  
resource grab. A further interpretation regards China’s new engagement in Africa as a  
new coloniser.
163
 Although Western political and military control over Africa ended  
when African states gained independence, some believe that the West is now engaging  
in ‘neo-colonialism’, whereby the West maintains control over Africa economically.  
China’s entrance into Africa represents a challenge to the West as ‘neo-coloniser’,  
resulting in competition over who can control the continent economically. However,  
another interpretation regards China as a development partner
164
 with Africa (Alden,  
2007: 5-6, 9). Whichever interpretation is accurate, it is clear that China’s involvement  
                                                 
162
 A ‘resource grab’ involves taking no account of local needs, whether developmental, environmental, 
or social (Alden, 2007: 5-6).  
 
163
 China as ‘new coloniser’ involves a long-term strategy which aims to displace the traditional 
coloniser, the West. (Alden, 2007: 6).  
 
164
 As ‘development partner’, China’s entrance into Africa is part of a long-term commitment which aims 
to transfer China’s development experience to Africa as part of a desire to build south-south partnerships. 
(Alden, 2007: 5). 
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in Africa is a challenge to the West’s pre-eminence on the continent. Commenting upon 
whether China could be seen as a development partner or neo-colonialist, Doctor Hale 
believes that: 
“it depends who [you talk to] and which way you look it. It’s certainly  
no worse than the model that they’ve had before. [Nevertheless,] I think 
what the Chinese are after is resources, ... that’s the bottom-line. I think 
they’re very canny in doing that” (Hale, A., personal interview, 22nd 
November, 2010). 
 
Therefore, it is possible to speculate that China is engaged in a resource grab in Africa.  
Indeed, commenting upon whether China could be seen as a development partner,  
Doctor Gbadamosi stresses that:  
 “I think primarily, for now ... it’s a lot more important for the  
Chinese Government to get ... their two feet on the ground, ... to feel that 
they really have captured that particular market, [and then] maybe 
issues of ... development and the Angolan people will begin to come up 
with a second segment of the agenda. [However,] there are a number of 
... Africans who are not very happy with the   existing ... status quo. So 
we are happily clamouring for a change. So anything that will provide an 
alternative [should be] tested” (Gbadamosi, G., personal interview, 30th 
September, 2010). 
 
Therefore, whilst Doctor  Hale believes that the Chinese are only after resources and 
‘that’s the bottom-line’, Doctor Gbadamosi believes that China may only be engaging in 
a resource grab for now, and as the new entrants, Africans are more than happy to 
experiment with Chinese involvement to see whether it is preferable to Western 
investment. Subsequently, Doctor Gbadamosi believes that the initial resource grab may 
pave the way for China becoming more of a development partner once they are 
established. Consequently, which viewpoint is believable? When one considers the 
Chinese ruling party’s political values coming from their institutional environment, 
which is to achieve the principle of a harmonious society, and it implements this in its 
domestic and foreign policies (Zhang and Li, 2010: 204), then the view of Doctor 
Gbadamosi is applicable. Nevertheless, Doctor Hale does state that what China has: 
“got going for them is they can cast themselves as a developing nation”  
(Hale, A., personal interview, 22
nd
 November, 2010).  
 
Therefore, does this mean that Western firms have the incentive to be more proactive as  
developmental agent now that China, another developing country, is involved in Africa?  
Concerning Anglo American’s attempts to act as a developmental agent, Jonathan  
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Samuel states that:  
“it is certainly true that we are trying to be a more proactive 
development partner for host communities, although generally via 
‘softer’ measures such as education, enterprise development and 
community-based projects rather than large-scale infrastructure. 
However, this isn't in response to Chinese competition. Rather, it is in 
response to a greater desire for these things from our host governments 
and communities” (Samuel, J., email interview, 26th February, 2011). 
 
Consequently, although the Chinese engage in large-scale infrastructure development  
(see below), Western firms may not act as a developmental agent in response to  
Chinese competition, but they are acting after engaging with host country institutions  
and local communities at the macro-level. 
9.7: Africans preferring Chinese investment. 
If Western criticism of China’s involvement in Africa is not entirely fair, as seen above,  
then what are the perceptions of the Africans themselves? Professor Child commented 
on Chinese national champion SOEs going abroad, and stated that:  
“A lot of the ground is laid government to government” (Child, J., 
personal interview, 25
th
 November, 2010).  
 
Therefore, this involves interaction between host country governments and the Chinese 
state at the institutional environment level. Professor Child further commented upon 
China dealing with the Angolan government by stating that:  
“It gives them a short term advantage [and] some people say there are  
signs that ... Africa is becoming ... more democratic, more open, in  
which case this Chinese approach ... will possibly not be so consistent 
with the local situation” (Child, J., personal interview, 25th November, 
2010). 
 
Therefore, Professor Child feels that the Chinese way of dealing government to 
government is preferable to African governments for now. China does put a lot of 
importance into good relations with African political elites (Rebol, 2010: 179), and 
indeed, Rampa and Bilal (2011: 33) confirm that China‘s overall package of public 
assistance and business agreements that are facilitated by government to government 
relations can be seen as a competitive disadvantage for Western companies. Whilst it is 
true that many African governments prefer Chinese investments that come without 
requirements for  governance reform (Rebol, 2010: 159), Urban et al (2011: 17) feel 
that this approach does not limit Chinese engagement with increasingly more 
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democratic countries in Africa. However, one has to agree with the viewpoint of 
Professor Child since, as Rebol (2010: 164) state, opinions of the people of Africa 
towards China might be developing more on a national level (through the media and 
political campaigns, for example) and depend more on how links with China affect the 
country as a whole, rather than different parts of a society. This is because ethnicity, 
educational background, rural/urban distribution, or income, are all less significant than 
the one single variable of country of origin. As Rebol states, Ethiopian, Kenyan, and 
Sudanese people are mostly positive towards China with relatively little variation of this 
viewpoint throughout society; whilst the people of Botswana and Zambia have the most 
negative views
165
 (with Egyptians, Ghanaians, Nigerians, and South Africans in the 
middle). This is interesting, since Botswana is a country that has built significant 
institutional capacity and is more open than other African societies, and therefore, 
Professor Child may be correct if other countries in Africa develop in the same way as 
Botswana has.  
A major feature of the Chinese way of doing business is the guanxi culture
166
  
within which gifts are exchanged. Doctor Gbadamosi comments upon the issuing of 
gifts, to get support on the ground, by stating:  
“Culturally gifts are not indecent, they are not corruption in much of  
Africa ... and you don’t turn it down because ... you think you are being 
bribed” (Gbadamosi, G., personal interview, 30th September, 2010). 
  
Egbue (2006: 86) confirms this, by saying that gift giving is a valued aspect of African 
tradition. Gift giving serves as an informal symbol of expected gratitude for 
benevolence received; and can take the form of money, clothes, farm produce, and 
animals, for example. Gift giving, according to Egbue, also serves traditionally as a 
means for obtaining support in Africa. This may be for a planned business venture, and 
                                                 
165 The negative perception amongst Zambians is due to a highly publicised workplace accident. As Gill 
and Reilly (2007: 46) explain, ‘one of the most visible cases of a negative backlash against Chinese busi-
nesses was in Zambia, where on April 20, 2006, an explosion at a Chinese-owned copper mine killed 51 
Zambian workers. Although Chinese firms had invested more than US$300 million in Zambia and 
employed more than 10,000 Zambians, a presidential candidate for the October 2006 elections, Michael 
Sata, made an anti-China message the centrepiece of his campaign. The Chinese ambassador initially 
threatened to sever relations with Zambia if Sata won, but Beijing later distanced itself from the 
ambassador’s remarks, and Sata lost the election’. 
 
166
 Guanxi, as part of networking in business circles, involves a series of activities that are largely pre-
planned and carried out between two or more parties. Such activities can include gift-giving (Fan, 2002: 
371). 
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in such cases, receivers are expected to reciprocate by not only giving a similar gift 
back, but also by providing some form of favour. 
Commenting upon the Chinese culture of giving gifts as part of the guanxi 
culture, in the context of Chinese investment being looked upon as being very welcome, 
Doctor Gbadamosi comments: 
“Absolutely, ...  you’ve just had an oil block in an area. There’s a 
community living around there and you’ve gone to visit the head of the 
community, ... ideally you take a little gift [and] in return you always 
will get gift back. [However,] what has changed ... is that those gifts 
used to be symbolic gifts, ... but now it’s all about opening a Swiss 
account ... which is quite different. It’s now about opening an account 
in some island somewhere where this money’s a very big amount, ... so 
even Africans recognise clearly that this is no longer a gift, this is a 
corrupt practice” (Gbadamosi, G., personal interview, 30th September, 
2010). 
 
Therefore, exchanging gifts is a way that the Chinese can get support from local  
communities. However, the Chinese are giving large amounts of money to various 
parties. Arbab (2007: 51) confirms this by saying that in Africa, ‘international observers 
fear that the Chinese way of doing business – paying bribes and attaching no conditions 
–  undermines local efforts to increase transparency and good governance’. Indeed, 
Chileshe (2010: 11) states that ‘what is alarming is that the Transparency International’s 
Bribe Payers Index
167
 rates Chinese businesses as some of the most willing to give 
bribes’. For example, Congolese workers and civil society representatives have 
expressed concerns over the habit of Chinese company representatives to pay bribes to 
‘get out of situations’ (Jansson, 2010: 3). Therefore, the locals can recognise that this is 
no longer ethical which could mean that dealing with the Chinese is not well received 
by all parties. Nevertheless, as Doctor Gbadamosi also comments:  
“in a community where [operations have been conducted by] Shell, ... 
Chevron-Texaco, ... [and] BP for a very, very long time, ... you’ll find 
that even though the community has a population of about 150,000 
people, ... they’ve watched and waited and hoped that this oil company 
will do something to help their school or ... hospital, and nothing has 
happened. ... The Chinese ... come in to say, ‘we can do that’, before they 
even start business, what do you expect from the community? They’re not 
                                                 
167
 Transparency International’s Bribe Payers Index is a ranking of 30 of the leading exporting countries 
according to the propensity of firms to bribe when operating abroad. It is based on the responses of 
11,232 business executives from companies in 125 countries (Chileshe, 2010: 13-14). 
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going to turn that down” (Gbadamosi, G., personal interview, 30th 
September, 2010).  
 
Consequently, if the Chinese are promising to make local content improvements (socio-
economic needs at the macro-level), then Chinese investment would be well received in 
the local communities. 
9.8: Chinese investment: ‘no conditions attached’. 
Professor Frynas commented upon African host governments possibly preferring 
Chinese investment by saying that: 
 “Chinese [investment does] not come with the baggage of the West  
[because] the Chinese [come with] no strings attached. [In addition,]  
... as part of a deal you may have roads built or other infrastructure 
improved and ... you will find [the African governments] very 
sympathetic ... since there’s a great need for these things in many 
countries, ... [and] sometimes you have loans to [African] governments 
as part of those deals [without] the necessity to comply with certain 
rules, ... not just ones that foreign governments may have or companies 
may have, but from the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank, ... so ... it’s more than natural for any government to prefer a 
Chinese competitor ... because of all of these advantages” (Frynas, J.G., 
personal interview, 20
th
 December, 2010).  
 
Therefore, Chinese investment may be preferred by African governments because it  
comes with ‘no conditions attached’ concerning governance and transparency, which 
the West insists upon. In addition, one sees complimentary investment from the Chinese 
government, and African countries get infrastructure improvements as part of any deal. 
Professor Child confirms that Chinese investment may be preferred by African 
governments because, as he states: 
“I think the Chinese would say their principle is ‘no conditions 
attached’. So they’re not going to ask too many questions and worry too 
much about people’s practices. That I think in the eyes of local 
politicians would obviously give them a considerable advantage. ... I 
suspect the Chinese are clever enough to adapt to the local system and 
they may well prefer to deal with people who are in a system that is not 
so open, where not so many questions are asked even by Africans” 
(Child, J., personal interview, 25
th
 November, 2010). 
  
 Therefore, the Chinese oil SOE’s must be considered to be firms that engage in  
institutional adaptation, where they adjust their own policies to better fit the  
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environment, and they certainly do not promote elements of institutional development 
through the process of co-evolution. Attention will now turn to considering the role of 
the Chinese state in their support of the Chinese oil SOEs.  
9.9: The role of the Chinese state: complimentary investment.    
Concerning state patronage from the Chinese institutional environment for their 
‘national champions’, Professor Child states that: 
“It [state patronage] is very important and there’s still a lot of  
guidance regarding their [the Chinese] strategic priorities coming from  
the state” (Child, J., personal interview, 25th November, 2010). 
 
This is supported by the evidence presented in Chapter 6, where it was seen that state 
patronage was extremely important in the earlier adoption of the corporate form, and 
this has clearly influenced practice today. Doctor Hale provides further reflection that 
the Chinese state continues to play a major role, by stating that:  
 “It’s the mix of state and market with the Chinese. It certainly wants 
progress, but modernisation does not equate with Westernisation. 
Modernisation means, I guess, a brand of capitalism, but it will be a 
Chinese brand of capitalism” (Hale, A., personal interview, 22nd 
November, 2010). 
 
If this Chinese brand of capitalism involves the significant influence of the state, then  
one must consider how this has evolved. According to Doctor Hale: 
“The planned economy failed in China, just as it failed in the USSR. ... 
What has been introduced since 1979, ... it’s much more pragmatic. 
[Nevertheless, one] quote that [Deng Xiaoping was] famous for was how 
to cross a river. ‘One might as well cross the river feeling one’s way with 
one’s feet’. In other words, you do it gradually and you do it very 
clinically, and that’s what’s happened since 1979. Whereas you had a 
shock therapy approach in Europe when the Communist Parties went, 
what you have in China is a gradualism, and it’s worked in the sense that 
it’s opened up the economy, it’s allowed market forces in, but it’s all 
under the control of the government” (Hale, A., personal interview, 22nd 
November, 2010). 
 
Therefore, how has this gradualism under government control manifested itself in terms  
of corporate governance? As Doctor Hale states: 
“The government still has a large amount of control within the economy. 
So, in my understanding anyway, what you see in a Chinese firm [is] ... 
the government speculates an active role by holding onto shares” (Hale, 
A., personal interview, 22
nd
 November, 2010).  
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Therefore, for the large SOEs, the Chinese government continues to be the major  
shareholder. Professor Child commented on Chen (2005) writing that China’s corporate 
governance model was Anglo-Saxon in principle, but in reality it’s a mixture of both the 
Anglo-Saxon and German Japanese model and upon the emergence of organisational 
hybrids,
168
 by saying: 
“That wouldn’t surprise me. [Nevertheless,] corporate governance, if 
you take the traditional and I think the rather narrow view [of the 
principal-agent problem], ... I think that mechanism is very much in 
place in China because the principal there is the state. The state if 
anything is increasing its governance powers, ... so I think the one thing 
the Chinese authorities are most concerned about is exerting control. 
From that point of view their governance system is actually fairly 
effective” (Child, J., personal interview, 25th November, 2010). 
 
Therefore, the Chinese state maintaining control produces an effective corporate  
governance system because the state acts as the principal. Doctor Hale,  
commenting upon this notion of what could be called politicised capitalism, stated that:  
“just like the Japanese developed their own institutions within the firm  
and external to the firm, I guess you might get a model developed in  
China which is similar to that. It won’t be exactly the same, but it would  
certainly be closer to what I would call state-led capitalism” (Hale, A., 
personal interview, 22
nd
 November, 2010). 
  
Therefore, whether it is termed ‘politicised capitalism’ or ‘state-led capitalism’, and  
commenting on this, Professor Child confirmed that:  
“Some people call it state capitalism, yes” (Child, J., personal interview,  
25
th
 November, 2010), 
 
the Chinese national champion oil firms are entering the market whilst enjoying  
preferential treatment from the Chinese state. Furthermore, the Chinese state makes 
complimentary investment in the host countries where their ‘national champions’ are 
engaging in operations, embracing co-evolutionary government to government 
interaction, as will now be outlined.  
9.9.1: The nature of the complimentary investment. 
Professor Frynas states that: 
“Chinese firms could ... be accepted [in Africa] ... because [they 
provide] other incentives”.  
 
                                                 
168
 See Chapter 6.  
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As Professor Frynas continues, these other incentives, including institutional 
environment level intergovernmental interaction, such as soft loans, means that: 
“Chinese firms have a major contractual advantage [in comparison with 
Western firms], this is very, very clear” (Frynas, J.G., personal interview, 
20
th
 December, 2010). 
 
This major advantage that Chinese firms have in receiving formal licences to operate  
involves the complimentary investment that the Chinese government offers, and the 
literature provides plenty of evidence to support this, as will now be outlined.  
Whilst it is true that Angola has not signed up to the EITI, initially the country  
did consider it. In fact, representatives from the Angolan government and Sonangol  
attended the 2003 EITI launch conference; and in November 2004 the Angolan deputy  
prime minister, Dr. Aguinaldo Jaime, expressed a desire for Angola to join. The reason  
for this expressed desire to join was to finalise a loan from the IMF, which included  
conditions concerning governance and transparency. However, by early 2006 Angola’s  
desire to sign up to the EITI had faded. This was because, as the Angolan government  
subsequently announced, there was no longer an interest in borrowing from the IMF as  
Angola could now receive huge loans from other sources. Indeed, the fact that in March  
2004, Angola had signed a US$2 billion credit line with Ex-Im Bank of China
169
  
(Shankleman, 2006: 104-105) is perhaps of no coincidence. The complimentary  
investment, in the form of loans, by the Chinese state to seal oil concessions is  
obviously another source of borrowing that means that Angola does not have to rely on  
the IMF. Therefore, it is clear that complimentary investment by the Chinese state  
saves Angola from depending upon Western sourced loans that have conditions attached 
concerning governance and transparency.  
Angola provides a clear example of the way that China seals licences to operate 
in Africa with the complimentary investment made by the Chinese government. For 
example, the Indian state-owned oil company Oil and Natural Gas Corporation believed 
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 The most important Chinese bank in its foreign policy towards Africa is the Export-Import Bank (Ex-
Im Bank). The Ex-Im Bank is a state-owned entity that the Chinese government utilises to dispense 
official economic aid around the world, including to Africa. The Ex-Im Bank provides low-rate loans for 
aid programs and encourages Chinese firms to invest in Africa through export credits, loans for overseas 
projects, and international guarantees. 80% of all Ex-Im Bank loans to Africa goes to five countries: 
Angola, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sudan, and Zimbabwe (Gill and Reilly, 2007: 43). 
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that it had secured a joint-venture with Royal Dutch Shell for Angola’s Block 18. 
However, Sonangol handed the concession to Sinopec in a last minute decision. The  
critical factor in Sinopec sealing the deal was a US$2 billion loan to Angola made by  
the Chinese government. This loan freed Angola from its reliance upon funding from  
the IMF, and the conditions attached that accompany loans from the IMF. In addition,  
China has funded, provided expertise, and its own labour force to reconstruct Angola’s  
destroyed infrastructure, particularly the transportation infrastructure. For example, the  
Chinese government gave US$300,000 towards refurbishing the Benguela railway,  
US$2 billion to reconstruct the railway between the port of Namibe and Menogue,  
US$450 million towards Luanda’s new airport, as well as US$3 billion to build an oil  
refinery in Lobito (Alden, 2007: 44). Commenting upon whether complementary  
investment is an advantage for the Chinese firms, Doctor Hale confirmed that: 
“Of course it is, because it’s an alternative model to a failed Anglo- 
Saxon model which in Africa is seen as imperialism” (Hale, A., personal  
interview, 22
nd
 November, 2010). 
 
If Doctor Hale is correct, then one could argue that the complimentary investment by 
the Chinese government is a competitive advantage that Chinese oil firms have, 
representing a specific O advantage that the Chinese ‘national champion’ SOEs enjoy. 
China has been securing agreements with African governments by engaging in the 
construction of prestige projects such as, for example, funding the construction of a new 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Angola. Such a form of symbolic diplomacy is appealing 
to African elites because they embrace the opportunity to replace colonial public 
buildings. In addition, such construction represents a visual demonstration of China’s 
intent (Alden, 2007: 23). However, as Ofodile (2009: 96) asks, ‘does development mean 
prestige projects such as fancy houses for dictators, conference centres for corrupt 
leaders and sports stadiums for starving masses or does it mean people-centred, pro-
poor, sustainable development?’ Ofodile feels that China should ‘support measures and 
institutions that are more likely to be supportive of development’. Therefore, China’s 
complimentary investment may be appealing to African elites, but it is not necessarily 
supportive of development. Indeed, according to Zafar (2007: 121), China has not  
‘linked its loans to these [African] countries to social expenditure’.  
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9.9.2: Building infrastructure. 
The other major contractual advantage that the Chinese have is infrastructure 
development, a commitment made at FOCAC 1
170
 to address a vital macro-level socio-
economic need. According to Alden and Davies (2006: 90), with energy security at the 
heart of China’s involvement in Africa, ‘the role of Chinese MNCs and in particular 
those in the petroleum ... industry as well as related infrastructure development, had 
become a significant feature of the African ... development landscape’. Furthermore, 
Taylor (2009: 22), states that a ‘positive aspect of Chinese investment for ordinary 
Africans is its focus on building infrastructure, a need ... ignored by Western donors in 
recent years’. This confirms interviewee evidence. As Professor Child states:  
“The Chinese put in a lot of infrastructure ... [and] there is a long 
history. They built the railway in Tanzania. That was back in the 70s”. 
(Child, J., personal interview, 25
th
 November, 2010). 
Doctor Gbadamosi comments upon the Chinese building infrastructure by saying that:  
“they, [the Chinese,] have tried so much in Nigeria ... you could see  
that everywhere, including pipelining in the oil business ... and you  
will find that in terms of transportation, the haulage business, the  
construction, and particularly in the railways. There’s just road works  
everywhere in Nigeria now, and they’re getting stronger. ... In the 
transportation sector, ... they, [the Chinese,] are working very hard on 
trains in most of Africa, and ... this has been a massive developmental 
issue in Africa. It’s been at the pain of all the social problems that 
many African countries have [and] the Chinese are turning that 
around, literally” (Gbadamosi, G., personal interview, 30th  
September, 2010).  
 
The railway in Tanzania that Professor Child refers to concerns China’s construction of 
the TanZam railway which occurred between 1970 and 1975, linking the Zambian 
Copperbelt with the Tanzanian coastal port of Dar es Salaam, and it is remembered 
positively throughout Africa, a fact that is reflected by Doctor Gbadamosi’s positive 
expression as an African of China’s rail transportation infrastructure improvements, 
together with Taylor’s opinion. This transportation infrastructure project contained 
many of the elements of China’s current approach to Africa, including a preference for 
utilising Chinese labour, constructing high-profile prestige projects to signify relations, 
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and institutional environment level government to government interaction
171
 (Alden, 
2007: 15, 17). The TanZam railway represented a commitment by Beijing to promote 
pan-African economic development, enhancing China’s credibility on the continent 
(Yu, 1980: 141), and can therefore be seen as the benchmark in Sino-African 
interaction. Indeed, according to Alden (2007: 73), ‘the spectacle of thousands of 
Chinese workers diligently building the railway, living modestly and conducting 
themselves with decorum, made a lasting and positive impression’, reflected by the way 
Doctor Gbadamosi positively commented on the Chinese constructing such projects. 
However, throughout its operational history, the TanZam railway has 
experienced numerous problems and it has not functioned efficiently because of, in 
economic terms, depreciated capital stock. It has been plagued by a severe shortage of 
equipment, especially poorly-powered Chinese locomotives, a slow turnover of stock, 
and a lack of spare parts. It was only because of further Chinese financial aid that the 
railway has been able to function at all. The fortunes of the railway did enjoy an upturn 
when its authorities purchased new German rail stock, refitting the Chinese locomotives 
with more efficient German engines. Nevertheless, the railway continues to suffer from 
poor management and a shortage of skilled workers (Taylor, 2006: 62), and according 
to Alden (2007: 52), only a small number of Chinese stayed on after the completion of 
the TanZam railway, as is always the case with such infrastructure projects today in the 
sense that the Chinese construct, for example a railway, and then move on and build 
another one somewhere else.  
Therefore, the positive interviewee evidence is questionable because if the 
Chinese are not training locals to maintain the transportation infrastructure that they are 
constructing after they have moved on, and as argued below the Chinese are not 
providing the necessary education and training to locals, then the example of the 
TanZam railway offers a warning considering the many such projects that are now 
being built. In Angola today, such projects that are financed by Chinese money are 
obliged to contract only 30% of the construction work to domestic firms (Zafar, 2007: 
120), and therefore, what is going to happen when maintenance is required and what are 
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be an expensive mistake (Yu, 1980: 123). 
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the implications for the day-to-day operation of these projects if the Chinese are not 
training locals to perform these tasks?   
9.10: Chinese labour. 
BP states that:  
“A progressive recruitment and development programme in Angola is 
helping to break down traditional barriers to entry into [an] industry ... 
where BP has relied heavily on expatriate staff in the past, the initiative 
has focused on the recruitment and training of local candidates to provide 
a steady stream of skilled technicians. Aimed at men and women from all 
social backgrounds and at different educational levels, the programme is 
delivered in four stages, using Portuguese as a first language and 
including vocational training in South Africa. It is providing 
opportunities for local people and demonstrating BP’s willingness to 
work with the Angolan people and government” (BP, 2002b: 25). 
 
However, do the two Chinese oil companies (CNOOC and Sinopec) that are engaged in 
operations in Angola at the micro-level also recruit and train locals, a vital macro-level 
socio-economic need? One can see in Box 9.1 that one of the commitments made at 
FOCAC 1 was local job creation and to train African personnel (training was subject to 
further commitments at later Forums), addressing socio-economic needs at the macro-
level and education at the institutional environment level. Indeed, CNOOC claims that 
as its:  
“overseas business grows and expands, the number of its overseas 
employees increases year by year. As of now, the number of employees 
serving the Company outside the Chinese mainland has exceeded 1,000. 
They work in different countries and regions around the world, including 
...  Africa ... [and] employee localisation is an important aspect for a 
company’s globalisation. CNOOC Ltd. adopts and promotes a 
localisation and diversification strategy for its overseas employees. It 
recruits a lot of local employees and promotes the development of 
employees with different nationalities. At present, local employees 
account for 90% of the Company’s total overseas staff. [In addition,] in 
its overseas operating units, CNOOC Ltd. provides local employees with 
support in education and training. The aim is to help them to realise 
personal development. To enrich overseas employees’ career experience 
and obtain more career development opportunities, CNOOC Ltd. is 
implementing an employee exchange program [where] local employees 
are able to work and learn in the headquarters in China. Dozens of 
employees have benefited from this program so far” (CNOOC, 2009b: 
17). 
 
Sinopec claims that:  
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“We have been insistent on the principle of ‘attracting international 
talents and engaging local personnel’. We source international talents 
from global market and recruit technical and operational employees with 
local nationalities. We strive to develop on various employment forms a 
diverse international talent pool with professional skills and capabilities. 
Currently, our overseas employees reside in 52 countries and territories 
and amount to 22,000 people. The number of foreign nationals working 
for Sinopec is 14,000, making up 63% of overall payroll. When carrying 
out overseas operations, we strive to strengthen the team-building for 
three types of talents--senior executives, technicians and skilled workers. 
We select and employ outstanding employees, strengthening employees’ 
comprehensive skills training, carefully evaluating the result of training 
programs, encouraging team spirit, and creating a harmonious and 
friendly workplace for foreign and Chinese employees. At present, our 
overseas local employees are assigned to different departments of the 
company, including the departments of technical management, 
specialised management, and business administration. [Furthermore,] in 
every host country where Sinopec operates, the local personnel [have] 
been trained to develop many areas of expertise, including development 
and production, geophysical exploration, drilling ... and engineering 
construction. This has laid an important human resource foundation 
which enabled the host countries to foster independent development and 
manage the oil industry in the future” (Sinopec, 2010: 68). 
 
Therefore, CNOOC and Sinopec have employee localisation and training policies that 
reflect those under taken by Western firms. CNOOC claim that local employees account 
for 90% of their total overseas staff, whilst Sinopec claim that foreign nationals make 
up 63% of their overall payroll (see above), and both these figures compare favourably 
with the number of locals for are employed by Western firms. For example, as of 2006 
about 88% of Chevron’s employees in Angola were Angolans (Chevron, 2006: 26). 
Nevertheless, can these bold claims of CNOOC and Sinopec be ratified, confirming that 
their localisation and training policies are actually being implemented? 
 Abe and Shimizutani (2005: 7, 14) conducted a comparative study to examine 
the relationship between the employee-oriented governance system and measures for 
downsizing employment in large Japanese firms. They found that outsiders (Anglo-
Saxon) are more motivated to commit to wage cuts, layoffs, and voluntary retirement, 
while insiders (German-Japanese) are more inclined to commit to decreases in new 
hiring. Insiders are more inclined to protect incumbent employees. These findings are 
consistent with the stakeholder view on firms because one can see in Chapter 6 that 
China’s evolving corporate governance model is essentially an insider system. 
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Therefore, if Abe and Shimizutani are correct, Chinese firms when they go abroad 
would not be inclined to new hiring of locals. Empirically, is there any evidence to 
suggest that this is the case? 
Professor Child states that: 
“One hears reports of tensions in some places with local staff, local  
workers because there’s some projects, the big projects, they bring in  
Chinese workers. So the complaint is they’re not doing anything really  
for Africa. .... I don’t think [that the Chinese are] very accommodating 
towards the locals in a context such as Africa. ... My impression is that 
they provide the minimum of training that they need to, to train up the 
locals for employment. I would not be surprised actually because there’s 
always been a sharp distinction in Chinese culture between the Chinese 
and the foreigner”. 
 
This is because, as Professor Child points out:   
“this is a kind of reversion ... to a Confucian view of leadership, the  
importance of leadership but the particularly Chinese aspect of it is that  
it’s supposed to be leadership of effectively a kind of family, with mutual  
obligations. This is very strong in Confucianism and you’re seeing this 
as far as I can tell in the culture of some of these even large enterprises. 
... It’s also the leadership claiming and trying to demonstrate respect for  
the [Chinese] workforce, and indeed starting to put a lot of training and 
a lot of investment into [that] workforce. [Indeed, respect for the Chinese 
workforce] seems to be a characteristic as far as I can tell of many of the 
state enterprises. [This] also ties in with the social safety net whereby 
they have in the past tried to avoid lay-offs but there have increasingly 
been lay-offs particularly from failing state enterprises. I think probably 
for the successful ones they still maintain a sense of security because 
that’s part of this package, you know looking after your followers” 
(Child, J., personal interview, 25
th
 November, 2010). 
 
Therefore, this links to the importance of the social safety net.
172
 Doctor Gbadamosi 
comments upon the Chinese not employing locals, supporting Professor Child’s views, 
by saying that:  
“when people talk about the prospect of Chinese business in Africa I  
always alert people to ... gainful employment to everybody and  
winning assistance of these communities. But in my experience and my  
opinion, the Chinese are not exactly very interested in that. ... Over time 
Western businesses empowered the people, trained them [and] 
completely handed over a significant part of running many operations to 
citizens who trained locally or even came to this part of the world to 
train. [In contrast,] China seems to be a lot more interested in bringing 
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in their own people, even to do most elementary kind of job that any fool 
probably would be able to do, who is given the right tools and 
equipment. ... “It will get to the point where they’ll, [the Africans,] say, 
[to the Chinese] ‘well even the British and the Americans have more 
locals than you have now. Soon you will have to get your act together’. ... 
I see that developing over time” (Gbadamosi, G., personal interview, 30th 
September, 2010). 
 
Alden and Davies (2006: 93-94) confirm the views of Professor Child and Doctor 
Gbadamosi, by pointing out that an emerging debate surrounding Chinese investment in 
Africa concerns the Chinese practice of employing its own nationals. The failure to 
employ African workers can be regarded by as an important oversight with economic as 
well as political implications. The use of Chinese nationals, justified by their managers 
in terms of their cost, productivity, and cultural affinity, may seem misguided 
considering the extremely high rates of unemployment in Africa.  
Further evidence from the literature confirms the interviewee evidence. 
According to Anshan (2007: 81), the Chinese rarely employ local workers in Africa 
because Chinese nationals are more familiar with the relevant technologies and face 
fewer language and cultural barriers when they are in communication with the Chinese 
management. In addition, Chinese workers are used to the demanding labour practices 
insisted upon by Chinese managers. They are accustomed to working long hours, 
working during public holidays, and working overtime on weekends. Therefore, from 
an economic perspective, it is more efficient and convenient for Chinese firms to recruit 
workers from China than to train local workers. Nevertheless, as Anshan (2007: 82) 
states, whilst for the moment the Chinese will continue to hire Chinese workers because 
of the short-term benefits they provide, as Chinese investment expands in Africa, ‘they 
will shift towards greater localisation of their practices’.  
However, using BP in Angola as an example, Western firms do already have far 
greater localisation policies than Chinese firms. As part of their Angolanisation 
programme, possibly influenced by their experience in Iran as was seen in Chapter 5 
that in order to not enrage host countries significant numbers of locals should be 
employed, a lesson that has possibly been learnt from this experience, BP states that: 
“We aim to ensure that our workforce reflects the local communities in 
which we operate. This goal is underpinned by targets set by government 
for the recruitment, integration and training of Angolan nationals” (BP, 
2008c: 16). 
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Therefore, BP strives to meet targets set by Angolan legislation to recruit and train  
Angolan nationals, so as to gain favour with host country officials. As was seen in 
Chapter 5, the company initially enraged officials in Iran, but later accepted that host 
country nationals should be trained and integrated into firm activities, and subsequently 
Iranianisation was initiated. Indeed, Anglo American invests heavily in educational 
projects,
173
 and therefore, this institutional environment level issue should be seen as 
highly relevant to the African setting. As Professor Frynas states:  
“BP has been faced with those [challenges] for a lot longer, certainly  
when you go back to the days of Anglo Persian and Anglo Iranian. ... 
This is certainly going to be an issue for the Chinese firms because they 
would be more traditional in using their own labour. So from that point 
of view, Shell or BP, you could think yes they are in a little bit better 
position, they’ve been thinking about it for longer. [However,] in the 
case of Angola ... there is a shortage of expertise in certain areas to  
comply with [these challenges]” (Frynas, J.G., personal interview, 20th  
December, 2010).  
 
Indeed, the use of high numbers of Chinese immigrant labour can be explained by the  
lack of relevant expertise amongst locals to work in the oil sector in Angola.  
Furthermore, in awarding contracts, the MPLA government does not make specific  
provisions for the use of the local labour force, and consequently, Chinese labour  
continues to play a significant role because of this (Alden, 2007: 46, 84). Nevertheless,  
if the Chinese are not interested in training locals for employment, this situation will not  
be addressed. As Professor Child states: 
“if a Western firm offers training to local people it’s going to help with  
local employment ... I think that’s all about education” (Child, J.,  
personal interview, 25
th
 November, 2010). 
 
Professor Child commented upon whether over time this is a lesson that a Western  
firm like BP has learnt whilst China have yet to learn by stating that: 
“I think that would be received positively, an effort to train people, local  
people. [Nevertheless,] the other problem from a local point of view as 
well is the Chinese tend to not only bring, often bring in their own 
workers, but they bring in their own management. So they are, a bit like 
the Japanese have sometimes been accused of being, they are sort of self 
contained which obviously is not going to lead to very good 
communication with ordinary people. They may have their lines 
established with the politicians, ... but it doesn’t mean to say that they’re 
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doing very much ... social responsibility in the sense of contributing to 
the local community” (Child, J., personal interview, 25th November, 
2010). 
 
It is reasonable to conclude therefore, that the bold claims of CNOOC and Sinopec 
concerning employing and training locals should not be taken at face value. Indeed, we 
saw in Part 2 that one of the problems of firms providing their own accounts of their 
CSR is that they could mask negative impacts and, in particular, they could misstate 
their performance,
174
 and this certainly appears to be the case concerning this issue. 
9.11: Social and environmental issues.  
The Chinese government is standardising the behaviour of Chinese firms abroad by 
developing environmental and corporate laws at their institutional environment level. 
Through these regulations, Chinese firms overseas must factor social and environmental 
responsibility into their business plans (Anshan, 2007: 86) to address macro-level socio-
economic needs. Concerning environmental issues, CNOOC claims that:  
“the natural environment is essential to human survival and development. 
It is also a fundamental source from which the Company acquires its oil 
and gas resources and realises growth in its business. Therefore, CNOOC 
Ltd. has always [given] top priorities to the ecology and environmental 
protection at the location of its operations. CNOOC Ltd. strictly follows 
environmental protection regulations in host countries, actively 
implements the Company’s environmental protection policies, draws 
[upon] experiences from the successes of other international companies 
in environmental protection and prevents [the] environment from being 
adversely affected by oil and gas operations” (CNOOC, 2009b: 12). 
 
In addition, Sinopec claims that:  
“the survival of the human race depends on the environment. To protect 
the environment is to protect ourselves. As a responsible energy and 
petrochemical mega company, we always attach great importance to 
environmental protection” (Sinopec, 2010: 38). 
 
Furthermore, concerning social issues, Sinopec claims that in its overseas operations:  
“we have made a positive contribution to local economic and social 
development. In the meantime, all of Sinopec’s overseas subsidiaries and 
branches have launched a series of public welfare activities for the 
benefits of the local residents, including donations and disaster relief 
support” (Sinopec, 2010: 57).  
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Despite these claims, Frynas (2009: 91) states that Western oil firms such as BP do tend 
to spend more on social and environmental issues than their non-Western counterparts 
such as the Chinese. Indeed, Chinese oil firms are often singled out for criticism 
because of their lack of consideration of the social and environmental agenda, together 
with their aggressive complimentary investment when entering new markets as the new 
entrants. Although much of this criticism may be due to unjustified fears and/or 
prejudice, it does reflect genuine concerns that Western oil firms may have to spend 
more on tackling social and environmental issues whilst Chinese oil firms can 
aggressively enter the market and free ride by not spending to address social and 
environmental issues. Professor Child echoes this issue by providing an interesting 
account that highlights the problem of free riding:  
“I came across this a few years ago, working with somebody on the  
attitude of chemical multinationals in China and in Taiwan towards  
environmental protection, and our initial expectation was that they would  
take account of what was a fairly lax regulatory environment in mainland  
China. We found that wasn’t the case and it wasn’t necessarily because  
their decision makers believed from a moral point of view, if you like, or  
from an ethical point of view in CSR or in this case environmental  
responsibility. [One reason was that] these multinationals did not want 
local Chinese firms to be allowed to come as competitors who need not 
incur any costs of dealing with effluent, toxic waste, and the like. ... They 
wanted the local firms to bear the same costs and therefore felt that it 
was in their interest to do anything that they can to help the Chinese 
government formulate not only effective rules, but the means to enforce 
them” (Child, J., personal interview, 25th November, 2010). 
   
Therefore, there is some evidence to support the view that the Chinese do consider 
environmental issues as a result of Western influences. In fact, as the CORE Coalition 
anonymous source states: 
“Chinese companies have got a very strong culture and legal framework  
which is designed to ... protect the environment in a lot of ways, much  
more than the culture of western companies” (Anonymous, personal  
interview, 2
nd
 November, 2010). 
 
Consequently, the criticism of Chinese oil firms that they lack a consideration of the  
environmental agenda may be unjustified, and the concerns of Western oil firms that  
Chinese oil firms may free ride on environmental issues is perhaps unwarranted. Indeed, 
Alden and Davies (2006: 95) reflect the opinion of the CORE Coalition anonymous 
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source, by stating that Chinese oil ‘activities on the African continent are not especially 
reprehensible or at least no more so than many of their Western counterparts’. 
9.12: Liability of foreignness. 
Commenting upon how the African people benefit from Chinese investment, Professor  
Frynas states that: 
“Chinese firms operate in the same business environment as Western  
firms ... the rules of the game are very similar. The only thing that  
potentially maybe different is that there is a history of better experiences  
with some Western companies. [Nevertheless,] Chinese managers, I think 
... have the same sort of problems of legitimacy and licence to operate as 
other firms. You always have liability of foreignness as a multinational 
firm. So just because you’re Chinese it doesn’t necessarily mean that 
you’ll have a much nicer ride, maybe at the beginning when people don’t 
know you, but eventually there is a liability of foreignness” (Frynas, J.G., 
personal interview, 20
th
 December, 2010).  
 
This opinion is confirmed by Gill and Reilly (2007: 46), who state that ‘one problem is 
that Chinese firms, new to Africa, are rarely familiar with local customs, laws, or 
institutions’. Nevertheless, Doctor Gbadamosi comments upon whether a Western firm 
might have more experience in addressing macro-level socio-economic needs in 
comparison with a Chinese firm by saying: 
“I think they have a lot more experience in doing it. Plus, given the  
background of the West and the development that is on the ground here  
which has evolved over the years, they know what’s the best sort of thing  
to put in a school. How to minimise cost in schools, the best equipment  
to put in hospitals, how to minimise costs in hospitals. All of these have  
evolved over the years, ... and I don’t think the Chinese can claim as 
much expertise in all of this” (Gbadamosi, G., personal interview, 30th  
September, 2010).  
 
Therefore, the West can reduce their liability of foreignness in comparison with Chinese  
firms because of their greater experience of knowing what kind of development is 
necessary, such as, ‘the best sort of thing to put in a school’.   
9.13: The Western response to Chinese involvement. 
As Professor Frynas states:  
“Sometimes in business there is a problem of a new entrant. Any new  
entrants may change ... the rules of the game [which] makes it harder  
to compete for the same concessions” (Frynas, J.G., personal interview,  
20
th
 December, 2010).  
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Commenting, in that case, upon whether Western firms can continue to compete, 
Professor Frynas states that:  
“it’s up to them to up the game. I mean ... on the social and 
environmental front ... you may have to try and actually get recognition 
for being a good corporate citizen and being selected on phases where 
you provide the highest social and environmental standards” (Frynas, 
J.G., personal interview, 20
th 
December, 2010).  
 
Therefore, distinguishing yourself as a good corporate citizen in order to gain that all  
important social license to operate is an important strategic move to compete with a new  
entrant in an institutional regime such as China. Confirming this, Frederick et al (1988: 
335) sum up the advantages of a good business-society relationship by saying that 
‘when a business has a good relationship with its community, it makes all the difference 
in the quality of that community’s life and in the successful operation of the business’. 
Furthermore, Carroll (1993: 32) suggested that business’s philanthropic activities are 
part of ‘being a good corporate citizen’. This means therefore, that if a firm is to be seen 
as a good corporate citizen, then it should embrace CSR and make it an integral part of 
the way it is run. Hence, for many corporations, CSR should no longer being seen as a 
purely discretionary issue. Rather, it should be given increasing attention on many 
boardroom agendas, and as we saw in Section 8.9, Western oil MNCs have engaged in 
strategic CSR to secure licences to operate. That is, some contribute to government 
favoured social funds to help secure formal licences to operate from host country 
governments, whilst another form of strategic CSR involves distinguishing yourself as a 
good corporate citizen to gain social licenses to operate by gaining the support of local 
communities. The case of Royal Dutch Shell in the Niger Delta reminds us that unless 
local communities are given due consideration, an oil MNC may be forced to cease 
operations in a locality.
175
 In the light of the fact that the Chinese, with their government 
to government summit diplomacy and complimentary investment, have major 
contractual advantages, distinguishing yourself in this way is how Western oil firms can 
compete with China.  As Professor Frynas continues:  
“This is potentially a way forward to distinguish yourself and, certainly  
in the light of BP in the Gulf of Mexico, in the future there may be  
certain demands to have companies that distinguish themselves by being  
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the best performers in the social and environmental agenda” (Frynas, 
J.G., personal interview, 20
th
 December, 2010). 
 
Nevertheless, as Jonathan Samuel of Anglo American states:  
“it is worth noting that while Chinese companies have become  
competitors for ... assets they are only some of many. If you look at  
recent deals in [the mining] sector the best deals and new projects  
still tend to be done by Western companies. And China is, of course, a  
major driver of demand and profits for the mining sector, so if we have  
lost out on any projects to Chinese competition (and I'm not sure we  
have) it is more than compensated for by Chinese custom” (Samuel, J.,  
email interview, 26
th
 February, 2011). 
 
Therefore, even if a Western firm cannot distinguish itself as a good corporate citizen,  
which could be the way forward to compete with Chinese involvement, any loss of  
business may be compensated for by engaging directly in the Chinese market. Indeed,  
BP notes that the International Energy Agency:  
“estimates that world energy demand could be 45% higher by 2030, half 
of it coming from China and India” (BP, 2008a: 12). 
 
9.14: Discussion. 
CSR is generally a Western concept, and this raises the question as to whether it  
represents a set of principles that the new entrants from China should also adopt. 
However, the Chinese face the same ethical dilemmas as Western firms when they 
engage in outward FDI, as indeed CNOOC themselves acknowledge. Furthermore, the 
West’s negative perceptions on what China is doing in Africa, according to the CORE 
Coalition anonymous source and Professor Child are largely misplaced. In addition, the 
Chinese can present themselves as another developing nation, and this raises the 
question whether China can be viewed as a development partner for Africa?  
The evidence suggests that China is engaged in a resource grab in Africa for 
now, although this may pave the way for China becoming a development partner in the 
future. However, would Chinese investment be preferred by Africans? The Chinese way 
of dealing government to government is preferable to African governments today, 
particularly because Chinese investment comes with ‘no conditions attached’ 
concerning governance and transparency, unlike Western investment.
176
 As Frynas 
(2009: 140, 142) points out, whilst BP, along with fifteen other firms in the extractive 
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 Aim 5 in Section 1.1. 
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industry sector including the other three oil ‘majors’ (Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Royal 
Dutch Shell), supports the EITI, Chinese oil firms in comparison are not so enthusiastic; 
and indeed, it is known that CNOOC and Sinopec are not formal supporters of the EITI. 
 The Chinese also engage in the exchanging of gifts to get support from local 
communities. However, if this is being extended to giving large amounts of money to 
various parties, the locals can recognise that this is not ethical which would become 
more apparent as Africa becomes more open and accountable. Nevertheless, Doctor 
Gbadamosi believes that the Chinese are receiving inside information from local 
communities concerning what local content improvements are required, meaning that 
Chinese investment would be well received in comparison with Western investment. 
  The Chinese ‘national champion’ oil SOEs are entering the market whilst  
enjoying preferential treatment from the Chinese state. However, increased management  
autonomy today is avoiding the problems of direct government interference in the  
running of firms suffered in the earlier adoption of the corporate form. Nevertheless, the  
role of the Chinese state in securing licences to operate is key and represents an O  
advantage that a Chinese oil SOE enjoys. This contractual advantage comes in the form  
of complimentary investment from the Chinese state. Complimentary investment, in the  
form of loans, provides Angola with another source of borrowing so that the country  
does not have to rely upon Western sourced loans, such as those from the IMF, that  
have conditions attached, some of which relate to concerning governance and 
transparency. This will affect the attempts of a Western firm to influence the 
institutional environment by promoting transparency and in turn sounder governance 
practices, and could lead to a failure of any initiative to engage in institutional co-
evolution. In addition, the Chinese do not follow a policy of providing aid. Instead, the 
Chinese construct infrastructure projects and there is a long history of engaging in such 
infrastructure improvements. As the example of Angola
177
 and Doctor Gbadamosi’s 
comments highlight, improving transportation infrastructure is a vital developmental 
issue for Africa. The Chinese are engaging in improvements in Africa’s transportation 
infrastructure which is a key social problem that many African countries have. 
Therefore, the Chinese are addressing socio-economic needs at the macro-level in this 
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way. However, the example of the TanZam railway provides a note of caution because 
without the required local job creation and training, there is a danger that the 
maintenance of infrastructure projects will suffer.  
Indeed, the major contested issue, in the context of what the Chinese firms 
report that they do, is to do with local employment and training. Both CNOOC and 
Sinopec claim that they have significant employee localisation and training policies that 
reflect those undertaken by Western firms, and their reporting emphasises the success of 
these policies. However, the evidence suggests that their reported success is far from the 
case. Professor Child, Professor Frynas, and Doctor Gbadamosi all provide evidence 
that refute these claims; and their evidence is persuasive when one considers that the 
Chinese have an O disadvantage where their firms operate within an insider system, 
which means that Chinese firms when they invest abroad would not be inclined to new 
hiring of locals. In comparison, Western firms employ significant numbers of locals, as 
BP’s Angolanisation programme proves, containing the goal of adhering to targets set 
by the Angolan government at the institutional environment level for the recruitment, 
integration and training of Angolan nationals. Not enraging host country officials is a 
lesson that was learnt by BP in Iran, and Anglo American has been investing in 
educational projects for many years in the African setting, illustrating that the provision 
of educational opportunities is a highly applicable tool to promote development; and 
Western firms, using BP as the example, have perhaps learnt this from experience, 
which in comparison is a lesson that the Chinese are not in a position to learn from 
because of their relative inexperience.  
Another way that the relative greater experience that Western oil firms have 
(resulting in an advantage over the Chinese) is that they have knowledge of how to be 
cost effective, and they have knowledge of what is the most appropriate expenditure 
when they invest in local schools and hospitals. This knowledge has been procured over 
time and the Chinese cannot claim as much expertise. Therefore, the West can reduce 
their liability of foreignness in comparison with Chinese firms.   
 A further issue surrounding Chinese investment in Africa involves the fact that  
Western oil firms may have to spend more on tackling social and environmental issues 
whilst Chinese oil firms can enter the market and free ride on the benefits. As was seen 
in the last chapter, despite the fact that Doctor Gbadamosi stated that businesses have a 
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responsibility to contribute to local communities and they learn how to do this over 
time, the CORE Coalition anonymous source stated that BP does not deal with 
environmental and social abuse effectively because it has not learnt from their 
experience, suggesting that the new entrants, China, would not be in an inferior position 
in comparison with BP when it comes to embracing sustainability issues. Indeed, as a 
result of Western influences the Chinese do consider environmental issues, and 
consequently, the criticism of Chinese oil firms that they lack a consideration of the 
environmental agenda is unjustified. In addition, the concerns of Western oil firms that 
Chinese oil SOEs may free ride on environmental issues appears to be hypocritical 
when, as we saw in the previous chapter, one considers the social consequences of 
environmental degradation resulting from oil spillage and flaring gas that Western oil 
firms do not address. This is especially important since, as Professor Frynas states, an 
important strategic move to compete with a new entrant such as China is to distinguish 
yourself as a good corporate citizen.
178
 If a Western firm does this, it may be able to 
engage in institutional co-evolution more effectively.  
However, one should not dismiss China as an agent for change. Officials of the 
Chinese government are increasingly becoming aware of the risk of operating in the 
African environment, such as corrupt practices. For example, as Alden (2007: 114) 
reports, the Chinese government discovered that a significant proportion of their 
funding to the Angolan government was ‘being siphoned off’. This forced dos Santos to 
remove the senior MPLA official who was in charge of managing Chinese funding and 
to establish an office under General Kopelipa, the military advisor to dos Santos, to 
oversee Chinese funding.  
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Chapter 10: Conclusion. 
10.1: The findings and the implications of the study. 
As stated in Section 1.1, this thesis has attempted to assess: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, the findings of this study will now be presented to show where this aims 
were met, together with answering the research question.
179
 Chapter 5 showed that BP 
has been concerned with board composition issues throughout its history. However, 
what has evolved is a board that can be regarded as an effective governance mechanism 
to embrace the concerns of multiple stakeholders. This chapter also showed that BP 
learnt from experience that macro-level socio-economic needs have to be addressed 
(Aim 1), embracing the CSR agenda on an ad-hoc basis throughout its history and long 
before it actually came into being. Nevertheless, as the CSR agenda evolved into the 
reporting phase, BP adopted a professionalised approach to CSR by setting targets, 
measuring impacts, and stating commitments. Initiatives from the global institutional 
environment to influence firm behaviour at the micro-level acquires significance here, 
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 As stated in Section 1.1, but restated in this section too. 
1. whether a major international oil corporation (BP) has learnt how to 
embrace the CSR agenda from long-term experience of engaging in operations 
in developing countries, 
2. what CSR principles are applicable to the African setting, 
3. de jure convergence to the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance 
(China) versus actual adherence to a version of the Anglo-Saxon model of 
corporate governance (the UK), 
4. whether major international oil corporations can positively influence the 
institutional environment in the host countries where they operate,  
5. whether China’s attempts to engage in resource-seeking foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is more likely to be successful in gaining licences to operate 
than the attempts of the West to engage in resource-seeking FDI,   
6. how or if Chinese resource-seeking FDI is influencing the way that the 
West transfers CSR principles,  
7. whether CSR is used merely as a strategic tool in order to receive licences 
to operate. 
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particularly because firms adhering to the GRI guidelines generally coincides with 
embracing the concept of sustainable development. Embracing developed world notions 
of sustainability has focused corporate responsibility on the climate change agenda, 
which is inapplicable to the African setting where local environmental issues are more 
appropriate (Aim 2).   
Chapter 5 also made a study of Anglo American and highlighted the importance 
of considering social issues that the company learnt from their extensive experience of 
the African setting. In addition, it revealed that education is a highly applicable social 
project to invest in throughout Africa (Aim 2). This provided a useful comparison with 
BP as it highlighted that macro-level socio-economic needs should continue to be 
addressed rather than a focus upon the developed world notion of environmentalism that 
has evolved by fully embracing the sustainability agenda.   
Chapter 6 found that China’s earlier adoption of the corporate form, just like its 
adoption today, is driven by a sense of competition with the West, and whilst the 
evolution of the SOEs in China has been a process to a model that resembles the 
Western corporate model, for the foreseeable future continued state control remains 
desirable. This is because the Chinese feel that high social costs, such as a loss of 
employment, would result from the departure of state ownership of firms. Nevertheless, 
embracing Western techniques, especially management technology, and adapting them 
made China’s earlier corporations competitive, and is making today’s Chinese SOEs 
competitive. More importantly, China’s earlier adoption of the corporate form involved 
embracing Western ideas and adapting them to China’s own needs. The Western notion 
of sustainable development has been embraced today by both CNOOC and Sinopec as 
they have adopted the CSR agenda, but it has been adapted to their own specific needs 
in that they have interpreted the concept as meaning the sustainability of the companies, 
their continued existence. This represents a recreation of what China did during the 
earlier adoption of the corporate form: adapting Western ideas to the Chinese business 
environment.     
Chapter 6 also discovered that large Chinese SOEs have been corporatised and 
significant management autonomy has evolved, but the Chinese government continues 
to be the major shareholder, and the lack of a social safety net is an important reason 
why SOEs continue to play a key role in China. In addition, one of the key factors in 
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China’s corporate governance is the insider control of corporate affairs (rather than the 
outsider control in the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance, Aim 3) to pursue 
‘higher national goals’ such as providing employment. All of this has significant 
implications when China’s ‘national champion’ SOEs invest overseas.  
Chapter 7, by focusing upon Angola to highlight the development issues that are 
relevant to African oil-producing countries, found that education and/or training is 
important to fill a skills gap that needs to be addressed to enable locals to engage in 
meaningful employment with the oil sector, and there is an inadequate institutional 
capacity to manage the legal regime. Moreover, there is a lack of transparency 
surrounding oil revenues. In addition, local communities should be able to sustain their 
livelihoods, and significant infrastructure development is required. Importantly, 
however, the development of good quality institutions can be promoted by oil MNCs 
enhancing transparency.  
 
 
 
 
To summarise the findings in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9, it will be considered whether  
BP and/or China promotes economic development in the six ways identified,
180
 which 
provides the subjective element of the research question, whilst analysing the Angolan 
case performed the objective function by identifying the problem. To do this, the above 
definition will be used as a guideline.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, an interesting paradox in development economics is 
the resource curse, which is the poor growth performance of many countries with rich 
natural resources. This is because, as Zafar (2007: 107, 115) states, ‘both theoretical 
analysis and empirical evidence show that capital-intensive natural resource abundance 
creates opportunities for rent-seeking behaviour and ... this is an important factor in 
determining a country’s level of corruption’. As Zafar further stresses, in order to 
discourage rent-seeking behaviour, a prime contributor to the resource curse, the 
institutional capacity needs to be established so that there can be a transparent 
accounting of oil revenue windfalls. For promoting revenue transparency, an intentional  
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 See section 7.7. 
 
         The working definition of CSR for the purpose of this thesis was identified as:  
‘The voluntary requirement for business to behave ethically, and to  
address negative externalities so that local communities can sustain 
their livelihoods, in order to contribute to economic development’.     
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transfer of their CSR principles,
181
 BP operating at the micro-level could have set in 
motion a sequence of events (by voluntarily deciding to behave ethically by publishing 
their accounts in 2001) that could have promoted revenue transparency to address 
governance shortcomings in Angola’s institutional environment (Aim 4) and promote 
Angola’s economic development. The failure of BP’s unilateral move in Angola 
influenced the launching of the EITI. Subsequently, Angola considered signing up to 
the EITI to improve governance and transparency in order to meet the conditions of 
securing an IMF loan. However, the new entrants, China, have stepped in and provided 
another source of borrowing that means that Angola now does not have to rely on IMF 
loans. Consequently, this new source of borrowing, with ‘no conditions attached’, has 
removed the incentives for Angola to sign up to the EITI to improve governance and 
transparency.  
Moreover, China has entered the market and have changed the entire co-
evolutionary dynamic. This thesis has focused upon BP transferring their CSR 
principles and behaving as an agent for change at the micro-level to the entire 
institutional regime, including addressing macro-level socio-economic needs and 
governance shortcomings within the institutional environment level.
182
 The new 
entrants at the macro-level, the Chinese firms, have entered the market primarily 
concerned with their continued existence as firms and to secure the energy security of 
China. Therefore, the Chinese are not acting as change agents and are not even 
attempting to behave in this way. Instead, they are only concerned with securing 
licenses to operate and the Chinese state is playing a key role in this by providing 
complimentary investment such as soft loans via government to government interaction 
(including high-level summit diplomacy as we saw in Section 9.3) within the 
institutional environment, and building infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, and 
transportation improvements. Consequently, the Chinese are not attempting to change 
the institutional set-ups and instead they are prepared to work with them. In this sense, 
the Chinese are engaging in institutional avoidance
183
 where they are willing to accept a 
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 See Section 2.3. 
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 In fact, BP themselves state that business has always been an important agent of change (See Section 
8.1). 
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 See Section 1.3. 
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weak institutional environment, and furthermore, they are engaging in institutional 
adaptation
184
 by engaging in corrupt practices
185
 and behaving in such a way (by 
providing relevant soft loans) that is relevant to the host country context. By 
comparison, BP is attempting to engage in institutional co-evolution by behaving in 
such a way as to attempt to improve the host country institutional environment by, for 
example, promoting transparent accounting. As a result, a country like Angola now can 
rely on China as an inward investor, one that is not concerned with attaching conditions 
to any investments, like the West would do, regarding institutional environment level 
governance (Aim 5).  
Therefore, to address the research question: whether the competition for Africa’s 
natural resources between Chinese firms (as the new entrants into the market) and 
Western firms (focusing upon BP) has negative implications for the governance climate 
in the region, China entering the market as a new competitor for Western oil firms has 
had a negative impact upon the governance climate in Angola. However, regarding the 
EITI, unlike Angola many other African oil-producing countries have signed up to this 
initiative, including Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria. In this respect, the Chinese entering 
the market has not had a negative impact upon the governance climate in Africa as a 
whole. Nevertheless, in stating this, one must acknowledge that the EITI is unlikely to  
be effective because it does not focus upon the government spending of revenues.
186
  
 For developing a strong civil society, oil corporations can contribute by  
planning, delivering, and monitoring social investments. The evidence suggests that BP  
and other Western firms have certainly delivered social investments. Oil corporations  
can contribute to increasing employment opportunities for locals in Angola by training  
and educating locals to enable them to engage in employment in oil sector operations.  
BP implements the Angolanisation programme and consequently, the company makes a  
positive contribution. However, in comparison, the Chinese frequently bring in their 
own labour when they invest in a foreign country due to the fact that their SOEs pursue 
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 Also see Section 1.3. 
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 See Section 9.7. 
 
186
 In fact, an oil export boom in Africa that stems from increased Chinese demand will lead to a sense of 
complacency that would prevent African countries undertaking the measures necessary to make economic 
development sustainable, such as investment in human capital and institutional reform (Deutsche Bank 
Research, 2006: 12).  
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the ‘higher national goal’ of maintaining employment levels and they compensate for 
the lack of a social safety net in China. Furthermore, they provide no education and 
training for locals.  
Nevertheless, the Chinese invest heavily in improving Africa’s infrastructure, 
especially the transportation infrastructure, and therefore, the interviewee evidence and 
the literature study suggests that Africans certainly benefit from Chinese involvement in 
this way. This represents an unintentional transfer of social responsibility
187
 because 
this can be regarded as unforeseen societal benefits. The intention of these infrastructure 
improvements is to seal licences to operate rather than to directly benefit society. 
However, the example of the TanZam railway, which has suffered from depreciated 
capital stock and a lack of trained staff, highlights that since the Chinese are not 
educating and/or training locals, a skills gap emerges which means that the 
infrastructure improvements may not be maintained.  
Western oil MNCs contribute to social investment funds which can help to 
support livelihoods. However, this contribution is cancelled out by the social 
consequences of environmental degradation resulting from oil spillage and flaring gas. 
The negative externality of pollution from oil sector operations means that local 
communities cannot sustain their livelihoods, a lesson that has arguably not been learnt 
from history. As Kreike (2004: 7-8) stressed, this issue has not been touched upon in 
previous research on Africa, and it sums up the viewpoint of the CORE Coalition 
anonymous source that BP has not learnt from their history in the context of addressing 
social and environmental issues effectively. This lack of learning from operational 
history has been reinforced by the fact that firms like BP have fully embraced the 
concept of sustainable development which does not address local environmental issues 
in the developing world.          
Therefore, one implication of this study is that these firms, despite the fact that 
today they set targets and measure their performance, should engage in more effective 
impact assessments of the environmental and social consequences of their local 
operations. If effective impact assessments were engaged in, this important issue that 
this thesis has raised may be addressed. BP has decided to tackle the climate change 
agenda to answer an audience in developed countries, but it is everyday pollution from 
                                                 
187
 See section 2.3. 
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oil sector operations that is appropriate to the African setting and the rest of the 
developing world, and this is not being considered. This raises the other implication of 
this study because what is not helping this situation, the localised impact of firm 
operations, is that initiatives from the global institutional environment to influence firm 
behaviour at the micro-level attempt to mean something to all stakeholders, with the 
result that they can be too voluminous for firms to implement, and more importantly, 
they are too focused upon developed world notions of environmentalism, just like the 
concept of sustainable development that underpins these initiatives. A more focused 
global initiative that is relevant to the developing world setting is called for, one that 
embraces development issues and local environmental and related social consequences. 
Such an initiative should be designed along the lines of the original Sullivan Principles, 
which was relatively effective in achieving more narrow and well-defined objectives.    
Furthermore, such a focused global initiative should be designed so that Western 
oil MNCs can distinguish themselves as good corporate citizens. We have seen that 
there is some evidence of firms transferring their CSR principles strategically (Aim 7), 
and this is not only an important strategic response for Western firms to compete with a 
new entrant such as China (Aim 6), but the mere fact that firms transfer their CSR 
principles strategically does not necessarily help this issue of developing world local 
environmental problems. If strategic CSR that focused upon securing a social licence to 
operate was more orientated upon local environmental issues rather than solely on 
winning the support of local communities via social projects and/or funds, then perhaps 
the social consequences of environmental degradation would be addressed. 
10.2: The applicability of co-evolutionary insights. 
This thesis used the co-evolutionary theoretical framework in an original way, as it has 
rarely been applied to corporate governance and CSR, and certainly not in the context of 
an oil sector firm attempting to engage in institutional co-evolution in the specific  
location of Angola. Although Cantwell et al (2010) did propose such a framework, this 
thesis actually applied it. Nevertheless, since co-evolutionary insights have rarely been 
applied to corporate governance and CSR, this raises a question regarding how 
applicable co-evolutionary insights have been in this study. The use of co-evolutionary 
theory informed the way that the evidence was looked at, and although every single 
facet of co-evolutionary theory was not deemed relevant to every single issue under  
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Figure 10.1: The Institutional Regime: BP as Active Change Agent (NB. The 
concepts and terms were also utilised in the study of Anglo American).  
 
consideration, certain co-evolutionary insights were deemed applicable to differing 
phenomena. It will now be shown how certain facets of co-evolutionary theory were 
utilised, with reference to Figure 10.1. 
Considering the institutional regime that BP was attempting to act as the agent  
for change in, co-evolutionary theory stresses the importance of considering new  
entrants in the market. Consequently, due attention was given to the most significant of 
these, China. Therefore, Chapter 6 employed co-evolutionary path dependent analysis 
(embraced within the micro-environment) to discover whether sequences of events 
throughout history have shaped Chinese firm behaviour today, and found that the way 
that today’s Chinese SOEs embrace Western ideas is a recreation of what the earlier 
Chinese corporations did prior to the founding of the People’s Republic. In addition, it 
considered technology transfer (managerial technology) from the macro-environment to 
the micro-environment, together with foreign competition at the macro-environment 
instigating change in the micro-environment. Furthermore, this chapter stressed that the 
two Chinese oil firms engaging in operations in Angola must be viewed in the context 
of the overall energy policy (economic policy) of China. 
Macro-environment 
Technology transfer 
New entrants (China) 
Foreign competition  
Socio-economic needs 
Institutional Environment 
Regulations (global together 
with national) 
Education 
Politics/Political change 
Governance 
Economic policy 
Micro-environment (BP) 
Management intentionality 
Strategic choice 
Path dependence 
Organisational adaptation 
Organisational principles 
Meso-environment 
Sector dynamics 
Sector adaptation  
Collective action 
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Chapter 6 also employed action determinism within co-evolutionary strategic 
choice analysis in the micro-environment, and showed that continuing state-firm 
relations in China is a built-in preference. Chapter 5 also showed that BP’s built-in 
preferences meant that for a long time the board was dominated by members who would 
consider the narrow definition of organisational performance, i.e. financial performance. 
In addition, this technique showed that in contrast to BP, Anglo has been controlled by a 
powerful tightly knit elite group, which also represents a built-in preference. 
Furthermore, Chapter 5 showed that as BP is now subject to the Combined Code 
from the UK’s institutional environment, the board has over three outside directors who 
may be more knowledgeable about stakeholder issues. The primary advantage to 
adopting the co-evolutionary framework regarding this chapter however, is the study of 
the initiatives (regulation, even if only soft laws) from the global institutional 
environment level and how these impact firm behaviour in the micro-environment. This 
gave valuable insights to how BP would act when attention turned to analysing their 
implementation in Part 3. Similarly, studying how these initiatives influence the way the 
Chinese behave in Chapter 6 revealed profound implications that could then be explored 
in Chapter 9, including their pursuance of ‘higher national goals’ such as employment 
which may be regarded as built-in preferences (the institutional environment’s politics 
influencing the micro-environment). Importantly, both Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 stressed 
the importance of addressing socio-economic needs in the macro-environment, and how 
micro-environment action can change the institutional environment’s education.  
In highlighting the problem facing African oil states, using Angola as the case,  
Chapter 7 showed that the promotion of economic development can be achieved by  
addressing the issue of macro-environment socio-economic needs that the previous two 
chapters raised, and transferring micro-environment organisational principles to 
promote transparency, for example, can promote the development of good quality 
institutions for sound governance at the institutional environment level. Subsequently, 
Chapter 8 showed that BP’s greater transparency (management intentionality) was a 
micro-environment level attempt to transfer an organisational principle, and also 
considered improving socio-economic needs. Chapter 9 then considered the impact of 
the new entrants, and found that although Chinese involvement affects the ability to 
engage in institutional co-evolution when it comes to promoting transparency, the 
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Chinese are addressing socio-economic needs in the macro-environment, and are 
engaging in government to government interaction within the institutional environment 
level via summit diplomacy, highlighting the important role the Chinese state plays in 
securing licences to operate. All of this has enabled insightful conclusions to be reached 
in this chapter, particularly how Chinese involvement has changed the whole co-
evolutionary dynamic.  
10.3: Limitations of the study. 
The following factors represent possible limitations of the study:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10.4: The need for future research. 
The consideration of China as the new entrants highlighted a significant factor  
that impacts upon firm activity, which in the context of this thesis was the ability for a  
firm to engage in institutional co-evolution. Therefore, a consideration of other 
emerging economic powers in the global market would enhance this, to discover 
whether firms from these countries behave in the same way China does when they 
 It was seen in Section 3.4 that the Chinese firms provide little concrete 
data on their consideration of social and environmental issues. This meant 
that Chapter 9 could not have the same balanced analysis as Chapter 8 did 
by fully analysing company reports and interviewee evidence. 
Nevertheless, some bold claims made by CNOOC and Sinopec could be 
assessed in relation to interviewee evidence.  
 Chapter 5 studied the ad-hoc responses that BP made to social issues 
throughout their history as and when these were raised as part of the first 
generation of the CSR agenda, prior to adopting a professionalised 
approach to CSR. However, this discussion is incomplete because it drew 
upon three volumes of BP’s company history which only brought the story 
up to the 1970s. A fourth volume which may have brought this story up to 
when BP began reporting their impacts was withdrawn from publication 
and no other literature is available to cover this period.       
 Despite mentioning impacts in other countries such as Nigeria, the thesis 
was arguably too focused upon the situation in Angola. This raises the 
question as to how much the findings of this thesis can be generalised 
beyond the case.  
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invest overseas: government to government inaction, corrupt practices, for example. 
This could be embraced by researching the other so-called BRIC
188
 economies. Chousa 
et al (2008: 1) were concerned with investigating the decline in environmental quality 
within these BRIC economies themselves, due to high energy consumption levels as a 
result of rapid economic growth. This could be extended to beyond the countries 
themselves, to considering whether they have impacts when their firms engage in 
outward FDI. 
BP’s influence, acting as change agent at the micro-level, upon the wider 
institutional regime is what this thesis focused upon. Although the impact of China as 
the new entrants at the macro-level was studied, together with BP’s influence upon the 
institutional environment level; meso-level influences and/or inactions were not fully 
taken into account because, as Lewin and Volberda (2003) stated, satisfying all of the 
requirements of co-evolutionary research is a daunting prospect.
189
 However, collective 
action problems associated with the issues of revenue transparency and environmental 
degradation could be considered within the context of micro/meso-level interaction, 
which would embrace sector dynamics and adaptation.
190
 Consequently, a future study 
that focuses upon meso-level influences and/or micro/meso-level interaction regarding 
these issues, by considering whether a number of firms could act collectively, would 
engineer a deep understanding of these phenomena. Indeed, embracing meso-level 
dynamics by studying a number of firms in the sector was the original intention of the 
research, but upon the advice of an external expert the thesis became focused upon BP.  
This thesis has highlighted the importance of the local social consequences of 
environmental degradation resulting from firm activity, and this is an issue that should 
be explored in some depth in future work to understand the processes involved, and 
qualitative accounts from the local community members that are affected by the 
environmental degradation and/or relevant experts in the field would engineer a deep 
understanding of the problem. This could also be conducted by considering the situation 
in a variety of developing world countries to in an attempt to solve the issue of 
generalising beyond the case.  
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 BRIC refers to the emerging markets of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (Chousa et al, 2008: 2). 
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Appendix 1. 
THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT 
Officially launched at the UN’s New York headquarters on 26 July, 2000, the Global  
Compact is an initiative that has the objective of encouraging businesses globally to  
adopt policies for sustainable and responsible behaviour, using a common framework to  
report on them. It is not a regulatory instrument. Rather, it is a forum for discourse and  
networking between governments, firms, and labour (whose activities it attempts to  
influence); and NGOs and civil society (its stakeholders). Once firms sign up to the  
Global Compact, it does not mean that they are recognised as having fulfilled its  
principles. The core values and principles that the Global Compact asks firms to 
embrace, support and enact, within their sphere of influence, are:  
Human Rights 
Principle 1: Businesses should support and respect the protection of  
internationally proclaimed human rights; and 
Principle 2: make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.   
Labour 
Principle 3: Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the  
effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; 
Principle 4: the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour; 
Principle 5: the effective abolition of child labour; and 
Principle 6: the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and  
occupation.    
Environment 
Principle 7: Businesses should support a precautionary approach to  
environmental challenges; 
Principle 8: undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental  
responsibility; and 
Principle 9: encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally  
friendly technologies.    
Anti-Corruption 
Principle 10: Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms,  
including extortion and bribery.  
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The Global Compact provides a useful tool for analysis as it sets standards for socially  
responsible behaviour for firms globally. In addition, it is an important tool when  
comparing different firm activities together with setting the agenda for what should be  
regarding as socially responsible (Aras and Crowther, 2009: 16-18). 
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Appendix 2. 
LEGISLATION 
Since the beginning of this century a number of attempts have been made to introduce 
into the laws of Anglo-Saxon countries a basic requirement for firms to exercise CSR in 
their operations at home and overseas. In the UK earlier this century, for example, 
NGOs and other stakeholder groups that make up the CORE Coalition lobbied to 
enshrine stakeholder consideration and protection in UK corporate law, which resulted 
in the CORE Parliamentary Bill. Under the CORE Bill, applicable CSR standards were 
aligned with already operational national and international legislation prevailing in the 
various countries of operation where British firms were engaged in activities, and the 
Bill stipulated that:   
‘A company shall carry out its activities in accordance with administrative practices and 
laws of the countries in which it operates, as well as international agreements, 
responsibilities and standards, including but not limited to, those relating to:- 
(a) the preservation of the environment, 
(b) public health and safety, 
(c) the goal of sustainable development, 
(d) employment, 
(e) human rights, and 
(f) consumer protection’. 
The CORE Bill made a particular focus upon the social and environmental duties of 
company directors, stipulating that: 
‘A director of a company shall, when considering any matter or taking any decisions, 
act in the way which in his opinion would be most likely to promote the success of the 
company, but in so doing it shall be the duty of the directors of any company- 
(a) to consider- 
(i) the environmental, social and economic impacts of their operations and 
any proposed operations, and 
(ii) the interests of all their stakeholders when making any decision in 
respect of those operations or proposed operations, 
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(b) to take all reasonable steps to minimise any negative environmental, social and 
economic impacts of any such operations or proposed operation, and 
(c) to prepare an annual report which identifies any risks to the company as a result 
of the company’s environmental, social and economic impacts and how any 
such risks would be managed’. 
Following on from this, further lobbying by the CORE Coalition, together with the 
Trade Justice Movement, pushed for a more radical formulation of directors’ duties in 
the UK Companies Act 2006. This formulation called for directors ‘to take reasonable 
steps to minimise any significant adverse impacts on workers, local communities and 
the environment’ (Horrigan, 2010: 213-216). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
287 
 
Appendix 3. 
THE ORIGINS OF BP 
BP originated in the activities of the adventurer William Knox D'Arcy, who had made a  
fortune in Australian mining. D'Arcy, in 1901, secured a concession from the Grand  
Vizier of Persia to explore for petroleum. This exploration proved to be extremely  
costly and difficult, because Persia lacked the necessary infrastructure and was  
politically unstable. In need of capital, D'Arcy was joined by the Burmah Oil Company  
in a Concessionary Oil Syndicate in 1905, who supplied funds in return for operational  
control. In May 1908 oil was discovered at Masjid-i-Suleiman in the southwest of  
Persia, and this was the first oil discovery in the Middle East. As a result, in April 1909,  
with the Burmah Oil Company having a majority of the shares, the Anglo-Persian Oil  
Company was formed. Subsequently, the British government invested £2 million in  
Anglo-Persian and received the majority shareholding in return. The British government  
would retain this majority shareholding for many years, until October 1987 when the  
then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, sold the British government’s remaining shares  
as part of a wide-ranging privatisation programme.  
In the early years of the company, the major figure was Charles Greenway, after 
having been invited by Burmah Oil to assist in forming Angola-Persian as founding 
director. Greenway became managing director in 1910, and became chairman in 1914. 
Greenway’s successor was John Cadman. In 1923 he became Anglo-Persian’s 
managing director, and chairman in 1927. Cadman had been a major figure in official 
British oil policy during World War I, and introduced major administrative reforms, 
overcoming the excessive departmentalism and lack of coordination that had formerly 
characterised Anglo-Persian (Jones and Wolf, 2002: 46-47). Standard Oil of New 
Jersey, which later became Exxon in 1972, and Exxon Mobil after Exxon merged with 
Mobil in 1999 (Martin, 2005: 177), joined forces with Cadman and Royal Dutch-Shell 
in 1928 to reach a wide-ranging international agreement on the establishment of a 
clearing house, which had the fundamental objective of bringing surplus productive 
capacity into balance with demand by controlling competition (Bamberg, 1994: 107, 
109), establishing the principle that the world's largest oil companies could collude 
together.  
Anglo-Persian was renamed Anglo-Iranian in 1935 when Persia became Iran,  
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and subsequently, Anglo-Iranian was rebranded as the British Petroleum Company in  
1954. Later, BP Amoco plc was formed in 1998 by the merger of the British Petroleum  
Company and Amoco Corporation. However, in 2000, the Amoco name was dropped  
and the corporation is now known as BP plc, and it is now the third largest oil company  
in the world. The previous BP and Amoco logos were replaced by a new BP logo,  
which is a green and yellow sunburst. Oil industry analysts have speculated that the new  
logo has been adopted with the intention that people will perceive BP not as an oil  
company, but as an energy company, with operations in oil, natural gas, and solar power  
(Jones and Wolf, 2002: 47-49, 55).  
BP is today one of the most powerful corporations in the world. It is a genuine 
global enterprise with approximately 104,000 employees, of which just 17,500 are 
located in the UK, compared to 39,000 in the USA, (Maclean et al, 2006: 207) despite 
being a UK-based firm. Compared to other major corporations, BP ranks highly in the 
index of multinationality, which is defined as the average of the percentage of global 
assets, sales, and employment accounted for by overseas affiliates. This figure rose for 
BP from 66.3% to 75.8% of its operations being overseas between 1985 and 1996 alone 
(Dunning, 2001: 240-241). 
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Appendix 4. 
THE ORIGINS OF ANGLO AMERICAN 
Anglo American’s history can be traced back to 1902, when Sir Ernest Oppenheimer  
arrived in Kimberley, South Africa representing diamond merchants A. Dunkelsbuhler  
and Co., who were members of the Diamond Syndicate. The Diamond Syndicate was  
a cartel that maintained prices for South African diamonds by regulating production.  
Oppenheimer also became interested in gold mining, and in 1905 he acquired  
Consolidated Mines Selection, originally formed in 1887, with properties on the East  
Rand gold field. By 1916, when the true value of the East Rand was realised  
(Katzenellenbogen, 2003: 30), the formation of Anglo American was initiated as part of  
the strategy worked out by Oppenheimer to gain access to US capital markets so that he  
could proceed with developing the East Rand (Innes, 1984: 91), and subsequently, the  
Anglo American Corporation of South Africa Ltd. was founded by Oppenheimer in  
1917. The company name derives from the fact that it was founded with British  
financial backing and in addition, and for the first time for a South African concern,  
with significant American financial backing.  
At this time all major mining finance houses were registered in London. 
However, Oppenheimer was attempting to build up a major South African mining house 
in order to compete in the gold sector (Reichardt, 2007a: 43). A number of political 
reasons have been put forward to explain the reason for locating in South Africa rather 
than in London, since Oppenheimer was a naturalised British subject. However, the 
primary reason was to avoid the possibility of double taxation problems 
(Katzenellenbogen, 2003: 30-31). Over the years, the Anglo American Corporation 
increased its mining interests in the Southern African region by becoming the largest 
shareholder in De Beers, developing the Zambian Copperbelt, and exploiting platinum 
group reserves in South Africa. The Anglo American Corporation also diversified into 
chemicals, construction, newspapers, and financial services. The Anglo American 
Corporation originally had its primary listing in Johannesburg (Jones et al, 2007: 227). 
However, in May 1999 the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa Ltd. merged 
with Minorco to form a new Anglo American (Maclean et al, 2006: 200), and this new 
Anglo American with its primary listing in London became a UK-based firm. 
 Significant corporate restructuring followed, including the disposal of non- 
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core assets such as financial services and the acquisition of new businesses including  
the UK’s Tarmac, Shell’s coal operations in Australia and Venezuela, Chile’s copper  
producer Disputada, and Russia’s Skytyvkar forestry enterprise. By October 2005, the  
new Anglo American announced its intention to rationalise its assets further so that it  
can focus more on its core mining business. Therefore, Anglo American has  
transformed itself from a South African-based diversified firm with business interests  
concentrated in the Southern African region into a UK-based global mining giant with  
operations in over 50 countries around the world (Jones et al, 2007: 227-228).  
Today, Anglo American PLC is believed to be the world’s largest gold mining 
organisation. Through a 45% share in De Beers, it also has a major interest in the 
distribution of 80% of the world’s rough diamonds. Since its early beginnings in South 
Africa, it has become a unique multinational group, headquartered in London. Despite 
being based in the UK, Anglo American dominates South Africa’s economy by 
maintaining interests in some 1,300 South African firms and controlling roughly a 
quarter of the South African stock market. Their corporate structure is based only in part 
on majority share ownership of its subsidiaries, associates, and other firms. Most of 
their control and influence lies in a web of connections based on family ties, 
friendships, and mutual business interests, a clan that is often referred to as the 
Oppenheimer Empire. Anglo American has become essentially a holding company, 
with operations being the formal responsibility of a group of associates 
(Katzenellenbogen, 2003: 30). 
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Appendix 5. 
THE EITI PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA. 
What is now known as the EITI process evolved from the first statement of the EITI  
principles at the Lancaster House Conference in June 2003. The EITI principles and  
EITI criteria are the most concise statement of the beliefs and aims of the initiative, and  
they are endorsed by EITI stakeholders, supporters, and implementers. 
The EITI Principles 
The EITI principles, agreed at the above conference, provide the cornerstone of the  
initiative. They are, as the EITI themselves quote: 
 ‘We share a belief that the prudent use of natural resource wealth should be an  
important engine for sustainable economic growth that contributes to sustainable  
development and poverty reduction, but if not managed properly, can create  
negative economic and social impacts.  
 We affirm that management of natural resource wealth for the benefit of a  
country’s citizens is in the domain of sovereign governments to be exercised in  
the interests of their national development.  
 We recognise that the benefits of resource extraction occur as revenue streams  
over many years and can be highly price dependent.  
 We recognise that a public understanding of government revenues and  
expenditure over time could help public debate and inform choice of appropriate  
and realistic options for sustainable development.  
 We underline the importance of transparency by governments and companies in  
the extractive industries and the need to enhance public financial management  
and accountability.  
 We recognise that achievement of greater transparency must be set in the context  
of respect for contracts and laws.  
 We recognise the enhanced environment for domestic and foreign direct  
investment that financial transparency may bring.  
 We believe in the principle and practice of accountability by government to all  
citizens for the stewardship of revenue streams and public expenditure.  
 We are committed to encouraging high standards of transparency and  
292 
 
accountability in public life, government operations and in business,  
 We believe that a broadly consistent and workable approach to the disclosure of  
payments and revenues is required, which is simple to undertake and to use.  
 We believe that payments’ disclosure in a given country should involve all  
extractive industry companies operating in that country.  
 In seeking solutions, we believe that all stakeholders have important and  
relevant contributions to make – including governments and their agencies,  
extractive industry companies, service companies, multilateral organisations,  
financial organisations, investors, and non-governmental organisations’. 
The EITI Criteria. 
The implementation of the EITI, as the EITI themselves quote, must meet the following  
criteria: 
 ‘Regular publication of all material oil, gas and mining payments by companies  
to governments (“payments”) and all material revenues received by governments  
from oil, gas and mining companies (“revenues”) to a wide audience in a  
publicly accessible, comprehensive and comprehensible manner. 
 Where such audits do not already exist, payments and revenues are the subject of  
a credible, independent audit, applying international auditing standards. 
 Payments and revenues are reconciled by a credible, independent administrator,  
applying international auditing standards and with publication of the  
administrator’s opinion regarding that reconciliation including discrepancies,  
should any be identified. 
 This approach is extended to all companies including state-owned enterprises. 
 Civil society is actively engaged as a participant in the design, monitoring and  
evaluation of this process and contributes towards public debate. 
 A public, financially sustainable work plan for all the above is developed by the  
host government, with assistance from the international financial institutions  
where required, including measurable targets, a timetable for implementation,  
and an assessment of potential capacity constraints’. 
Source: EITI website at www.eiti.org (accessed 01/06/2011).         
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Appendix 6. 
THE EVOLUTION OF CHINESE SOEs 
The evolution of the SOE in China has been a process from a model where the state  
holds all property ownership and managerial rights, to a contracting model where the  
firm assumed responsibility for its own profits and losses, to a model that resembles  
corporations in the Western sense. Schipani and Junhai (2001: 1) state that these SOE  
governance models can be classified firstly as the traditional model (1950s to 1984),  
secondly as the transitional model (1984 to 1993), and finally as the modern corporate  
model (1993 to present). These institutional environment level models will now be 
outlined. 
The Traditional Model (1950s to 1984). 
The traditional model of SOE governance is also referred to as the state-ownership 
model or the state-owned and managed model. In this model, state ownership was the 
only legal form available to safeguard state property. The state owned all the property 
rights, had managerial powers, and the SOEs were deprived of economic and legal 
independence. State planners were able to mobilise human and financial resources and 
to decide production and distribution. SOE executives had the duty to fulfil the 
production plans of the state and not to enhance profits, and therefore, SOEs were not 
real businesses. In fact, most SOEs were simply referred to as factories and functioned 
as state affiliates responsible for producing goods and services, and accordingly, the 
governance structure was an integral part of the general governmental framework. SOE 
executives were appointed and dismissed by state agencies, were responsible to those 
agencies, and enjoyed the same political and economic treatment as state officials.  
Executive achievements were not evaluated by financial performance, but by  
performance in the terms of satisfying the state plans. Due to the fact that SOEs and 
their employees effectively lived off state financial input, SOEs were not only  
production units, but also social security units. SOE employees received an ‘iron rice 
bowl’ for life in terms of salary, housing, medical treatment, and pensions (Schipani and 
Junhai, 2001: 1-2). 
The Transitional Model (1984 to 1993). 
The transitional model, also known as the state-creditor’s rights model, or the  
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contracting model, dominated until the Company Law was enacted. The strategy was to 
encourage SOEs to expand production and to earn profits, whilst the goal was to make 
SOEs responsible for their own gains and losses. The main tool to achieve this goal was 
the separation between state ownership and management rights to transform SOEs into 
legal entities. In order to achieve the reform objectives, the SOEs Law was adopted in 
1988, which recognised that:  
 the property would be owned by the people,  
 the SOE would be managed with state authorisation based on the principle of the 
separation of ownership and management,  
 the SOE would obtain the status of legal person in accordance with law and bear 
civil liability with the property,  
 the SOE may, in accordance with the decision of government agencies, adopt 
contracting, leasing or other forms of managerial responsibility. 
The 1988 SOEs Law introduced a corporate governance structure with three salient  
features:  
 the managing (factory) director assumes overall responsibility for the  
management of the SOE, and acts as its legal representative, 
 the local representatives of the Party in the SOE guarantees and supervises the 
implementation of the Party’s guiding principles and policies, 
 the SOE is allowed, via the employees’ congress and other forms, even trade 
unions, to practice democratic management.  
Between 1987 and 1993, in order to govern the relationship between the state and the 
factory director, the contracting system was adopted. The basic principle of the  
contracting system was to fix a minimum amount of SOE profit that should be paid to 
the state, and allowing the SOEs to retain the remaining profit. The result of the  
contracting process was that state intervention in SOEs was significantly diminished, 
and SOEs gained greater freedom to make their own business decisions. However, the 
transitional model failed to provide sufficient SOE reform because it was difficult to 
identify a reasonable minimum amount of profit to pay to the state, and although most 
SOEs enjoyed benefits when they were profitable, they were unable to pay the fixed 
amounts when they had losses. Too little SOE profit was reinvested, leaving insufficient 
resources for future expansion. In addition, huge amounts of SOE assets were 
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expropriated for personal uses. The need for further reform was clear, and consequently, 
policy-makers began to look to the Western modern corporation model. Furthermore, 
transitional SOE leaders had greater managerial powers than their predecessors in 
traditional SOEs, together with more resources, facilitating embezzlement and misuse. 
In addition, this transitional period, included unnecessary and excessive government 
interventions (Schipani and Junhai, 2001: 2-6, 45-46).  
The Modern Corporate Model (1993 - present), and the 1994 Company Law. 
The 1994 Company Law combines Western influence with an effort at innovation. It 
imports two types of firms, limited companies and joint stock companies from Anglo-
American systems, and adopts the two-tier board structure of the German system (Wei, 
2002: 98). In the years since the introduction of the Company Law, the incorporated 
sector has contributed an increasing proportion of the output of all firms in China. In 
2003 the incorporated sector contributed some 63% (71% collectives included) of 
national output (Krug and Hendrischke, 2008: 101). 
One of the goals of SOE reform at this stage was to establish a modern  
corporation system in large and medium-sized SOEs, and corporate legislation was 
perceived as an essential instrument for corporatising. Therefore, the 1994 Company 
Law provides a solid legal foundation for the transformation of SOEs, which has since 
been accompanied by the Securities Law of 1998. In addition to legal sources, the 
memorandum of associations of each corporatised SOE plays an active role in designing 
corporate governance structures. The Chinese memorandum of associations is 
comparable to a document that would combine both the articles of incorporation and 
bylaws of US corporations.  
China’s Company Law stipulates that all Chinese limited liability corporations 
must have modern corporate governance institutions (McNally, 2002: 104), with three 
statutory and indispensable corporate governing bodies (Schipani and Junhai, 2001: 6). 
These governing bodies are shareholder meetings, boards of directors, and boards of 
supervisors (McNally, 2002: 104). In addition, it introduced two statutory corporate 
positions, namely the chair of the board of directors and the chief executive officer. At 
first glance, the corporate governance structure in the China of today appears similar to 
the German two-tier system, since German corporations are also governed by a board of 
directors and a supervisory board. However, in China there is no hierarchical 
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relationship between the board of directors and the board of supervisors, and both 
directors and supervisors can be appointed and dismissed by the shareholders. By 
contrast, the German supervisory board oversees the board of directors, and board 
members are appointed and dismissed by the supervisors. Chinese corporate law  
recognises two types of corporations, which are closely held corporations and publicly 
held corporations. Each category contains special provisions allowing subcategories, 
organised according to the ownership structure of the corporation. Nevertheless, the 
governing bodies in both closely and publicly held corporations are substantially the 
same (Schipani and Junhai, 2001: 6-7).  
A revised Company Law of 2005 in China came into force on January 1, 2006. 
The main implications of this was a lowering of the transaction costs associated with 
establishing a limited liability company, greater enhancement of the rights of minority 
shareholders, and an introduction of mechanisms designed to create greater 
transparency and accountability in corporate governance. All limited liability companies 
must now establish a supervisory board to act as a watch dog to ensure that the 
management and directors fulfil their obligations. In particular, the common-law 
doctrine of ‘piercing the corporate veil’ was introduced, allowing creditors to access the 
assets of the all shareholders to repay company debts. Under the previous limited 
liability form, minority shareholders are not personally liable for debts (China 
Solutions, 2005).  
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Appendix 7. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINESE SOEs 
In China, a SOE is a firm that was confiscated by the Communist Party from the former 
Kuomintang government, a firm purchased from the national capitalists after 1949, or a 
firm established by the state since 1949. When the People’s Republic of China was 
founded, the ruling group instigated the adoption of a command economy with little 
place for market mechanisms and private ownership, and all of the old corporations 
were gradually nationalised (Wei, 2002: 101, 108).  
To regulate private business, the new government enacted the Interim 
Regulations Concerning Private Enterprises in 1950. This divided private business into 
sole traders, partnerships, or companies. Shareholders were able to exercise their 
residual rights through shareholders’ meetings. However, an important characteristic of 
the legislation of 1950 was that it enabled the state to incorporate the productive activity 
of private business into its economic plan. By 1953, the first five-year economic plan 
was launched, and private business reform accelerated. Private businesses were 
restructured to become joint state-private enterprises. The 1954 Interim Regulations for 
Joint State-Private Enterprises provided regulations for joint state-private enterprises in 
the form of limited companies. The shareholders were the state and private investors, 
and all shareholders had limited liability. In addition, the state could appoint 
representatives to participate in management. By now there were no shareholders’  
meetings. The 1954 legislation stipulated that joint state-private enterprises were subject 
to the leadership of the state, but jointly managed by state representatives and private  
agents. By 1956 all private businesses had been converted into joint state-private 
enterprises, and in that same year, the State Council enacted new rules, fixing the 
dividends of private shareholdings in joint state-private enterprises to just 5% per year. 
These new rules effectively converted private shareholders into creditors. Consequently, 
the joint state-private enterprises, which were the only remaining limited companies, 
were converted into SOEs (Wei, 2003: 92-94). This 1956 transformation of joint state-
private enterprises into SOEs marked the extinction of the Western-style corporate form 
in China. In the following two decades, China experienced economic stagnation, and the 
poor performance and inefficiency of the SOEs was clearly perceived by the Chinese  
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leadership (Wei, 2002: 101-102). Nevertheless, for a Chinese SOE, the state controls 
both the enterprise and the bank which finances it and receives the entire return from 
refinancing. Therefore, the state can internalise the costs of monitoring.  
Che and Qian (1998: 22) believe that because sunk costs, costs already incurred 
which cannot be recovered regardless of future events, are relatively low for large 
SOEs, the incentives for refinancing are high. Consequently, continued state patronage 
for large Chinese SOEs appears desirable. In addition, the Chinese government of today 
feels that high social costs would result from the total departure of state ownership from 
firms. These social costs would be higher unemployment and an increased risk of social 
instability.
 
Therefore, many Chinese accept that state shares in firms that are not 
essential to the national economy should be permitted to be sold on stock markets to 
enable the market control mechanism to operate and to provide greater financial sources 
for firms (Wei, 2002: 110), so long as the state maintains a majority shareholding. 
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Appendix 8. 
THE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW PLAN. 
Interviewers must have a pre-prepared interview plan for conducting semi-structured  
interviews. Laforest (2009: 7-8) presents a sample semi-structured interview plan for  
researching safety diagnosis in local communities that can be adapted to other contexts.  
Laforest reminds the researcher that the interview plan should be used in a flexible  
manner. It should be adapted, if necessary, to the topics the interviewer seeks to explore  
and the type of informant being interviewed. There are three sections to the semi- 
structured interview plan that is suggested. The first section of the semi-structured  
interview plan is concerned with introducing the interviewer, and it should be easily  
adapted. The important point here is that the interviewer introduces himself or herself to  
the interviewee and reminds the participant of the issues that will be discussed during  
the interview. In this way, the interviewee will know exactly what the interviewer’s  
expectations are.  
The second section of the semi-structured interview plan is the main part which  
should indicate which issues are to be discussed and suggest possible questions.  
Contrary to the situation with a closed questionnaire, interviewers do not have to ask all  
of the proposed questions in the interview plan, and they should merely follow the  
general outline. In order to make the interview flow more easily, one should summarise  
each issue that has just been discussed before moving on to another issue. In addition,  
the interview will also flow easily if one asks the main questions first whenever a new  
issue is introduced. In any event, the interviewer must choose questions with which they  
are at ease and which are adapted to the interview. The second section of the proposed  
plan should also have clarifying questions in the event that the interviewer would like  
the interviewee to explain certain things in more detail. Interviewers should keep a few  
different versions of such questions in mind so that they can encourage the interviewee  
to keep the discussion going. Furthermore, in the event of interviewees having difficulty  
in addressing certain issues, then interviewers should give some examples.  
Nevertheless, interviewers must not suggest answers.  
The third and final section of the semi-structured interview plan is aimed at  
concluding the interview. The goal here is to enable the interviewer to make sure that  
the issues they wished to explore have been covered and/or clarified. Obviously, one  
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particular interviewee may not be able to talk about all of the issues that the  
researcher wants to address in a thesis. Therefore, it is important to decide what issues  
are pertinent when the interview is being prepared. Acknowledging all of the 
considerations outlined by Laforest, the following semi-structured interview plan was 
proposed which has been adapted from the one presented by Laforest, and it was used 
as a guideline.           
The first section: the introduction of interviewer. 
Hello, my name is Steven Kort, and I am a PhD researcher at the University of  
Worcester. The title of my thesis is Comparing the Transfer of CSR Principles by 
Western and Chinese Extractive Industry Firms to Promote African Development: A 
Co-evolutionary Approach. Therefore, during the interview, I would like to discuss the 
following themes: 
 Corporate governance.  
 Corporate social responsibility.  
 Embedded corporate cultures.  
 Institutional environment. 
 Social issues.  
 Environmental issues.  
 Development. 
 Transparency. 
 The governance climate in Angola and/or Africa.  
With these issues in mind… 
NB. Depending upon the interview, issues were added and/or excluded. 
The second section: the main part of the interview, using the example of exploring  
the issue of the governance climate in Angola. 
Main questions:  
Can you tell me about the governance climate in Angola? 
In your opinion, is the governance climate in Angola representative of the whole  
African setting? 
Additional questions: 
 How did you learn about these issues? 
 Why is it considered a problem? 
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 Why is it not considered a problem? 
 How do problems arise? 
 How is the scope of the problem important? 
 How are people affected by the problem and who are the main victims? 
 How does what happens now represent a change to past? 
 How do you explain the problem? 
Clarifying questions: 
 Can you expand a little on this? 
 Can you tell me anything else? 
 Can you give me some examples? 
The third section: concluding the interview. 
Clarifying questions: 
 Can you expand a little on this? 
 Can you tell me anything else? 
Additional questions: 
 Can you give me some contact details of other people to talk to? 
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Appendix 9. 
Semi-Structured Interview with Professor John Child of the University  
of Birmingham Business School, 25
th
 November, 2010. 
Key: 
SK: Steven Kort (interviewer) 
JC: John Child (interviewee) 
SK: Can you tell me about the economic reform period in China, in relation to how  
the firms, and if you can the state owned enterprises, the national champion state  
owned enterprises, how they have evolved with the institutional environment? 
JC: Well, if you’re particularly interested in the national champions let me first point  
you to one or two other sources you may or may not have come across. Have you come  
across Peter Nolan? 
SK: Yes. 
JC: Okay. If we take the story up to... I’m not sure if they’ve done anything recently, if  
we take the story up to the beginning of this of this century. Also there was the work of  
Gordon Redding, the Redding and Witt book, have you come across that?   
SK: Yes I have. 
JC: Have you come across Barbara Krug’s work on local state enterprises? 
SK: Oh that name sounds familiar. 
JC: She works at Rotterdam School of Management. Her book was published by  
Edward Elgar in 2007. Now yeah, there are national champions which are state owned. 
SK: They are state owned. 
JC: I don’t know how far you want to go with the economic reform; of course it  
officially started at the end of 1978.  
SK: Pretty much that far back. I’ve looked at BP right back to when they were  
Anglo-Persian and I’ve looked at the early corporate period in China. 
JC: It started primarily in the agricultural sector but then by about ’84 you started  
getting some reforms in the enterprise system particularly the internal government of  
enterprises and shifting from leadership by the Party and the Party executive committee  
to the enterprise director, and that was the beginning of the movement towards normal  
executive line management as we would know it. State enterprises, the larger ones were  
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still subject very much to and controlled by their respective ministries and there is still  
as far as I can tell certainly a large degree of interweaving between the ministries which  
is not the case with the general run of state enterprises which have been progressively  
devolved in terms of control and to some extent ownership. Some of them are joint- 
stock companies. There have been a few cases where they’ve even been acquired by  
foreign companies, particularly if you’ve got a big failing state enterprise. And there’s  
been another development in an area which is always a little bit ambiguous and that’s  
more at the provincial and local level because the movement that was originally called  
township and village enterprises, and these are certainly not the national champions,  
were just seen as supplementing the rural economy in terms of employment, but often  
they discovered very rapidly, discovered niches that state enterprises are not catering for  
very effectively. They then became collective enterprises which meant strictly speaking  
they were owned by the employers but in practice meant they tended to come under the  
tutelage, if you like patronage, of the local government. They weren’t officially state  
enterprises but they were certainly not private enterprises. Some of them have since  
become private and of course you will see people talk about privatisation of the  
collective sector and even some state enterprises seem to become privatised. The big  
movement has been the growth of private enterprises from, you know usually very  
small outfits and this is the most dynamic and entrepreneurial sector in terms of, when  
you look at the statistics, employment because you’ve still got under-employment in the  
state sector; and then of course there’s the so called foreign funded enterprises, foreign  
ventures, foreign owned business. Now so far as the large state enterprises are  
concerned I know in an area that I’ve just touched on a little bit with some colleagues  
more recently which is their ability, their freedom to invest abroad, that’s a particular  
issue. They have been increasingly encouraged to do this but they’ve also been freed  
from the many bureaucratic approval conditions and restrictions that they were  
previously subject to. This only started around the year 2000. 
SK: Yes. Do you think that state patronage is still very important?  
JC: Yes of course. 
SK: China has had a long history of that. When they earlier adopted the corporate  
reform they relied significantly on state patronage. 
JC: Yes. 
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SK: So that’s very important I think. 
JC: It is very important and there’s still a lot of guidance regarding their strategic  
priorities coming from the state. There’s no doubt about that. Now, how this impinges  
on issues of corporate social responsibility I don’t know. What seems to happen at least  
with going abroad with these sorts of enterprises is that a lot of the ground is laid  
government to government by government understandings so Chinese officials will  
reach an understanding with Angolan officials. They kind of ease in the state enterprise  
which I’m sure locally is seen as an arm of the Chinese government which is not an  
unreasonable way to perceive them. 
SK: Would you say it’s very much state-led capitalism? 
JC: Well some people call it state capitalism, yes. But and this is where the Redding and  
Witt book is useful. One has to bear in mind this is just one sector of the Chinese... it’s  
one business system among many and China is characterised by three or four different  
business systems. Now in terms of you’re looking at them going abroad, in terms of  
foreign investment it has particularly been the state sector, the large state enterprises  
have been particularly important because the majority, in terms of the value of foreign  
investment, has been asset seeking: raw materials, some food supplies and so forth. So  
you see it in Sudan where I believe China takes pretty much takes all of the oil out of  
Sudan, you see it in Angola and maybe other places. You see it increasingly in Latin  
America, you see it in Brazil... not so much oil yet although that may be will come in  
time but iron ore and food supplies, and the Chinese put in a lot of infrastructure. I’m  
sure that these investments are based on soft loans from the government. So you’ve got  
the funding angle and you’ve got no doubt a big sort of steer in terms of political needs  
to meeting Chinese strategic interest to secure its raw materials and food.   
SK: How would you say that... Chinese investment often involves complimentary  
investment from the Chinese state, so how do you think that could give them an  
advantage compared to a Western multinational with a CSR package? 
JC: First of all I think the Chinese would say their principle is no conditions attached.  
So they’re not going to ask too many questions and worry too much about people’s  
practices. That I think in the eyes of local politicians would obviously give them a  
considerable advantage. 
SK: Absolutely. 
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JC: Secondly the Chinese don’t, as far as I understand it, follow a policy to this giving  
of aid but they go in and they will build particular projects. There is a long history. They  
built the railway in Tanzania. That was back in the 70s so there’s a long history. 
SK: They are rebuilding the Bengali railway currently and other tracks. 
JC: Bengali, I think it’s Angola. 
SK: Angola, yes. But I mentioned it as an example. 
JC: One of the projects they did in Africa and it goes back, was in Tanzania, I’ve  
forgotten the name of it now, it was a major project and the Chinese have become very  
good at building infrastructure. 
SK: So they have a long history of building infrastructure in Africa? 
JC: Oh yes they do, yes. And you can trace it back. I don’t know the history of how  
long back their association with countries like Sudan goes because it may go back quite  
a long way. Tanzania, it probably goes back even further but I’m not sure how active  
they are today in Tanzania. I suspect... it takes two to make a relationship. I wonder  
whether in a country like Tanzania which has actually as I understand become more  
democratic and more open...   
SK: Not as good as Botswana perhaps? 
JC: Oh no, Botswana is an exception. But one wonders and I suspect the Chinese are  
clever enough to adapt to the local system and they may well prefer to deal with people  
who are in a system that is not so open, where not so many questions are asked even by  
Africans. It would also be interesting to see and one hears reports of tensions in some  
places with local staff, local workers because there’s some projects, the big projects,  
they bring in Chinese workers. So the complaint is they’re not doing anything really for  
Africa. They may be putting money in the pockets of some politicians. 
SK: Oh clearly yes, but what about the people? 
JC: The local complaint is that they’re not doing anything directly for the people. Now I  
don’t know how justified that complaint is. 
SK: Did you know that Zambia had a presidential election a few years ago, and the  
opposition candidate campaigned on an anti-Chinese platform, saying that Zambia  
had become another province of China, and not just because of the Chinese  
bringing in all their own labour, particularly in the mining sector.    
JC: It was an issue. 
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SK: Indeed it was an issue. As it worked out he didn’t get the presidential post but  
he did establish himself as a very powerful political force. He won a lot of votes in  
the mining areas. Of course that was the Copperbelt. 
JC: The other problem from a local point of view as well is the Chinese tend to not only  
bring, often bring in their own workers, but they bring in their own management. So  
they are, a bit like the Japanese have sometimes been accused of being, they are sort of  
self contained which obviously is not going to lead to very good communication with  
ordinary people. They may have their lines established with the politicians, with the  
decision makers but it doesn’t mean to say that they’re doing very much PR or  
demonstrable social responsibility in the sense of contributing to the local community. 
SK: Do you think that’s one advantage that a Western firm might have? I know  
that BP has had a very long history of at least trying to employ local people.   
JC: Yes if a Western firm offers training to local people it’s going to help with local  
employment. Yes I think that’s all about education. 
SK: When BP were originally in Iran, it was Anglo-Persian then, there were a lot  
of complaints that they were employing Turks or British nationals rather than  
local Iranians, but they did address that by training and educating locals. So do  
you think over time that’s a lesson that a Western firm like BP has learnt whilst  
China have yet to learn that lesson? 
JC: Could be, yes. I think that would be received positively, an effort to train people,  
local people. On the other hand I don’t know from a purely business point of view  
whether the Chinese way of dealing with political power puts them in a position to do  
that. I’m sure it does give them a short... 
SK: It gives them an advantage? 
JC: It gives them a short term advantage. It’s debatable isn’t it? Some people say there  
are signs that Sub-Saharan Africa is becoming... more and more African countries are  
becoming more democratic, more open, in which case this Chinese approach if that’s  
what it is will possibly not be so consistent with the local situation.  
SK: So in the long term it may not be applicable? 
JC: Yeah and no doubt they’re doing deals with Mugabe but is Mugabe going to last, is  
that system going to last? 
SK: Quite. 
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JC: And if it doesn’t then of course all of a sudden if the Chinese have been seen to  
back him maybe it could be a big disadvantage for them. So in the short term it may pay  
off, in the long term it may be a riskier policy than a more open Western approach. 
SK: The second theme that I wanted to explore... can you tell me whether in your  
opinion China is evolving in her own unique business model or simply embracing  
foreign models and adapting them? I’ll give you an example here of the kind of  
thing I’m after and you can maybe tell me a similar story.  Have you heard of the  
Kailan Mining Administration? 
JC: No. 
SK: We are talking about the early 20
th
 century here when China originally  
adopted the corporate form before 1949. This was a British owned firm operating  
in China and they employed a guy called Liu Hongsheng as a, have you heard of  
what a comprador is? 
JC: Yes. 
SK: In addition to his role of comprador, like other compradors he owned his own  
businesses and he used this position as comprador to further his own business  
interests and to learn about modern Western business practices. So he learnt about  
Western style corporate practices and he adapted them into his own businesses,  
and it has been viewed not as a means of Westernisation but as a tool to improve  
like I said his own business practice and even as a tool to improve the economic  
well-being of China. He was called later, during the communist era, a Chinese  
national capitalist. 
JC: Yes. 
SK: Therefore, do you know of any similar cases in the more recent periods?   
JC: There are, as Nolan pointed out in one of his books, there have been examples of  
Chinese entrepreneurs even in the state sector who have become quite prominent and  
there was a period when the authorities seemed to get worried about them becoming too  
powerful and so they were trying to cut them back. That has happened I think less  
recently so you’ll have people like the Haier corporation which is technically a  
collective but it operates more like a state enterprise. 
SK: Well somebody I interviewed the other day told me that Haier is probably the  
only Chinese corporation that most people have actually heard of. 
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JC: Yes it’s been very successful. But there are others. There is a lot of credit being  
given and publicity even to the leaders now of state enterprises and this is a kind of  
reversion I think to a Confucian view of leadership, the importance of leadership but the  
particularly Chinese aspect of it is that it’s supposed to be leadership of effectively a  
kind of family, with mutual obligations. This is very strong in Confucianism and you’re  
seeing this as far as I can tell in the culture of some of these even large enterprises  
where it may be difficult to maintain because of their large size.  
SK: Respect for the leadership? 
JC: It’s respect for the leadership but it’s also the leadership claiming and trying to  
demonstrate respect for the workforce, and indeed starting to put a lot of training and a  
lot of investment into the workforce. Now may not be true for the traditional  
enterprises, the smaller family enterprises, but it seems to be a characteristic as far as I  
can tell of many of the state enterprises and it’s something that is being publicised. In  
terms of actual methods, I think they have learnt a lesson from the West... I don’t how  
much they’ve adapted them. It also ties in with the social safety net whereby they have  
in the past tried to avoid lay-offs but there have increasingly been lay-offs particularly  
from failing state enterprises. I think probably for the successful ones they still maintain  
a sense of security because that’s part of this package, you know looking after your  
followers. 
SK: Do you think that has an influence when the Chinese firms go abroad? I’m  
thinking here about the fact that they bring their own Chinese workforce rather  
than employing locals.   
JC: Well the impression I get is that when they do employ both Chinese and locals that  
their practices diverge quite a lot. I don’t think they’re very accommodating towards the  
locals in a context such as Africa. 
SK: They prefer to look after the Chinese workers? 
JC: My impression is that they provide the minimum of training that they need to train  
up the locals for employment. I would not be surprised about this because there’s  
always been a sharp distinction in Chinese culture between the Chinese and the  
foreigner. But I think there are signs of a distinctly Chinese approach to managing  
workers. For example, I talked with a lady who is the CEO of a steel company,  
specialised steel. It’s very successful and she was telling me she believes in a  
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management style that seems to be a combination of paying very favourable wages but  
linked to performance, and at the same time a lot of pretty close supervision as to what’s  
going on, so the control element is high. But this company is located in an inland  
province Jiangxi, in the capital Nanchang. In Nanchang I guess there may be a  
willingness to accept these kinds of methods particularly if the workers are paid well. It  
may not be so acceptable in Shanghai anymore because along with modernisation  
comes a change of attitude.  
SK: It’s not a national champion? 
JC: No it’s not a national champion, it is a very successful company. It suggests an  
emerging distinct Chinese style of management, particularly as a lot of scope now has  
been given to business leaders to put their own ideas into practice. 
SK: So it’s like an organisational hybrid company? 
JC: Could be, yes could be. 
SK: Have you heard of Jian Chen’s book? 
JC: No.   
SK: He wrote about corporate governance in China and wrote that it was Anglo- 
Saxon in principle, but in reality it’s more akin to the German Japanese model. So  
it’s this hybrid. 
JC: Well that wouldn’t surprise me. A little bit more communitarian if you like, but that  
wouldn’t surprise me. That would certainly fit with a Confucian model. Now I’m not  
saying they’re all influenced equally by Confucianism but it is a factor in Chinese  
culture and it’s been allowed to have more influence, very much more in recent years. 
SK: Culture is very important in any system isn’t it? 
JC: Yes. 
SK: The next theme I would like to cover is, in your opinion, is the Chinese  
business model transferable to other developing countries?  
JC: That’s a good question. Well I’m sure that their labour practices would be insofar as  
what probably goes on in Chinese companies is probably suited to unskilled labour and  
some of whom has been recruited recently from the countryside and so forth which you  
will find in some other emerging economies. So that’s a factor. In terms of attitude  
towards a style of management and towards leadership... yes. It’s a characteristic of  
many emerging economies because it may be an element of traditionalism, more respect  
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for authority, more acceptance that people in power have the right to tell you what to do  
and you don’t question it, and insofar as that does characterise relations in Chinese  
firms, which I suspect it does, then that might be transferable. So I think in some  
respects yes, it probably could be transferable, but as culturalists would say there’s  
always the need for re-contextualisation. What I’ve always found interesting and useful  
here is a notion concerning the transfer of Japanese practices like quality circles, where  
when the Americans first just tried to copy the practice, the concrete practice, it didn’t  
work because the context was different in the American environment from the Japanese  
sort of approach. But when they learnt what was the principle behind it, and transferred  
the principle and worked out a concrete application of it, then it worked. It could be that  
there are certain principles in the Chinese approach which they may develop  
successfully. These may be generally suited to emerging economies but again their  
specific application would need to be sensitive to the institutional and cultural context.  
SK: It would be certainly sensitive to the institutional context. But do you think  
that, because another developing country will be in catch up, China, even though  
it’s a very large economy in terms of its aggregate GDP, it’s still pretty much in  
catch up stage and in that sense the model might be viewed as transferable?  You  
could argue that when you’re in catch up stage any model could work. 
JC: They’re not in catch up mode anymore in some industries. 
SK: Certainly not in some industries. 
JC: Not for example with high speed trains or electric cars. Maybe a little bit with autos  
but not so much as previously. 
SK: And not in construction? 
JC: Construction, no. They have transitioned from the catch up stage to become leaders  
in the field and to go beyond competing just on the basis of low cost. I think they’re no  
longer on the whole a low cost economy. There may be areas where they still need to  
catch up, but in terms of quality of product and design, they have caught up a lot now. 
SK: Do you think it depends where you are, in terms of being a low cost economy?  
I mean Shanghai is one of the most expensive places in the world to live. 
JC: Yes, there have been pressures to push wages up; and no, China is no longer a very  
low income economy. Maybe it will follow a similar path to Taiwan. You see Taiwan  
now is not a low wage economy, and it has invested a lot in scientific and engineering  
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education which the Chinese are now doing. 
SK: It’s the Chinese nationalists in Taiwan isn’t it? 
JC: Yes. 
SK: It’s even now called the Republic of China. 
JC: I have a colleague here who is from Taiwan and I’m always having some fun with  
her because she says, “Oh I’m from Taiwan”. I say, “Yes you’re Chinese, from the  
Republic of China. When are you going to connect back with your mainland?” 
SK: Do you think that will ever happen? 
JC: I think it could, yes I think so, because some people have said that China is more a  
nation than a country. In other words, because of family and there’s still a lot of family  
ties between many of the people who come to Taiwan and relatives in nearby provinces  
like Fujian.   
SK: Perhaps a model for welcoming Taiwan back to the mainland like there was  
for Hong Kong? 
JC: Well I was going to say this one country two systems model could be the way that it  
is achieved. 
SK: I’ve got a very quick question now. I’ve often come across Western media  
sources and their perceptions of China, what they are doing in Sub-Saharan Africa  
and complaining about what they are doing particularly in Sudan. Do you think  
that such negative perceptions of China are fair? 
JC: Probably not entirely because there’s always a tendency to criticise a powerful  
nation as the Americans have been, particularly if that nation starts to flex its muscles  
and is seen to be throwing its weight around. China has clear strategic needs which are  
now taking it onto the world stage. 
SK: And you could argue that its strategic need is not any different to that of the  
West? 
JC: No it’s not. They’re just as concerned about their future as any other nation. I think  
criticism of China’s ascendancy isn’t entirely fair. 
SK: Can you expand a little on this?  
JC: Well I’m mindful of the fact that there have been and are a lot of stories about China  
and the Chinese. Some of it may be misunderstanding although we’ve learnt a lot more  
about the Chinese than we used to know, about their culture. One of the things that I  
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was briefed on before I went to China was how to recognise the fact there are about five  
different kinds of laughter in China, and there is a meaning in what people are saying  
and to realise that you’re not dealing with a simple culture. You’re dealing with one  
where certainly better educated people are very subtle and sophisticated in what they do  
and say, and I think that’s true, but it can lead to misunderstanding. 
SK: We’ve touched on governance already, but to how much extent in your  
opinion are Chinese firms well governed? I’m thinking here of the state owned  
enterprises, the national champions. To how much extent is the corporate  
governance of these national champions comparable to international standards?  
From what you know of course. 
JC: Corporate governance, if you take the traditional and I think the rather narrow  
view...  
SK: The principal-agent problem? 
JC: That’s right... the rather narrow view, which is concerned with whether managers as  
agents meet the requirements and interests of the principals then I think that mechanism  
is very much in place in China because the principal there is the state. The state if  
anything is increasing its governance powers even into private enterprise because they  
are increasingly insisting that entrepreneurs join the Party, they’re trying to extend the  
role of the Party and the Party Secretary in the larger private enterprises, so I think the  
one thing the Chinese authorities are most concerned about is exerting control. From  
that point of view their governance system is actually fairly effective. 
SK: In that case, do you think there is a danger of too much state interference? I  
have looked at the early adoption of corporate form before 1949, and it didn’t  
really work very well. One of the reasons for this failure was that the government  
progressively increased their control and interfered too much in the management  
of firms. So do you think that there can be too much interference? 
JC: Yes, but they have at the same time delegated more to management and I think that  
management has become more... 
SK: Autonomous? 
JC: Yes, and China has been turning out a lot of these programmes where Chinese  
managers are studying business abroad and some of the programmes seem to be quite  
good. I’ve come across one that was very good although admittedly it’s along American  
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lines, but it provided a channel whereby some American practices can be introduced  
into the Chinese system.  
SK: Therefore, if the government is interfering but so long as the management has  
sufficient autonomy it shouldn’t be a problem? 
JC: That’s right. Now if you take the stakeholder point of view, how well they are  
responding and taking into account the needs of the local community and the  
environment, that may be another matter. But I think so far as a narrow shareholder  
point of view is concerned or ownership responsibilities concerning governance then I  
think it’s actually quite strong. 
SK: The last question now... to how much extent, in your opinion, do  
multinationals use CSR strategically? I mean here, considering the work of Wiig  
and Kolstad, who researched oil multinationals in Angola and they found that  
improving governance was not an issue in their CSR principles. Their CSR was  
only used strategically in order to receive licenses to operate in Angola. 
JC: Well using it strategically doesn’t necessarily mean that they’re not going to follow  
that up with action. It’s not just what they can get away with in a local situation. It’s  
also going to put them in the face of public opinion and even shareholders in their own  
countries. Now I came across this a few years ago, working with somebody on the  
attitude of chemical multinationals in China and in Taiwan towards environmental  
protection, and our initial expectation was that they would take account of what was a  
fairly lax regulatory environment in mainland China. We found that wasn’t the case and  
it wasn’t necessarily because their decision makers believed from a moral point of view,  
if you like, or from a ethical point of view in CSR or in this case environmental  
responsibility. It was primarily for two reasons. One is that as the Bhopal incident in ’86  
showed, a transgression locally can almost wipe out a company, even a multinational  
because the it has to deal with the reaction on its home ground, not just the reaction  
where an incident occurred. So that was one factor and, of course, that was in the  
chemical industry but I think it applies to other industries too. So I’m sure that the  
Mexican Gulf incident is going to change a lot of practices in BP. But that may not be a  
good example because we’re not talking about a developing country here. The second  
factor which may not apply to oil but it applies to chemicals was that these  
multinationals did not want local Chinese firms to be allowed to come as competitors  
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who need not incur any costs of dealing with effluent, toxic waste, and the like. 
SK: You mean like a free-rider? 
JC: Yes exactly. They wanted the local firms to bear the same costs and therefore felt  
that it was in their interest to do anything that they can to help the Chinese government  
formulate not only effective rules, but the means to enforce them. So in fact the net  
result was that they took, what you like is an aspect of CSR to do with the environment,  
they took it very seriously but it was in their own interests. So you could say it’s a  
strategic move and it wouldn’t surprise me if that doesn’t apply for a lot of firms.   
SK: Well thank you very much for granting me this interview.  
JC: No problem. 
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Appendix 10. 
Semi-Structured Interview with an Anonymous Expert Witness from  
within the CORE Coalition, 2
nd
 November, 2010. 
Key: 
SK: Steven Kort (interviewer) 
CCET: CORE Coalition Expert Testimony (interviewee) 
SK: Can you tell me about the CSR industry in general and how it’s evolved? 
CCET: Well it kind of really came out of the, it’s a very new industry and it’s in its  
teenage years really. It’s relevantly young and it kind of evolved in response to the anti- 
globalisation movement, after the riots in Seattle there's a strong feeling from citizens  
and activists all over the world that these companies were having too much power, more  
power than their own government, as it were. Communities saw that they were doing  
harm to people and the environment and they wanted more checks and balances to be in  
place to stop these multinational companies, in some cases resisting and in other cases  
introducing laws and standards to ensure that they didn’t commit harm, and when they  
did they wouldn’t get away with it. The business response towards that was the birth of  
CSR, which really started with a lot of philanthropic activity such as building schools  
and wells and there was a significant amount of investment in improving particularly  
big multinational companies brand in terms of so that they could place themselves as an  
ethical or a responsible company which would consider these environmental and social  
issues in their operations. CSR officials were generally appointed into the public  
relations department of the firm to try and improve the company’s reputation in terms of  
environmental and social issues, various voluntary initiatives popped up in terms of  
helping companies develop their thinking on CSR, most notably internationally there  
was the Global Compact. 
 The CSR movement, particularly in those early stages, was about companies  
doing good things, you know building a school or a well, it wasn’t about companies  
managing their own environmental and social risk and ensuring that the harm that they  
did was minimised, managed and hopefully mitigated. There was a lot of criticism  
therefore by civil society groups and activists, that these CSR initiatives were just a  
public relations exercise, there was a lot of work from the environmental movement on  
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green washing and exposé of how companies are saying that are doing one thing but  
behaving very differently, including BP, and there was a lot of work done by groups  
like Rising Tide particularly a lot of interesting artwork playing on this Beyond  
Petroleum campaign of BP. The response of the critics of CSR was that there needed to  
be much more regulation on the multinational companies. This sort of came to head at  
the Rio Summit where there was a lot of pressure on states to introduce an international  
binding agreement and also, of course, the UN norms for multinational enterprises,  
which was another opportunity where civil society groups and some governments were  
very keen to introduce binding human rights and environmental standards onto these  
international corporations, because there would clearly be governance gaps in terms of  
the environment and humans rights abuses that the companies involved were  
committing. However there was a huge backlash from business against this regulation,  
and there was a polarisation really about between businesses on the one side saying that  
they were going to do these voluntary initiatives and CSR could ensure that they  
behaved themselves and civil society on the other side saying these voluntary initiatives  
are a load of rubbish, what we really need is more regulation. What was interesting is  
that in the early days, in the early assessments, it became clear that CSR may be of  
relevant interest of brand sensitive companies, but for the vast majority of companies  
who weren’t very sensitive, or who worked in complex supply chains or joint ventures  
or subsidiary companies, there was no actual sort of competitive advantage in respecting  
the environment, respecting human rights, and that if there was no competitive  
advantage in being ethical then why would a company be ethical? It goes against the  
basic legal foundations of what a company was designed for, profit maximisation is  
what a company is about. 
SK: How far would you say that a CSR program is just about protecting the  
brand? I am thinking of BP here. I’ve heard a lot of things saying it’s all about  
companies, I mean particularly BP, producing glossy reports saying that they do  
this and they do that, and they don’t really deliver on it, so how far would you say  
it’s actually about protecting the brand, protecting the reputation? 
CCET: Well it’s all about protecting the brand. 
SK: That’s all of it, it’s entirely about protecting the brand? 
CCET: It’s entirely about protecting the brand. I mean that’s not saying that BP or  
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another company isn’t considering environmental and social issues from another lens or  
prospective, they may consider investing in a complex zone and the risks associated  
with that from a brand perspective. They may consider it also from a risk perspective,  
both in terms of what risks the company will face on the brand in terms of the conflict  
with the government, with rebels and so on; but also in terms of the risk of NGO  
campaigns against the company, litigation and other risks, and the possibility of risk in  
terms of things going wrong. So just because, you know... CSR is a significant element  
of the environmental and social way that companies consider things, but it’s not the  
only way that they would consider it. John Ruggie, the US special representative on  
business and human rights has done a lot of work and thinking on this, thinking of  
environment and human rights issues from a due diligence perspective which is  
important.  
SK: How do you think, the CSR initiatives have evolved? What I’m thinking of  
here is a company like BP; they have had a very long history of operating in the  
developing world. They were originally Anglo-Persian and Anglo-Iranian, but I  
know from the very early years they, on the social issues perspective of it, they  
learnt from their mistakes. For example, in the very early years the Iranian  
government was very, very cross with the company because they weren’t  
employing many local people, not even for middle management, they tended to  
bring in Ottoman Turks if they didn’t bring British labour over. But they learnt  
from that experience and they started educating Iranians so that they could  
employ more locals. Of course they were eventually kicked out because the oil  
industry in Iran was nationalised. However, I’m thinking here that the Chinese are  
coming in on the scene, but without the same kind of experience. So would you say  
that a Western firm might have more experience in implementing CSR than a  
Chinese firm that is now investing in oil? 
CCET: No. 
SK: Not at all? 
CCET: Why would BP have more, BP because it’s an older company? 
SK: Yes, because it’s an older company and perhaps got more experience. 
CCET: So would an older company with more experience be better at CSR, is that what  
you’re saying? 
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SK: Yes. 
CCET: When you say, with an older company, does experience make you better  
qualified to do stuff? Of course, yes as a general rule. However, in terms of corporate  
social responsibility the Chinese companies have got a very strong culture and legal  
framework which is designed to support the workforce, designed to protect the  
environment in a lot of ways, much more than the culture of western companies, and in  
terms of CSR, I think it’s important to separate whether or not your question is actually  
referring too – are you talking about CSR per se, or are you talking about the  
environmental and social responsibility of these companies? And does BP’s history  
mean that it has more experience and its more capable of dealing with environmental  
and social issues than the Chinese companies is a very different question than how good  
these companies are at CSR. 
SK: The environmental and social issues. 
CCET: Right. Well I think that BP clearly doesn’t deal with environmental and social  
abuse effectively. I think it clearly hasn’t learnt from its experience, so I don’t think  
anyone could reasonably come to the conclusion to say that BP was a company which a  
new company would be in a worse position in, in terms of its performance, because BP  
clearly haven’t learnt from experience. But in terms of CSR I think that Western  
companies do have some advantages with that debate, because CSR is a kind of  
Western brand and the kinds of things that CSR promotes and is interested in comes  
from a Western culture.  
SK: Can I ask you about transparency? How would you say that a company could  
be more transparent? I’m thinking specifically here of when they are dealing with  
Sub-Saharan Africa. Do you think... well I’ll give you an example. In Angola BP  
were threatened a few years ago with having their contracts cancelled because they  
unilaterally decided to publish their accounts. All oil revenues are supposed to go  
through the Angolan state-owned oil company, Sonangol. Sonangol are supposed  
to transfer the money to the Angolan treasury but they actually divert monies via  
subsidiaries before it goes to the treasury, and of course a lot of money disappears.  
So when BP decided to publish their accounts, they objected to this, they said  
confidentiality agreements were being broken. So they sent a letter to say that they  
objected, but I think it was threat to other oil firms, and they were never really  
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serious about cancelling BP’s contracts, it was more a case of scaring the other  
firms operating in Angola into not publishing their accounts. Basically, the  
initiative didn’t work. So to make things more transparent, do you think that it’s  
right that a company should try to do that on its own or should there be some kind  
of cooperation with other bodies? 
CCET: I think, I mean it’s obviously a complicated area trying to hold them to account  
and ensure that companies are transparent when we’re talking about international  
companies and national regulatory systems, and that there's a clear need for a  
cooperative effort both nationally, regionally, and also internationally; and so in the case  
of Angola, the Angolan government or the Pan-African Agreement or international  
agreements and Publish What You Pay. In many ways they’ve done a lot of work in this  
regard. There's a need for much greater transparency in terms of tax accounts,  
partnership agreements, and the other environmental and social data that’s collated and  
how its presented, and the need for information to be given which is then audited...  
which is comparable, which is relevant, with a need for information, up to date  
information to also be available and accessible to stakeholders and there's a lot of work  
which in many ways has been done on all of this. Companies, some companies, do  
make difficult decisions that then means they're put in a position where countries make  
it impossible for them to be transparent about what they're doing, but they may leave.   
SK: Well like I said I don’t think Angola were serious about cancelling BP’s  
contracts, and I don’t think BP really wanted to leave so how would you say all of  
this has been affected by China coming in now? Because of course China invest  
with no conditions attached, so do you think that would be more agreeable to some  
African countries when you consider a lot of Western firms are going to have at  
least some conditions attached? Like BP, they wanted some transparency. But the  
Chinese are coming in and they are saying we’ll invest, no conditions attached. So  
how do you think Western firms are going to be affected by China coming in now? 
CCET: In terms of the environmental and social impact of the project, or brand, or  
condition of the -? 
SK: Well yes all of those things, but in particular do you think the Africans will  
actually prefer the investment from China? 
CCET: I think developing countries have got governments that generally have got a  
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strong desire for foreign direct investment. It’s obvious that they want to maximise that  
investment with minimal risk and with minimal conditions attached. That’s clear. I do  
not know, and I am not privileged, and I expect very few people are actually privileged  
to knowing what the conditions are attached to investments between these deals and I’m  
sure that they're incredibly complex and pretentious. I know that there's been a lot of  
stuff in the media about how the Chinese don’t have conditions attached, that Western  
companies do, but how much of that is actually true or the Chinese have just got  
different conditions to the Western companies, I don’t actually know. 
SK: So possibly a cultural thing? 
CCET: Yes, and I am conscious of the fact that there is a lot of anti-Chinese feeling  
going on which drives this debate and the cynicism and I think that there is a quite  
patronising colonial attitude by a lot of Western business people. 
SK: Just to clarify do you think the anti-Chinese sentiment is coming from the  
West, the anti-Chinese attitude that you refer to just then? 
CCET: In terms of the competition between the Western companies and Chinese  
companies, and Western companies voicing concerns about the lack of Chinese  
standards and the lack of Chinese conditions, I take a lot of that with a pinch of salt. 
SK: Do you think though that China could be seen as a development partner for  
these countries? I mean a large number of developing world countries have been  
quite welcoming to Chinese investments, at least initially. There is a debate which  
I’ve latched on to now, which is perhaps the honeymoon period for Chinese  
investment in the rest of the developing world is starting to be over. I think that we  
might be seeing the start of that because African elites certainly benefit from  
Chinese investment but the major problem I’ve heard about is that the Chinese  
employ very few locals, so do you think that’s a problem that’s going to manifest  
itself in the coming years?   
CCET: Well I think that there's generally a lot of scepticism about foreign direct  
investment, particularly in the extractive sector in terms of the impact on the  
environment and people, and you of course the resource curse; the Chinese companies  
certainly aren’t going to be exempt from all of that. 
SK: Can I ask about the idea of strategic corporate responsibility? To how much  
extent in your opinion do multinational corporations use corporate social  
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responsibility strategically? What I mean here is that Wiig and Kolstad, two  
academic writers, suggested that a lot of multinational corporations present their  
corporate social responsibility programs and they promise to deliver on them, but  
this simply is a way of sealing deals, certainly in the extractive sector. Do you think  
a lot of firms use CSR strategies in this way? Do you think they use it strategically?   
CCET: I think that CSR initiatives can be very important in companies securing a social  
license to operate, yes. I am not talking about a physical license to operate. I am talking  
about a social license to operate which goes back to your previous point in terms of the  
backlash against companies and all companies need to be accepted, foreign companies  
need to be accepted in a local community. Going back to the risk management strategies  
of the company, BP has tried very hard to put in place systems or schools or projects  
which will win over the support of the local community, which clearly is in BP’s best  
interests to do that. So yes of course some of the CSR initiatives are strategic, some of  
them are very un-strategic, like for example building two schools in a very small  
village, which has already got a school. 
SK: So why do you think they do that in that case? Is it risk management? 
CCET: It is strategic CSR. 
SK: So do you think that might be a good thing to explore?  
CCET: It seems very related to the business case of CSR and there's a lot of stuff about  
the business case of CSR, and particularly by people like Tomorrow’s Company,  
who’ve have done a lot of work for exploring how the long term successful companies  
are companies which consider these issues, and deal with these issues and manage their  
environmental and social risks effectively. Again, there's huge limitations to that, in  
some ways it works for a brand sensitive company, if they're a company which is  
designed for long term investments, but there’s plenty of companies for whom  
financially it makes much more sense to commit violations of human rights than it does  
to protect human rights. 
SK: How do you think that’s come about? 
CCET: Because they're driven by what makes business sense. 
SK: As simple as that?  
CCET: Yes. 
SK: I think that’s pretty much the main questions that I wanted to ask, so if you  
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don’t mind I will ask for some background on the CORE coalition. You work  
within the coalition so can you just tell me about the CORE coalition? 
CCET: Yeah the corporate responsibility coalition was formed in 2000 and it now has  
130 supporting organisations. Our members include environmental groups, human  
rights groups, that kind of thing. Our members include Amnesty, Actionaid, WWF,  
TraidCraft, and all our members, whether or not their organisational objectives are  
poverty, international development, the protection of information and human rights and  
workers rights; have all found in their experience that yes, although companies can  
sometimes be a force for good, the majority of UK companies when they operate abroad  
get away with violating human rights and the environment, and that in terms of the  
cases that they’ve looked at, that if they're going to achieve their organisational  
objectives, whether it be protection of human rights, the environment, or international  
development, they need to stop UK companies getting away with committing these  
violations and it’s a key problem that US special representative John Ruggie talked  
about. There's no international law for these companies, there's no governance of these  
companies. You have poor countries who are prepared to compromise on environmental  
and social standards for things like foreign direct investment and plenty of wealthy  
countries who are quite happy to receive the funds and then the profit at the expense of  
the breach of these environmental and social standards. So CORE based its work over  
the last ten years, or for the last seven anyway, on securing members to the UK  
Company Law. We were instrumental in the introduction of a new statutory duty or  
directorate with regards to their environmental and social impacts and then there's the  
reporting legislation which requires the largest public limited companies to annually  
produce a report of their environmental and social impacts. Since the end of that  
campaign and the Companies Act 2006 coming into play we focus our efforts more on  
the issue of enforcements than on the law, and our latest campaign is the introduction of  
a new UK commission for business, human rights and environment, mandated to ensure  
that UK companies respect human rights and environmental standards wherever in the  
world they operate, and also have a duty to investigate, penalise and sanction UK  
companies who are not complying when they operate abroad. This campaign has  
already got some support from the Liberal Democrats and from a wide diverse range of  
civil society and academia. We have produced a report for the London School of  
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Economics which talks about how the complex web of social, political and economic  
reasons acts as a barrier to things getting addressed and the need for the UK to take  
action. It’s all on our website though. 
SK: Well thank you very much for granting me this interview. 
CCET: Yeah I am sure you’ll do a very interesting study. 
SK: I hope so. 
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Appendix 11. 
Semi-Structured Interview with Professor Jedrzej George Frynas of  
the Middlesex University Department of Business and Management,  
20
th
 December, 2010. 
Key: SK: Steven Kort (interviewer) 
GF: George Frynas (interviewee) 
SK: As we’re relatively short of time, I’m just going to ask you to tell me just  
generally about corporate CSR principles of multi-national corporations in the oil  
sector. So can you fairly briefly outline what the major CSR principles of oil multi- 
nationals are?   
GF: A lot of them, you have human rights and you have - you work CSR principles that  
you are familiar with. You have environmental ones which will include also the thing  
from [unclear speech]. You have health and safety principles. You have payment of  
taxes to government and if... all the agenda includes are the tax revenues compliant with  
the extractive industries transparency initiative and so forth. So there are all sorts of  
very, very different types of principles. 
SK: What would you say was the main priorities for an oil multinational? I’m  
thinking here of BP because they have their beyond petroleum campaign. What  
would you say would be their priority? What would they – let’s say for example  
social issues or environmental issues, which would they consider more important? 
GF: I’m the wrong person to ask. You have to ask BP, I can’t say what their priorities  
are. I would suspect however, that social investment would potentially be a key one  
because it’s very tricky, it’s difficult to get it right and quite important to get the social  
licence to operate in developing countries which cannot be done without some sort of  
social investment. But then it doesn’t mean that everything else isn’t important.  
Certainly the disaster in the United States showed that certainly environmental concerns  
were equally as important, if not more important. So you have to ask BP those things,  
especially people in charge if that is possible. I’m not able to fully answer that question. 
SK: Okay that’s fine. I pretty much feel that BP, from what I’ve read and what  
I’ve researched so far, I think that BP do place a strong emphasis relatively on  
environment issues, but that’s all, of course, what they do in developed countries.   
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So you think that… 
GF: Well developed countries that put a lot of emphasis on climate change and carbon  
emissions. I think that the leaders should in part still consider, despite everything else  
that has happened, consider other things because they’ve managed to reduce their own  
operational emissions, to a much larger extent than any other oil company. But I mean,  
that was partly to answer to an audience in developed countries. Also the key thing to  
remember is the role of government. The government is the baseline of what is our  
means. My favourite example is the difference between Norway and Nigeria. If you  
avoid oil spills in Norway it’s just complying with the law, if you do it in Nigeria it’s  
considered CSR. So government is key to everything. It provides the definition of what  
CSR is, it’s the baseline from where it starts. In developed countries, in the United  
States and in the UK you have to comply with the law. You have to avoid too many  
health and safety risks and so forth, and on top of that there’s a share of BP that decided  
to tackle the climate change agenda. Whereas in developing nations, you know, you  
have very, very different priorities. 
SK: To how much extent, in your opinion, do you think that western oil firms, I’m  
using BP as an example here, but what do they do to transfer good corporate  
governance principles to developing countries, particularly to Africa? 
GF: What do you mean by good governance? 
SK: This is probably leading on to a later question, but … 
GF: By corporate governance I mean organisation, so having a CSR compliment of  
corporate governance. 
SK: I was thinking more of things like promoting transparency. What I mean here  
is that the transfer of good business principles could be enhanced by collective  
action by oil multinationals. An example here is that BP a few years ago published  
their accounts in an attempt to build transparency in their dealings with Angola,  
and this promoted a very angry response in Angola and they even threatened to  
cancel BP’s contracts, and no other firm published their accounts. So what I mean  
here is that can one firm really do much to promote the transfer unilaterally? 
GF: So when you – I mean we speak now specifically of transparency. 
SK: Yes transparency. 
GF: Well I mean we obviously know Angola and Azerbaijan will be like pioneering  
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something new. It didn’t go very well and it’s very, very clear that it will only work  
with collective action, and that hasn’t happened, it’s a long way from that. 
SK: So why is that then? 
GF: Well it’s difficult to find consensus between companies and here you have free  
riders which can potentially benefit if some companies do it but others don’t do it and  
so forth, there’s a lot at stake, you could potentially enrage some actors, particularly  
host governments. You may have things too high yourself potentially, transferring  
transparency and other things. So what you potentially would need is something on the  
model of the mining sector with the mining associations, which obviously is not the  
case, at the moment really you only have the extractive industries transparency initiative  
which doesn’t really go anywhere near enough. So there isn’t much happening  
transparently as a sort of governance. Not just taking transparency but also  
organisational principles... there isn’t really best practice. So I don’t think there’s  
anything emerging in terms of voluntary governance in a specific style that would be  
the most effective. Companies at headquarter level tend to have specific principles, but  
again it is open to question what is the best way or trying activities that could be seen as  
best practice amongst any commercial activities, certainly amongst British-based  
companies. But then again, you know, you can question if this is the most effective  
thing, but then more importantly how does it fare, running operations everywhere else  
where it matters. So I don’t think in terms of corporate governance, including  
transparency, that there is much best practice established or implemented really. 
SK: So do you think that BP had anything to be gained by promoting  
transparency? Advanced reputation or protecting the brand? 
GF: Well I mean there was potentially a genuine willingness to come forward and to  
either respond to critics including groups like Global Witness or themselves to be more  
proactive and show that yes we are, for whatever reason, becoming more transparent.   
But this hasn’t provided the best practice as an example to be followed by others or  
even to be continued by yourselves all around the world, so for whatever reason they  
did it, for whatever reasons it didn’t work out, you know, it didn’t provide an example  
for others to follow, or for BP. 
SK: Well when I said that it promoted an angry response from the Angolan  
authorities, it was Manuel Vincente who sent the very angry letter to BP. But he  
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sent the same letter to all the other oil companies operating in Angola. So do you  
think that might have been a bit of a scare tactic to stop other oil companies  
publishing their accounts? 
GF: Yeah, well I mean again that is an opinion. I think I can provide the best input to do  
with an overview of what companies actually do rather than, you know, the motivation.  
You only have to ask those actors what their motivation may have been, or how it was  
perceived by the companies themselves, you know and what they thought at the time. 
SK: Okay. Do you know anything about the Chinese firms going abroad? 
GF: Very little. 
SK: Very little. Well I mean we do know that the Chinese firms invest overseas  
with their guiding principle of no conditions attached. Obviously there’s little in  
this to promote transferring governance principles to developing countries. It is  
your opinion I’m looking for here. My Director of Studies has clearly said it’s okay  
to seek people’s opinions. To how much extent would, in a Sub-Saharan African  
country, for example, would they prefer Chinese investment with no conditions  
attached rather than Western investment? 
GF: Who is they? 
SK: Well that’s probably the key question. 
GF: Government? 
SK: I don’t think just the government, I’d say also the people. 
GF: The population at large or local communities? 
SK: Local communities. Okay two questions, first of all the African host  
governments? 
GF: Well the governments would probably very much like Chinese investment.  
Whereas the Chinese do not maybe provide as many obstacles to certain things, I mean  
they do not come with the baggage of the West. But above all I think the Chinese, so  
what I’m trying to say I suppose, no strings attached to Chinese firms there. On the  
other hand we get lubricants to help Chinese firms get established, such as the  
government helping them and supporting them, offered as part of any contractual or  
non-contractual arrangements to get established. But as part of a deal you may have  
roads built or other infrastructure improved and so forth, and that certainly is very, I  
mean anyone, you know if this was a European country, you will find it very, very  
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sympathetic, you’d be very sympathetic yourself especially since there’s a great need  
for these things in many countries. So if Chinese firms actually do invest they might  
have more chance of those roads and other infrastructure projects getting built.   
Sometimes you have loans to governments as part of those deals from the Chinese  
government and so forth, and on the other hand there’s not the necessity to comply with  
certain rules that maybe, not just ones that foreign governments may have or companies  
may have, but from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, who would  
have less leverage in those countries as a result because money comes from a different  
source. So I mean it’s more than natural for any government to prefer a Chinese  
competitor to a potentially Western one because of all of these advantages. It’s also not  
totally unheard of... in the 1950s or the 1960s, there was a lot of grumbling amongst  
Western companies against AGIP because they were a new competitor and they were  
happy to accept less favourable deals in African countries such as Nigeria than other  
companies because they wanted to quickly get into the business market. So sometimes  
in business there is a problem of a new entrant. Any new entrants may change the rules  
again because they’re quite cheap to get to it and it’s not just the Chinese, the new  
entrants, but equally Indian, Korean, and Brazilian and so forth. So obviously that  
changes the rules of the game and makes it harder to compete for the same concessions  
and be offered the same fiscal terms and so forth. So I think it’s just part of intensifying  
competition. 
SK: Do you think there’s anything Western firms can do about that then? Because  
in that case they are going to lose out aren’t they? 
GF: Well I mean it’s up to them to up the game. I mean there are lots of things they can  
do from collaborating with those new entrants in investing in technologies, particularly  
offshore, and the Chinese often actually are not direct competitors because they are  
often merely interested in the financial stakes but not in operational control. So you can  
collaborate with them, you can offer other incentives to host governments like local  
content improvements... you help sub-contractors in those countries to transfer  
technology and so forth, to provide technology to the oil sector, being technical  
advisors, or even on the social and environmental front sometimes you may have to try  
and actually get recognition for being a good corporate citizen and being selected on  
phases where you provide the highest social and environmental standards. So this is  
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potentially a way forward to distinguish yourself and, certainly in the light of BP in the  
Gulf of Mexico, in the future there may be certain demands to have companies that  
distinguish themselves by being the best performers in the social and environmental  
agenda as well. So there’s at least something we could do but obviously, you know,  
you’re going to face the competition and there’s going to be greater competition for a  
smaller piece of the cake.  
SK: Okay, well how about the African people then? How would they benefit from  
Chinese investment?  
GF: It is still to be seen and could be a very, very different response depending on who  
you are. 
SK: Well I’ll give you an example actually. A Nigerian I have interviewed  
suggested there was a honeymoon period for Chinese investment, and that may  
actually be over. I gave him the example of Zambia. This was not to do with the oil  
and gas sector but the mining sector. There was somebody who went for the  
presidency a few years ago in the Zambian elections and he campaigned on an  
anti-Chinese sentiment. He didn’t win the presidency but he established himself as  
a political force in the mining areas very much on this anti-Chinese sentiment, with  
all of the complaints that the Chinese were bringing their own labour, for example. 
GF: Yeah, I mean let’s go one step back. Chinese firms operate in the same business  
environment as Western firms, Brazilian firms, Indian firms, that’s not any different, the  
rules of the game are very similar. The only thing that potentially maybe different is that  
there is a history of better experiences with some Western companies, although Shell in  
Nigeria was a problem and because of that people may have been very antagonistic  
against Shell specifically, and all British firms or whoever as a result of those  
experiences and because of that potentially they could welcome Chinese firms initially. 
SK: Do you think there could be a colonial legacy there as well? 
GF: Yes. So that’s what I mean by history and path dependence. But other than that,  
assuming this is the case certainly for countries where you are only starting, you still  
have the same constraints, so the Chinese firms just like the Brazilian firms, Indian  
firms or Western firms will have the same complaints from other communities about, as  
you said, not employing local labour... finding enough jobs, in terms of not keeping to  
promises, in terms of polluting and doing various other things, not investing in the  
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communities where the oil comes from and a lot of people not benefiting from those  
activities and so forth. Chinese firms like any other firms will face the same constraints  
and they may have the same problems in Nigeria and other places. Chinese managers, I  
think effectively have the same sort of problems of legitimacy and licence to operate as  
other firms. You always have liability of foreignness as a multinational firm. So just  
because you’re Chinese it doesn’t necessarily mean that you’ll have a much nicer ride,  
maybe at the beginning when people don’t know you, but eventually there is a liability  
of foreignness. A lot of firms will transgress. The foreign firm will transgress and it’s  
always the foreign firms that will take a lot more rides anywhere in the world whether  
you are a Chinese firm in Africa or whether you are an African or Western firm in  
China. So there’s a few reasons for me to explain why the international firms always  
pay a lot more lip service to CSR and try to do something about it because they’re  
forced to. When you become international you are much more in the public eye, you’re  
much more open to criticism. You are looked at, in much more detail, at what you’re  
doing and you have to be a lot more careful. So I’m sure Chinese managers are  
grappling with the same question as British or American or Brazilian managers... how  
to deal with those social and environmental challenges. 
SK: Do you think Western firms may have a certain advantage in this? What I  
mean here is that I have researched the long history of BP and they had a very  
early social issue. We are talking here about the early years of the 20
th
 century  
when there were still Anglo Persian and/or Anglo Iranian. In Iran there were  
complaints that they weren’t employing enough locals, and even if they weren’t  
employing expatriate Brits, they were employing Ottoman Turks. The company  
said that Iranians didn’t work hard enough. But they learnt from this experience  
and eventually, they went on to train local Iranians through links they had with  
Tehran University. So do you think that such experience of knowing that you have  
to employ locals, and they’ve had a long history of knowing that they really have to  
do something for their locals, do you think that such experience might give them  
an advantage? 
GF: Well obviously production in BP has been faced with those changes for a lot  
longer, certainly when you go back to the days of Anglo Persian and Anglo Iranian, but  
certainly the last few years a lot of content requirements seem to be getting potentially  
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or becoming potentially more and more important issue recently in Nigeria, Ghana, just  
this year. There have been attempts to impose new laws related to a lot of content. The  
regional government I think of Rio De Janeiro was threatening companies with  
throwing them out even though in Brazil local content is much, much higher, and still it  
was pushed to do that. So this is certainly going to be an issue for the Chinese firms  
because they would be more traditional in using their own labour. So from that point of  
view, Shell or BP, you could think yes they are in a little bit better position, they’ve  
been thinking about it for longer and maybe they have a few skills. But then they still  
have a lot of trouble doing that, complying with the criteria and they find it very, very  
challenging. In the case of Angola and Nigeria there is a shortage of expertise in certain  
areas to comply with that. So they still have problems, not so great but it is a big  
challenge and a lot less of a challenge in Brazil than in Angola. So that’s one thing, and  
the second one is that potentially Chinese firms could, if it’s just a formal requirement,  
it will be accepted by the government because it provides other incentives. So I don’t  
think it’s a clear case that Shell and BP are in much better positions, but Chinese firms  
have a major contractual advantage, this is very, very clear. 
SK: Okay, this is the key question to finish on. To how much extent, in your  
opinion, do oil multinationals use CSR strategically? I will explain what I mean,  
which is do oil multinationals use their CSR strategy strategically to seal deals?  
Have you heard of the work of Wiig and Kolstad?  
GF: No I haven’t.  
SK: They are at the University of Bergen, and they examined the responsibilities of  
multinational oil firms actually in Angola, which is quite a coincidence because I  
chose Angola as my case study before I discovered this work. Angola, as you  
probably know, is plagued by poverty and corruption, which are basically the  
consequence of the resource curse. Wiig and Kolstad argued that the lifting the  
resource curse placed an emphasis on improving governance in Angola and on  
improving the country’s institutions. In the absence of any government  
commitment in this area an ethical argument can be made that multinational oil  
firms should attempt to transfer sound governance principles, a rather normative  
statement of course. But their research found that transferring governance is not a  
priority in the CSR policies of oil multinationals. They found generally that CSR is  
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used strategically to obtain licences to operate, as simple as that. Therefore, do you  
agree with their opinion?   
GF: I think there’s a lot of interpretation concerning this question. What I would think  
about strategically first of all is headquarters using them for specific purposes in some  
structured way and I think that only happens probably most of the time. I potentially  
think the problem surrounding John Browne at BP and bringing in Beyond Petroleum, it  
was a time of change, so I think that was potentially a strategic move. It was a strategic  
move... what’s happening is to benefit... to get certain advantages of being a pioneer in  
certain areas and being seen as a force and so forth. Then in terms of actually getting  
some specific licences so going to the level of specific countries and subsidiaries,  
there’s certainly been some of it and in my book you have some examples as well.  
ChrevonTexaco in Angola is one example and a few other places that it is certainly the  
case that it’s been used strategically. I think the key question is how important it is,  
certainly in terms of getting the government to pay as much emphasis towards either  
secondary or tertiary or whatever, is important to get licences. But it’s clearly yes at a  
subsidiary level of countries certainly yes companies have to use it strategically to  
ensure... usually it’s been spending on social investment in general or on a specific 
government-favoured social fund. So certainly companies are trying to get an advantage 
in some way and some companies are certainly keenly aware that this sort of activity 
offers an advantage, but I think it’s still haphazard in terms of how companies organise  
it, but I think some companies are certainly keenly aware that this protection is a key  
advantage. Probably leave it at that. 
SK: Yes, okay.  Well thank you very much. 
GF: Thank you. 
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Appendix 12. 
Semi-Structured Interview with Doctor Gbola Gbadamosi of the  
University of Worcester Business School, 30
th
 September, 2010. 
Key:  
SK: Steven Kort (interviewer)  
GG: Gbola Gbadamosi (interviewee) 
SK: So shall we explore the institutional environment to start with? So can you tell  
me about the institutional environment in Africa? What I’m after here is the fact  
that Angola is considered to be a very institutionally poor environment and it’s one  
of the most corrupt countries in the world. So would you say it is actually  
representative of Africa? 
GG: The problem is sub-Saharan Africa is a very, very corrupt area and- 
SK: Probably a better question would be of oil-producing countries in Africa? 
GG: To a very large extent then I would say yes. Much of what you will find in Angola  
is typical of what is likely to be the scenario in most of sub-Saharan Africa involved in  
oil production. Because there’ll be very few really: Gabon, Nigeria, Ghana is joining in  
now very soon, and much of them will have similar problems of poverty, of poor  
infrastructure and lack of institutional support for businesses, and so on. It’s just that  
Angola specifically has been a country having been ravaged by war for over thirty years  
and it’s very different, it’s very unique in its own way, and until lately we’ve kind of  
grown into thinking in the public domain about what will transpire in the oil sector. I  
think that’s becoming a little clearer now with the end of the war, and a lot more effort  
at making the country into a more habitable country and friendly to foreigners and  
investors. 
SK: So how do you think, say, if a firm is investing, they have to deal with the  
institutional environment. Therefore, is there anything they can do to try and  
influence and/or improve the institutional environment?   
GG: I think most organisations that work in that part of the world are very clear how  
they can deal with the environment. I think most of the time, in my opinion, it’s just  
about the will. It is the will to do it or the constraint, the governmental constraint,  
because of the institutional high level of corruption that we have in the system, which  
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make a kind of guide, an organisational way to move along a different path to make sure  
that a lot more of the funds gets into the pockets of private individuals at the end of the  
day, and that is an unfortunate fact of the case. But, having said that, the reality of it is  
when a multi-national, a big organisation, gets into countries in sub-Saharan Africa who  
have anything to do with oil or any of that kind of mineral resource are usually  
confronted head-on immediately by a basically poor infrastructural environment. You  
will see a lot of poverty and so on, and you barely see how you can make the life of the  
immediate environment in which you are going to operate better without costing a lot of  
money. But I suppose one of the issues would be... well if, as an organisation, we pay so  
much tax, or we have to pay so much tax to the government, and it is not our  
responsibility to do that, why should we be then putting a lot more of our resources in  
getting the environment right? I think that is one of the questions that organisations  
should probably be asking at the beginning. You know, they want to be sure that they  
get it right from the beginning. But certainly, to answer your question in a simple way, I  
think there is so much companies can do in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of improving  
the state of the environment, the institutional environment within which we find  
ourselves. 
SK: How do you think it’ll work? Because you might be able to confirm something  
for me actually. Because I’ve got an Angolan contact that Howard and I have  
decided to use an advisory role, pretty much like a supervisory team here, and he’s  
told me about transparency. The oil firms investing in Angola, they are supposed  
to pay their taxes directly to the Angolan Treasury and then that creates a lack of  
transparency, because in fact, the revenues do not go directly to the Angolan  
Treasury? 
GG: Where does it go to? 
SK: Sonangol handles all such payments and they don’t actually pass them  
through the Angolan Central Bank that Angola’s law actually requires. They  
flagrantly break the law. Instead all the payments pass through the bank accounts  
of Sonangol’s foreign subsidiaries, places like the Cayman Islands and Jersey. So  
when the payments actually do finally reach the Angolan Treasury they’re always  
later or usually much less than expected. I mean, for example, he said that he  
knows somebody who used to work for Sonangol and, considering his salary, how  
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can he afford an expensive villa in South Africa for his family to holiday in? So  
that’s an example of where it all goes.   
GG: Yes. This is why I said the case with Angola is quite peculiar. Although there are  
problems of corruption, but it’s the entire spectrum of the African continent, particularly  
in sub-Saharan Africa. But, having said that, the kind of scenario you just described  
now, I haven’t heard about that happening anywhere else.  
SK: Really? 
GG: Yes. Because this is kind of very blatant, you know, very open way of channelling  
of public resources through other channels. 
SK: Do you think it could be in fact that Sonangol is actually a state-owned  
enterprise? Do you think that might have some relevance, where they work for the  
government, let’s say, and yet they still get away with not passing things on to the  
central bank? 
GG: Yes, I think probably- 
SK: The fact that they’re state-owned rather than privately owned? 
GG: My concern actually would be that it shouldn’t really matter whether it’s a  
government or an enterprise. You would expect that even the Government of China  
should be concerned about the general development of a poor country like Angola, and  
therefore everything that has got to be done has got to be done properly and  
transparently. 
SK: Well in your opinion then, do you think that China are actually considering  
the development issues in Angola when they’re investing there? Or throughout  
Africa in fact? 
GG: Much as I don’t have any- 
SK: Can they be seen as a development partner? 
GG: I understand. Much as I don’t have any evidence for this, but the evidence on the  
ground doesn’t reveal that. I couldn’t say that’s the case, but the evidence on the ground  
doesn’t reveal that. How justified would we be to say that the Chinese Government can  
be concerned about development issues in Angola if the issues of the fundamental  
resources that have been offered to the people of Angola is not going directly to the  
coffers of Angola, and it has to go to some other machinery or some other process, we  
find difficulties along the way. So we really want to be conscious in terms of that. I’m  
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not sure. I think primarily, for now, it would appear to me that it’s a lot more important  
for the Chinese Government to get an effective... their two feet on the ground to feel  
that they’re really strong on the ground, to feel that they really have captured that  
particular market, and they have become almost like a monopoly, if you like, before...  
maybe issues of a development and the Angolan people will begin to come up with a  
second segment of the agenda. It is not impossible that behind it in their mind now is  
the issue of competition first. You know, that there are other potential competitors that  
will take this potential in a good market. So it’s better we put our foot in there, make  
sure everybody that takes decisions is happy, and then when it’s gets really in they can  
get on to the next stage of focusing on the Angolan people. I’m not talking for them,  
but- 
SK: But it may happen, yes?   
GG: Yeah, that may happen, but it’s-  
SK: My Angolan contact actually says that. He actually thinks the Chinese for now  
are in Africa for themselves. They want to... I mean, they’re building  
infrastructure, yes, but it’s infrastructure that’s conveniently helped them get the  
oil out of Africa. 
GG: Yes. For example, they have tried so much in Nigeria but they haven’t been able to  
get a very strong hold on the oil business in Nigeria. But now you could see that  
everywhere, including pipelining in the oil business now, which is giving them some  
kind of leverage to get them to do business. And you will find that in terms of  
transportation, the haulage business, the construction, and particularly in the railways.  
There’s just roadworks everywhere in Nigeria now, and they’re getting stronger. So it’s  
pretty much competition, expansion. Africa has a very good business ground, a vast  
potential for the future in terms of developing business opportunities, and it is that  
prospect that I think they are trying to explore and maximise, and it’s an advantage for  
them for now and for the future. Granted, you know, the background I believe is that  
there are a number of sub-Saharan Africans who are not very happy with the existing-. 
SK: The existing status quo? 
GG: Yeah, status quo. So we are happily clamouring for a change. So anything that will  
provide an alternative is better tested to see whether I can walk or not. So they are in a  
clearly advantageous position, as it were, the Chinese businesses and the Government of  
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China. And I think that’s what they really are capitalising on over the continent and a  
special advantage in Angola. 
SK: So do you think the Chinese are delivering? Well, they said they’re probably  
not delivering now but they may do in the future. My Angolan contact has actually  
said that the Chinese are only really offering... they’re building the infrastructure  
to pretty much seal the deals, to seal the exploration or the drilling deals, and when  
it comes to actually delivering on them, they do to a certain extent. 
GG: Yes. 
SK: I think two writers from Norway wrote about this, from the University of  
Bergen. They said firms only consider CSR in Africa, in their opinion, pretty much  
as a way to seal deals. They say, “Yes, we’re going to do this,” but then they don’t  
necessarily deliver it in the way that they said they would when they actually  
signed the deals.  
GG: Yeah, that is obviously not impossible, that is actually likely to be... you know, it’s  
an area that will work well for most African business people. I would not doubt the fact  
that many of the business contacts and links that Chinese businesses will have in Africa  
will naturally suggest very nice CSR programmes that it will venture into as a way of  
getting interest, getting support, getting sympathy and getting on the ground, and getting  
all kind of support on the ground. But I’m not sure the extent to which when they are on  
the ground they will really want to do that. Even if they had planned to do that really at  
the back of their mind, by the time they are confronted often times with the sheer size of  
financial requests of the greedy African collaborators, they probably would begin to  
think differently about how much money should be now be going to the CSR if this is  
much more than the planned expenditure required our so-called happiness and our  
needs. And I think pretty much that’s the way it works for most of the continent, and  
that is why the case of Botswana is actually very, very unique. Because that opportunity  
is not there at all. That middle contact, that kind of leakage has been taken out  
completely. Everything is De Beers. De Beers, the big diamond company. They take  
charge of everything and the modality of sharing. 
SK: How did that come about then? 
GG: I wouldn’t know. If I say I know, I would be lying. I wouldn’t know. But what is  
clear is that the various problems in other African countries, must have been factored in.   
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At the beginning when diamonds were discovered in Botswana, most of this was  
factored in the thinking of the government one signature at a time, to say, “Well let’s rid  
ourself of all the bureaucracy. Let’s rid ourself of the potential distrust and disharmony  
that will form in our people. Let’s trust this resource with people who have been doing  
only this forever and therefore let’s give them access to this material, and let’s agree up  
front on how it’s going to be shared. That way we can just collect our share and develop  
our country with it.” And I think that’s worked pretty much for them. And perhaps one  
of the reasons why- 
SK: What I understand is Botswana has got very high standards of governance. 
GG: Yeah. But part of the reasons why they have been listed on the corruption index is  
because really they don’t try to control corruption. I think the effort is to prevent  
corruption. So you take away all the potential avenues that could make people corrupt.  
If people don’t have decisions to make about whether, “do we give this particular  
component of land with diamonds to John or to Howard or to Gbola?”. If it’s been  
settled that all of this goes to Michael, it’s Michael that gets everything, so nobody  
needs to talk to Paul or Howard or yourself to say, “well if I give you a little bit of  
something decent, would you be willing to save a little bit for Michael?” That can’t be  
done for them. And I think that works pretty much for them compared with other  
African countries, in terms of minimising all those elements of corruption that has  
tended to hinder the development process in these countries, and I think that it’s  
lessening there. Much as personally I’m not happy with it, as I don’t think they’re  
getting the best deal, in terms of the percentage that they get off De Beers. But it’s  
pretty much enough to develop their country, and if it’s because it allowed them an  
opportunity to be much more egalitarian than other countries, and if it has helped them  
to minimise the level of corruption and access to public funds being diverted to private  
pockets, then it isn’t. 
SK: Well exactly. Do you think that’s a model that that could be practised  
throughout Africa? 
GG: Yes. It is good on that basis. On that basis it’s good. 
SK: Well I think we’ve covered the institutional environment; we’ve done a bit on  
transparency as well, which is good. So can you tell me about cultural issues in  
Sub-Saharan Africa? I think what I’m after here is are there any cultural issues  
339 
 
that may affect how corporate responsibility is perceived in Africa? Probably a  
very open-ended question, but- 
GG: It is an open-ended question, but it’s one question where you are likely to have a  
rich pool of information. Because, you know, culture itself is very, very broad.  Much as  
it is broad, it is also somewhat specific. Again, as always, it’s a double-edged sword, as  
they say. So with culture I think there are a number of issues that leans on culture with  
the transparency now we’ve talked about. That leans with the issue of use of public  
funds. Maybe it’s development issues as well, and so on. Some parts of Africa are very  
hierarchical in class. There are some other cultures in Africa that are very... extremely  
actually... egalitarian in the way they are organised. 
SK: Can you give me some examples? 
GG: Yes, in terms of the ones that I know. You see, if I go back to Nigeria, which I’m  
much more familiar with, then I will compare that with Southern African, like  
Swaziland or Botswana, South Africa, all of which I’ve lived in and am also familiar  
with. You will find that, for example, amongst the Ibo in Nigeria. They are very, very  
egalitarian. Almost everyone is equal. They don’t have kings, there is no... they don’t  
have kings, they don’t have...  communities are ruled by a number of elders, as a group  
of elders. You know, twenty, thirty, depending what number. It’s about their age  
because they believe that people become wiser as they get older so these are the people  
who take positions. Because experience, they say, is the best teacher so they’re going to  
learn a lot of things from their experiences. So you’ll find that they are very communal  
in everything. They build houses by collective effort, they till their farm by...  
everything’s by collective effort. So they tend to be, originally, less competitive. All of  
that has changed as a result of Westernisation. They, the same people I’m talking about,  
are becoming a lot more competitive now like they used to. But amongst the workers in  
Nigeria, for example, you will find that those are the groups of people where society is a  
lot more Westernised. You know, the wealthy or the very poor, you know, who are  
collecting... they are down there, and who think the only way they can cross the barrier  
is through education which is why they invest a lot of their money on education. But if  
we link this back to our discussion, which is the influence of culture in all of these  
multi-nationals investing in Africa, I think there are a number of things that will become  
problematic to an average business investor in Africa. Let’s take the issue of... I’ll use  
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specific examples to highlight my point. The issue of gifts. Culturally gifts are not  
indecent, they are not corruption in much of Africa. It’s a sign of showing affection, of  
showing love. It’s a sign of showing respect to people. And you don’t turn it down  
because you’re suspicious of... you think you are being bribed. The person’s offering...  
so in much of Africa the person offering gifts what has not been solicited for, you know,  
but he’s doing it out of affection, the rejection is the rejection of affection, which throws  
some spanner into the works and brings about some kind of suspicion. So that actually  
could be a problem. 
SK: So do you think that’s why Chinese investment might be looked upon as being  
very welcome, because of the culture in China they’re very used to giving gifts?  
You know, the guanxi culture? When you’re doing business deals, it is normal to  
give gifts, but it’s not seen as corruption. 
GG: Absolutely. Yes. 
SK: Here in the West it is. 
GG: Yeah. So you’ll find that people tend to... well let’s say when they visit the  
community. You’ve just come in, you’ve just had an oil block in an area. There’s a  
community living around there and you’ve gone to visit the head of the community,  
let’s say the king of the community, whatever name they call it, and you’ve gone there  
to do that. Ideally you take a little gift. Right? In return you always will get gift back.  
You could be giving yourself your own first or do it that way, but definitely when you  
visit a community as a new person in most of Africa they will welcome you with some  
kind of gift. What has changed, in my mind, in my opinion, is that those gifts used to be  
symbolic gifts. They used to be, you know, nothing that would cost an arm and a leg.   
But now it’s all about opening a Swiss account. You see? Which is quite different. It’s  
now about opening an account in some island somewhere where this money’s a very big  
amount. You know, or where you would put in and pull out money. That’s not the way,  
you know, culturally it has been. So even Africans recognise clearly that this is no  
longer a gift, this is a corrupt practice. 
SK: It’s a corrupt practice, yes. 
GG: Yeah. So the idea of a gift would be you taking in... you go into to that community,  
you’re taking in drinks, you’re taking in pictures, you’re taking in, you know, those  
kind of basic things, as an exchange of your love and affection. 
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SK: So can you also say that even the Chinese coming in and saying, “well we’re  
going to build hospitals and schools for you, and infrastructure,” even the Africans  
may possibly recognise that’s not a gift, that’s complementary investment? 
GG: I think that is different. I think what is happening there is that... you see, in a  
community where Shell has operated for a very, very long time. We had Chevron- 
Texaco also for a very very long time. We had BP for a very, very long time. And you’ll  
find that even though the community has a population of about 150,000 people, they  
have a very poor school where everyone has to then sit on the floor and so on. And  
they’ve watched and waited and hoped that this oil company will do something to help  
their school or help their hospital, and nothing has happened. Right, the Chinese didn’t  
just wake up in China to take the business to that community. Most often they have  
inside information from people who live in that community, in terms of what we will  
offer to them, and they will have been told, “yeah, we’d like a new school, come and  
have a look yourself. Our hospital’s a hovel, come and have a look yourself. Our roads  
are not motorable, come and have a look yourself.” And then you come and you look,  
“how much is all of that going to cost?” “That’s going to be £100,000.” “That’s it?”   
“That’s it.” “Okay, we can do that.” So on the initial visit, when you come in to say,  
“we can do that,” before they even start business, what do you expect from the  
community? They’re not going to turn that down. They’ll say, “well the man who has  
been doing business there for a very long time has not put anything on the ground. This  
person is just hoping to start and he’s already offered us all of this. If we’re getting half  
of those, that would be something to start with.” So that could be an issue, a potential  
issue. So most of the time I don’t think it is the brilliance of the Chinese, these are all  
inside information about the privation of the people. But, having said that, I’m very  
conscious of the fact that... see, in CSR, businesses have a responsibility to develop the  
communities in which they operate and contribute there and so on and so forth.   
Businesses learn from experience over time. Sometimes they have paid special taxes on  
this community so that the infrastructure that I was talking about can be put in place, but  
this money has been diverted to some other purposes. Or sometimes it is the leadership  
of this community that has had one on one discussion with the management of this  
multi-national to physically say, “I will talk to my community, they would be happy,  
but don’t come build a school, give me the money, I know who to give. As long as  
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everybody’s happy, you shall be happy.” 
SK: Do you think a Western firm then... I can think of examples specifically here,  
but do you think they have a lot of experience of doing that? Because I know that  
BP used to be originally Anglo-Persian then Anglo-Iranian Oil before they were  
BP. I think after numerous revolutions it was all nationalised. But they were  
specifically in Abadan in Iran which is right on the coast by Iraq and Kuwait. I  
know that they are heavily involved there. But they pretty much learnt a lot of  
social issues, but they learnt from experience. When they first went in there, they  
didn’t really do much but they actually learnt from their experience what to do  
and in the end they ended up building hospitals and schools for their employees.   
But they learnt from experience and they were doing that back in the thirties. I  
know that the International Labour Office wrote about what BP was doing in  
Abadan in the 1950s. They said that the hospital was very impressive. What they  
did for the local community was very impressive. So do you think a Western firm  
might have more experience in implementing those sorts of things as compared to  
a Chinese firm? 
GG: Well it’s the... that’s spot on, that’s the correct thing to say. I think they have a lot  
more experience in doing it. Plus, given the background of the West and the  
development that is on the ground here which has evolved over the years, they know  
what’s the best sort of thing to put in a school. How to minimise cost in schools, the  
best equipment to put in hospitals, how to minimise costs in hospitals. All of these have  
evolved over the years in these communities, in this environment, in the Western world,  
and I don’t think the Chinese can claim as much expertise in all of this as the Western  
communities. And that is why Shell will fight, for example, it will be a difficult task for  
them to be able to regain their old glorious name in Nigeria, no matter what they do. See  
because, having had their hands soiled, you know, you find that Texaco... sorry,  
particularly Chevron-Texaco- 
SK: They’re the company that’s had the most experience in Angola actually,  
Chevron-Texaco. 
GG: You see interestingly, they’re the ones, in my opinion, from what I know on the  
ground... I have visited most of oil producing areas in Nigeria, and I can tell you from  
what I know, they’re the ones who have warmed most significantly and impressively to  
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the rural and local population in the communities where they operate. Because what  
they have done is, irrespective of the amount of tax that they pay to government, which  
they should pay really, they have identified those developmental issues as very basic to  
that community. They have recognised the fact that if the communities are happy, they  
will be supportive of them, and that’s why you hardly read about problems of Chevron- 
Texaco being attacked and so on in Nigeria. Very rarely. Because- 
SK: And they’ve been doing this for a long time? 
GG: For a long time. So you’ll find that on the ground they’ll look at the community.  
You see, in Africa people don’t want... they don’t a listed building, they don’t want...  
they don’t want that kind of listed building, they just want a building. They just want,  
you know, a rectangular building, where there are enough classrooms, classes,  
windows, two toilets, and that’s it. 
SK: They wouldn’t want a show-piece building, would you say? 
GG: No, they are not keen about that. 
SK: Because I heard the Chinese in Luanda, the capital of Angola, are building a  
very, very nice shiny skyscraper made of gold glass. It’s going be the tallest  
building in Angola, and this is going be the centre of Chinese investment in Angola.  
It’s intended to be a show-piece statement of intent. Do the Africans really want  
something like that?   
GG: Well they do. 
SK:  A statement like that? 
GG: Yeah, they do in their cities.   
SK: In the cities? 
GG: Yes, but not in their rural communities where most of the business operations take  
place if you are in exploration. Now, of course, in the cities people do want that, they  
don’t mind to have that, you know, they want to identify with that. But what... if I go  
back to Chevron-Texaco, what they have done and what they’ve done for the people, is  
that people could in different communities say, “well I have been able to get my kids to  
school, a good school, thanks to Chevron-Texaco and, as a plus, as they put the building  
in place, put the hospitals in place, it also empowers the local community people to be  
able to find places to work, for examples as cleaners. They probably go and train to be  
teachers, and so on and so forth. And they give scholarships to this community. So, you  
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know you’ll find that they get some level of education and they are able to then work in  
their community like that they would want to work. Perhaps when we get to the other  
issues of environment, I’ll be able to point out some other things about that. But  
culturally there are significant issues of culture that affect businesses in much of Africa.   
It is just that most of the corrupt leaders in Africa hide under that culture.  
SK: I think that brings us nicely on to further social issues here. Can you tell me  
anything more about social issues? What I’m after here, tying in with the  
environment, the relative importance of social issues versus environmental issues  
in the whole sphere of corporate responsibility. Specifically for social issues, the  
sort of thing I’m after here is my Angolan contact has told me in Angola’s oil  
industry there’s very little linkage with the rest of the economy, only with the use  
of revenues. But, more specifically, he said certainly Chinese investment... he said  
Western investment as well, but particularly the Chinese investment creates very  
few local jobs, and therefore very few local people benefit, in his opinion. It would  
be interesting to see what you say about that. He did say this could be partially  
explained by the capital-intensive nature of the business. Of course it’s a very  
specialised sector, isn’t it, oil? So therefore, can you comment about this social  
issue? For example, can foreign firms do more to create local jobs? 
GG: Yeah, that’s an interesting one. When people talk about the prospect of Chinese  
business in Africa I always alert people to this social issue, in terms of gainful  
employment to everybody and winning assistance of these communities. But in my  
experience and my opinion, the Chinese are not exactly very interested in that. I might  
be wrong but what I’ve witnessed around Africa is that I’ve seen Chinese businesses  
and so on, they are not very very keen about the employment issues there. In the past  
Africans used to blame the Western businesses for bringing in too many Western  
expatriates.  
SK: But do you think over time Western businesses got better at this? 
GG: Over time Western businesses empowered the people, trained them in a way to  
ensure that... they completely handed over a significant part of running many operations  
to citizens who trained locally or even came to this part of the world to train. 
SK: Well certainly when BP was in Iran they were initially often complained  
about. They would employ very few locals and in fact if they were employing... I  
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should say if they were employing Muslims at all, they would employ Ottoman  
Turks. But over time they began to employ more locals. However, the British were  
quite imperialistic at first and they said that Iranians don’t work hard, so all the  
top jobs were taken by expatriates, but over time they seemed to put in the course  
a process of employing locals, and subsequently they implemented it around the  
world. Perhaps they are saying now, “yes, Africans can work, we can use them.” 
GG: But that’s not exactly what I’ve seen the Chinese doing. You see? Relative to what  
we know on the ground, if I... I mean, I can say that China seems to be a lot more  
interested in bringing in their own people, even to do most elementary kind of job that  
any fool probably would be able to do, who is given the right tools and equipment. So  
you’ll find that when the Chinese businesses come into Africa they ship in the money,  
they ship in the equipment, and they ship in the people as well. Nearly everyone comes  
along. And if you listed the number of Chinese activities in most of Africa, you will  
always find an interesting balance of anything from 60%/70% Chinese to as little as 5%  
locals in some... you know, it is that bad in some businesses. And I know businesses in  
Nigeria that is 100% Chinese, and there is nothing actually that they do which they will  
not find Nigerians are able to do. But, because of the government’s interest in the FDI,  
they’ve kind of modified the law to allow 100% foreign ownership and foreign  
employees, if you want, and that flexibility allows some of the Chinese to come in  
100%, you know. I don’t know how it is in Angola in terms of the government labour  
law and who comes into the country to work, but in the middle and long term I see the  
prospect of a conflict between the Sub-Saharan African people and the sheer size of the  
Chinese expatriates, if I can say that, on the businesses on the ground. You see, some  
people say they are in their honeymoon period now when, you know, we just want  
someone else for the competition. You know, not just the West. But it will always be...  
it will not always be like this. You know, it will get to the point where they’ll say, “well  
even the British and the Americans have more locals than you have now. Soon you will  
have to get your act together.” You know, “You’ve gotta do things differently.” I see  
that developing over time.   
SK: So would you say at the moment then, in that case, here I will make a  
statement to see whether you agree with it. The only people that really benefit from  
the Chinese investment are the African elites, not the people, in the current status  
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quo. 
GG: It’s very dangerous to make that statement because it will depend on the sector of  
the person that we are talking about. See, in the transportation sector, and they are  
working very hard on trains in most of Africa, and moving people from point A to point  
B locally in big cities in Africa. This has been a massive developmental issue in Africa.   
It’s been at the pain of all the social problems that many African countries have, in a  
number of big cities. The Chinese are turning that around, literally. And- 
SK: Indeed, they are planning to build a cross-continental railway from Angola  
right over to the East coast of Africa. 
GG: Yeah. So that would be in the interest of the people. And so, you know. But when  
you talk about businesses like the oil sector, like the mining, and all of the problems in  
mining, I’m not sure the African people are benefitting anything from that sort of  
businesses. I think, like I say, it’s largely for now the elite and the government, officials  
of bureaucracy, and everything has been sunk in there, and everything has been lost in  
there. You know, it’s not going down the channel to the people yet from those type of  
businesses. But road construction, all which businesses, transportation, you know, in  
terms of locally trains, I think the people are benefitting, so it’s some kind of balance.   
One has to choose which sector one is talking about specifically and in Angola, I am not  
sure to what extent the Chinese are involved in construction. Roads, trains, I mean  
railways- 
SK: They are building a lot of that infrastructure, because of course, Angola’s  
infrastructure was destroyed in the long civil war,- 
GG: Yes of course. 
SK: - but they are stepping in and building a lot. My Angolan contact said it’s  
amazing sometimes when you go out of Luanda. You can go down a dirt track, and  
two weeks later there’s a concrete road there. The Chinese have just built it and  
they have moved on and they are building another road somewhere else. 
GG: That’s good. That’s why I said- 
SK: The people can benefit from that? 
GG: Absolutely. Because in my five years of living in this country and one of the most  
fascinating things I have noted is that of the road network going to most parts of this  
country. As a Nigerian, you know, a big country, you make sure... the kind of research  
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work I’ve done while in Nigeria and some other things that I’ve been involved in, in  
terms of developmental issues, I have been able to travel every corner of that country.  
And I know how painful it can be sometimes when you leave cities and you leave  
towns, like you want to go into villages, it can be a very, very difficult exercise in some  
areas, because most of the time they don’t have any drainage, you know. I mean this  
month somebody has put some kind of surfacing on the road but no drainage and,  
because of the terrain, the rain comes and all of this gets washed off and the erosion  
creates big gullies that would always drown a car. So it is that bad, you know, moving  
around in Africa, around Sub-Saharan Africa. So when... I mean, if indeed the Chinese  
are being involved in putting up roads and constructing concrete roads and so on to link  
up rural areas with the city it will be very, very beneficial for the people. Much of the  
movement from the rural areas to the city congests the city. The cities are not planned,  
you know, to take, you know, for the inflow of people that keep coming in. So when  
that keeps happening it creates a kind of very big problem. And the reason why I’ve  
raised it, is the fact that much of these people in African cities will be very, very happy  
to remain in the rural areas if they were sure they would have access to the city, they  
would have access to... will be able to come to the city when they need to come to the  
city, and they know that if they want to, drive in their goods from their farms into the  
city, they can do that to make more money. 
SK: They can commute and it’s made them more mobile. 
GG: Exactly. But that is what most of the African governments have not done. You see?  
So they concentrate the money in developing the cities as a showcase for foreign  
visitors, for investors and so on who say, “oh were you in Cairo? Oh it’s a very nice  
place.” “Did you go to Johannesburg? Oh it’s really beautiful.” “Oh you were in Lagos.  
It’s really very nice.” That’s the way it is. But the people know... the citizens of these  
countries know that when they leave all these big fanciful cities it’s a nightmare going  
to their villages. 
SK: It’s even like that in South Africa? 
GG: Well it’s a lot better in South Africa. 
SK: I would imagine that it would be. 
GG: It’s a lot better in South Africa. I mean, because I have travelled almost every part  
of South Africa by road. I have driven on many roads twelve hours, eleven hours. You  
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know, most times, you know, and they’re all very good roads. It’s incomparable to the  
rest of Africa in terms of the road network. The reason being that the farmers, the Boers,  
who developed South Africa had to transport their goods to the cities. So that’s the  
reason. And the rest of Africa is largely... the majority of people are farmers, but they  
are subsistence farmers. 
SK: Well yes, subsistence farmers. Do you think also... South Africa does have a  
very long history of mining, doesn’t it? Is it also the necessity of transporting  
machinery to and materials from the mining sector? Considering Anglo-American  
here, they have been there for a very long time. South Africa apart, I would say  
that Sub-Saharan Africa has only relatively recently been involved in extensive  
mining. I’m just thinking the road network might be better in South Africa  
because they’ve had a longer history of resource extraction. 
GG: They have, yeah. I mean, it’s like a hundred years, maybe more. You know, it’s  
been there forever. And they have the advantage of having nearly all the natural mineral  
resources you can think about. They have diamonds, they have gold, they have all the  
other things. You know, they have nearly everything and they take advantage of all of  
those things, plus their agriculture is really recognised and therefore they need to have  
an appropriate network to lead to the different parts of the country. It’s an endowed  
country, you know, to a very large extent, and I think, much as we all condemn  
apartheid, with the measure of development that they have put in place which, without  
sounding condescending, you know, I’m not sure if the current African leaders, if they  
were in that place eighty years ago, one hundred years go or forty years ago, I’m not  
sure they would have had the same speed of development and infrastructure that we  
have seen put in place, I’m not sure. I can’t vouch for that, I’m not sure. 
SK: To move on, I think it would be a good idea to close with environmental issues.  
So can you tell me about environmental issues, general environmental issues in  
Africa? I mean, are they relatively important compared to social issues? My  
Angolan contact has told me, to give you an example, in Angola’s oil industry, most  
of the exploration and drilling is off-shore in Cabinda, which is an enclave that’s  
surrounded by the DRC.  
GG: They are very lucky. 
SK: Arguably. But this off-shore production area does create a lot of concern  
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about the possibility of polluting rich fishing resources. He said, particularly in the  
light of the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, that coastline, along that border, is one  
of the richest fishing areas in Africa. Local fishermen often lose their ability to fish  
there, and they receive no compensation. So therefore do you think environmental  
issues are considered important considering that example? 
GG: That’s the one part of your research that I have read of passionately. I have a bit of  
passion for this because I have seen it firsthand and I know that it is a real issue, it’s a  
real issue. And I will start by giving you a very quick example, and a very quick  
background information about this. In Nigeria environmental issues... if you ask the  
average citizen, you know, in the oil prospecting areas they will tell you eighteen,  
twenty years ago, thirty years ago, they’ll probably tell you, “what does that mean?”   
They probably wouldn’t have a clue what you were talking about. But today, in the last  
ten years, it is the only issue that is important to people who live in these communities.   
SK: Really? 
GG: Nothing else is important. And that is- 
SK: That is very interesting. 
GG: Yes. That’s the background information. The second information that I’ll point out  
to you here is that the Gulf of Mexico issue was a big deal, it was all in the news. You  
know? Obama had to go into the water to go and have a little swim with the daughter to  
tell us, “It’s all fine now,” you know. “BP are very good people,” you know, “you can  
come and have a swim.” Nevertheless, having said that, really what has happened with  
the Gulf of Mexico for the last how many months, you know, just this year, is what has  
been going on in Nigeria for about twenty five years. So you can imagine what made so  
much news in the Gulf of Mexico just within a couple of months it was on all the news.   
But this is an everyday activity problem in Nigeria for the last twenty five years. It’s not  
in the news! So when the average man on the streets of Southern Nigeria who lives in  
this area sees the Gulf of Mexico incident he says, “that’s what I see in the back of my  
house every day! What is this all about?” And I’m not being cynical. I’m not being  
cynical. I’m being very very frank. As a Nigerian, I have visited the oil producing areas  
of Nigeria, and I have seen it firsthand. You see, the people who live in that part of the  
country, unlike Angola, where everything is off-shore- 
SK: Mainly off-shore. 
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GG: Mainly off-shore, yes. In Nigeria it is fifty-fifty, both on-shore and off-shore, and  
much of the coast has villages and cities, i.e. inhabited by people who live on fishing.   
That’s the only thing they know how to do. They grow up knowing how to fish. They  
don’t know any other trade. In some of the communities they actually do not have land,  
they live on top of the water, they create rafts and put bamboo sticks and build the  
house there, and they have their canal around it, and that’s where they live, that’s where  
they live all their life. That’s where they bring up their children. So what has happened  
is that all of a sudden somebody comes in there with a ship and they’re drilling oil there,  
and within a couple of days the whole place is... you know, they have oil spilling  
everywhere. So the entire community have to evacuate. They can’t do any fishing as  
there are no fishes there anymore. Now, because they don’t have land, they become  
very, very poor. Those of them who are not into fishing, who are on the edges of the  
land there, the spillage comes there and kills all of their produce. So everything just is  
rubbish. You know, they can’t have anything. So when they talk about all the crime and  
all the fighting in that part of the world it becomes very easy to recruit people who are  
already very angry, the same way Al Qaeda is able to recruit and reach people for  
different reasons around the world. That’s exactly what is happening in that part of the  
world. So the point I’m making is that people, at least I know in some parts of Nigeria,  
are really very, very conscious of those environmental issues. And it is the only place  
that I know where the oil companies have not bothered to do anything about the clearing  
up. But you will ask me, “why should that be the case?” “Why should that be a  
problem?” “What is the government doing?” I am not seeing any legislation or any kind  
of arm-twisting tactics from government to say, “well if you want to continue doing  
business here, start to clean up this place a little bit.” Or to say, “okay, for the next five  
years you will contribute fifty per cent, government will chip in fifty per cent and we’ll  
clean-up this mess together.” 
SK: So that’s how you would explain the problem, a lack of clean-up? 
GG: Yeah, “but we have to clean up this place.” That’s not happening and therefore the  
place is just getting worse by the day, every time, and that’s it’s been there for twenty  
odd years. You know- 
SK: I was going to ask you how long this has been happening exactly? 
GG: Oh, it’s been there forever. I mean, some of this what I’ve told you about was  
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when I joined the university as an academic, when I started, you know, my travels, you  
know, and that was in 1986, 1987, and they are still there now. And they were not new  
when I was visiting then, so we’re talking about thirty years. 
SK: So these are all the Western firms that are responsible? 
GG: Mainly.   
SK: Including BP? 
GG: Yeah, all of them. 
SK: Chevron-Texaco? 
GG: Yeah, all of them. All of them. It’s really, really, really terrible. But the people of  
the area claim, they always do claim publicly, that Shell is the worst culprit. They  
always claim that, you know. So why I’m saying is, if it’s a bad issue in Angola now, it  
will be an issue when they begin to have spillage. 
SK: Well I think it certainly will be, but mostly it’s off-shore now I believe, rich  
fishing grounds. 
GG: Because I used to love my fish when I go to South Africa. I know the whole of that  
area you have a lot of very good fish. When I lived in southern Africa, you know, two  
weeks, three weeks, it’s all fish for me. So I wouldn’t want that to happen in Angola  
because that would kill the fish, and it’s going to render other people unemployed, and  
that creates more social problems. You see, you get more social problems, you know.   
So the environmental issues are a big concern there. But that’s one aspect of the issue,  
the oil spillage and the land and so on. The other aspect is the gas flaring. Very bad.  
That goes on forever, and we’ll find it all over the rivers and the land of southern  
Africa, of Southern Nigeria. You will find it there. You know, twenty four hours, it’s  
just there now, you’ll find it there, which is a lot of pollution. 
SK: How does the flaring gas happen though? I’ve read something about it but I’m  
not too sure. 
GG: I don’t know. You know, it’s a technical thing, but I think... may have to look into  
that. But, you see, when you go to the areas where they do this flare and the heat, the  
amount of heat, it’s not... we are not talking about sixty degrees Celsius, we’re talking  
about seventy or eighty, almost like boiling point, you know, because that is when you  
are almost boiling away. You will see a lot of heat and then in some areas there is not so  
much heat. There is some heat but there’s a lot of smoke. It’s like, you know, a bad  
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engine in a car, you know, and then a little bit of black smoke, something like that. And  
that goes on throughout the day, throughout the night, and there are people living within  
five miles, two miles, three miles, and that’s where they live. So there are significant  
issues of environment. 
SK: How do you think all these environmental problems will be solved though? Do  
you think the companies can do it alone? Do you think they’d have to work with  
the institutions in the country? 
GG: Honestly, if the companies could do it alone, some of them would probably do it.   
Some of them, I’m not vouching for all of them. Some of them will probably do it. But  
the honest answer is that it has got to a proportion that it is impossible for companies to  
do it alone. So it needs a lot of international awareness, of pressure on government to do  
something as well. 
SK: This ties in with the transparency issue in a bizarre way, because it’s about  
companies doing things on their own. I know that in February 2001 BP decided to  
publish their annual accounts to make transparent the tax payments to Angola.   
Because remember I said it doesn’t go through the central bank like it’s supposed  
to, it goes via Sonangol’s off-shore subsidiaries, off-shore bank accounts. It was  
widely reported at the time that Sonangol’s president wrote to BP saying that  
confidentiality agreements had been broken and he threatened to end BP’s  
contract. I don’t think that he was serious about that. He sent BP that letter, and  
he also sent all the other oil firms in Angola the same letter. My Angolan contact  
reckoned it was a scare tactic to scare all the other firms into not publishing their  
accounts. Consequently BP never changed their stance. 
GG: Of course. 
SK: Business pretty much carried on as before, more or less. So I know that’s a  
different issue, but that pretty much represents the difficulty of trying to act alone.  
If you are going to try and transfer sound corporate governance and CSR  
principles to Africa you can’t do it alone, you have got to do it in conjunction with  
other firms. 
GG: Yeah. But the problem is the competition. You see, they are in competition. They  
are in competition and they are competing for the same oil blocks, you know, or some  
exploration prospect in the here and there, you know, and “if you lose it, I get it.” You  
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know? And I think that is what has... there’s a lot of poaching, and so on. So I think it’s  
very difficult to get them to work together on some issues. 
SK: How or do you think international institutions could play a role in that case? 
GG: Yes, I think so. I think, you know, the same way that you have this UN agency that  
is responsible for investigating the development of nuclear power in countries, there’s a  
similar agency... I can’t remember the name now... within the UN that... you know, I  
think if international organisations get a lot more involved, I think it might generate a  
lot more awareness. There have been individual efforts here and there to sensitise  
people to the problems, to look at problems in many other sub-Saharan Africa,  
particularly regarding degradation and so on. But it’s still too little. What I have realised  
is that the media, the television media particularly, the international networks, they are a  
very strong conduit of information to a large number of people to sensitise. Anything  
coming on CNN, on Sky, on Aljazeera and so on, tend to generally raise a lot of  
awareness among people in the Western world. I’ve always realised that when things  
concern developmental issues and that affects something on rights of people in the  
developing world, when it is heightened in terms of awareness in the Western world,  
something gets done. Something gets done. As it is now, people in the Western world  
really do not appreciate the enormity of this problem still. So it is that publicity that  
should be the starting point. When people really know... that’s why we have all these  
Fairtrade things that, you know, “don’t buy from those ones, they are not trading fairly,”  
and so on and so forth. You know? So that awareness is not there at all. I’m sure if it  
were possible to get cameras rolling and get a group of close international networks,  
you know, CNN, BBC, Sky, to come and film your area and just show things in that  
documentary, in literally about three or four days you will see the awareness flooding  
and the condemnation, and the pressure going on to that part of the world. But that’s not  
happened. 
SK: You only really see issues like that on Current TV as they occasionally have  
reports on things like this, but you do not see things like that generally. 
GG: No, no. You only see the nature, you see the animals, you see the wildlife. You  
know?  
SK: You say that Africans are actually concerned, and they’re very concerned? 
GG: Oh they are very concerned. They are very concerned. They are very passionate  
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about... there is a particular group that I remember who has been praying and hoping  
that the oil in their own part of Nigeria will just dry up and make them into a poor  
country so they can have their lives back. 
SK: Really? My God! Gbola, I have got to say thank you very much. 
GG: Thank you. 
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Appendix 13. 
Follow-up Email Questioning with Doctor Gbola Gbadamosi of the  
University of Worcester Business School, 4
th
 October, 2011. 
Key:  
SK: Steven Kort (interviewer)  
GG: Gbola Gbadamosi (interviewee) 
SK: You mention in our face-to-face interview about the oil spills in the Niger 
Delta, and that people on the ground will tell you that Shell is the worst offender. 
Shell claim that “in recent years most spills from [our] facilities have been caused 
by sabotage and theft. But some are operational spills due to equipment failure or 
human error”. Therefore, in your opinion or from what you know, are the oil spills 
caused mostly by sabotage and theft, or mostly by operational spills? 
GG: I want to believe that it is possible to get a realistic on-the-ground view on this. As 
far as I know, the evidence on the ground and what you will read in the press and 
talking to people especially in that part of Nigeria, it is almost entirely operational 
spills. Human errors/equipment failure for environmental degradation can only happen 
for so long. We are talking about spillage that happened for well over a decade. 
Responsible firms will not close their eyes and let it continue for even a full month (in 
today's world) and that is really the point for me. As far as theft and sabotage it will 
certainly not apply to the timeframe we are talking about. Theft and sabotage are a lot 
more recent relative to the time of the spillage occurrence in Nigeria. I think the real 
issue is that the government of Nigeria may have significantly indulged Shell (and other 
Multinational Oil firms) with little or no control (which is their over sight function) 
hence these companies acted as they pleased at that time. All these have changed and 
Shell can now rationalise it and attribute it to others. I think it is a failure of CSR on 
their part and this is why they have more or less acknowledged their failure in this 
respect and are willing to pay the heavy financial atonement for it. The UN says it 
cannot be cleaned up in 30 years! 
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Appendix 14. 
Semi-Structured Interview with Doctor Andrew Hale of the University  
of Worcester Business School, 22
nd
 November, 2010. 
Key:  
SK: Steven Kort (interviewer) 
AH:  Andrew Hale (interviewee) 
SK: Can you tell me about the historical background to China’s re-emergence? I  
mean, this is a wide-ranging thing. The historical background determines re- 
emergence. Well I’ll give you an example of the sort of thing I’m after here. This is  
probably a more specific answer than you can probably give, but I’ve read that the  
Kailan Mining Administration... this was a British-owned firm that operated in  
China during the earlier period when China adopted the corporate form, before  
the Communist Party came into power. They had a guy called Liu Hongsheng, and  
he was employed by KMA, the Kailan Mining Administration, as a comprador or  
an agent. Basically what he did, he ran the business side of the Kailan Mining  
Administration. 
AH: So this was when? 
SK: This was in the early years of the twentieth century, so pretty much leading up  
to the founding of the People’s Republic. But in his role as comprador he also ran  
his own businesses and he used his position as the comprador to further his own  
business interests and actually to learn about Western style business practices, and  
therefore he adapted Western style corporate practices to his own businesses, but  
not as a means of Westernisation, but more it seemed... very much later he  
admitted this. He was even interviewed by the Chinese Communist Party in the  
fifties because they thought he could help. Not as a means of Westernisation, but  
more as a tool to improve the economic well-being of China. So they very much...  
they embraced Western ideals, Western business practices, and they adapted them  
to Chinese business needs. So can you tell me any similar stories concerning  
Chinese recent re-adoption, of capitalism, let’s say? 
AH: Part of my argument is that before the 1970s there was a Westernisation process  
going on in China. But, in fact, what- 
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SK: I think it was roughly the same time as Japan’s Westernisation? 
AH: Yeah. Well yes, because the Japanese actually were mortified, horrified at what  
was going on in China during the nineteenth century, the carve-up of imperialism, and  
the Meiji Restoration was one of the things that they did as they were determined to  
avoid what happened to China. And the part of why this happened to China was  
government interference. More recently, clearly since 1979 and the opening up of  
China, they have taken on board a lot of Western practices, and a lot of this has come  
about as a result of foreign direct investment where people have been allowed in. That’s  
one of the ways they learn. But where there’s this tension, I think, is always that you’ve  
got a government trying to- 
SK: Interfere? 
AH: Well, yeah, because having moved from a proper planned economy where the  
government signs everything to a socialist market economy, the government still has a  
large amount of control within the economy. So, in my understanding anyway, what  
you see in a Chinese firm, it may be a public joint stock company but the government  
speculates an active role by holding onto shares. In other words, it’s this golden chain, if  
you like. 
SK: Do you know anything about the ‘national champions’? I know there has been  
a lot of privatisation in China recently, but they have actually put a number of key  
firms in key industries. They’re calling them the ‘national champions’. Actually  
the state-owned oil enterprises that I’m looking at, they’re some of these national  
champions, but they purposely pick those as- 
AH: Yeah, well it’s part of the grand plan, isn’t it?. 
SK: It’s the grand plan by the government? 
AH: Yes. What China is trying to do is to catch up with the West. It’s trying to catch up  
with the West and having... I can see China, as I say, it’s Chinese capitalism as a strong  
element of economic growth. They want to catch up with the West, they want to get  
back to the situation where they were previously, when they were the centre of the  
economic universe. Now the trick is whether they can do that, and is it possible to do  
that with the government still being a one-party state? Or do you have... you know, is  
capitalism, is it a concoction of capitalism, or is it a Western-type democracy? I would  
argue not, as if you look at Asia, what you’ve got in Asia, there are a lot of examples of  
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countries where the state is viewed differently to in the West, whereas in the West we’re  
very disrespectful towards the state, we don’t like government basically in Anglo-Saxon  
economies. Whereas in China, because they culturally show great respect for their  
leaders. 
SK: So how do you think this cultural aspect influences that then, the Chinese  
culture? 
AH: Well I think we go back to Confucianism. I mean, the state has got... there’s a  
father-figure. And therefore, you have great respect to those above you. You have great  
respect for your leaders. So, I mean, I show a film on Taiwan. I know Taiwan is  
capitalist but it’s still Chinese.   
SK: Oh of course, yes. It’s the Chinese Nationalists who are in control there isn’t  
it? 
AH: Yes. But it’s still... it’s only recently they’ve adopted Western-type democracy. If  
somebody criticised our government I wouldn’t bat an eyelid, I’d probably agree with  
them. Whereas if you criticised the Chinese government they’d see it as an attack on  
China, the father-figure, and it goes back to individualism versus the group, and the  
group is more important in an Asian country because of Confucianism and because of  
their history. 
SK: Well how do you think... I mean, a lot of firms, certainly these state-owned  
enterprises, they listed in Hong Kong, not just only in Shanghai and Shenzhen...  
but do you think foreign listing affects this? I mean, I’ll give you an example there.   
I met a guy that went to Birmingham Business School, he just did a PhD there, and  
he worked at the... I forget what it was called now. Basically, he was in charge of  
the container ports for the city of Shenzhen on the mainland, and he actually lived  
in Hong Kong. But even though China have taken over Hong Kong, he found that  
in Hong Kong he could say what he liked about the regime, but when he went over  
to work... it’s the Yantian Container Ports, I just remembered now... but when he  
actually went across to the mainland to work, he actually commuted there every  
day, he had to watch is Ps and Qs. 
AH: Well, yeah, exactly. But even within Taiwan and Hong Kong, I still think there’s a  
greater respect. 
SK: There’s a greater respect than here in the West? 
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AH: In the West, yes. Because it’s individualism versus the group, and it’s built into  
their culture. They look at their state, they look at their leaders, and it’s different to the  
way we live. You know, we’re very critical of our politicians, we don’t trust them. And  
if basically you don’t trust them, I mean I guess most people think... or a lot of people  
think that politicians are in it for their own gain. Whereas in China, there you’ve got a  
different culture. I think that’s similar to Japan, and I think the fundamental cultural  
background is Confucianism. And it’s reinforced by Marxism... you don’t criticise the  
government.  
SK: So I am going explore Western perceptions I think, here. I mean, some of the  
things I’ve been finding are, certainly in the media... I’m thinking specifically here  
about the investment in Africa, and there’s a lot of complaints about what China  
are doing, certainly in Sudan. My case-study is actually Angola. But a lot of  
Western media, even some Western business people I’ve come across, they’ve said,  
“Oh China is going in and they’re investing without any conditions attached.” If a  
Western firm goes in, there always has to be some conditions attached about  
governance. But China, they see it in a different way, that you shouldn’t interfere  
in another country’s institutions or- 
AH: Yes, because if you interfere in theirs, then that would say the West could be  
critical of the Chinese government. 
SK: So in that case then, the obvious question is do you think that some of these  
Western perceptions about Chinese business, certainly there are a lot of negative  
perceptions, do you think these negative perceptions are fair? 
AH: Well, yes, I would think they are actually. I mean, I think what China’s up to is  
economic nationalism. And, you know, she’s not a resource-rich country so therefore  
she’s competing with the West to make a bad job of Africa- 
SK: That’s certainly what Gbola said and I’ve come across lots of evidence for  
that. 
AH: They can present this image of a different model of capitalism to the West, which  
appears to be very attractive to the Africans in that it’s saying... you know, it’s based on  
economic nationalism, and “If we can catch up with the West, then so can you”.  
However, and I think what the Chinese are after is resources, you know... that’s the  
bottom-line. I think they’re very canny in doing that. 
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SK: I mean, to some extent, because it’s probably something BP can’t offer, I know  
in Angola the Chinese, all three state-owned enterprises are involved in Angola, so  
it’s the perfect country to study, and the Chinese government are actually going in  
as well with complementary investments. They’re promising to give preferential  
debt, or in some cases they’re even wiping out the debt. So do you think that’s all  
part of this national capitalism then in that case, because the government are doing  
this complementary investment? 
AH: Yes. Reinstate their gravitas is what they’re trying to do. 
SK: Yes. And do you think that’s an advantage for the Chinese firms then? 
AH: Of course it is, because it’s an alternative model to a failed Anglo-Saxon model  
which in Africa is seen as imperialism. 
SK: And there’s an important argument I could probably raise there. Chris Alden  
he was at the LSE, I’m not sure whether he still is, but he wrote a book called  
China in Africa, and he wrote that China could be seen as a development partner  
for Africa, or they could actually be seen as neo-colonialists. So which would you  
say? Would you say development partner or neo-colonialist? 
AH: It depends who- 
SK: It depends on who you talk to? 
AH: And which way you look it. It’s certainly no worse than the model that they’ve had  
before. However, if I was African I think I’d be very wary, you know, of Big Brother.  
But what’s the alternative? If it’s a Western... American imperialism, or British  
imperialism or a European one, we haven’t had a good track record in the past. But I  
don’t think the Chinese are doing it in exactly the same way, it’s economic nationalism. 
SK: Of course, yes. Excellent. So you said you’d done varieties of capitalism. One  
thing I’ve read about what’s possibly emerging in China is ‘hybrid capitalism’,  
where you have the state but not interfering, but you’ve got state-led growth, and  
also they are embracing, to a certain extent, foreign business ideas. So you’ve got  
this kind of organisational hybrid. Have you ever- 
AH: Well you have that in Japan as well, in that the Japanese have learnt from the  
Americans. So if you look at things like quality control, which we now think of as very  
Japanese, in fact it was American, and the Japanese learnt that from America, took it  
and developed it, and I guess the Chinese will do the same thing. I would say that the  
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Chinese feeling is that China will do what China wants to do. And what I mean by that  
is that China will develop its own brand of capitalism. It’s the mix of state and market  
with the Chinese. It certainly wants progress, but modernisation does not equate with  
Westernisation. Modernisation means, I guess, a brand of capitalism, but it will be a  
Chinese brand of capitalism and it’ll be closer to, I guess, the Japanese brand. 
SK: Well have you heard the term ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’? 
AH: I think that’s what the Chinese call it, but I would say it’s ‘capitalism with Chinese  
characteristics’. 
SK: ‘Capitalism with Chinese characteristics’, that’s good. 
AH: You know, just like the Japanese developed their own institutions within the firm  
and external to the firm, I guess you might get a model developed in China which is  
similar to that. It won’t be exactly the same, but it would certainly be closer to what I  
would call state-led capitalism. I mean, the Chinese are never going to become like  
American Anglo-Saxon type capitalism. Why? Because of their history and because of  
their culture, and what they’ve got in common with the Japanese is their culture. You  
know, it’s the respect, the group is more important than the individual, and because  
they’re coming from behind. 
SK: Yes, it’s this catch-up? 
AH: Yes, where the argument is that in countries that come from behind, respect has a  
greater role to play, and I guess that is true of China as well. Where China ends up,  
heaven knows. I said to the Chinese students, “Why don’t you come back in a hundred  
years’ time, then I’ll give you the answer.” Because, you know, they don’t- 
SK: Do you they’ll be bigger than the United States then?   
AH: Well they’re definitely going be a bigger economy than the United States.   
Anything the Americans can do, the Chinese can do. And in terms of GDP they will  
overtake America, I guess, in the next forty years,- 
SK: I would say so, yes. 
AH: Where you’ve got the GDP per capita, that’s a different story. Also, whilst  
countries from behind grow faster, the other thing is that as they catch up they slow  
down, and Japan is a good example of that, and I guess that the Chinese... it seems easy  
for them to grow 10% now, but when they become more mature, they reach the  
production possibility curve, and they have to start coming up with new inventions, well  
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then I’m not so sure because that’s when the individual, the entrepreneurial, the flair  
comes into play. 
SK: Well another question this raises is how innovative do you think the Chinese  
are?   
AH: I think they’re very innovative. I mean, innovation is easy. In other words, you take  
the best from the West and you introduce it. But when it comes to the production  
possibility frontier, then what you need is invention and you know, pushing out into  
new areas. How good they’d be at that,- 
SK: You don’t know? 
AH: Well I suspect they won’t be very good, because what’s interesting is, I mean, if  
you think in terms of... again, I make this comparison between Japan and China. Japan’s  
catch-up after the Second World War, it didn’t take long before you had brand leaders  
around: Sony, Honda, whatever, and those became household names. Now, since the  
Chinese economic development since 1979 I can’t think of one Chinese brand. Haier is  
the nearest. 
SK: Lenovo? Didn’t they take over IBM-PC? 
AH: But they’re not world-leaders. Everybody’s heard of Honda, everybody’s heard of  
Nissan and so on, but it’s very difficult to think of Chinese brand-leaders. And why is  
that? Well I would argue that the model is still too state-orientated. The state’s heavy  
hand is on there. So, yes, it’ll be interesting to see whether they do catch up, and I’m not  
convinced at the moment. I think they’ll certainly catch up in terms of terms of GDP,  
but in terms of GDP per capita, I think that it is estimated that the Chinese haven’t  
grown. If they fail to grow at something like 6% then they’re gonna have social arrest.   
Right?  Because you need over 6% to mop up all of the pool of labour coming from  
your state sector, so also their economy is overheating and they’ve got asset bubbles  
developing at the moment in housing. And you’ve got a certain situation where they’re  
building houses and- 
SK: And nobody’s actually living in them? 
AH: And nobody’s actually living in them because they’re seeing them as a capital asset  
which you can make capital gains on, you know, you’ve gotta keep it in mint condition.   
Well that’s absurd. And the other problem is at the moment the Chinese are suffering  
from inflation, and that’s because of their low exchange rate. So it’s not all easy. 
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SK: I know you don’t know too much about corporate governance but, in your  
opinion, would you say that the... well, I’m thinking of the national champions  
here... do you think that these firms are well governed by... I’m thinking here are  
they comparable to international standards? You know, the large national  
champions, some would say. 
AH: Well I think that goes back on what I’ve just said, in that they hadn’t developed  
international and national champions to the extent that the Japanese did. I mean, what  
you’ve got in Japan, putting it crudely, after the Second World War, was an  
oligopolistic structure. They competed internally but they tried to develop national  
champions which would have a large market share of world trade. And, as I said, the  
Japanese, they did develop household names across the world. I can’t think of any  
Chinese firms that have done that. And that’s their weakness. That’s not a new idea.  
Whatever happened to Britain? He wrote that book, didn’t he?  He’s written another  
book on the Chinese economy, and basically he’s saying that China hasn’t turned out  
any national champions. 
SK: Really? 
AH: Really. 
SK: So why would he say that? 
AH: Well because they haven’t. I go back to what I’ve said. Can you name any world- 
famous Chinese companies? 
SK: Yeah, because I’m thinking here... I mean, the idea of the National Champion  
was- 
AH: They went at that as an objective, but they haven’t achieved it. Thirty years on  
from the Second World War we all knew of Nissan, we all knew of Honda, we could  
list a whole host of Japanese companies. 
SK: Even South Korean firms? 
AH: And South Korea. Exactly. But you can’t do that with the Chinese. Why is that?   
And if that’s the case, then you could argue that they haven’t achieved what they tried  
to do. I mean, the nearest you come to it... as I say, the only one I can name is Haier,  
and Haier makes cheap goods. You go up to Curry’s and you look at the cheapest  
goods, and it’s Haier or you’ve got the other Turkish one, Beko, which most people  
who’ve got any money wouldn’t touch with a barge-pole. So if that’s the height of their  
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success... it may well change in the future, but I haven’t seen it yet. 
SK: I think I’ll go back. Can you tell me a bit more about how the planned  
economy has demised then in China? What can you tell me about that? 
AH: Well the planned economy failed in China, just as it failed in the USSR as well. 
The Chinese did lots of things under Mao which... Mao might have been a good leader 
from a principle point of view, in that he... well he liked his China and he threw out the  
foreigners so that has to be good, in the sense that China became independent and  
became Chinese.  But he certainly wasn’t very good in terms of economics. And then he  
tried to catch up with the West and the way he did it, it didn’t work, and the cultural  
revolution was a disaster. So what has been introduced since 1979... oh what was his  
name? 
SK: Oh God.  I think I know who you mean though, so don’t worry. 
AH: I mean, he said- 
SK: I can always check on it. 
AH: Yes. I mean, it’s much more pragmatic than- 
SK: Ah, was it Deng Xiaoping? 
AH: Deng Xiaoping, yes. You know, it was his famous quote ‘it doesn’t matter what  
colour the cat is, so long as it catches mice’, and basically what he was saying was  
whatever economic system is best for China we will adopt that. Certainly he was much  
more pragmatic and, as a result, there’s been an opening-up of China and they’ve  
allowed foreign investment in, they’ve allowed privatisation and so on. And as a result  
the economy has started to flourish. But how far that will go is debatable, we don’t  
know. Nobody knows. 
SK: What do you... I mean, the cultural revolution failed, but didn’t they have the  
Great Leap Forward?  
AH: The Great Leap Forward was a disaster. 
SK: So do you think adopting this... well, this socialism with Chinese  
characteristics or, as you called it, capitalism with Chinese characteristics, do you  
think that was to recover from those disasters? But do you think also it was a way  
that the Communist Party could actually remain in power in the end? I’m thinking  
perhaps of Tiananmen Square here. Did they feel that they’ve got to get it right  
economically in order to stay in power? 
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AH: Well I think it’s... the other quote that he’s famous for was how to cross a river.   
“One might as well cross the river feeling one’s way with one’s feet.” In other words,  
you do it gradually and you do it very clinically, and that’s what’s happened since 1979.   
Whereas you had a shock therapy approach in Europe when the Communist Parties  
went, what you have in China is a gradualism, and it’s worked in the sense that it’s  
opened up the economy, it’s allowed market forces in, but it’s all under the control of  
the government. Now, how long the government can retain that, then that’s the question,  
because we have the de-centralisation. Also, you’ve got an unbalanced economy, in the  
sense economic development has been in the East, whereas in the West it’s very  
different. And there’s tensions there and also those tensions are [unclear speech] and  
tensions around the idea of whether if you introduce... inject capitalism, as they have,  
then does that mean that in the future they’ll have to go for political reform as well, in  
the sense that they have to move away from the one-party state? 
SK: Whether that’s going to happen or not is too clear is it? 
AH: Well, yeah, they talk about political reform, but- 
SK: Well some people have actually said that the next stage of development is that  
have got to move away from a one-party state. Whether that’s- 
AH: Well if you look at the counter argument around this, you know, if you look at  
Taiwan. Taiwan developed economically and they’re a dictatorship so is there a need  
for Western-type democracy. As I say, I’d like to come back in a hundred years’ time  
and see what happens. 
SK: And see what happens, yes, absolutely. That’s very good. One of the things  
I’ve looked at is this thing about hybrid capitalism and also I gave you this  
example about China embracing foreign ideas and actually adapting them to their  
own purposes. So how far would you say that China is actually... this is just for  
clarification really, how far would you say China is actually involved in developing  
her own business model as compared to actually wholeheartedly going to an  
Anglo-Saxon model? 
AH: Well they’re not actually... they’ve got no intention of going to an Anglo-Saxon  
model. 
SK: Or even a German-Japanese one?    
AH: Well they see their own brands. 
366 
 
SK: It will be their own model too? 
AH: Well, just like the Japanese. This is the point that I’m making. If you compare  
British capitalism to French capitalism or Dutch capitalism, there’ll be big differences.  
And even if you compare two in the Anglo-Saxon model, like Britain and America,  
there are big, big differences. And, likewise, I think within state-led capitalism, China  
is... rather than calling it a socialist market economy, I would say it’s state-led. And I  
can’t see the difference between state-led capitalism and socialist market economies.  
But, even within that niche of state-led capitalism, it ain’t gonna be the same as the  
Japanese, it ain’t gonna be the same as the Koreans. It’ll be in that area. I can see tribal- 
like conglomerates about in China, but there would be subtle differences because they  
are Chinese, they would develop their own brand of capitalism. And if you want it to be  
the same, it certainly won’t be anywhere near on the spectrum of Anglo-Saxon. As I  
said, modernisation is not synonymous with Westernisation, in the sense if you think of  
the USA as being Western. And then I think it would be more like the Japanese, more  
like the South Korean, but where exactly it will be, I don’t know.  There are gonna be  
subtle differences. The Chinese will do what they want to do. 
SK: Yes, because I think... because I can come back here. I think it was Jian Chen  
who said that, certainly in corporate governance, the Chinese, they’ve actually  
embraced Anglo-Saxon models, but only in principle. In reality it’s more like the  
German-Japanese model. But of course these are generalising models anyway. 
AH: Yeah, in the German model... I mean, there are big differences, and the German  
was based on industrial banking, as a result of taking a long-term perspective, and the  
Chinese might move... they’ll move to a sort of an indicative plan, where the plan will  
be more a relationship between private enterprise and the government. But who knows?   
It depends what happens. 
SK: That’s pretty much what they’re doing for me, because I looked at the earlier  
adoption of the corporate form and it’s pretty much... they’ve carried on where  
they left off from there. It almost seemed like the period the People’s Republic...  
well when it was certainly a planned economy, like that was a break in adopting  
the corporate form, I’m of course talking here about the period between 1949 to  
1979, that was just a blip, and that what they’re doing for me pretty much is:  
China is just carrying on with reforms that they were introducing in this earlier  
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period.. 
AH: But they’re still calling it socialism. 
SK: They’re still calling it socialism now though, yes. But of course a big problem  
with the early adoption of the corporate form is that of course it’s very similar, at  
least, to what they did in Japan where of course it was very successful in Japan but  
it wasn’t in China. You did say earlier that it was a failure in China, the early  
adoption, and one of the reasons was state interference. You said that- 
AH: Well not only that, but that the West had carved up China. 
SK: Indeed. Well, the one thing I heard is that during that period China was very,  
very corrupt. 
AH: Yes. 
SK: So you agree with that? 
AH: Yes, but also, you know, Japan was lucky in the sense that she was able... she had  
been kept in isolation for two hundred years, and that was- 
SK: That was the Tokugawa dynasty? 
AH: Tokugawa period. And then when the Meiji came in, firstly they wanted to expel  
the barbarian, you know, but later on it became less copied, or less learnt. And I’m sure  
the Chinese are doing exactly the same. You know, it’s interesting, I face in the next  
semester fifty Chinese in my class. 
SK: Out of a class of how many? 
AH: Out of a class of seventy. Talk about taking coals to Newcastle. You know, I never  
thought I’d end up teaching the Chinese about the Chinese economy. 
SK: Well, unbelievably, I’ve even done that when I lectured Howard’s MSc  
students. A lot of them were Chinese. And I was teaching them about Chinese  
corporate governance.   
AH: Well, yes, who would have thought that would have ever happened. But it’s  
happened. But then if you look back at Japan, this is what happened after the Meiji  
Restoration. They sent people abroad to learn from the West. But that doesn’t mean  
they copy the West, because they don’t. They embrace things from different places and  
then they synthesise them and then they add their own little ways, just as, as I say, in  
Japan. The Japanese took quality control from the Americans, but then they made it into  
something even more, and they exported it back to America. And I’m sure that will  
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happen with the Chinese. You know. And then, I’m guessing perhaps in fifty years or  
so, we’ll be driving our new Chinese cars, but not yet. Because, as I say, there is this  
question-mark over they haven’t turned out any brand world-leaders, whereas the  
Japanese and the Koreans have. You know, Daewoo, Hyundai, all these Asian  
companies are international champions. And where’s the Chinese international  
champions? 
SK: The so-called Chinese national champions, well there’s Petro-China, there’s  
CNOOC and Sinopec, but they are not exactly well-known, are they? 
AH: No. They’re not in the West, are they? 
SK: No. 
AH: They’re not competing with BP and- 
SK: Well they are competing for exploration and drilling rights, aren’t they? 
AH: Oh yeah, I’m sure they are... in the primary goods market. You know, if you go to  
Canada and you see BP or, you know, wherever you go in the world- 
SK: You see them in the Gulf of Mexico as well. 
AH: Yes. That’s the point, isn’t it? They are an international company. I can’t think of  
any international Chinese companies, so does that constitute a failure? 
SK: Exactly, yes. Well one thing... I don’t know if you would know, and we’ll just  
finish off on this. I’ll give you an example actually. You say you didn’t know, going  
back, about China being viewed as like a development partner for Africa, or like a  
re-coloniser. One of the things I’ve pretty much been gathering is, the Chinese  
investment in Africa will be very handy for the African elites because, like I say,  
the Chinese are going in with no conditions attached, and they’ve said, “oh yes, we  
don’t have to bother with the West, that’s fine.” But there’s some stories emerging  
concerning the actual people of Africa. I mean, the Chinese are coming in, and  
Africans are benefitting from the schools and the roads that they’re building. But  
what real benefit are the African people seeing? One of the things I’ve heard is  
perhaps the honeymoon period for Chinese investment is over, because they’ve  
only recently gone into it, and everybody thought, “oh great, this is a new model, a  
new kid-on-the-block coming in,” but... and everybody thought it would be great at  
first. But the actual people of Africa are now thinking, “well hang on, we’re not  
actually getting any real benefit from this at all.” I am going to use the example of  
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Zambia here. There was somebody who ran for the presidential race in Zambia,  
and he campaigned on an anti-Chinese sentiment, saying “Zambia is becoming  
another province of China, they’re coming here and they’re taking over.” And, as  
it worked out, he didn’t actually get the presidency, but on this anti-Chinese  
sentiment he established himself as a major political force, certainly in the mining  
areas where China were investing.   
AH: What did Gbola have to say about this? Because he would know all about Africa. 
SK: Well, yes, he said pretty much that I’m probably writing at the right time, we  
are arguably seeing the end of the honeymoon period for Chinese investment. 
AH: Yes. I mean, what they’ve got going for them is they can cast themselves as a  
developing nation. 
SK: It’s this south-south partnership, yes? 
AH: Yes, so, “like you, we’re a developing nation,” you know, “we’re trying to catch  
up with the West.” I mean, that’s what they’ve got going for them. And also the other  
thing, I guess, they’ve got going for them is this idea, as you suggest, is “well, you  
know, we’re not insisting upon Western-type democracy. Quite the opposite, we’re  
quite happy for you to have a totalitarian regime, we’re not gonna interfere with that.”    
Well they can’t, can they, because they too have a totalitarian regime. So, you know,  
that would be appealing, I think, to a lot of African leaders as a model against the  
imperialist West. But, as I say, whether this- 
SK: But would this be appealing to the people though? 
AH: Well I don’t know. Well it’s only appealing to the people if it gives economic  
development. No, I don’t know enough about that. But if the investment involves  
building hospitals and education,- 
SK: And in all fairness, BP is doing it as well. 
AH: - then that would seem to me to be a step in the right direction. But, against that, as  
you said, if people see themselves as being exploited and losing their sovereignty, to  
becoming a suburb of Beijing, well no, they’re not,- 
SK: They are not going to like it, are they? 
AH: - they’re gonna defend it. Because I would argue, just as China wants to develop its  
own brand of capitalism, well clearly so does Africa. Because they don’t have to follow  
a Chinese model. It should develop its own brand of capitalism, state-led capitalism or  
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whatever you wanna call it. 
SK: So whether it works in Angola or not, I’ll have to see. Well I’m finished, so I’ll  
tell you one quick story. I’ve got an informant that we have decided to use in an  
advisory role. He used to work for Sonangol. He says that if Chinese firms are  
going in, and not everybody’s happy about it, you can say the same about Western  
firms. Angola had the long civil war, and a BP official told my informant that, just  
to explain firstly... most of the oil exploration and drilling is off-shore in Angola,  
around Cabinda which is on the north coast. There is a big problem because it’s a  
fishing area, but that is another issue. But BP was still investing during the civil  
war and a BP official told him that when he is asked, “what are you doing? We’ve  
got a civil war here, why are you investing? You’re not doing anything,” the  
official answers, “Well we’re drilling off-shore, we don’t care about what goes on  
on land.” Charming. And that’s a Western firm, BP. 
AH: Oh yeah, yeah. I mean, Africa’s a lost opportunity. Unfortunately we’ve just gone  
in there in the past with imperialism and colonies. 
SK: Of course Angola was a Portuguese colony. 
AH: Exactly. But then all the West have treated them as colonies, so we carved it up in  
the nineteenth century. But whether the Chinese going into Africa now is going to  
present anything different- 
SK: Remains to be seen? 
AH: Remains to be seen. Because, as I said, the Chinese, they’re in it for their own  
benefit, and that is to get resources for their resource pool. Well the danger is they go to  
Africa and, as we suggested, it becomes just a suburb of Beijing. 
SK: Or Shanghai maybe. 
AH: Yes. 
SK: They have got some oil reserves in the South China Sea, I think, but I think  
the major reserves on land is just the Tamarin Basin, which is way out in the sticks  
of China. 
AH: Yes. 
SK: Okay, well thank you very much. 
AH: Does that help? 
SK: Oh I think that’ll help very much.  
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Appendix 15. 
Email Interview with Jonathan Samuel, the Social and Community  
Development Manager at Anglo American, 10
th
 December, 2010. 
Key: 
SK: Steven Kort (interviewer) 
JS: Jonathan Samuel (interviewee) 
SK: Can you outline the most important drivers of Anglo American’s corporate               
responsibility principles?  
JS: Firstly, the values of the company come largely from its employees. These values  
include: an absolute focus on keeping our employees safe at all times; developing local  
communities; environmental responsibility; treating employees and stakeholders with  
care and respect; respect for human rights and so on. We need to win the permission of  
both host governments and communities if we are to be able to develop new mining  
operations. Behaving in a responsible manner is critical to securing that formal and  
social licence to operate. We believe that responsible business can also be more  
profitable. For example, our free HIV/AIDS treatment programmes for employees are  
the largest in the world (and were a world first). However, in addition to the  
humanitarian and health benefits, the programmes keep our employees healthy and  
productive, and so save the company money in the medium term.   
SK: Anglo American still refers to their corporate citizenship as CSI. Why is this  
the case?  
JS: CSI refers to corporate social investment. We regard this as only a small part of our  
overall approach to corporate responsibility. Please see attached PowerPoint which  
explains our approach to social performance in more detail. Other aspects of CSR at  
Anglo American relate to environmental management, employee health and safety,  
responsible procurement, a zero tolerance of corruption, how we recruit and develop our  
employees etc. Please see our annual Report to Society for more details on what falls  
within our definition of responsible business.   
SK: CSI is a term that is widely used by firms based in South Africa to describe  
their corporate citizenship and CSR. Therefore, to how much extent does Anglo  
American regard CSI as applicable to the African setting? 
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JS: As noted above, CSI only relates to our social investment programmes. We view  
CSR and CSI as both being very relevant to the African context, and indeed to  
everywhere else we operate. Or, to put it another way, we do not think it would be in  
our interests to be “irresponsible” anywhere.   
SK: How does CSI differ from the CSR that other firms in the UK have? 
JS: Refer you to previous answers on CSI. For Anglo American’s CSR programmes  
more generally, our large footprint in emerging markets probably means that we have a  
great focus on community development, basic service provision (e.g. health) and human  
rights than businesses only operating in, for example, European or North American  
markets.   
SK: In the book by Jones, I.W., Pollitt, M.G. and Bek, D. (2007) Multinationals in  
their Communities: A Social Capital Approach to Corporate Citizenship Projects, it is  
reported that Anglo American treats corporate citizenship as a key component of  
sustainable development. However, this corporate citizenship is not delivered by a  
dedicated CSR department. Why is this the case? 
JS: We believe that responsible business relates to all aspects of our company’s business  
– procurement, hiring, environmental management, employee safety etc. We therefore  
ensure that policies are set at corporate level and all corporate functions and business  
units must respect those. For example, our Supply Chain team has dedicated specialists  
who ensure that we procure from responsible suppliers and develop local supply chains  
to ensure that local communities benefit. We believe it is much better for Supply Chain  
to manage this itself as it understands its process and is accountable for its  
performance.   
SK: Anglo American measures its ‘good citizenship’ business principles to assist its  
attempts to meet those principles by SEAT, a worthwhile attempt to understand  
the impacts of its operations on local communities. It does not appear however, to  
attach a monetary valuation to impacts. Why doesn’t SEAT attach a monetary  
valuation to impacts?    
JS: Firstly, we measure and report on our good citizenship principles using a wide range  
of metrics, not just SEAT. Secondly, as noted above, the motivations for responsible  
business are not primarily monetary. Finally, we do value aspects of our CSR /SD  
performance in financial terms when it makes sense, but many things cannot be reliably  
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valued. For example, what is the value of increasing community trust? We don’t believe  
this can be calculated in a financial sense, although we certainly believe it is valuable.   
SK: As long ago as 1954, Anglo American’s founder, Sir Ernest Oppenheimer,  
stated that the aim of Anglo American was ‘to make profits, but profits in such a  
way as to benefit the people and communities in which we operate’, suggesting a  
long history of corporate responsibility. Nevertheless, how does the way Anglo  
American perceives and implements its corporate responsibility today differ from  
how it may have been perceived and implemented in the past?  
JS: The key difference is that in recent years we have professionalised and systematised  
our approach. For example, we have:  
i. introduced clear policies and non-negotiable standards; 
ii. developed key performance indicators for a range of CSR-related issues; 
iii. instituted professional training programmes with leading universities; 
iv. and we are defining core competencies for roles within our organisation. 
We have also adjusted our response as we have learned more about the topic and how to  
operationalise it in our business, and as the external environment has changed (for  
example, we are placing a greater emphasis on human rights and on climate change than  
we were five years ago to reflect international issues in this sector).  
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Appendix 16. 
Follow-up Email Questioning with Jonathan Samuel, the Social and  
Community Development Manager at Anglo American 26
th
 February,  
2011. 
Key: 
SK: Steven Kort (interviewer) 
JS: Jonathan Samuel (interviewee) 
SK: Firstly, one of the aspects of CSR at Anglo American relates to "a zero  
tolerance of corruption", quite rightly, as indeed as you state in our email  
interview. The Chinese are now 'on the scene', if you like, and are now engaging in  
outward FDI in competition with Western firms such as Anglo American. There is  
one major feature of Chinese investment, and that is they invest with 'no  
conditions attached' concerning governance. Therefore, how does Anglo American  
react to such competition from Chinese firms who invest with 'no conditions  
attached'? Secondly, wherever Chinese firms invest globally, the host country  
often benefits from complimentary investment from the Chinese state. For  
example, to receive licences to operate in the oil sector in Angola, the Chinese are  
helping to rebuild transportation infrastructure that was destroyed in the civil  
war, and they have given preferential loans to the Angolan government. This may  
promote a perception of China being viewed as a 'development partner' for  
developing countries. Therefore, does Anglo American feel that they have to be  
more proactive as a developmental agent in order to receive licenses to operate in  
countries where the Chinese are also investing, or does Anglo American feel that  
their extensive experience of engaging in corporate responsibility in developing  
countries is already sufficient? 
JS: I'll take your questions one-by-one. In response to the conditionality question, firstly  
I think it is important to remember that the conditionality you refer to is typically related  
to Western aid donors, not private sector investors. We require minimum standards of  
governance before we will invest somewhere (rule of law, respect for human rights etc),  
but we don’t really have the mandate, power or legitimacy to expect sovereign  
governments to respond to a broad governance agenda that we might favour. Or, to put  
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it another way, on the whole we have to take it or leave it. If a country doesn't meet our  
basic requirements we won't invest (what happens once we are in a country and the  
situation deteriorates is another, more complex matter). 
I think your question is also asking how we can compete if Chinese companies  
don't adhere to ethical standards. In that regard I think it is important to note that some  
Chinese firms do have high standards, and that many Western listed/based ones don't.   
Indeed, I could name highly corrupt UK-based mining and metals companies, and we  
have faced competition from corrupt businesses from well before China started to  
venture into the outside world. It is also true that most of the good places to do business  
frown on corruption, even if there are corrupt individuals everywhere, so suggesting  
that it is a universal competitive advantage is incorrect. 
On the second question, it is certainly true that we are trying to be a more  
proactive development partner for host communities, although generally via "softer"  
measures such as education, enterprise development and community-based projects  
rather than large-scale infrastructure. However, this isn't in response to Chinese  
competition. Rather, it is in response to a greater desire for these things from our host  
governments and communities.  
It is worth noting that while Chinese companies have become competitors for  
mining assets they are only some of many. If you look at recent deals in our sector the  
best deals and new projects still tend to be done by Western companies. And China is,  
of course, a major driver of demand and profits for the mining sector, so if we have lost  
out on any projects to Chinese competition (and I'm not sure we have) it is more than  
compensated for by Chinese custom. 
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